Battle Flow

[quincannon]

I am not aware either and that is my memory as well

[Beth]

Oct 22, 2017 19:30:51 GMT quincannon said:

That's not the point. The point is that you thinking that is a reasonable course of action does not mean that Custer meant only for ammunition to come forward when he sent that note. If you insist on maintaining that the note was a call for ammunition alone you are presenting as fact something that is not and never was in evidence. The evidence says packs.

Now oddly enough there had been a solution to the tactical problem that has existed since the dawn of the age of firearms if not before. The solution is to divide your trains into two parts, the combat trains which are kept close by at company or battalion level which contain those supplies that need to be readily accessible like ammo and medical supplies, and in the later day fuel, and a field trains which contain the supplies for long term sustenance. No provision was made for this two tier approach, at LBH, and as I said above there may have been a hidden from us SOP that says - When I say packs, I mean ammo - but we do not know of any such SOP so ruminating on something we do not know is deceptive to those who read us and largely as waste of time.

If I am understanding correctly about the possibility of there having been a hidden SOP at LBH wouldn't we have seen it in Benteen's actions?  He did not divide out the ammo from the general packs until Reno Hill as I recall.

We have to look at the words in the message and Benteen's reaction to the message to the message.  Benteen expressed concerns about the message but to what part? ammo vrs pack, speed? 

When did he separate the ammo from the regular packs?

Did he attempt to bring the packs?

Did he attempt to increase the speed?

Did he do nothing?

I know that the question about where Benteen was to go after the note was delivered has also been discussed as hindsight but at the time Benteen first saw the note would he have known that Custer and Reno were widely separated on the battlefield? 

[quincannon]

There was no hidden SOP. It is fiction. It is the contrivance of people like Keogh.

Ian thought it was the proper thing to do, and it is almost.

The proper course of action, the way of doctrine would be to divide the trains as I described above combat for immediate need items, and field, for those items of long term sustainment. The combat trains, a much smaller and more manageable body you keep closed up. The field trains should be stashed outside the battle space. The combination of these two procedures would allow you to reinforce each of those under-strength companies, require a minimal guard for both sets of trains, and give you an additional maneuver company added to your combat echelon.

Benteen read a note that said packs. He gave him packs. To do otherwise would require nearly the insights into Custer that are on the order of revealing the Third Secret of Fatima.

Benteen did just what he was told to do, and did it in as timely a fashion as possible, and the rest of what you hear is shit for the Shinola can, especially that coming from Queens.

[Beth]

I assumed the SOP comment was a nudge nudge wink wink. However there are people beyond this group who believe it as fact. The best way to counter that is to view things objectively.

[quincannon]

It was a nudge, nudge, wink, wink, as far as I am concerned, and you are correct there are people who believe it is fact.

That said, such a procedure was known at the time and long before. If you recall Waterloo in the Sharpe's series, he has Wellington's combat trains immediately behind the ridge which is exactly where they were historically.

But to believe "packs" was some hidden code for "ammo" regardless of how proper the concept of bringing ammo up just behind your combat echelon is, and that there was some sort of understood meaning or SOP contained in the piece of rubbish that Cooke wrote is just plain pigeon poop. Something I would expect from conspiracy theorist and Three Card Monte dealers.

[deadwoodgultch]

The very simple answer is, Reno's men needed ammo. Who was sent to hurry them up after Benteen arrived on Reno hill.

[yanmacca]

The only reference I can find to ammo mules was in the RCOI and testimony given by Lt. Hare;

[quincannon]

An interesting (at least to me) WHIFF.

Had the procedure I outlined above regarding splitting the trains into combat and field, thereby enabling the reinforcement of all the line companies and the releasing of Company B to join the combat echelon were to be done. would it, or could it have changed outcomes.? Most likely Company B would have gone to the Custer battalion and the five companies would have each received a plus up of about about an average of four, AND each battalion would have had immediately available, extra ammunition and medical supplies (soldiers fight harder when they know someone has the ability to take care of them if injured or wounded - Meds are important too).

So would or could it have changed outcomes, and would or could it have changed the apparent decisions made?

[yanmacca]

As we have seen with the various clashes that day, the soldiers came off second best. From Reno to Custer and the hurried withdrawal off Weir, the Indians were just to powerful.
The only place they held on to was Reno hill and that was down to having 360 degree line with ample ammo and about 400 men, plus I don't think the Indians were that fussed over knocking them off.

So it would have changed the out come? I don't think so because they would have been under pressure from numerous directions and if they stood their ground, they would have been lucky if they managed to withdraw in good order.

Change the decisions? hmmm.........I don't know, but one thing I do know, is the pack train was used by Reno and Benteen to explain their motives after the valley attack.
Benteen said he was to bring the train forward and Reno wouldn't move until it reached his hill.

[quincannon]

I digress a bit here before responding directly Ian.

I have often said on this board, and others, that contrary to what some have said when cavalry dismounts it DOES NOT become Infantry. When cavalry dismounts there is a doctrinal reduction in combat power up to 25 percent, with a figure somewhat (but not much) less than that in dire circumstance.

The premise then is not much different then that of an armored personnel carrier mounted Infantry platoon which has about a fifteen percent reduction in maneuver oriented fire power when it dismounts from their carriers. In theory the men remaining in the carriers make up for their absence among the dismounts, by providing mounted fire support for those dismounted, but not always, because dismounts can and do go where carriers can neither support or follow.

Both then, when the dismount leave the mount, have an inbred liability, the horse for the cavalry and the carriers for the Infantry. That is a constant in both type forces operation when they dismount for further operations. It is in fact a ball and chain from which they cannot escape.

The smaller the force then, the attendant ball and chain becomes exponentially a larger burden.

??

With the above in mind then having an additional company, plus the sustenance of the ammunition, would place a smaller burden on a six company Custer force, and it may have prevented the dispersal of the Company E horses, and provided just enough fire power to keep the Indians at bay for a longer period of time. That of course would be contingent on the proper disposition of those six companies, but I do not think that outside the scope of the possible

We also do not know why Custer chose to start a withdrawal. Could it have been he was aware of the finite supply of ammunition on hand, and like Reno in the valley decided that when it got to about the fifty percent level it would be time to exit, rather than let it drift downward toward bingo. We can't know that, but that is got to have been one of the deciding factors, which would not be nearly as much of a critical point were his combat trains present.

We also do not know what would have happened it terms of units becoming separated had there been another company. Cavalry operated on a one and one makes two (the tactical whole) basis, and absent that sixth company may have just been the deciding factor as to how at least one (Company E) got separated from the pack.

Then there is stay or go. Granted CR, BRE, LSH are piss poor positions to defend, does not mean they cannot be defended, and there could have been a heavy price to pay in taking them. Indians are casualty adverse. They cannot make up their losses at a recruiting station, They must do it the old fashion way by first carnal knowledge, followed by gestation, and fifteen to eighteen years of growth and training. So the concentration of a greater degree of firepower, even coming from a poor defensive position, may have discouraged them enough to provide an opportunity to have a different outcome.

??

In case anyone is wondering, I do not think it would have made much if any difference, but I think the topic worth some thought and conversation.

[mac]

I doubt that they would have made a difference and am interested to learn from the above. Another factor perhaps is the "spread" that will be required at Ford D to accomplish a river crossing. A small number of extra men will be lost in the space. They may of course be useful in the more confined space of a defense
Let me consider in this context why Custer never attempted to cross the river.
When he arrived, as shown earlier, he was expected, and although there were initially small numbers of warriors they were on Custer's side of the river and well concealed. They were also being quickly reinforced. I imagine too that some warriors were starting to move along the west bank of the river to the north and thus behind Custer in the valley. The sweep north that has been long noted and sometimes attributed to Crazy Horse.
Secondly there was no easy target of people fleeing the village.
Adding these two things Custer would well decide to withdraw and try to move quickly back to the south to consolidate with Reno and Benteen.
Cheers

[quincannon]

Lost in space, but perhaps lost in time as well.

Were I doing that crossing with six instead of five I would divide into three, each of two, which would give me more combat power at what would then be three points of contact. The alternative with five would be five each with less combat power than any of the three, or two twos and a singleton. Had the singleton been repulsed because of too little combat power at the point of contact, or any of the five operating independently been repulsed for the same reason, it very well could have caused a splitting of forces in time and space to the extent that the valley, not the ridge line would be the point of dissolution and dismemberment.

It just might be that those small forces present on the east/north bank would be enough to disrupt one of the single company elements, but most likely not enough to take on any of the stronger two by three elements.

The only thing we know for sure is that at some point, be it valley or ridge line the force was dismembered.

Absolutely correct about the target presented. It would have been akin to herding cats uphill. I don't put much stock in the idea of the objective being the women folk and kiddies, but if it was then somebody was putting some funny stuff in their pipe and smoking it.

Deciding on moving back south to consolidate, is not only a mental process, but also physical, and if the physical is rendered impossible by the flow, your mental is flushed.

[mac]

The archaeology and other evidence tell us that Custer was in the valley. The accounts suggest that he left the valley rather than that he was pushed out, although this is perhaps that he saw he needed to move before he was pushed.
So the flow here is into the valley and a rebound if you will, back to the ridges.
Cheers

[yanmacca]

Chuck, I think I was reading a different scenario, the one I was thinking of was the notion of the pack being a burden on Reno and Benteen, because they have both used it in their defense, but I can see now that the focus was on the regiment having B Company in the Custer battalion, giving him six instead of five companies, in that correct?

The theory concerning the civilians, was probably due to the idea that he found ford B empty and he saw from the high ground, the civilians moving north, I guess that this is what convinced authors, historians and battle students, that this is what made him leave ford B and move north himself.

Mac; when you mention the valley, are you talking about the area around ford D?

If so then consider his options, south across the river was too dangerous, and to carryon west would also force him to cross the same river. North would take him out of the battle altogether, so back east was his only option. This direction also could have allowed him to regroup on high ground plus we don’t know if some elements of his battalion where waiting in readiness, so being pressurised or not, it still looked like turning back east was his best option.

[yanmacca]

Chuck, your well written piece on armoured infantry was correct, but why didn’t they follow the German option, now in a panzer grenadier company, we have a single armoured half-track [Sd.Kfz. 251], which could carry a full section of ten men, the vehicle itself had a crew of two and these include, driver, co-driver [who fired the MG42 to give support]. These men were not part of the section and were just responsible for the vehicle and to provide covering fire, that way the section, when dismounted, is at full strength.

The same principle was used in the armoured recce companies, but this time the squad was reduced to eight. The squad was carried in two half-tracks [Sd.Kfz. 250s], which was a smaller version of the Sd.Kfz. 251. The squad was divided and carried in these two vehicles. This still allowed for the crew of two to drive the vehicle and provide fire support, which made up for the lack of numbers with a lot of automatic fire, as each half-section of four men had its own LMG and the half-track also carried a MMG, so you had a section of eight men carried in two half-tracks, with four crew and four MG42s.

Which shows that having a crew which is organic to the APC and not a part of the squad, will allow for the squad to remain at full strength.