mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Oct 18, 2017 1:01:16 GMT
Dave Much as I admire Fred's work I do not agree that you can make what you will of the note. As per QC above, packs means packs. Bring more men means just that but Custer did not say it in the note. The only logical and military explanation is that Benteen did exactly what his order said. So the question is why did Custer send that order? Answer is toprotect the on coming packs while he, Custer, attacked the village. Remember here Custer has seen Reno in the valley and must know Reno cannot hold his position and will be forced back towards Ford A. Cheers
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Oct 18, 2017 1:49:55 GMT
Mac I am not wedded to any particular theory so I have no problem going with your thoughts and ideas. I still believe Custer went too far and allowed his command to be divided with fatal results for the 5 companies but that seems to accepted by most. His order was poorly written and still debated 141 years later as to what he wanted so the debate continues if he wanted, packs, ammo, men or whatever.
If Custer saw Reno in the valley and knew he would be pushed back to Ford A why did he not tell Benteen to ignore Reno and come to him? Am I missing the point, if so please don't hesitate to let me know. Regards Dave
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 18, 2017 9:54:07 GMT
Well I have to go with my gut and that is, when Custer saw Indians the game was on, no time for stopping and no time for fussing.
We have to remember who we are dealing with here and if we stick with the idea, that he went straight across deep coulee with all five and carried on north, then surly he would have done this right from Reno creek. Apparently while the battalion was watering their horses, troopers saw a band of fifty Indians on the hills, which was also seen by Kanipe [Kanipe mentioned this to Sgt Bobo, who then reported this to Lt. Harrington, who passed it on to Custer], so after this they certainly hit those bluffs at pace, which is also reported.
I don’t think for one minute that Custer would relax once he saw his enemy or his village, he knew that Reno was receiving his orders, so he went, like the accounts say, towards the large band of Indians on the hills.
Once this advance was initiated, there was no time for piss balling about, he carried on forward with the Crows on one flank, Bouyer and Curly knocking about somewhere and a detail from F Company leading the column and that was it.
I am one for seeing this as an unfolding section of events which would appeal to an impulsive commander like Custer, for one seeing the enemy ahead, two spotting the village, three attack from another direction, all fall into sequence.
We must also remember that Custer didn’t write that note and the choice of Martini was down to who ever picked him as a member of the HQ as a courier in the first place.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 18, 2017 19:25:25 GMT
SEEING THE ENEMY AHEAD - I buy that
SPOTTING THE VILLAGE - I buy that too
ATTACK FROM ANOTHER DIRECTION - I buy that as well for a Trifecta
They do all fall into sequence and no time for dilly dally.
As to your last point - It is obvious Ian that you have never entered Her Majesties service. First Sergeants run companies, and when it comes time to provide a detail to the higher headquarters, they ALWAYS send their brightest and best. Sure they do. It's sort of like a used car salesman telling you that this 1957 Chevy you're looking at was only driven to church on Sunday by a sweet little old lady, has low mileage, and was kept in a garage, and your really getting a cream puff deal.
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 18, 2017 19:45:22 GMT
Three out of four ain't bad Chuck.
So who would pick the orderlies and couriers detailed for work with the HQ? Here are the none HQ staff who where detailed who served in some capacity;
Sgt M Hughes (K Coy) (regimental standard-bearer) Sgt Vickory (F Coy) (regimental standard-bearer) Corporal J Callahan (K Coy) (Orderly to Dr Lord) Trumpeter H Dose (G Coy) (courier) Trumpeter G Martin (H Coy) (courier)
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Post by quincannon on Oct 18, 2017 20:02:28 GMT
I would suspect that Hughes and Vickory were most likely picked by Custer himself. Color guards are usually pet projects of brigade/regiment/battalion commanders. Most likely these two were nearly always away from their company on a detailed to the regimental headquarters status. I picked my color guard from Sergeants in my headquarters battery. That was also the way it was done in every battalion I ever served in. The difference was that we had a headquarters company or battery, and Custer did not, so he had to draw them away from the companies.
Callahan was most likely in a similar status to those above. He may have had some special skills. Don't know, but you do not send Tommy Dipwad on a job like that.
The other two were picked by their first sergeants, and first sergeants are notorious for pawning their dead wood off on a higher headquarters.
I would suspect the first three held the same job for the whole campaign, while the couriers rotated daily.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Oct 18, 2017 21:08:06 GMT
Mac I am not wedded to any particular theory so I have no problem going with your thoughts and ideas. I still believe Custer went too far and allowed his command to be divided with fatal results for the 5 companies but that seems to accepted by most. His order was poorly written and still debated 141 years later as to what he wanted so the debate continues if he wanted, packs, ammo, men or whatever. If Custer saw Reno in the valley and knew he would be pushed back to Ford A why did he not tell Benteen to ignore Reno and come to him? Am I missing the point, if so please don't hesitate to let me know.Regards Dave If Reno was pushed back Dave then the packs were lumbering into the back of Reno and the front of the warriors behind Reno...goodbye packs. Benteen in front of the packs secures the packs and assists Reno to hold at say Ford A. That is the flow I see. Add to this that Custer is then free to attack at Ford D thinking that the warriors are well down the valley engaged with Reno and Benteen. This may be why the withdrawal from Ford D is back to the south towards where Custer expects Reno and Benteen to be consolidated with few warriors between Custer and Reno/Benteen. Custer has warriors attacking him at Ford D and thinks others are down the valley at Ford A so the mid-ground is clear. If you look at the timing, had Reno not tried to hold so long in the valley but moved back towards Ford A then this would be true. Reno held his ground too well. How about that ? Cheers
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Oct 18, 2017 23:38:11 GMT
Good thought Mac. Reno might have held longer than he should have. Maybe he was expected to not go into the timber, but to withdraw back to ford A. That probably would have drawn warriors away from the village and ford D.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Oct 19, 2017 1:14:02 GMT
What? You two believe Reno stayed too long? He should not have held out an additional 30 minutes as speculated by many pseudo analysts? Wow, taking about world changing!
I have finally found others who agree with me that Reno was correct in leaving the timbers when he did if not earlier. I feel a lot smarter today! Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Oct 19, 2017 4:26:02 GMT
OK, let's put this thing in its proper context.
I am under the impression that Benteen thought of his battalion as the advance guard for a regiment, and at the very least a regiment (-). He went forward at the appropriate distance to draw warriors out and develop the situation.
He stayed on that skirmish line much too long and allowed himself to be flanked on his left (west). He expected Custer to appear and both cover that flank then exploit the situation further. When Custer did not appear, he had no choice but to take refuge in the timber.
Had this been some deliberate attempt to draw out warriors and having done that retrograde to Ford A, he would have done it early, before it was possible to flank him, and made a retrograde by alternating bounds, drawing the warriors after him.
Had Reno known early enough that Custer was not coming, undoubtedly he would have conducted that retrograde, and not gotten his ass stuck in those woods.
So yes Reno stayed too long, but he stayed too long believing that goddamned fool of a commander, not because he was negligent.
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 19, 2017 9:39:46 GMT
Yes Reno was stuck between a rock and a hard place, he was promised support and it didn’t arrive, he was forced to halt due to terrain and an increased enemy build up to his front. One flank was pretty good [timber and river] and he used it as an anchor, the other flank [west] was wide open. Reno’s battalion managed to put between 75-80 men into skirmish positions on the prairie, which is not that many seeing the ground they had to cover.
Things certainly went awry when reports came in of Indians entering the timer and threatening the horses, M company had already detached about a dozen men to clear the timber line and when these reports came in, Reno personally led a detachment of G company men to shore up the timber, which further weakened G company, which was only 37 men strong and that’s including the horse holders.
M company had no chance with only A company for support, and once French saw Moylan’s company A starting to withdraw, he soon mounted up his own men and followed.
So the Indians dictated play from the word go, they forced the soldiers to halt then worked both flanks, with the main emphasis being the western flank. So in a way they rolled the skirmish line up and forced it back in the timber, so Reno didn’t have a say “really” well I suppose he did have the last say when he said mount up and follow me, which reminds me of the phrase said by General Oliver Smith at Chosin, “Retreat hell! We're not retreating, we're just advancing in a different direction”
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 19, 2017 9:56:09 GMT
I know I am taking us off topic, but I have to mention about G Company, when I started researching this unit, I was amazed at the way the officers at the top, virtually sliced and diced this company. I have cut this from my own records and it shows how they diluted McIntosh's company;
Co 1st Lieutenant D. McIntosh KIA 2nd in Co 2nd Lieutenant G. Wallace (Detached to Scout Group) 1st Sergeant E. Botzer KIA Sergeant M. Considine KIA Sergeant O. Northeg Corporal J. Akers Corporal O. Hagemann KIA Corporal J. Hammon Corporal J. Martin KIA Trumpeter H. Dose (Detached as orderly to Custer) KIA Black Smith W. Taylor Farrier B. Wells KIA Saddler C. Selby KIA Trooper J. Boyle WIA Trooper H. Brinkerhoff Trooper E. Dwyer Trooper T. Goldin Trooper T. Graham Trooper E. Grayson Trooper J. Hackett (Detached Orderly to Lt. Wallace) WIA Trooper B. Johnson Trooper J. Lattman Trooper G. Loyd Trooper S. McCormick Trooper J. McDonnell Trooper J. McGinniss KIA Trooper H. McGonigle Trooper J. McVay WIA Trooper A. Moore KIA Trooper J. Morrison WIA Trooper T. O’Neill Trooper H. Petring WIA Trooper J. Rapp (Orderly to McIntosh) KIA Trooper J. Reed Trooper E. Robb Trooper B. Rogers KIA Trooper H. Seafferman KIA Trooper J. Small Trooper E. Stanley KIA Trooper T. Stevenson Trooper J. Wallace Trooper M. Weiss
2 x Officers & 45 x EMs 14 x KIA 6 x WIA 3 x Detached 7 x Detached to Pack Train Field Strength 37 Mounted on Mixed Colours and Sorrels
Pack Train Detachment (Total of 7)
Sergeant A Brown Trooper C Campbell WIA Trooper J McEagan
Men left at Powder River Depot
Corporal M. Crussy Trooper C. Barnett Trooper F. Geist Trooper W. Gray Trooper G. Henderson Trooper J. Katzenmaier Trooper M. Kilfoyle Trooper F. Lauper Trooper E. McKay Trooper J. McKee Trooper R. Rowland Trooper J. Shanahan Trooper G. Stephens Trooper D. Sullivan Trooper J. Tulo Trooper P. Williamson
Men left at Fort Abraham Lincoln
Sergeant F. Lloyd Trooper J. Laden Trooper J. Lawler
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Oct 19, 2017 10:42:37 GMT
It is refreshing to discuss Reno's performance without the obligatory, "He should of stayed 30 more minutes", like anyone today would know what was developing against the man at that time. Armchair strategists who have no discernable skills shrilly pronounce that if only Reno had stayed another half hour, he could have been reinforced by Benteen. His position in the valley was such that he and his command would have been destroyed in they had waited longer.
Those who tend to blame Reno for the defeat of the 7th Cavalry are the ones who cannot accept that the mission changed that day after contact with the hostiles, was not to save Custer but mere survival. GAC sailed off with 5 companies completely separating his battalion from the majority of the regiment, then compounded that mistake by further subdividing his small command. Custer's fault!
I better quit now as this was why I was selected to be declared a nonparticipant on another board and cautioned to be sure I studied before postulating theories. I agree with Mac and Colt, he stayed too long. Regards Dave
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 19, 2017 10:53:45 GMT
Trouble is though Dave, what if he would have pulled his men out earlier and bumped into Custer's battalion coming up the valley, because he didn't know until it was too late, that Custer wasn't turning up. To find out how these things happen, we have to put ourselves in Reno's position and act on what he knew and shortly before he halted his battalion, Cooke had told him "he will be supported by the whole regiment"
I always wonder were these people who say "he should have stayed longer" get their thoughts from, I mean most of Reno's men had gone through their personal carbine ammo and some had already dipped into what they had in their saddles, so how long would it had been before all of Reno's men were down to six shooters only and don't forget they only had 24 rounds per man for these pistols.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Oct 19, 2017 13:46:30 GMT
Reno stayed too long because he believed he was going to be supported by Custer, and his orders were to charge the village. I agree that he stayed on the skirmish line too long and allowed the Indians to flank him on the left. Again, this was probably due to his trying to obey Custer's order and his expectation of Custer coming up behind him to cover the left and develop the situation.
Had he known Custer changed plans and left him dangling, I think he would have pulled off the line much sooner and would have withdrawn back to ford A using a covered withdrawal. He also could have expected Benteen to show up either behind him on the east side of the river, or from up the valley, if he had continued all the way to the LBH as ordered.
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