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Post by quincannon on Aug 8, 2017 13:20:36 GMT
Ian I was referring to poor you after reading Carl's post
I took a look at the site and all I saw was the various insignia, no data.
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 8, 2017 15:23:39 GMT
The data is there, I uploaded it all a while ago; linklinklinklinklinkI don't know how Carl's post effect my data, his is dated 1950 which is too modern for mine, which covers WW2.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 8, 2017 16:02:40 GMT
Carl's post Ian just serves to illustrate how we Americans do not pay all that much attention to what tables or organization have to say.
We do what works for us regardless of those tables. What we do differs from unit to unit even if they are organized under the same tables, which is what I have been trying to tell you for years
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Post by sgttyree on Aug 8, 2017 18:05:42 GMT
One USMC Korea veteran told me the 13 man rifle squad, as laid out in TOE, was always just a starting point during his service and was modified in the field as needed.
Specifically, he mentioned times when the squad was employed with balanced fire teams as designed and times when one team might be heavy with BARs, leaving the other two teams light to clear bunkers, etc.
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 8, 2017 18:36:21 GMT
Chuck I do get the adhoc way that most armies work, but what else can I do, its a no win situation for me as a military enthusiast because I have got to work by the book when doing these organizational tables, I can't make it up and say to site visitors "sorry but this how I thought they would work during that period" I have to do it by the book and if that document written for the army from Washington DC says that a Company is commanded by a Captain and he is armed with a M1 Carbine and .45 M1911 pistol, then that is how it has got to be.
How did you find the site by the way, or can't you open the links?
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Post by sgttyree on Aug 8, 2017 18:38:46 GMT
Here's another example of modifying an organization:
"The three of us, Jake, Joe, and I, became an entity. There were many entities in out close knit organizations. Groups of threes and fours, usually from the same squads or sections, core elements within the families that were the small units, were readily recognized as entities. This sharing evolved never to be relinquished, never to be repeated. Often three such entities would make up a squad, with incredible results in combat. They would literally insist on going hungry for one another, freezing for one another, dying for one another. And the squad would try to protect them or bail them out without the slightest regard to consequences, cussing them all the way for making it necessary. Such a rifle squad, machine gun section, scout-observer section, pathfinder section was a mystical concoction." - The Making of a Paratrooper by Kurt Gabel.
In WWII, the Army rifle squad was not organized into fire teams yet informal fire teams were frequently employed. A squad leader might say, "You, you, and you, bound up to that next hedgerow." Things like that were common. It seems that the fire team is such a natural level of organization that if it is not standardized it will still pop up in action even if it is invented on the fly, so to speak.
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benteen
First Lieutenant
"Once An Eagle
Posts: 406
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Post by benteen on Aug 8, 2017 19:19:36 GMT
Perhaps the reason for the interest in Peleliu is that there is evidence that it may not have been necessary.
I have the book by Col Hoffman, in it he states the following...
Unbeknownst to everyone as they sailed west toward the objective, the division almost received a reprieve. Navy carriers conducting strikes on the Philippines reported surprisingly weak Japanese air and ground defenses. Their commander Admiral William F. "Bull" Halsey, fired off a message on September 13th recommending that MacArthur skip his November 15 invasion of Mindanao and go directly to his eventual objective of Leyte as early as October 15
Nimitz, MacArthur, and the Joint Chiefs all approved in short order. Suddenly, the original rationale for the Palaus operation no longer made much sense, but Nimitz was unwilling to cancel the Peleliu assault just hours before its scheduled execution.
Now, do I say this is proof that the invasion was or wasnt necessary, no. But it does present a pretty good argument that it was not.
Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Aug 8, 2017 21:20:54 GMT
Ian: You have no choice but to put on your site the tables as they were written and developed. As long as you and your readers are aware of the fact that these were often or ignored in the field. You and they should also understand that these modifications, field experimentation, ignoring the rules, were often the birthing of authorized changes based upon usage in the field.
Benteen: The point you bring up is the only really controversial thing about Peleliu. Peleliu was first thought to be necessary to guard the right flank of MacArthur's invasion of the Philippines. That changed. All one can assume is that Nimitz saw the necessity for it. I do not know the rational behind his decision. What I do know is that Nimitz would do back flips to avoid unnecessary casualties. He was a very careful and deliberate man, and invading a well fortified island for no reason, was totally against the man's character.
Rupertus got thrown under the bus by Dave, and I believe it to be completely unfair to attack him, having only one side of the story in hand doing it. Rupertus died less than six months after Peleliu, and never had a chance to tell his side of the story.
So in the end there is no "evidence" that it was unnecessary. The only thing you or anyone can say is that there existed and exists a dispute as to if it was still necessary. That, in the way we do business is the theater commander's call, and Nimitz made the call.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Aug 8, 2017 22:19:57 GMT
I don't believe I threw Rupertus "under the bus" as it was not my research or study that dealt with his refusal to request that Geiger release the 81st Division to join the Marines on Peleliu. Did Rupertus not advise or release the 81st on D Day +1 to attack Angaur?
You have correctly pointed out that I was wrong in stating that Rupertus had control over the 81st but he did refuse them till his 1st Marine Division was battered with nearly 30% losses. And he was the one who thought the whole operation would be over in a couple of days which he stated to the press openly ,which indicates to me he was very confident that his division could handle this operation alone.
Rupertus is as open for discussion as well as possible criticism as is George Custer. I honor both of them for serving their country but I can still study and critique their actions. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Aug 8, 2017 22:53:29 GMT
Look, I am not going to change your mind, so just drop the subject, or I will be forced to regale you with tiny little factors like beach capacities, inter-operability between the Army and Marine Corps, logistical considerations, communications (and I will get to that in a moment), and the fact that you could not tell me how it could have been done better, because you were ignorant (the absence of knowledge) of what Infantry combat is all about.
I do know for a fact that going in that Peleliu was considered BY ALL, as a one division operation.
I know for a fact that during the initial landings the odds were nearly even (unbeknownst to U S intelligence) and fell far short of the three to one minimum that assaulting a fortified position requires.
I know for a fact that the Japanese defenses on Peleliu were the most sophisticated ever encountered, and that was both unexpected and did not reveal itself until day three at the earliest. They were far more sophisticated than those on Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.
I do know for a fact that the 321st Infantry was the first available reinforcement for the 1st MARDIV, and they themselves were engaged in the first days of the battle elsewhere. You seem to think you can dial a division like you dial a prayer. That ain't so.
You hit a low blow to Rupertus by saying in your original post without further explanation, that the division commander remained on shipboard, while by implication his Marines were dying on the island. Where is bloody blue hell do you think a commander should be, in the front yelling Charge like Jubilation T. Cornpone or one of your other southern heroes? WHERE DAVE WHERE. He is supposed to be where he can command, and you command a division through the best communications available to you. The AGC was built for division commanders to exercise command. Their communications and electronics allowed them to coordinate the activities of ground, air, artillery, naval fire support, and all the tools of modern warfare.
Your portrayal of Rupertus is a slap in the face to the United States Marine Corps. It was doubly so because you took the word of "your research" without giving Rupertus the benefit of the doubt.
You took yourself out of the critique business by your own statement, that you did not know how it could have been done better. You cannot critique what you do not know. Doing so is not critique. It is blather.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 8, 2017 22:56:14 GMT
Chuck I do get the adhoc way that most armies work, but what else can I do, its a no win situation for me as a military enthusiast because I have got to work by the book when doing these organizational tables, I can't make it up and say to site visitors "sorry but this how I thought they would work during that period" I have to do it by the book and if that document written for the army from Washington DC says that a Company is commanded by a Captain and he is armed with a M1 Carbine and .45 M1911 pistol, then that is how it has got to be. How did you find the site by the way, or can't you open the links? Ian, on your site I would preface all of the manuals and such by saying that the book numbers were a starting point, fluid, and subject to adjustment by the commanders on site.
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 9, 2017 10:20:49 GMT
Good idea Tom, I could add a link to the manuals because all of them are on line in pdf format. Could you please tell me if those links worked when you opened them?
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 9, 2017 10:58:48 GMT
Yes, Ian, all opened and all are more informational than just lists. Rather than worry over the structure, which is important I would pick out a story from one or two of the regiments. Blood, sweat, and tears sells. The disclaimer regarding structure will cover your butt, if you are concerned.
Regards, Tom
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 9, 2017 12:08:13 GMT
That is Chucks data Tom, so I have to respect that, but one for the future though.
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 9, 2017 12:14:55 GMT
Ian: You have no choice but to put on your site the tables as they were written and developed. As long as you and your readers are aware of the fact that these were often or ignored in the field. You and they should also understand that these modifications, field experimentation, ignoring the rules, were often the birthing of authorized changes based upon usage in the field. Chuck, that would be a given, I am sure, I think that we all would know that. We can see from the 7th Cavalry that took to the field in 1876, that changes happen during combat and even in peace times. As if I was daft to think that the 7th would be at full strength and it actually took to the field with this structure; Regimental Staff: Colonel Sturgis Lt. Colonel Custer Maj. Tilford Maj. Merrill 1st Lt. Cook 1st Lt. Nowlan Sgt. Major Sharrow Chief Trumpeter Sgt. Voss Unassigned Officers: 2nd Lt. Reily 2nd Lt. Crittenden Company A: Capt. Moylan 1st Lt. Smith 2nd Lt. Varnum 1st Sgt. Heyn Sgt. Alcott Sgt. Corwine Sgt. Culbertson Sgt. Easley Sgt. Fehler Sgt. McDermott Corp. Cody Corp. Dalious Corp. King Corp. Roy Company B: Capt. McDougall 1st Lt. Craycroft 2nd Lt. Hodgson 1st Sgt. Hill Sgt. Criswell Sgt. Gannon Sgt. Hutchinson Sgt. Murray Corp. Cunningham Corp. Dougherty Corp. Smith Corp. Wetzel Company C: Capt. Custer 1st Lt. Calhoun 2nd Lt. Harrington 1st Sgt. Bobo Sgt. Finckle Sgt. Finley Sgt. Hanley Sgt. Kanipe Sgt. Miller Corp. Crandall Corp. Foley Corp. French Corp. Ryan Company D: Capt. Weir 1st Lt. Bell 2nd Lt. Edgerly 1st Sgt. Martin Sgt. Flanagan Sgt. Harrison Sgt. Morton Sgt. Russell Corp. Cunningham Corp. Wylie Company E: Capt. Ilsley 1st Lt. DeRudio 2nd Lt. Scott 1st Sgt. Hohmeyer Sgt. James Sgt. Ogden Sgt. Riley Sgt. Murphy Sgt. Wells Corp. Brown Corp. Hagan Corp. Mason Corp. Meyer Company F: Capt. Yates 1st Lt. Jackson 2nd Lt. Larned 1st Sgt. Kenney Sgt. Curtis Sgt. Drago Sgt. Nursey Sgt. Vickory Sgt. Wilkinson Corp. Briody Corp. Clyde Corp. Coleman Corp. Teeman Company G: Capt. Tourtellote 1st Lt. McIntosh 2nd Lt. Wallace 1st Sgt. Botzer Sgt. Brown Sgt. Considine Sgt. Lloyd Sgt. Northeg Corp. Akers Corp. Crussy Corp. Hagemann Corp. Hammon Corp. Martin Company H: Capt. Benteen 1st Lt. Gibson 2nd Lt. Garlington 1st Sgt. McCurry Sgt. Conelly Sgt. Geiger Sgt. Maroney Sgt. McLaughlin Sgt. Pahl Corp. Bishop Corp. Lell Corp. Nealon Company I: Capt. Keogh 1st Lt. Porter 2nd Lt. Nave 1st Sgt. Varden Sgt. Bustard Sgt. Delacy Sgt. Craddle Corp. McCall Corp. Morris Corp. Staples Corp. Wild Company K: Capt. Hale 1st Lt. Godfrey 2nd Lt. Hare 1st Sgt. Winney Sgt. Campbell Sgt. Fredericks Sgt. Hughes Sgt. Rafter Sgt. Rott Corp. Callahan Corp. Hose Corp. Murray Corp. Nolan Company L: Capt. Sheridan 1st Lt. Braden 2nd Lt. McCormick 1st Sgt. Butler Sgt. Bender Sgt. Cashan Sgt. Mullen Sgt. Warren Corp. Gilbert Corp. Harrison Corp. Seiler Company M: Capt. French 1st Lt. Mathey 2nd Lt. Sturgis 1st Sgt. Ryan Sgt. Capes Sgt. McGlone Sgt. O’Hara Sgt. Weilhe Corp. Lalor Corp. Scollin Corp. Stressinger
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