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Post by yanmacca on Aug 7, 2017 7:40:55 GMT
I suppose that there is no unions in the army, and if an officer commands a unit which should be done by some one on a higher pay grade, then I suppose its like commanding on the cheap
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Aug 7, 2017 10:35:59 GMT
The Pacific war was the great changer in the strategic relationship between the US and Australia. This was first set in motion by the Australian Prime Minister John Curtin ( about.curtin.edu.au/who/history/john-curtin/ ) in December 1941 here is a quote: We look for a solid and impregnable barrier of the Democracies against the three Axis Powers, and we refuse to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle must be treated as a subordinate segment of the general conflict. By that it is not meant that any one of the other theatres of war is of less importance than the Pacific, but that Australia asks for a concerted plan evoking the greatest strength at the Democracies' disposal, determined upon hurling Japan back.
The Australian Government, therefore, regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the democracies' fighting plan.
Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.
We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces. We know the constant threat of invasion. We know the dangers of dispersal of strength, but we know too, that Australia can go and Britain can still hold on. ...
Summed up, Australian external policy will be shaped toward obtaining Russian aid, and working out, with the United States, as the major factor, a plan of Pacific strategy, along with British, Chinese and Dutch forces.
Since then the US and Australia have always operated together. Cheers
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Aug 7, 2017 10:55:20 GMT
Interesting Curtin story. As Prime Minister he kept a book of stamps in his desk and each time he used the phone for a personal call he took out a stamp and tore it up to pay for the call. I so want that to be true. A little more The 'great justification of Curtin as Prime Minister is not merely that there was no viable alternative government in 1941-45, but that his contemporaries acknowledged that no other politician was fit for the task'. At Australia's most critical hour Curtin 'successfully projected himself as national leader, inspiring respect from cynical Australians as few Prime Ministers have done. His achievements all derive essentially from character...'
In terms of ideals, the inscription on his gravestone perhaps best sums up Curtin's outlook and contribution to Australia:
His country was his pride His brother man his cause.
It is generally accepted that John Curtin's death was attributable to the great stress his service caused him.
Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Aug 7, 2017 11:07:50 GMT
But that is not what you said Dave, Words and how they are used matters. You said Rupertus withheld the 81st ID out of combat for six days. That is just not true. He had no authority over any other unit but his own 1st Marine Division. You also must realize that most of the 81st ID was otherwise engaged during these 6 days you point to.
If you had said that Rupertus did his best to keep the 81st out of battle, that may hold water, but you still have to consider what the 81st was doing at the time, and I will give you a hint. They were not playing beanbag, especially the 321st Infantry, which I believe was also the first regiment of the 81st to land on Peleliu and reinforce the 1st MARDIV. Words matter.
You did indeed make negative comments about Marine ethos and hubris when you made those comments about Rupertus. You said Rupertus bled the 1st Marine Division in order to keep Peleliu an all Marine operation. That is not only a negative comment regarding Marine ethos and hubris, but also an possible criminal charge against a Major General for gross misconduct and dereliction of duty. Words matter.
If you would not attempt to tell me or anyone how the battle should be handled, then how do you know the battle was handled improperly. Ignorance is not a defense. Silence is the only shield for those who are ignorant of subject matter. You are engaging in the same sort of unsupported slander against Rupertus as has been engaged in against Reno. You are cloaking opinion and supposition as fact.
Personally I don't believe anyone can write anything against Puller that will ever overcome his legendary status in both the Corps and America at large. The best biography of Puller is by Colonel Jon Hoffman, and he treats Puller in a very fair manner, and dwells on Peleliu.
For the life of me I cannot understand why you dwell on Peleliu. There were a total of only 10,000 casualties, with 2000 or so of those being KIA. That is far less than Iwo Jima and Okinawa, yet you make no mention of them. Actually is is far less than the Guadalcanal campaign. Is there some reason for this fixation of yours. You mentioned 1st Battalion, 1st Marines having only 74 riflemen and no original platoon leaders after what, 9 days. Do you think that odd? Do you think that in any way unique? If you do either immediately disabuse yourself of that notion. In active offensive operations that is both normal and routine. Remember that when next the bugle blows and the drums roll for war
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Post by quincannon on Aug 7, 2017 11:48:29 GMT
Ian: For the life of me I cannot understand why you continue to dwell on this captain business.
Do you not understand that the Tables of organization define that and officer should hold a given position and the highest grade that officer can be is a captain. The tables say nothing about it having to be a captain, only that the rank of the incumbent cannot be any greater than captain.
When the Army and Marine Corps were going through their great expansion in 42 and 43, it was common to cadre new units at company level with 2nd Lieutenants fresh out of OCS, and most often during these formative periods the only officer in a company was a Second Lieutenant and he was the company commander.
When I went through basic training my battalion had one Major as a battalion commander, a couple of Captains as staff officers, and all of the four companies were commanded by Lieutenants. Three of those companies had only one officer, when the tables called for three. My company, Company D, had two, a First Lieutenant, as commander, and a brand new Second Lieutenant, as the company training officer. That was common throughout the regiment. Later in both of the battle groups I served with the company commander in each case was a First Lieutenant. This was all in peacetime. We see all this as routine. Nothing to wonder about, nothing to find strange.
The company that Bale commanded C/1st CTB had only been activated in January 43, I don't know this as a fact, but in all probability he was the only company commander they ever had in their short existence of 13 months.
That is the way we do business. It may not be the British way or your way, but it is our way and it works for us.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 7, 2017 11:58:43 GMT
Ian, I am sure you know more about the structure of a tank company during WWII Europe than I ever will. I do not know who Al reported to if he ever told me. I am sure there were no unions, just needs, requirements, and getting the job done. Does a tank company act as a whole? Are they dispersed as needed? Were tanks used in special operations? You or Chuck can correct me on this, but I think Creighton Abrams was 27 or 28 but a Lt, Col. and still driving a tank in relief of the Bulge. The Queen of Queen's would love his cavalry story.
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 7, 2017 12:33:55 GMT
I think I need to change the way I post on this site, nothing against anyone here but on some of the sites I deal with some really geeky people and the tables written by Washington are discussed a lot between the members, the German versions [the KSTNs] are very popular, but it seems they don't go down as well here.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 7, 2017 12:38:56 GMT
Tank companies and battalions are used in two ways Tom.
Tank companies used to support non-mechanized Infantry are normally parceled out by platoon, and serve mainly as fire support platforms for dismounted Infantry operations. Rarely do they operate as a whole company together.
Tank units in mechanized/armored divisions normally cross attach with mechanized Infantry to form tank-Infantry teams and are used in much the same way dragoons were in the 19th Century. A typical company team may be:
Company headquarters, 2 tank platoons, and 1 mechanized rifle platoon Company headquarters, 1 tank platoon, and 2 mechanized rifle platoons Company headquarters, 2 tank platoons, and 2 mechanized rifle platoons Company headquarters, 1 tank platoon, and 1 mechanized rifle platoon
The process is called tactical tailoring, and the various structures are based upon the mission assigned to the company team.
Today, with combined arms battalions, those cross attachments into company teams still take place as before. The only difference with the CAB is that the CAB commander owns both tank and Infantry companies all the time. He has the support structure organic to the CAB to support both types of combat vehicles. In the past there were pure Infantry and pure tank battalions, and they would cross attach companies to form, first battalion task forces, and then from within those task forces, company teams. Such structure also requited that a lot of maintenance and logistics assets had to be cross attached as well. The CAB is a superior design to what was done before, for a number of reasons, main among them less turmoil in the organization and preparation for combat phase, that, and tankers and Infantry belonging to the same battalion all the time means that the leaders form greater bonds of trust with each other.
Down the road there will no longer be and Infantry and Armored Branch per say, but rather mounted and dismounted portions of the Maneuver Branch, and that is already underway.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 7, 2017 12:49:48 GMT
Ian, please don't be put off or turned off. I am just saying quirky things happen. The vast majority of my military time was NG. I at one time saw a 1st SGT who was an E-6 generally reserved for E-7, 8,& 9. It was short time an he was soon promoted to E-7 and eventually all the way to 1st SGT E-9.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 7, 2017 12:52:02 GMT
You can discuss tables until the cow next jumps over the moon Ian, but they are pieces of paper outlining what someone thinks a company and battalion should look like, while reality dictates what they do look like. Often, in fact most often, reality wins.
I suppose you do realize that Congress only authorizes only so many Lieutenants, Captains, Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, and Colonels, and most often the structure exceeds those authorizations. You may need say a hundred Captain positions to be filled, and you may only have ten Captains to work with. That means lower ranking officers have to occupy slots that are authorized officers of a higher grade.
There is nothing at all complicated about this. For us it is a routine way of doing business. The question is do those really geeky people have any experience in the U S Army or is their knowledge confined to what they read on a piece of paper
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 7, 2017 12:55:06 GMT
Thanks, Chuck, for the break down.
I will add one more thing on Abrams, he is somewhat the father of our modern day Rangers, due to his actions in the early 1970's
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 7, 2017 12:59:03 GMT
Funny you mention authorized strength, I would have forgotten that I was once promoted in was called overage, we actually borrowed a slot from elsewhere.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 7, 2017 13:06:50 GMT
Correct, mostly.
Ranger companies were formed during the Vietnam War as LRRP (Long Ranger Reconnaissance Patrol) units. There were three different types, one working for corps, one working for divisions, and the third the smallest, working for separate brigades. Most were inactivated as we drew down, although a couple remained active in Europe.
When Abrams became Chief of Staff, he authorized (reluctantly) the activation of the 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Infantry, with a very stern warning that they were to behave themselves. Evidently they did, because the 2nd Battalion followed in a few years, and some eight of ten years later as I recall the 3rd Battalion and the Ranger Regiment headquarters.
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Deleted
Deleted Member
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Post by Deleted on Aug 7, 2017 13:18:15 GMT
I am getting ready to weigh in here. I recommend we focus posts on the 3 levels of war: Strategic, Operational, Tactical.
1. Strategy. This is the multinational Allies planning. The decision to have 3 theatres is strategy. Note the Central Pacific theatre was all US, the SWP mainly US and Australia, and China/Burma/Indian a true multinational affair, led by UK. I plan to discuss the Central Pacific strategy led by King, and the SWPA strategy led by MacArthur.
2. Operations. This is where campaigns support strategy. It is basically selecting what island chains to attack, and what specific islands to attack or bypass. As a forecast of this, I will get into the Gilberts. The campaign was a power play b King for resources, for islands of no use in the war effort.
3. Tactics. This is the fire and maneuver on particular islands. I have limited interest in this. Casualties were heavy and unit ability degraded rapidly. A major argument here is the theory that the USMC were aggressive, took more casualties but resolved battle faster. US Army was slower, firepower dependent, tried more maneuver, and took less casualties. The argument is that slower resolution in fact led to higher casualties, by prolonging the fighting.
The argument is not relevant. It is situationally dependent. IN general, any of the 6 USMC divisions were better trained than any Army Division in the Pacific. The Army best divisions were in Europe, where there were zero Marine divisions.
But the real difference was combat replacements. The Marines organized replacement pools that were sitting offshore. The Army did not, their replacements were in training back in the States. So after a few days of combat, the marines outperformed the army.
I believe man for man the USMC outperformed USA. Not that they were inherently better, they simply fought smarter, wore more efficient and effective at small unit level. Again, they had 6 divisions, how many did the army have?
But winning a war is not done at company level. Army advantage was Corps, Army, Army Group and theatre.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 7, 2017 13:19:31 GMT
When I commanded Tom, I did so as a Major in an LTC slot. I was not promoted because I did not have time in grade and would not for another two and a half years. When I was selected for promotion I was also in an LTC slot, and had to wait about nine months for Congress to act on the proceedings of the selection board.
I know an officer, a Second Lieutenant, who was fresh out of West Point and the Armor Officer Basic Course whose first troop assignment was as commander of a cavalry squadron headquarters troop. His next was as a platoon leader in Troop C of that same squadron.
That is why tables do not always reflect reality, and reality is what matters.
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