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Post by quincannon on Aug 6, 2017 15:19:16 GMT
Would you propose using less than your best in taking Tarawa? Could less than your best do it?
If you are planning to take the rest of the Gilberts and Marshalls then Tarawa had to be taken first. If you are going to take the Marianas then you must first take the Gilberts and Marshalls. You need to take the Marianas because? B29, and the only place that strategic bombing of Japan can be logistically supported
What do maritime patrols produce - Intelligence. What was important to the Japanese Navy - Intelligence
The Japanese at this stage of the war depended upon island bases as unsinkable aircraft carriers to make up for their shortfall in the real thing. Any airfield, empty or not could be used as staging bases for air attacks on the U S Fleet. Fly them in under cover of darkness, strike, and fly away. You see this technique adequately demonstrated in the Battle of the Philippine Sea six months after Tarawa. I mentioned the acronym FARP in the fantasy thread of LBH being fought today. Tarawa, if nothing else, was a FARP.
The two pronged strategy of Central and South Pacific arms was designed for the purpose of not allowing the Japanese Fleet from concentrating against only one main axis of attack. The objective in the Central Pacific was to bring out the IJN and give battle to them short of the Philippines. That was done in June 1944 in the Philippine Sea. That battle nearly destroyed the IJN based in the north and in homeland waters. The battles later that year in Philippine waters themselves brought out remnants from the Philippine Sea battle, plus all the remaining IJN power that remained in the south. The IJN was defeated in detail from June 44 through most of the rest of that year. Keep in mind that fleet must be completely destroyed before you could go after Iwo and Okinawa.
Destruction of divisions. I cannot name on division that fought in the Pacific that was not destroyed, defining that word as unfit for future combat without a complete period of rehabilitation and retraining. People point to casualties thinking that they are measured in KIA and WIA. What about debilitating disease?
The reason that C/1st CTB did not have the opportunity to train with the 2nd MARDIV, is that the 1st CTB and the 2nd MARDIV came to Tarawa from two different places. The division was in New Zealand, and C/1st CTB was in New Caledonia.
Looking only at the small picture never provides all you need to place the big picture in proper focus. Never has. Never will.
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 6, 2017 15:28:27 GMT
I am not saying taking Tarawa [Betio airfield] was wrong, that is why I wrote the piece about the Betty bombers and the maritime flights. The 2nd Marines got better and better after each campaign as they developed better tactics and firepower. Take out the lesson they learnt from Tarawa and they would have had to learn them on some other island, but Betio was one of a kind.
No Chuck, I will leave the bigger picture to you and Dave, I am happy with posting about the men on the ground from both sides, I only posted the piece about the politics about taking the islands to show the good points and the bad points.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 6, 2017 16:08:51 GMT
I never said that you said it was wrong. I addressed the big picture of the strategy of why.
For instance, if you do not understand the WHY of Guadalcanal, the operational considerations and the strategy behind them, you can never understand how the campaign played out. It is impossible. So understanding the forces engaged at Alligator Creek or Bloody Ridge, is nearly worthless without understanding WHY it was important to deny Henderson Field and Tulagi Harbor from the Japanese. Without those two important assets the Japanese were completely stopped in their stated intent of dominating the Coral Sea, and the supply lines that kept Australia in the war. Nothing is just another fight. It must have purpose and meaning lest it become wanton slaughter.
Without starting with the big picture and working downward you will never fully understand what happened at the levels you are most comfortable with.
When you speak of a Marine Division, as I assume you are, you must for purposes of clarity refer to them as the 2nd Marine Division, or 2nd MARDIV. A Marine regiment is referred to as 2nd Marines, 5th Marines, 10th Marines etc. You must differentiate if someone is to understand the meaning of your words.
They did not develop better tactics. They developed better techniques and procedures for using those same tactics used by Caesar in Gaul, and Napoleon at Marengo. This is much covered old ground. Tactics do not change. They are universal and timeless.
Let me attempt to assist you in this regard. The attack on Tarawa and the attack on Nassau by Continental Marines during the Revolutionary War used the same tactics, a frontal assault on a defended position. The frontal assault was the tactic. It was the same tactic as any frontal assault ever conducted by anyone throughout the history of mankind. The technique of that assault was from the sea. The techniques of an assault from the sea and the procedures developed for such an undertaking are what change and are in a continuous, never ending process of change, as are all techniques and procedures.
Firepower yes: Case in point, after Tarawa all of the Marine Divisional Tank Battalions were reequipped with the M4 medium tank as the M3 proved to be inadequate to need, and the 1st CTB disbanded.
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 6, 2017 17:45:54 GMT
I should have stated the 2nd marine div, but seeing we were talking about Betio, I thought it was ok just to keep it short.
What I mean is that the marines developed their blowtorch and corkscrew technique and attached four man teams of engineers to each squad armed with a flame-thrower, 2.36in RL and satchel charges. They also increased the number of BARs to three per squad.
The M4 tank was also equipped with means to communicate with infantry, Lt. Bale said on Betio, he could communicate with Aircraft but not with the Infantry he was supporting.
These were valuable lessons which got learned the hard way.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 6, 2017 18:08:49 GMT
Learning the hard way is the ONLY way you learn valuable lessons.
The lessons you learn in training are only the temporary lessons that you think you need to learn. The lessons you learn in combat take all of the think out of it.
LT Bale was riding an M4 was he not? If the M4 was equipped to communicate with Infantry what couldn't LT Bale communicate with Infantry. Was the M4A2 not equipped with a phone at the rear of the tank so dismounts could talk to the crew inside. I do not know that answer. What was the frequency band width on the tank's radio. If you could talk to aircraft overhead, why could you not talk to Infantry you are cooperating with. I don't know that answer either, but I do suspect one of two things. LT Bale was not sufficiently trained or that the person who designed or allowed that radio to be installed in a tank that was meant to operate in support of Infantry ought to be taken out and shot.
The reason the subject was brought up is that at Betio the 2nd Marine Division was there, as were the 2nd Marines which was and is an organic part of that division.
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 6, 2017 18:21:37 GMT
Chuck, here is what Lt. Bale said;
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 6, 2017 18:30:11 GMT
I think that the Marines first started fixing EE-8 field telephones to the back of there M4s in July 1944. The Army in Europe didn't follow suite till after operation Cobra, but it was roughly around the same time. Apparently they attached a standard .30 metal ammo box as protection for the phone.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 6, 2017 18:31:49 GMT
Well it is pretty hard to train with Infantry, if the tanks are in New Caledonia and the Infantry is in New Zealand.
I am not letting Bales off the hook here. This problem of radio band width should have been identified before hand. When someone is shooting at you it is pretty goddamned hard to say someone above me fouled up. That tank company commander (LT Bale) is responsible.
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 6, 2017 18:39:25 GMT
I agree, but is it standard to have a lieutenant in charge of a medium tank company? This unit was straight out of the box with no combat losses, so what had happened to their captain. I know you will tell me off for this [you have already on the other thread], in the same way Peck as a lieutenant commanded a company at pork chop hill, but his unit was in the field and losses can happen.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 6, 2017 19:44:39 GMT
We have covered this before as well. The senior man present in a unit commands, regardless of what the tables of organization call for. THE SENIOR MAN PRESENT COMMANDS.
You do not seem to understand that there may be a hundred reasons for someone that is under the authorized grade to be in command, or for that matter to fill any other slot. It was not uncommon for lieutenants and captains to fill the slot of majors and lieutenant colonels.
When are you going to throw away those sacred organizational tables of yours and realize that the military and the military in combat is real life not something that some idiot puts on a piece of paper saying this is what should be.
I don't have the foggiest idea what happened to "their" captain. I don't know if they ever had a captain. I don't frigging care if they had one and he got trench foot of the bowels, or got a dose of the clap for some French filly in Noumea, or if he ever existed. It does not matter to me, or 99 and 9/10ths of the rest of the world. It only matters to you in that it does not reflect what some piece of paper says, and you live buy those pieces of paper, not in the real world.
THE SENIOR MAN PRESENT COMMANDS AND THE REASON DOES NOT MATTER
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 6, 2017 22:50:35 GMT
E-5 then E-6 Albert Smelgus commanded a group of Sherman's(6) under Patton in late 1944 and early 45 until his tank was blown up and he lost an arm, two fingers on the other hand, and a piece of tongue. the company commander took over two weeks later.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 6, 2017 23:12:52 GMT
By the way shrapnel carried until the last time I saw him.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Aug 7, 2017 0:44:39 GMT
Rupertus bleed the 1st Marine Division in an attempt to make Peleliu an all Marine operation withheld using the Army's 81st Division for 6 days. Do you believe he was correct in his actions? He had injured his ankle in rehearsals and stayed afloat for the duration of the battle. Prior to the landings Rupertus had stated "It will be a short operation, a hard fought 'quickie' that will last for 4 days, 5 days at the most." Boy was he wrong!
Chesty Puller had warned his superiors that assaulting Peleliu would be far more difficult that they believed as the 1st Marine Division only had about 9,000 men in its three regiments but was ignored. Puller with his 1st Marines assaulted the enemy position known as "Bloody Nose Ridge" the following quote provides the casualties of the 1st Marine Regiment: "The 1st Marines had taken on one of the roughest assignments ever given to a Marine regiment, conducting one of the most fiercely aggressive fights ever waged against an equally determined and savage adversary. They had destroyed over 145 Japanese caves and pillboxes and killed 3,942 Japanese. The price was high. The regiment had suffered 56-percent casualties: 71 percent in 1/1, 56 percent in 2/1, 55 percent in 3/1, 32 percent in the regiment's headquarters and weapons companies. Of the 9 rifle platoons in the 3 companies of 1/1, 74 men and no original platoon leaden remained. The regiment had suffered 1,749 casualties in 8 days of fighting."*
I have made no charges against Puller regarding his command and actions on Peleliu but have read several articles and books about him. I did find an interesting monograph about Puller which I have listed below^for others to read and judge. Regards Dave
*https://www.mca-marines.org/leatherneck/peleliu-forgotten-battle ^file:///C:/Users/David/Downloads/ADA339492.pdf
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Post by quincannon on Aug 7, 2017 1:48:47 GMT
Rupertus commanded the 1st MARDIV. As such he had no authority to withhold the 81st Infantry Division or anyone else.
The commander of the III Amphibious Corps was the only man who had that authority. His name was Geiger.
It might be well to revisit the matter.
So you don't like how Peleliu was handled. You still have not told me how it could have been done better. If you do not have that answer, then all the criticism of any and all involved is largely meaningless.
The Infantry strength of all American divisions, Army and Marine, was about 9000. If you want to make a case, make that case centered around a two division assault. Was that possible? I don't know, and unless you are familiar with the available beaches on Peleliu commentary on that is also meaningless.
If you wish to make an argument about Marine hubris, or some Marines hubris, make your case, but that is rather hard to prove.
You might want to check on what the bulk of the 81st ID was doing on those six days in question.
If you wish to make a case based upon an early reinforcement by 81st ID attempt to make it, but do you know across the beach logistics could support such an effort at an earlier date. I don't
Peleliu was I believe the place where Puller remarked that there is no room for fancy tactics at regimental level and below. People have nearly universally taken that statement to indicate that Puller was a tactical Neanderthal. What he meant though was if there was anything that could have been done there it would be above the regimental level, and he was right.
The bottom line here is that on a realistic basis. the decision by Nimitz that mandated Peleliu was necessary was correct given the totality of circumstances. Rupertus could only do what he had the beach capacity and logistics to do. The 81st went in and got nearly as bad a bloody nose. SO, if you want to hold someone responsible for the conduct of the battle, you must hold the corps commander responsible, Geiger. The commander is always responsible.
Would it be a safe assumption that something you have carefully planned has sometime in your life gone wrong to a greater or lesser degree? The emphasis is on the word planned. If the answer, as I suspect it will be is yes something that I had carefully planned has gone wrong to some extent. Why should you or I be any different than those who plan battles? The only difference in what we plan and battle is that we face no enemy that has a vote. At Peleliu the enemy not only had a vote but they had just changed their defensive techniques, and were far more formidable than they were anyplace previously. If you don't examine both sides of the story you have only half the facts.
I have been doing this a long time Dave and can argue, I think successfully, the other side of the problem with equal vigor. I prefer though to argue the side I agree with.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Aug 7, 2017 2:30:36 GMT
I can not nor would I attempt to tell you or anyone how the battle should have been handled and you well know that. I can make comments regarding Rupertus as well as his actions without having to provide better solutions simply because this a discussion board. If only those who have the answers are allowed to comment then this board as well as all others would cease to function. Rupertus did his best to keep the 81st out of the battle and that is a fact.
I have not made negative comments regarding Puller or the Marine ethos and or hubris. I merely shared 2 sources written BY OTHERS not me regarding the battle, participants and their decisions. Regards Dave
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