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Post by Beth on Jul 8, 2017 23:21:58 GMT
I think that one of the biggest considerations to the what if, is would Makenzie have found himself in some of the same situations that Custer did? For example would the men of his regiment moved up too close which helped make using a day to plan the attack impossible and would he have tolerated some of the civilian scouts who saw fleeing Indians where ever they looked. Would they have lit fires for their morning coffee? Would they have dropped a box of supplies? None of those things led to Custer's defeat but they lead Custer believing that their position had been given away and the village alerted to them. (he must have assumed that the Natives if they hadn't heard that many horses moving or seen the trail of horse muffins and iron shoes already)
The battle wasn't won or lost at any one point though I personally believed Custer squandered so many opportunities to make the right choices that day beginning with Crow's Nest. It was a series of misinformation and impulsive choices that lead Custer that day, a different commander would have made very different choices.
Makenzie might have run a tighter ship that Custer and therefore would have had the time to scout out his enemy and make a battle plan that he shared with his officers. If he had scouted though perhaps he would have the advantage of we do with hindsight which would be divide the Village from the ponies and stay off the bluff.
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Post by Beth on Jul 8, 2017 23:23:12 GMT
I will ditto that. We can stand on our own to feet without denigrating another site.
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Post by Beth on Jul 8, 2017 23:26:38 GMT
Ian, Captain Tyree specified the 4th Cavalry in that they were arguably the best trained and most experienced of any cavalry regiment in the west at the time. They stayed pretty much together in west Texas (San Antonio to New Mexico and beyond). They learned how to fight irregulars from company to regimental level, and had conducted near continuous combat operations for more than six years. I have personally visited some of their bases, like Fort Concho (the most out of the way God forsaken place you can imagine), and Fort Richardson, as well as the Staked Plains and Palo Duro, and followed the Commanchero Trail from Santa Fe. Any military unit that fights and wins on that terrain could go to the dark side of the moon, fight Godzilla, and not break sweat. That's why he specified the 4th Since I now live in TX and love going to NM, I try to go west every year in the fall. I am discovering a whole new area of history to dig in to. I am discovering the importance of the terrain in the "old West' stories now and I am fascinated with the commanches, like I said before. I am also interested in the pueblo Native American culture. I can't get enough of it. When you study the same subject for a long period of time, things start to get redundant even though it still hold my interest because of new discoveries and info. But, digging into something new is like a baby seeing the world for the first time. Everything is new. Mary and I are from the same next of the woods and I have to admit that some of the history of BHBH made no sense until I moved to the west and learned terms that are just taken for granted like a divide. Once I visited the battlefield again with more experienced eyes, I could get a better feel for the events.
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 10, 2017 13:08:57 GMT
I think that looking at the big picture, that you can trace all what was wrong with this campaign, all the way to Washington. Grant, Sheridan, Crook and Terry all had a hand in this debacle, they couldn’t even provide trained mules or three full cavalry regiments. The worst thing was that the 7th had to leave men behind because of the lack of horses plus just looking at the roster you can see that a good number of officers and Ems were on other duties, which beggars belief, surly a campaign as large as this should have meant that all staff should be dispatched back to their units for this assignment. We know that Custer made some momentous mistakes, but these men too should shoulder some of the blame.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 10, 2017 14:48:35 GMT
OK, if there was someone to blame let's start with Congress.
Congress, in its Article One Powers given it by the Constitution is empowered to raise and maintain the Army. They are the ones then who must provide the financial and legislative resources for the United States Army to do the job that army is intended to do.
They were the ones who put a strength cap on the Army of that time at 25.000 personnel. They were the ones who mandated the strength of the units themselves. They were the ones that mandated that every commissioned officer in the grade of Colonel and below must be assigned a slot in one of the 40 regiments that existed at the time (25 Infantry-10 Cavalry-5 Artillery). They were the ones that made no provisions whatsoever for an officer and enlisted extra-regimental overhead, so that all of the other very necessary jobs of the Army could be filled, so that the Army itself could operate.
So if you want some officer to command the remount depot at Front Royal, Virginia, or the recruit barracks at Jefferson, Missouri, those officers would out of necessity be taken from one of the regiments to fill those duty positions. When you operate on the cheap the results you can expect are cheap.
The people that you mentioned Ian, from President Grant on down could only do what they could with what Congress authorized them to have, and that authorization extended from personnel, all the way down to saddlebags and ammunition allotments.
So in the end you must blame Congress for failing to adequately do their job.
Those you name though are not without blame, because they failed to do their jobs as well in the area of strategic and operational planning. Just don't blame them for the absence of personnel, and equipment. Also keep in mind that this is a very big country, and amassing what they did for the initial stages of this campaign was itself a monumental effort. Having an army of only 25,000 in this country, with all that was required of the army at the time, is like having one pat of butter to spread over an entire loaf of bread.
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Post by Beth on Jul 10, 2017 18:19:14 GMT
Out of curiosity, where the Navy and Coast Guard also limited so much? Did the Army receive more funding after Custer and the increased public interest?
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Post by quincannon on Jul 10, 2017 18:39:06 GMT
Beth there was no Coast Guard as such at the time. The Coast Guard was a 20th Century creation by combining the Revenue Cutter Service, the Lighthouse Service, and something else, shore based lifeboats or some such. The Coast Guard has always been, and continues to be the red headed step children of our naval services and in this day and age, that is near criminality.
I do not believe the Navy built even one ship between the close of the ACW and the very late 1880's. If they did I can't recall what it was.
Yes the Army received more money, and a strength authorization increase, but as soon as Custer Revenge mania subsided they went back to their same old ways.
In a way I don't blame them for keeping costs down during that era. We still depended upon the breadth of the two oceans and the militia during time of war and at the time had no overseas ambitions. They just went about it wrong headed. There was too many Infantry and cavalry organizations. They could have cut the numbers of both in half, but at the same time kept them full up with professional soldiers. Any money that may have been freed up in that process would have been well spent on training a professional officer corps with a school system, and advanced military education.
The thing you need most in a mobilization based Army is professionally trained officers, that are the framework for rapid expansion. We finally learned that lesson in WWI, and in WWII our victories in Europe and the Pacific were won at Leavenworth, Benning, and Sill in the 1920's and 30's.
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 10, 2017 19:32:39 GMT
Chuck, I don't mind aiming higher, if congress restricts the army to a certain strength and budget then they too must carry some responsibility for failure.
Cavalry with not enough horses is not good enough, cavalry with men detached when a big campaign is planned, again not good, a pack train containing untrained mules is not good.
These three points could have been addressed in the planning stage.
To show just how bad this problem was, if you count the number of Officers, NCOs and Privates who were left behind at both FAL and PRD, it comes to a staggering 174 and that is not counting the men who were on detached service.
Add that total to the 90 of used as trooper packers and you get about 250 men who took no part in the initial phase of the battle, I wish I knew just how many were on detached service but we could be looking at a total exceeding 300.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 10, 2017 21:32:02 GMT
Who is going to provide the money to buy the horses and mules and train them for military service? You can't train what you ain't got.
That is exactly why I said they should cut the number of regiments in half Ian. They had the resources for twenty good full, up, fully equipped regiments. They did not have the money for forty.
If you cannot afford to hire enough civilians to man and protect your logistics so you can keep your combat power on par, what do you do?
So if you do not have all of whatever it takes or close to it, then all the planning in the world is not worth a bucket of spit.
These people were trying to make bricks without straw. It never works. They knew what their deficiencies were. They did the best they could.
Remember - King George commands and we obey. Over the hills and far away.
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Jul 10, 2017 23:37:30 GMT
Chuck, I don't mind aiming higher, if congress restricts the army to a certain strength and budget then they too must carry some responsibility for failure. Cavalry with not enough horses is not good enough, cavalry with men detached when a big campaign is planned, again not good, a pack train containing untrained mules is not good. These three points could have been addressed in the planning stage. To show just how bad this problem was, if you count the number of Officers, NCOs and Privates who were left behind at both FAL and PRD, it comes to a staggering 174 and that is not counting the men who were on detached service. Add that total to the 90 of used as trooper packers and you get about 250 men who took no part in the initial phase of the battle, I wish I knew just how many were on detached service but we could be looking at a total exceeding 300. Good points Ian but the kicker here is still Custer feeding his regiment to the NAs in penny packets. Granted each packet may have been a bit larger and better lead but a larger, unsupported packet to me = higher casualties. They might inflict more as well but the issue on the battlefield the was still GAC's lousy decision making.
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Post by rebcav on Dec 29, 2017 2:10:46 GMT
Beth there was no Coast Guard as such at the time. The Coast Guard was a 20th Century creation by combining the Revenue Cutter Service, the Lighthouse Service, and something else, shore based lifeboats or some such. The Coast Guard has always been, and continues to be the red headed step children of our naval services and in this day and age, that is near criminality. I do not believe the Navy built even one ship between the close of the ACW and the very late 1880's. If they did I can't recall what it was. Yes the Army received more money, and a strength authorization increase, but as soon as Custer Revenge mania subsided they went back to their same old ways. In a way I don't blame them for keeping costs down during that era. We still depended upon the breadth of the two oceans and the militia during time of war and at the time had no overseas ambitions. They just went about it wrong headed. There was too many Infantry and cavalry organizations. They could have cut the numbers of both in half, but at the same time kept them full up with professional soldiers. Any money that may have been freed up in that process would have been well spent on training a professional officer corps with a school system, and advanced military education. The thing you need most in a mobilization based Army is professionally trained officers, that are the framework for rapid expansion. We finally learned that lesson in WWI, and in WWII our victories in Europe and the Pacific were won at Leavenworth, Benning, and Sill in the 1920's and 30's. My Beloved Corps has had to suck Hind Teat when it came to new toys as well.....Just SAYIN'....... Thanks Again for all the help with my mom's Christmas Present, You guys ROCK. Respectfully submitted, Duane
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 6, 2018 15:40:15 GMT
Britain always had a small standing army of professionals. Even in 1939 it was relatively small in comparison to other nations, but they always had the Territorials to fall back on when needed. At the outbreak of WW2, we had 50 full time and part time divisions. Out of these 50, we sent 12 to France with the BEF.
The RAF in 1939 had 135 Squadrons in which 24 were fighter and another 74 bomber plus support Squadrons. We had another 19 Squadrons with the Auxiliary air force.
In 1939 the Royal Navy was the largest Navy in the world with 15 battleships, 7 aircraft carriers, 66 cruisers, 184 destroyers and 60 submarines. Plus a large number of support vessels.
I remember a friend of my father saying that he joined the Territorials along with him in 1936, mainly because you got well fed and well educated. There was a lot of poverty in Widnes then and men would leave school at 14 to find a job and work all week just to bring home a few shillings. Many of these men were poorly educated and malnourished so the army offered a quick way to remedy this, so many joined up and gave back to the nation during the war, with many of these men going on to be junior NCOs and passing on what they knew to the young draftees after Dunkirk.
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