Armchair General--What is your battleplan

[quincannon]

How far can cavalry march in a day and not wear out their horses after a certain number of days forcing a march?

How far can Infantry march in a day?

Both are estimated at around forty?

How much more in logistics is demanded that a cavalry unit carry with it, a number that gets exponentially larger as the size of the unit they support grows larger.

How much less in the way of logistics does an Infantry unit need to support it.

I don't suppose you have heard of  Roger's Rangers or Jackson's foot cavalry, but forty or fifty a day, every day, for as long as it takes, with ten minute breaks every hour, and four hours sleep at night was standard.

It only takes training.

Mobility is a state of mind, and the only advantage that cavalry has over Infantry is short term speed, for relatively short distances.

Yes Indians could disperse if a force was detected, BUT, BUT, BUT. you have a much better chance of not being detected with Infantry, and a much better chance of being detected with cavalry.

Read up some time on the Saint Francis raid that Rogers conducted during the French and Indian War.The distance start to target was on the same order that Custer traveled. Most of it was on foot, although they did go part of the way in boats until lake travel became much too dangerous if surprise was to be achieved. A fictionalized account, probably the best there is is contained in "Northwest Passage".

Then you must really read about the 1st Ranger Battalion at Sened Station in North Africa. There they crossed open desert and scaled a mountain range, and like at Saint Francis, well trained soldiers on foot achieved complete surprise and virtually wiped out Sened. as Rogers did at Saint Francis 200 years before

If anyone ever tells you Ian that cavalry is more mobile than Infantry tell them I said they are full of shit. You may quote me.

Were it me designing a force to go after the Sioux/Cheyenne confederation in 1876, I would weight my force heavily with Infantry and require only a squadron of cavalry with each of the three columns. for reconnaissance.  I would venture most professionals even of that day would have done the same. The only reason that the three forces had an overbalance of cavalry, is that was what was available. Keep in mind that for the most part the Army west of the Mississippi was used as a mounted constabulary, a police force, nothing more.

Errol Flynn was a butt sucking idiot.

[yanmacca]

Okay so the logistics and overall speed could be calculated around the same, but still the Infantry in those two columns were redundant because Custer left them in his wake, two days in his wake!

Wouldn’t infantry be at a disadvantage against mounted warriors, especially with poorly trained soldiers caught in the open in operating open order, wouldn’t mounted Indian attacks force them to go to ground and fight in close formations in situ.

Chuck, of course I have heard of Rodgers and his rangers, we have discussed this formation many a time in the past, but the US army had no such formation on their roster and certainly couldn’t train one up to fight the Sioux and Cheyenne. I would agree that a regiment of Rogers Rangers armed with repeating rifles and six shot revolvers plus tomahawks, would run amok among a startled village, but they didn’t have them, same as the British never had Comet tanks in 1940.

We had discussed the idea that a full regiment of cavalry attacking through the valley would yield better results then what Custer achieved, so image this attack with another regiment attacking over ford D, the Sioux and Cheyenne would be torn in two different directions and be forced to fight two different battles. Their non-com elements would obviously head away from the danger, so they had two choices, over the river and up the bluffs or west.

[yanmacca]

BTW; Flynn was some what of a hard case, see if you can track down what he did to a smart arse cowboy who acted as an extra in the charge of the light brigade, this chump who David Niven discribed as 'looking like huge tough ranch hand' got rough up by Flynn in a tussle in which Errol [as you say] 'cleaned his clocks'

[deadwoodgultch]

May 22, 2019 9:09:00 GMT yanmacca said:

Wouldn’t infantry be at a disadvantage against mounted warriors, especially with poorly trained soldiers caught in the open in operating open order, wouldn’t mounted Indian attacks force them to go to ground and fight in close formations in situ.

I know and understand your concerns here, but Gibbon and Terry used their tools properly. Both were successful infantry generals during the ACW and used their mounted infantry and cavalry properly during this campaign.  They were used as scouts and as a delaying/blocking force should the command be seen and attacked. They were seen.

A bit about Gibbon, who was some what under the weather during the march. "In 1862, he was appointed brigadier general of volunteers and commanded the brigade of westerners known as King's Wisconsin Brigade. Gibbon quickly set about drilling his troops and improving their appearance. He led the brigade into action against the famous Confederate Stonewall Brigade at the Battle of Brawner's Farm, a prelude to the Second Battle of Bull Run.  He was in command of the brigade during their strong uphill charge at the Battle of South Mountain, where Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker exclaimed that the men "fought like iron". From then on, the brigade was known as the "Iron Brigade". Gibbon led the brigade at the Battle of Antietam, where he was forced to take time away from brigade command to personally man an artillery piece in the bloody fighting at the Cornfield."  

"Gibbon was promoted to command the 2nd Division, I Corps at the Battle of Fredericksburg, where he was wounded.  At the Battle of Gettysburg, he commanded the 2nd Division, II Corps and temporarily commanded the corps on July 2 and early July 3, 1863, while Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock was elevated to command larger units.  At the end of the council of war on the night of July 2, army commander Maj. Gen. George Meade took Gibbon aside and predicted, "If Lee attacks tomorrow, it will be on your front."  And his division did bear the brunt of fighting during the defense against Pickett's Charge on July 3, when Gibbon was again wounded."

"Gibbon was back in command of the 2nd Division at the battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, and Cold Harbor. On June 7, 1864, he was promoted to major general of volunteers. During the Siege of Petersburg, Gibbon became disheartened when his troops refused to fight at Ream's Station. He briefly commanded the XVIII Corps before going on sick leave, but his service being too valuable, he returned to command the newly created XXIV Corps in the Army of the James. His troops helped achieve the decisive breakthrough at Petersburg, capturing Fort Gregg, part of the Confederate defenses. He led his troops during the Appomattox Campaign and blocked the Confederate escape route at the Battle of Appomattox Courthouse. He was one of three commissioners for the Confederate surrender. "

When combined forces are used properly you should not have to worry about your infantry  being caught out in the open, with their pants down. I am not saying that the enemy does not get a vote. But, when you use your tools properly the likelihood is exponentially reduced.

Regards,

Tom 

[yanmacca]

Hi Tom, I am not calling Gibbon and Terry bad commanders, but their infantry never got a look in, Crook mounted some of his infantry to keep them up with the cavalry but when attacked he almost lost his pants in a close-run thing with the same Indians which Custer faced later. They went home to have a party; Crook left the field to head back the way he came.

Why did Terry use his cavalry support in such a way which would allow its commander to use them as an assault formation. Surly if Terry wanted to use his forces in a combined way, then why let loose a full regiment of cavalry with a fire brand at its head.

If the seventh was supposed to be the eyes of the column, then it should have been separated into segments, half should have remained with the column whilst the other half along with scouts, go out and find any trails or even the village itself and report back to the column, because that is the only way to keep the idea of combined arms alive.

Once Custer and his 600 where sent out, then Terry could kiss goodbye to combined arms because he should have known that Custer would take it on himself to wage total war on any village he found and not even wait for Terry, I don’t think he even kept in contact with column in any way shape or form.

[quincannon]

Ian: Your original premise in your first post was mobility, saying or suggesting that cavalry possessed superior mobility to Infantry. My response was intended to refute that myth. Except, as I noted, for only the short term does cavalry have a mobility differential over Infantry. A man cannot run as fast as a horse, but the horse has severe limitations placed upon it. Even in the modern age, the 10th Mountain Division, a very light Infantry formation, outpaced and outdistanced the 1st Armored Division in the race up the Po Valley in Italy. Infantry has another great advantage as well. It can go places denied to either horse or armored fighting vehicle.

While I pointed out the myth of cavalry having a mobility advantage over Infantry, I made no claim to defend the inept manner in with organizations of both branches were employed in the first half of the Little Big Horn Campaign.

Well trained Infantry can stand up to any opposition on the battlefield, and Infantry need not feel intimidated by anything a mounted opponent can muster.

Scattering would be the factor that would give the Indians a trump card against Infantry. Hogwash. Double hogwash. One, making that statement, and we both know who would be such a proponent, Old Cavalry Minded himself, fails to acknowledge that the Indians scatter with their infrastructure in tow. Well trained Infantry can move at four miles an hour all day long. Can a village move that fast? Only in Queenie's dreams.

One of the ARTEP (Army Training and Evaluation Program) events back in my day was for an Infantry Company to move 12 kilometers on foot in ninety minutes with full field equipment, and upon arrival fire for qualification. That was routinely done, with regular Infantry, not Rangers or Special Forces.

The key as always is training. Often said by me, but can never be repeated enough. Training to be effective must be much harder than combat, and yes, despite the expression, you do have to train to be miserable. You must learn to face the hardships of weather and terrain. Make rain and formidable terrain your friend. Welcome all things that may give you the slightest advantage. Move at night, even if you have to hold hands, Use your tools. A good pair of eyes and a compass will allow you to navigate, even without a map. When you are near the enemy make him think you are far away. When you are far away, make him think you are near. Fight on your terms, not his.

Now the reason I use Rogers as an example so often when talking LBH, is that Rogers was doing these things a hundred twenty years before LBH. These things were known, yet not adopted. To evaluate anyone's performance against the same type of opponent in 1876, you must evaluate it in terms of what Rogers did, routinely, and ask yourself the question then, - Why not a LBH. 

[yanmacca]

I take in every point you make Chuck. But how was Terry and Gibbon ever going to get their infantry into the fight when their main force of cavalry was two days ahead of them.

The BLBH would have suited combined arms, because the field in question has areas impassable to cavalry but suited to infantry.

Would any of the commanders in the three columns be used to combining infantry, cavalry and artillery? To combine all three would need good timing and planning, mainly because of the range that artillery can fire.

I suppose you could kick off the proceedings with a few rounds of canon ball and shot, then send your infantry through any brush or scrub to emerge to hit the village from an angle it wouldn’t have expected or let them hold the high ground on the bluffs in an attempt block any move east. Cavalry could dominate the flatter land to the south, west and north.

The key areas to pick up on is to; catch the village on the hop, make sure every one knows the plan and start by scattering the Indians mobility [horses]. Placing the village in a panic with soldiers on every front would water down their defensive qualities.

Look at the real battle; Reno was spotted and was quickly faced with 500 to 800 Indians, bad odds against 140 soldiers. They managed to assemble these numbers because they faced no other threats at that time, but if you place 500 soldiers on each on four sides [2000 in total], then we have a different ball game and it would deny each of the main circles the chance to merge as they did with Reno and later Custer. I would guess that each circle would run towards the nearest threat to their own non-coms stopping any build up to the numbers we saw in 1876.

[quincannon]

1) They weren't. That is not the Infantry's fault. That is the commander's fault. Good Infantry is no good if the commander does not know how they should be employed. Terry both did not know how to employ them,  he did not have what I would call good Infantry either.

2) All battle calls for combined arms in some shape or form.

3) Take a good hard look at the banner photo. That is Infantry Paradise.

4) The key is to be so stealthy, so secretive, that you cut the bastards goddamned throats while they sleep.

5) The only reason that one should ever look at the real battle is to find out what not to do, top to bottom.

You keep looking at the this or that, and what I am telling you is that the this or that does not matter. The only thing that matters is training, and behind training is the motivation to be trained that was completely lacking. Without both, and I mean good hard training, building both the man and his skill set there is absolutely no profit in going further with LBH. Nothing, no what ifs, no supposition, no alternative scenarios can make anything better, or justifiable. Training is such a basic ingredient.

I do however understand both your perspective and point of view. You, not having ever been in the military, and that's neither fault nor crime, assume that all units are trained to and achieve the same standard. That is as far from the truth that can be. Take Normandy. The 4th Infantry Division entered combat on D Day, They had no previous experience, and they did exceedingly well. The 90th Infantry Division entered combat on D Day and they were absolutely miserable performers. Both divisions were subject to the same training schedule, the same subjects, the same training opportunities and environment. The 4th Division were highly trained, and it showed, while the 90th Division went through the motions of training. Look at your own web site and see how many commanders the 90th had in such a short amount of time. They were not worth two shits in a Chinese whore house until Van Fleet took command. After that they fully lived up to their World War I nickname "Tough Ombreys"

[deadwoodgultch]

Ian, take what Chuck says to heart. Then take the fact that Custer either disobeyed his orders or the spirit of them. He got nowhere near the Tongue. He never sent Herendeen whit the update, which caused Terry to delay. Combined arms means team work.

Terry knew how to cooperate, read the entire attached piece. He even cooperated with other branches. He knew team work, one of his commanders did not. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Fort_Fisher

Regards,
Tom

[herosrest]

ANECDOTE - 

[azranger]

May 21, 2019 2:52:06 GMT mac said:

It sort of disturbs me that I actually understand this post.


The thing I would add here is that prior to calling anything you need to know what the opposition is doing. If scouts had been thrown well ahead then the final play would have been easier to call.


Instead it was a rush to contact, any sort of contact.

The game was always in the valley and the best option was to stay there. The end around play had the first problem of actually getting around; and never achieved that but were picked off along the sideline and pushed out of bounds.


What about if Custer had gone left instead of right? Is it a better prospect?

Cheers

Col Hoyt wrote a paper on that and focused on the horses as the center of gravity (COG). Montrose has always thought and stated for years that the main body should have followed the advanced guard.

Obviously to me is that it keeps all 12 companies in sight of Custer and where he could command. If they had real trouble they could fall back up the valley to the high place near the 7th Ranch that Chuck talked about a few years ago. Tom and I went and looked at it. Dodging traffic since it is between the highway lanes.

The cavalry advantage was its ability to move the valley was much better cavalry ground. The carbine's advantages were in valley where they could make hits at distance. Since it flat the bow is of little use in indirect fire. To get within range there would be no cover or concealment.  Carbine v. Bow on flat ground is no contest if you can shoot.

Regards

Steve

[yanmacca]

Hi Steve.
It seems like the valley held no interest to Custer, let’s face it he didn’t even know the terrain or any value to the route as a tactical maneuver as he never went near the place, instead he sent Cooke forward. He wanted to attack from another direction just like he did at Washita, but the terrain and village size would make this a totally different battle.

[mac]

May 23, 2019 15:35:12 GMT azranger said:

The cavalry advantage was its ability to move the valley was much better cavalry ground. The carbine's advantages were in valley where they could make hits at distance. Since it flat the bow is of little use in indirect fire. To get within range there would be no cover or concealment.  Carbine v. Bow on flat ground is no contest if you can shoot.

Regards

Steve

Absolutely true AZ!
The above quote is what has always made me feel Custer was moving right with the intent of quickly regaining the valley which he could only do at Ford D. Well not there as it turned out but that was probably his intent all along.
This thread is, I think, a "what if" thread and so we perhaps assume troops are trained and competent although I fully endorse what QC has said about training.
Here is an example along the lines of the impact of training and leadership on performance. It just happened that I was reading about this man when the topic came up.

 Major General Harold Edward Elliott, CB, CMG, DSO, DCM, VD (1878–1931)


Elliott had already received the Distinguished Conduct Medal for bravery in the Boer War before commanding a battalion on Gallipoli and later the 15th Brigade in France and Belgium. The war historian Charles Bean reflected: “What a brigade he made of the 15th! … In his exuberant vitality he overworked them, strafed them, punished them; and yet they would do anything he asked of them.”

Elliott was wounded on the first day on Gallipoli and maintained a reputation as a fighting leader, always close to the action, throughout the war. He was devoted to his troops and always concerned for them. In France, following the disastrous attack at Fromelles in July 1916 he was seen greeting the brigade’s survivors with tears streaming down his face.

My understanding of this last event from other sources is that having lost 1452 of his men in 24 hours, in an action he had protested to his commanders was not achievable, he was standing in the road shaking the hand of each man as they returned.


Cheers

[quincannon]

That's right Mac. If you train them right,and treat them right, your soldiers will climb Mount Olympus for you and kick the crap out of Zeus.

Do neither, and they will hate you till their dying day.

[yanmacca]

I don’t know why Terry didn’t keep the seventh attached to the main column, there he could keep all his assets together.

As for scouting and recon work, if you look at a map of the valley and Reno’s advance, you will notice that Reno had a detached group 12 to 15 acting as a scout unit moving ahead of the battalion in a northwesterly direction, now this group contained three officers and their orderlies plus Renos orderly [Lt. Varnum, Lt. Hare, Lt. Wallace, Pvt. Strode, Pvt. Clear, Pvt. Hackett and Pvt. Davern. I would guess that rest of this detail contained Indian scouts.

Now if the column had two such details each one led by an officer [probably Varnum and Hare] plus a couple of privates and a half a dozen Indian scouts, then these two details could have done just a good a job on finding the village as did Custer’s whole 7th cavalry.
That would mean that Terry and Gibbon would have at their disposal;

7th Cav. (12 x Companies)
2nd Cav. (4 x Companies)
17th Inf. (2 x Companies)
6th Inf. (3 x Companies)
7th Inf. (6 x Companies)
Lt. Lows Gatling gun Detachment (3 x Guns)

Which looks pretty good on paper, so with proper scouting and planning, this force could have been much more effective.