mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Jan 12, 2017 12:29:36 GMT
Long, Long ago on a board far far away there was a discussion of Custer's plan. The consensus was that whatever the plan, the essence was speed. Now with our new analysis of the action in the thread Custer Attacked Ford D, I think we can consider what happened after Custer left the valley, as we now better understand where he was going and his purpose. This impacts on interpretations of his actions at 3411 and his route to Ford D. I am happy with the notion that he felt that the warriors coming out to Reno were a screen to attempt to slow him down and his split from Reno was an attempt to bypass the screen and get as quickly as possible at the warriors infrastructure. Cheers
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Jan 12, 2017 14:34:51 GMT
Custer mounted the bluffs after Gerard, I believe it was, told him "There go your Indians, General". This implies that Gerard knew Custer wanted to prevent the Indians from fleeing the area. This then implies that sometime between the 22nd and 25th, that Custer shared the overall goal of corralling and/or killing as many as possible before Terry arrives with his officers and probably scouts like Gerard.
Once he hears the Indians are running, he has to get around them to the north, hence the move up the bluffs instead of into the valley behind Reno. From 3411, it has been debated as to what he would have seen. I believe he would not have seen Reno in retreat, as in moving fast, he would have been able to see the opening scene of Reno either still in the initial charge, or Reno deploying into skirmish lines. He would not have lingered there very long at all, and he probably had his battalion moving north the whole time he was viewing Reno. He left 3411 believing Reno was facing a screening force only, and that the Indians were attempting to flee north. That would be a good thing if Custer were a team player. Fleeing north takes them straight into Terry. However, Custer wanted this victory for the 7th only. Now he has to quickly get north of the Indians. Remaining hidden during travel should prevent the Indians from fleeing any faster than they already were, so he goes the eastern route behind the hills rather than down MTC. Enroute to the ford D area, he encounters Wolf Tooth and has to engage him, probably from the LNC area all the way to ford D. This slows him down a bit, plus makes his presence known to the village, if they didn't already know he was there.
He continues, taking all 5 companies to ford D, and from there we go to the Custer attacked ford D discussion.
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
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Post by azranger on Jan 12, 2017 14:42:05 GMT
Is Custer's on the fly plan caused by the lack of recon?
Was the total picture of the valley including horse herds and the bluffs across from the Big Village included in Custer's decision making?
Were there Indians on the bluffs prior to Custer moving that direction?
I get that he made what he thought was the best decision but was that because he did not have enough information.
One of the things that struck me was if Custer continued up the Rosebud would he have gathered increased information. In Gordie's book he has chapters after the first ten chapters that are called analysis. Analysis 2 "How The Indian Bands Came Together At The Little Horn" gives routes and numbers. Custer was unaware of the these other trails.
Would the have been discovered moving up the Rosebud?
Some for sure.
Regards
Steve
* Colt posted while I was forming this one.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 12, 2017 15:18:53 GMT
That is exactly what George Patton would do. That is exactly what Colt was trained to do at the Armor School. That is exactly the tactic that should be used in this particular situation, and it would have worked had two factors been in place.
1) Patton and Colt, and everyone else that wanted to do this, and I assume that this was Custer's intention from the outset as Colt says, would have thoroughly reconnoitered the battlespace before launching such an attack.
2) Patton and Colt, and everyone else that wanted to do this, would have given more weight to both the main and supporting attacks.
3) Failure to do numbers 1 and 2 mean that you end up such an adventure with essentially the same results seen on 25 June 1876.
There is a new book out or shortly to be released "Death At The Little Bighorn" by Phillip Thomas Tucker. Based upon the blurb I read Tucker concentrates on this flank attack, which as you all know from previous discussions here and elsewhere was not a flank attack, but rather an envelopment around the flank. His, according to that same blurb sheds new light on how it could have succeeded, blah, blah, blah. It asks the question why was Custer repulsed. Again blah, blah, blah.
Before any of you rushes out to purchase this, I would caution you all to read the reviews, and take note of the people doing the reviewing. Tucker wrote the absolute worst book ever written in my estimation on the Alamo - "Exodus From The Alamo". It was universally panned by people I know and respect who have forgotten more about the Alamo that Tucker evidently ever knew. The scholarship sucked, and the conclusions drawn would make the brown board look like purveyors of truth and prudence.
Tucker seems to relish taking the shine off the apple. Don't let him take your money until you thoroughly investigate this one.
NOW - Keep in mind that school solutions do not always work. They don't work if you do not apply them correctly. They don't work if they are not executed with speed and precision. They do not work if you leave the door opened to be surprised by factors unknown. The selection of a good tactic is only the first step. It is not the be all and end all. Sometimes a poor tactic is a good choice if you have a better chance of executing it with success, by the actions you take when the tactic is put in motion. A frontal attack for instance is no one's first choice, but a frontal attack many times works to achieve what you set out to do, particularly when you have incomplete situational awareness.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 12, 2017 16:07:16 GMT
You do get the idea that all Custer wanted to do was to hit the village from top to bottom, which shows that this was a simple operation, which was made more complicated by distance.
Because when he devised this plan, he had no idea of how long this village stretched and the distance involved.
But unperturbed he pressed on, hoping that with some luck, the majority of the fighting element was still located to the south.
This plan of Custer’s would have worked a treat if the ford B was the north end of the village, but he didn’t find that out until he got to 3411, but he was a stubborn man and he was not going to let this set back ruin his plan.
He was going to press on and follow the terrain and find a crossing point further north, but this extra distance gave his enemy time not only to virtually track him but gather enough strength to stop him cross the river.
This blocked his advance and forced him to do what he should have done when he saw how far the village stretched from 3411, and that what re-unite his force in the valley.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 12, 2017 17:53:40 GMT
I think the question must be asked at this point, what was Custer's purpose in going to 3411, if in fact he actually did?
In all probability he did go there, or someplace in that vicinity, but what if he did know that crossing at Ford B was a no go before he went there?
What if the intention all along was to go to Ford D, cross over, and have a mile or so of open ground between that place and the north end of the village?
All this would suggest some prior knowledge on his part of both of these fords, and the possibility exists that he could have obtained that knowledge from one of his scouts, who had been in this area before, and had the ability to relate the advantages of D and the disadvantages of B. Ford B still stunk as a crossing place, even without the village being on the immediate other side. Still a bad place to swing west, then south again. Ford D on the other hand offered good approaches, and could be assumed to be clear of that village. Coming across at D also allowed you to get between the Indians and a good part of the pony herd.
I do not know if any of this is feasible, but I think it deserves a look and some analysis. The one thing that Custer could not have known from anyone by virtue of their pervious visits was the location of the herd. Perhaps that is why he went to the edge of the bluffs, to obtain that one last piece, and seeing Reno was not the intention, but rather a bonus. I agree with Colt here. He would have only seen Reno's preliminaries, and Reno had not yet had the time to either fully or partially develop the situation.
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Post by Beth on Jan 12, 2017 19:17:51 GMT
If Custer didn't go to 3411, who did? I agree there is no evidence that it was Custer on the bluff but enough eye witness testimony that someone was there--perhaps it was a small recon type party and it was survivors with wishful thinking that made the 3 figures on the bluff Custer.
If you remove Custer from the bluff then it just pulls another prop from the leg of the Ford B story. I remember asking a long time ago on that board far far away about what Custer would have seen and was told he should have seen that Reno would have been in serious trouble. If you remove Custer from 3411 you have to put a big question mark on if Custer knew Reno would be in trouble or if whoever was there would have passed the info on. There would be no reason to go to Ford B to 'save Reno'. Perhaps if there was an aborted attempt by soldiers at Ford B, it was the small group seen at 3411. Or, to talk myself in circles, there was no one at 3411 and they actually saw Custer on Weir point. (Such a puzzle because what does that do to Martini's story)
I know at one time I would have totally agreed that Custer's ego would have been that "I can do with the 7th what Terry has planned to do with 2 different columns" but anymore I am really trying to tone down my knee jerk dislike for Custer the man and look at things on how a competent man with a more than healthy ego might have handled the battle. Would it be realistic that a person with the information that Custer had about the expected size of the village that we know he had from the government, and the intelligence about the possibility of a northern ford that we suspect he had, have decided that he could hit the village north and south with the sources he had. I think so.
The problem is that we don't know if Custer really ever realized from what the trail was telling him that the village and the number of hostile warriors he was about to face was a whole lot larger that he had been briefed on. I am unsure if that was a recon fail or if it was a failure to accept the information about what the recon should have told him. Sometimes people just develop mental blocks that when they have been told by a reliable source to expect one thing, they are willing to dismiss information that doesn't support that view.
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Post by Beth on Jan 12, 2017 19:25:36 GMT
If Custer wanted to know where the herd was, would he have gone to 3411 personally or sent someone to get the information? Would his focus have been getting that information or getting everyone north ASAP? Or perhaps the question is would this be the type of information best designated by a commander to someone else to find out or so important that he would have to do it himself.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 12, 2017 19:34:43 GMT
The 3411 is not based on any real evidence, I know that a couple of men saw figures on the bluffs and Martini said that he and the general went to view the village from a high point, but apart from that 3411 is a spot chosen for its locality and not set in stone.
If we read again what the survivors said then we can see that the column got dragged away from the bluffs by a group of fifty or so Indians over near SSR, so I would regard this as more solid evidence then a high point on the bluffs picked because it is the best place on the hill side.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Jan 12, 2017 19:44:20 GMT
Custer's trip to 3411 was designed to let him see the total lay of the land, if possible. From the point where he sent Reno across ford A, he could not see the village at all. Moving to the high ground gave him a chance to see just where the village actually was. As we now know, you couldn't really see the whole picture from 3411, but you could see that the village was a hell of a lot bigger than expected. You could also see a little of the terrain where a possible ford might be, if the scouts hadn't told him that.
Since Custer spent the first part of the ACW doing recon work, I would expect him to be the one who went to the viewing point to see the area for himself. I can't see him sending a subordinate to gather that info and have it relayed to him. He would want to see if for himself, as a commander should do, if possible.
To AZ's point about Custer continuing up the Rosebud. If had had done that he most certainly would have hit Indian trails (SFRC?) that would have given him information about movements and a better estimate of the size of the opposing force. However, that depends on him properly interpreting those signs. He had signs all along that told him there were growing numbers of hostiles, but he never pieced that info together to realize that fact. He just assumed they were always following the same static-sized group, large though it was.
He also should have already known where the pony herd was from the scout reports at the Crow's Nest, even though he personally couldn't see the horses. He would not have needed to climb the bluffs just to see where the horses were. There were probably visible from the point where he and Reno split off.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 12, 2017 20:00:12 GMT
Custer like any commander, would be chomping at the bit to see his objective but without moving along those bluffs I cannot see what he could view just by scanning the valley from the high ground.
I don't know just what they could see from SSR, but by the sounds of it the whole column apparently saw the village together and that is when Custer said "hold on to your horses boys" etc. etc. so the must have all saw the objective before the last courier left. So is this is relevant, then why would he go on a ride to 3411.
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Post by Beth on Jan 12, 2017 20:12:48 GMT
The 3411 is not based on any real evidence, I know that a couple of men saw figures on the bluffs and Martini said that he and the general went to view the village from a high point, but apart from that 3411 is a spot chosen for its locality and not set in stone. If we read again what the survivors said then we can see that the column got dragged away from the bluffs by a group of fifty or so Indians over near SSR, so I would regard this as more solid evidence then a high point on the bluffs picked because it is the best place on the hill side. I am afraid that I consider '3411' shorthand for 'a high point someplace on the bluffs' perhaps we need should to come up with something like HPOTB instead? (anything but just HP)
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 12, 2017 20:19:18 GMT
Yes Beth, I agree, I know that Fred came up with the location and I am not knocking him in anyway as he does have an eye for terrain and locations, just check out the Wagner gap.
But at the end of the day, 3411 is where Fred would have gone to view the village if he were Custer.
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Post by Beth on Jan 12, 2017 20:54:15 GMT
The irony of Wagner's Gap is that it would have been well known to everyone until the road went in, yet I am unsure if any of them viewed it as significant enough to mention, or perhaps they didn't mention it because it was obvious and they couldn't foresee that it would be erased from the terrain by a road crew?
Also if you go with Ford D theory as we have been discussing it, then the Gap loses some of its significance. Keogh is no longer positioned to stay in that area either under Wagner's theory of what he was watching or Montrose's-I seem to recall they had different views. Perhaps Keogh was just caught moving on low ground when a tide of warriors washed over him from different directions.
Ghads I don't mean that statement to be quite as persnickety as it sounds.
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Post by Beth on Jan 12, 2017 21:04:55 GMT
Custer like any commander, would be chomping at the bit to see his objective but without moving along those bluffs I cannot see what he could view just by scanning the valley from the high ground. I don't know just what they could see from SSR, but by the sounds of it the whole column apparently saw the village together and that is when Custer said "hold on to your horses boys" etc. etc. so the must have all saw the objective before the last courier left. So is this is relevant, then why would he go on a ride to 3411. Which bit is he chomping though? Seeing the valley from high ground or getting north of the village to put his plan in motion? Custer has only so long to get into position to set his Northern plan into motion. If you believe Custer was going after the women and children for hostages, then they are only going to be vulnerable position for a short window of time and after that they will possibly be scattered to the hills. If you believe that Reno was to hold the warriors focus to give Custer time to into position to attack from the North then Reno is only going to have a limited time to hold that focus.
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