Custer Moves to Ford D with Five Companies Part A

[mac]

I was very struck when I visited the SSL and walked to Deep Ravine that you cannot see LSH, as you observed Ian.
At the start of the video he is at the cluster of markers that I mentioned earlier as being on the crest of the first hill you would climb if you ran south off Cemetery Ridge you can see this at the start of the video and then, shortly after, he points out Cemetery Ridge. 
The line of escape then is simply away from Cemetery Ridge. From here you are running across the slope which is going to your right, coming down to the river. In a panic run you will naturally tend to run slowly down the slope as each step takes you a bit more to the right. That is why the line bends towards the river. They are not heading to Deep Ravine, it just gets in the way of their escape. This is why it does not surprise me that we have a report of bodies at the ravine rather than all in it. You probably live longer if you jump in and head towards the river, but not much longer.
Pity old Custer Apollo didn't film anything at Ford D.
Cheers

[Beth]

Nov 21, 2016 3:25:01 GMT quincannon said:

It is textbook maneuver Mac.

A column is the easiest formation to control on the march, but shucky doo, it ain't worth crap in a firefight. SO. What you do is start to spread wide as you approach where you think you may have to deploy, as an aid to that deployment. At what we now call the PLD (Probable Line of Deployment) or when you first take fire, it is rather easy then for these smaller units to shake out and come into line, and place maximum firepower forward. Much easier say then sorting out a three company column.

My suspicion was always that Custer was traveling in two groupings. That was probably for security, although there may be some unknown factor I am not aware of. What I am sure of is that he would wish to be able to control as wide a front as possible coming down off that high ground. Companies E and F could very well have been in that feature AZ calls Crazy Horse Draw. They obviously went back that way as evidenced by the Kellogg body find, so there I every reason to believe that they may have approached the ford that way as well. Roads get put in because they are they pathways men travel for the most part.

KISS KISS KISS or better IIBTKATAYSSBSMMTDFTAYS

It Is Best To Keep All Answers You Seek Simple Because Simple Men Made The Decisions For The Answers You Seek.

Walter Camp Beth has probably caused more harm than any good he ever did. Reminds me of this guy who my old man used to hang out with back in the thirties and forties. Always wondered why my father could not read a map or have any clue about fighting or positioning of troops. His theories were so far off they baffled me. It became clear after my father passed away when I went through volumes of letters exchanged during the period cited between him and my father, as well as quite a few other ACW buffs that lived in the DC area. The man who led them was a tactical moron. Unfortunately he was the ACW historian for one of the more prominent Union States, so I will not mention his name. He was the Walter Camp of his particular area of interest.

First I apologize for inserting my bit about Camp into the flow of a more interesting conversation. For some reason I did not see the info about Two Moon et al until today.  It's happened before and I am unsure if I am just inattentive and reading an entire thread or if it is a problem with proboard--I've noticed before that I will be missing a whole page of posts but they will reappear with a refresh.

I am going to have to reread all the comments about the columns because it is not something I can easily visualize but I will work on it.  Hopefully if we can all manage to get together at LBH it will help make it clearer.  It's why I appreciate Ian's graphics so much.

About Camp--it is safe to say I am not his biggest supporter.  He is the worse type of researcher-he had a set idea and only collected the information that backed his theories and dismissed anything that didn't sometimes even by personal attacks.  Unfortunately many of the terms we use about LBH and the early ideas about the battle are directly from his work.   He never bothered to see when a narrative talks about a ravine or a Ford, if there were any other candidates for the described action.  He decided that there was an attempt at Ford B so any discussion of a Ford had to be Ford B even if the rest of the story didn't fit.  The same goes for the Deep Ravine--he decided the story of 28 bodies had to be in Deep Ravine and even though he was told there were no bodies in there he continued with the story as fact.

Mac I really really doubt they would have thrown bodies in a ravine to bury them, especially when you look at the efforts that were made all over the rest of the field to scrap what dirt they could over remains. I suspect that they went to such effort not because they were making sure every man received a "Christian burial" but because it was the only choice available.  Remember these were bodies in advance decay and would have been essentially unmovable by what was available at the time.  

So if Lieutenant Roe says there were never bodies in Deep Ravine we are have a several other possibles--that those burials expected to be in Deep Ravine are on SSL, perhaps there is another ravine or even the legend of the 28 bodies is really just a legend.  May I suggest that we open a different thread in theories to look at the possibilities especially based on all the reports since it doesn't quite fit in this thread?

(sorry if this is fragmented-I'm trying to listen to a live broadcast of the events in Japan-hopefully at this time it's going to be a minor event compared to the tsunami a few years ago.)

[Beth]

Nov 21, 2016 20:09:38 GMT quincannon said:

The story that Custer Apollo relates in that video clip defies belief for the rational and those of sound mind.

But his videos allow me to see the area and refresh my memory--and since he is more mobile than I, his videos take me to places I would not be able to reach even if I was right there.  I do find his commentary troublesome at times--most times.

[quincannon]

Using my theory that - People in battle make simple decisions, so we should therefore look for simple answers - I would submit a very simple answer as follows.

As C-I-L pull out E and F change front slightly to lend cover. C-I-L get away, but E and F are pushed back south to where they end up. I think it covers all the bases. What it does not answer is were E and F trying to withdraw and got caught, or were they just forced off where they were, and ultimately got caught in the final positions.

Take you Bonafides and draw a line from the river near the staff housing area straight east to infinity. Nearly everything will be south of that line. It also marries up quite well with the yellow and green marks on that map Ian (I think) posted.

My money is on E and F getting pushed south. The Deep Ravine area was a refuge of last resort for people that came off Cemetery Ridge and across Cemetery Ravine, and LSH was a similar place for a company driven from their original position only to fine Indians between them and parts further south.

[mac]

I think this is probably correct QC. 
Previously I have mentioned the fact that Sgt Sharrow and another soldier were found north of LSH; out near the Indian monument I believe. My feeling is that this represents a time where that was a defensive line/position. This, to me, might represent that the pressure was coming from the north mainly. This too shown by Company E (and a few others) being pushed towards Deep Ravine.
Warrior tactics were to probe the enemy flanks creating a half moon shape around the enemy. If Companies C,I,L have escaped south, then that eastern side of the line is the weak point with just a DCIL out there perhaps. When Companies E and F are split then the whole thing collapses back to LSH with the split portion (largely Company E) heading to DR.
LSH will then quickly be surrounded and isolated.
Cheers

[quincannon]

Mac: Indian tactics and techniques are nearly mirror images of CHICOM and IMMUN GUN T&T in Korea.

None of any of this then is unfamiliar to those who study the Korean Conflict, especially between June 1950 and the Summer of 1951. This stuff happened all the time, where units were completely cut off, and usually the circumstance of trying to force a withdrawal or trying to cut off the same.

This is the methodology of forces weak in firepower but strong in mass, and it has been so down through the ages.

[mac]

Looks like this is another highly probable scenario that fits this theory.


New question for thought.
Why does Custer return south and not pull out east?
First thought... It is textbook in that is it is the way he came and he knows what is there.
Second thought...Is it possible he knows there is a feature that he passed that is a good/better defensive position ...like say Nye Cartwright.
Cheers

[quincannon]

Personally I like Thought Number One, and love Thought Number Two.

First off we don't know that Custer ordered anything, but let's say he did. He sees three companies pull out to the south. As far as he knew they made it. Why not. He forgot the other fellows have both a mind and a vote.

Nye-Cartwright is a miserable defensive position, but keep in mind that miserable is a few steps above abysmal, and abysmal was what he was sitting on. He would had he gotten away have to stop at some sort of rally point, and that place should be defensible. N-C fits that description, not well, but it is the only station on the railroad south.

[yanmacca]

Mac, I think it makes sense to follow the bulk of your command, though it does seem like they were fixed around the cemetery area.
The idea of being separated thus isolated then chopped up, would be on their minds as these 38 men units were extremely vulnerable when cut off.
I would have thought that if he was allowed to, then he would have followed C-I-L all the way.

One thing though, when you was discussing Two Moons (I think), did you read the section in "battle lines"?
He said that on the cemetery area, the soldiers took their horses to a ravine and fought on foot, but the grey horse soldiers kept hold of their own horses.

Could the horses then spooked by the Indians and drove off be the mounts of F Company? This could explain why they  ran to LSH and not followed Keogh. There is more to be found about soldiers keeping hold of their horses whilst trying to fire their carbines, some accounts say that the horses simply broke away from their riders, leaving them on foot and with only limited ammunition.
I am not sure though on what are of the field that these accounts cover, as some say this could have been E Company and other C Company on FFR.

[quincannon]

Holding on to you own horses does not necessarily mean that the soldier on a skirmish line literally held his horse while trying to fire. It could well mean that the horses were held (by non-firers) close at hand. Indian familiarity with the Oxford Dictionary was not wide spread, nor were translations accurate to 100 percent certitude.

In situations like these, I think it is best to assume that soldiers would follow training and doctrine, and that would say in this instance, dismount, horse holders to the rear. The question then remains, how far to the rear, and how close would they have to be for the observer to say the unit retained immediate control of their mounts.

I have never tried to fire a carbine while both dismounted AND holding a horse, but if I did, I suspect I would only try to do it once.

Reading too much into what was said, is always just as much a detriment to understanding as reading in too little.

[yanmacca]

Two Moons;

When Custer got on top where the stones are the troops dismounted and they tried to lead the horses down into the gulch. The Gray Horse Company was the only troop that held their horses. Each man held his own and not a shot was fired while this was going on. They were making preparations.

The horses in the gulch were now turned loose by the soldiers and they fled toward the river. Some were caught tied together; some jumped into the river before the Indians got there, but the Indians got them all.

Richard Fox;

[quincannon]

First off Richard Fox is not God. He interprets things just like you and I.

Events have a continuum. I do not find it implausible for a company of soldiers to dismount and hold their horses. I find it implausible for a company of soldiers to dismount and fight while holding their horses. Two Moon said that the soldiers held their horse while dismounted and not a shot was fired. I find that easy to believe. What I find impossible to believe is that these same soldiers would hold onto their horses, when the lead started flying.

Which stones? When was the statement made? The stones on the top of LSH predate the modern cemetery by some good time. Was he speaking of the stones on top of LSH (the monument and temporary cemetery establish for those from the Fetterman fight), or was he speaking about the modern cemetery? It makes a very big difference in understanding what company Two Moons was talking about.

What gulch? The place is full of such features. Horses in a gulch do not tell us anything. Only horses in a specific gulch can tell us something.

Which of those companies was Two Moons focused on. In combat you focus narrows to only those things that are important to you at that very moment. It is not a time for sightseeing. Having been to that place I feel confident is saying that when someone is shooting at you from one place, you cannot see squat anyplace else. If for instance you were focused on people shooting at you from the modern cemetery, you ain't seeing diddly in a gulch, any gulch. SO what is the answer. Some of what Two Moons had to say is probably what he saw. Other portions are in all probability what he heard from others or what he surmised in the aftermath.

If you are in your back garden it is unlikely that you see any event six blocks away. That is the kind of distances we are dealing with here, You may have seen emergency vehicles heading that way. You may have seen smoke in the distance. You may have seen police cordoning off areas leading to the incident. You may have heard you neighbor say that some idiot started a fire and was standing in his front garden holding a horse and shooting a carbine. You may wander over that way later this afternoon and try to put the pieces of what happened together. That in no way means that what you observed was accurate. Now if you told that story in print, how could anyone differentiate between what you saw, what you heard, or what you surmised? It could not be done unless you, yourself told us what you actually saw, what you surmised, what you heard. Two Moons was not that kind to us.

[yanmacca]

Low Dog was there, but it is hard to determine were about on the battlefield he was (account written in 1881);

I called to my men, "This is a good day to die: follow me." We massed our men, and that no man should fall back, every man whipped another man's horse and we rushed right upon them. As we rushed upon them the white warriors dismounted to fire, but they did very poor shooting. They held their horse’s reins on one arm while they were shooting, but their horses were so frightened that they pulled the men all around, and a great many of their shots went up in the air and did us no harm.

If this is not enough, then I am simply at a loss and unable to contribute with the same enthusiasm, as we are starting to cherry pick accounts to suit our own theory.

[quincannon]

Does Low Dog say they were firing carbines? No.

Can you reload that type carbine with one hand while holding a horse with another? No.

You must then suspect then that if they were firing, they were firing revolvers, and if that is the case, then if the range was too great for effective fire that could have contributed to not hitting anyone.

As an alternative to that immediately above Low Dog does not say if this was a skirmish line or a group of horse holders. Were they horse holders I would expect them to be mounted, each one holding three or more. I would also expect them to, if attacked, dismount to defend themselves.

It is not the contribution, it is the examination of that contributed.

So what Low Dog says I would find highly improbable if he were speaking of attacking a skirmish line, but near letter perfect if he were attacking horse holders alone. I would not call that cherry picking. What I would call it is trying to make some sense of a given story so it too may be included in the overall narrative.

When something that is read is inconsistent with known doctrine and training it must be thoroughly examined to validate the statement.

Men holding horses on a skirmish line while firing is inconsistent with doctrine and training. That is why you train to do the same thing all the time, every time, consistent with the situation at hand. So let's look at it.

Soldiers standing stationary, holding a horse, is consistent with training. In fact the command given is stand to horse.

Soldiers firing on a dismounted skirmish line with their assigned long weapon is consistent with doctrine and training. Soldiers firing their assigned long weapon on a dismounted skirmish line while holding a horse is inconsistent with doctrine and training.

Horse holders remaining mounted, while holding horses is consistent with training. Horse holding soldiers mounted, dismounting to defend themselves while trying to maintain control of the horses they are responsible for is neither consistent or inconsistent with doctrine and training, so you give the benefit of the doubt in favor of human instinct.

Everyone should look at what Low Dog said, but you should also look for what was not said as well

[colt45]

Nov 22, 2016 13:59:00 GMT quincannon said:

Holding on to you own horses does not necessarily mean that the soldier on a skirmish line literally held his horse while trying to fire. It could well mean that the horses were held (by non-firers) close at hand. Indian familiarity with the Oxford Dictionary was not wide spread, nor were translations accurate to 100 percent certitude.

In situations like these, I think it is best to assume that soldiers would follow training and doctrine, and that would say in this instance, dismount, horse holders to the rear. The question then remains, how far to the rear, and how close would they have to be for the observer to say the unit retained immediate control of their mounts.

I have never tried to fire a carbine while both dismounted AND holding a horse, but if I did, I suspect I would only try to do it once.

Reading too much into what was said, is always just as much a detriment to understanding as reading in too little.

It would be entirely feasible that the horse holders were only a few feet behind the shooters if the terrain didn't offer good protection for the horses and if the shooters knew they were going to have to bug out in very short order.  The firing line might only fire 3-5 rounds before it became necessary to leave the area.  If that were the case, as a shooter, I would want my mount only a few seconds away at running speed.  Fire, mount, and get out of Dodge quickly.

I agree that it would be against training for the shooter to try and hold his horse with one hand and try and shoot the rifle with the other.  With all the commotion going on, I can't envision a horse standing still enough to allow a well-aimed, one-arm shot.  Even with the pistol, trying to control an excited horse and hit something one-handed with a pistol is asking more than most men would be capable of, even those that were good shots with a handgun.

Common sense precludes the notion of one man shooting while holding his horse.  That would only occur in a very dire emergency and then with the pistol, and I doubt that it occurred even under extreme duress.  It would become a matter of priority.  Forget the horse, kill the guy that is trying to kill you.