Custer Moves to Ford D with Five Companies Part A

[colt45]

Can't argue with Chuck's logic above. I also believe the JSIT account holds the most water when looking at the battle. I look at the whole thing and think "What would I have done if I were in charge that day?" The movement described by JSIT makes the most sense from a military point of view. I would not have approached ford B because you can see what you need to see from LNC and at that time they were probably engaged with Wolf Tooth. Did Custer take 4 or 5 companies to Ford D? A case can be made for either way, but I can see him taking all 5 toward ford D, and when repulsed there, and upon seeing the growing threat from all sides, deciding to beat feet back the way he came. If L was the last company in march, they would naturally be first to retrograde and would have to move to a spot to facilitate the covering of the other units as they withdraw. C company coming up from behind might very well have moved to the right of L to set up a skirmish line as well as push back the hostile threat coming from the coulee.

If I am at the Ford D area and feel the need to get out of Dodge, I would send a company back the way we came with orders to find a spot that was defensible on the short term, long enough so the rest of the battalion can exit. The next company to leave would do much the same thing, though maybe not go as far as the first unless conditions forced it. The goal here is to secure the escape route. They would have been able from LNC and/or Calhoun Hill, to see the corridor the Indians could use to get in their rear, Deep Coulee. This would need to be protected while the rest of the battalion retreated. I would send the 3rd company, in this case, I company back to the battle ridge area in order to be able to cover E and F as they withdrew from the SSL and cemetery ridge areas. Assuming that the hostile action wasn't as overwhelming as it was, I would then have E and F withdraw past I company, leapfrogging past I Co toward Calhoun Hill, where they could then cover I company's withdrawal. If all was going according to plan at that point, C and L should have kept the exit route open, then I, E, and F move back toward LNC, and C and L then move back past those 3 companies, with I, E, and F covering C and L.

This leapfrog action would continue as long as hostile fire dictated that necessity of fire and maneuver. This all uses the assumption that the Indians didn't apply the kind of pressure they actually did. Custer may very well have tried to retrograde in this fashion, but there was just too many darned Indians on all sides for this to work. He flat went too far out on a limb and was probably not quick enough in making the retreat decision. His horses were also probably completely played out and unable to move out smartly when necessary.

That may be why we see L company having defended the area like they did, and why we don't see that kind of defensive evidence at the other locations, other than the desperation shooting of horses for breastworks on LSH.

In any event, the JSIT account seems to me to be the most reasonable, when considering things from a military point of view. Custer was rash, but he wasn't a complete idiot. I don't think he would screw around at ford B, drop off 2/3rds of his combat power at Calhoun Hill, then leave I company looking for Benteen and head for Ford D with 2 companies. That just doesn't make any kind of military sense.

[mac]

Thanks Colt!
That is what I was getting at. It seems to (amateur) me that you need to "open" MTC for an escape just as you would for Benteen to come in in the standard theory. This reverse though seems to jell better for me with Custer as the commander.
One thing about the company (C maybe) charging down to the warriors is that when they are confronted the account said some started to shoot each other. This is a desperate last act I would have thought. The kind of thing you do when you are escaping and then realize that the jig is up. It may not be what you do in an early stage where you feel you may be able to hit the road and escape. Just a thought.
Cheers

[quincannon]

Mac, I disagree in part with what you have said.

The critical thing was to cross over Deep Coulee and reach the L-N-C heights beyond for Company L, so they could fire into Deep Coulee until the rest crossed over and reached those same heights. If Deep Coulee is blocked at any time the game is up. That coulee becomes key terrain, and that terrain must be held open by fire. It cannot be done by occupation or from the north side.

Medicine Tail Coulee is irrelevant to the fight. It is Deep Coulee. That is the critical place.

When Calhoun reaches Calhoun Hill and finds the coulee blocked it is all over.

That does mean that Company C was an act of desperation. I am not sure about them shooting themselves at first, but it would not surprise me if it happened as they were being overrun. I think there is ample evidence that they deployed per doctrine, and were simply overrun by both fire and maneuver, with a few managing to escape to temporary safety. I have absolutely no idea though on how long they were engaged. My gut say only a few moments, but few is both relative, and to the story irrelevant.

[mac]

Thanks for that clarification Chuck.
Does the position of Companies L and I suggest then that they were trying to set up to accomplish the required task of getting to LNC?
Cheers

[quincannon]

I think it is apparent that Company L was trying and I base that on the position of the first skirmish line artifacts in the low ground below the hill. The Bonafides Map shows it clearly. Had they not there was no point in going down any further that the military crest of Calhoun Hill, which is a few hundred yards back from where Company L's initial positions were. I suspect the location of their horses were initially down close to that first skirmish line as well, and when it became apparent that a breakthrough was not in the cards, and they would have to start to build a defensive position, the horses were withdrawn to what we now know as horse holders ravine, and rearward movement of the skirmish line commenced toward the hilltop by bounds. There was at least one bound, but I think the distance involved would have required two, before the hilltop was gained.

Company I was most likely the last to arrive, but not necessarily. Were they second in order of rearward march they would have probably come up on Company L's left. If that speculation is correct then where you see them in the swale is the position they were pushed back to.

Company C was probably second, but you really just can't tell. Whenever though, their actions were done in haste, and resulting in unhinging the whole.

If Company I arrived after Company C, the critical damage was already done, but you still have to account for the why were they there aspects of that final swale position. Let's say that they were indeed the last to arrive. Company L was in place and fighting. Company C the second to arrive had already angled off to the right toward F-F, and were out of sight of Keogh. Keogh sees Company L holding, move to their left to shore up a flank or extend the line. Company C breaks causing a chain reaction with L, which forces I back as well, and it's to the swale they go.

There are probably a few variations of that, but the critical moment was the Indians winning the race to impose themselves between L-N-C and CH and have possession of the upper part of Deep Coulee, possession that initially manifested itself as possession by fire.

[yanmacca]

If this retrograde was undertook then their posture could have been what we originally thought when we spoke about the Keogh battalion being left behind.

What is the difference from the point of view of Keogh being left behind to hold the position or being sent back from cemetery hill to hold the position.

He would have still resorted to keeping C Company mounted and L in skirmish order, his own company would provide a secure right flank and protect the horse holders of L Company.

This crescent type of formation is the same one that we have been discussing for years, with Keogh resorting to a text book defense with one dismounted company and two mounted companies, with one on each flank.

So if we keep to this principle, then the sweep by C Company would still have gone ahead, whilst they waited for E and F to arrive, as pressure from this area may have threatened to whole withdrawal mission and Harrington had to sweep the area to allow for follow up units to follow through unmolested.

[yanmacca]

What really attracts me to the JSIT account is that it has none of the baggage that we find with other accounts, DC used to say that these are flawed because they are accounts of accounts and most were done through a translator with stuff being lost in translation, but this cannot be said of the JSIT account, as this was told from one Indian to another as Wolftooth was his step Grandfather and he not only explained to him what he saw but actually took him to the battlefield and showed him.

JSIT could also speak good English so what you read is what he was told and shown, without all the gaff about Indians telling the Whites just what they want to hear and spinning stuff.

I think it has a lot going for it as one of the most reliable sources of info out there.

[quincannon]

Unlikely I think, and for the following reason. You are forgetting the factor of time. The time expended up north by the five companies would have allowed the Indians to cross at Ford B and environs. If you then come back south with three companies and the Indians are already there, you must either break through them or set up a conventional dismounted defense as soon as possible.

A one company dismounted, two companies mounted does not suggest a consolidated defense, and the location of the first Company L skirmish line, and the location of Company C's line on F-F Ridge suggests two attempts to break through.

When I say defense here, I mean three companies dismounted on the same piece of ground in a tight perimeter. The situation called for that not a game of dragoon style mounted-dismounted footsie.

High ground is important. You do not surrender the high ground advantage to defend the bottom land.

Dismiss the idea of pressure. Think more in terms of standing in the path of an avalanche.

If you go back and look at the Wagner timelines, he suggests (using the conventional scenario) that it took about fifteen or so minutes to build up pressure on the Calhoun-Harrington-Keogh front. I agree with the fifteen minutes, that seems to be a logical amount of time to cross over the river and mass on the other side of B thence up Deep Coulee. So if you take that same fifteen minutes, and the same intention and apply it to the five company north end fight, those Indians are already in place when the three companies return. You must also consider the fact that out of necessity they returned sequentially, so there was not opportunity to coordinate anything between them.

Calhoun comes up and hits a brick wall, Harrington comes up angles off to Calhoun's right hoping to find a gate in the wall, but hits another solid part of that same wall. Keogh comes in last slams on his breaks just in time, but the wall reached out and slams into him.

Dark Cloud would not have like JSIT. Dark Cloud liked no one but Dark Cloud, and he not very much.

[colt45]

Yan,
I am not sure that Keogh commanded all 3 companies during the retrograde as imagined. The actions of the 3 appear different. L was clearly fighting for a while under positive control, exhibiting the proper TPP. C company appears more haphazard in the area it was covering, and I company, by its final position, appears to have been fighting surrounded. In my view of the retreat from ford D, if that is what happened, is Custer not sending 2/3rds of his power all at once, as he would have needed as much firepower as he could muster if the action was tought enough to force a retreat decision. I could see him sending L company back, then later C or I company, but not 3 companies at the same time. Just my opinion.

[yanmacca]

Colt you may well be right, this retrograde could have been done in stages, which as I said the other day about how each company seems to act in a different manner the longer the withdrawal takes, as for example;

L Company falls back first in good order and sets up a defensive line.
C Company is next but is under more pressure from the river bank and gets broken before it can set up a defensive line.
I Company just about makes it and instead of going to Calhoun they go straight over battle ridge as the basin area becomes a killing field.
F Company + HQ find the rout blocked and move up to LSH, there they are faced with more Indians who have moved around to block them.
E Company is simply fixed and loses their horses and is unable to go anywhere.

They then have to contend with Crazy Horse and his charge.

[quincannon]

It is not that it could have been done in stages Ian. Such an action MUST be done in stages.

You cannot under those circumstance of heavy contact pull three companies off at once. It must be done in sequence, and sequence means time in between.

The tea leaves of sequence say Company L was first. On the southern position their area shows the evidence of more long term resistance. Company C was most likely second because they had the longest distance to cover before they met their demise. That leaves only L arriving late, as depicted by their final location. That location indicates them being caught and confronted there, or being pushed back to there. My money would be on the latter.

Colt has probably done this very same thing in training more times than he can count. You take the least engaged to the rear first, then the next least, and finally you last element if it is still breathing. It is easier to do with a tank company than with Infantry or vulnerable to fire horse mounted cavalry, but not all that much easier.

[yanmacca]

I would bet that this retrograde in stages would be their down fall, as these small companies would soon be struggling as the pressure mounted, the final proof is in the way they all died in different areas, with no interlocking fields of fire and no support of each other, basically five units in five locations.

They would have been better off doing a Reno.

[quincannon]

"They would be better off doing a Reno".

It was not the same situation, at least not to their knowledge. What they saw, the only thing they saw was action front. They had no earthly idea that there were any Indians a mile behind them. They had imperfect knowledge. They only saw one thing which was in reality another.

They did exactly what they should have done in the circumstance they saw themselves in.

You on the other hand have a near perfect view of the battlespace based upon 140 years of hindsight.

[yanmacca]

Maybe I have Chuck, but it would still be their down fall as the they were scattered all over the place.

If you look at each company you can see on a map just how they were calved up, so this retrograde was done by the book, but it looks like they all went via different routes, should they have done this?

Why didn’t they stick to a more compact formation and arrive one after the other in a tight group.

[yanmacca]

I think that we are getting ahead of ourselves here, we were making headway with the theory of Custer moving with all his five companies to attack the village from the north end, but now we have jumped forward and our approach has shifted to one of him getting out of the area.

I have included my notion on how they moved back, and it was not that different to what the ex-military have come up with. Apparently what we have done is take our eyes off what the Indians said and that was, that this halt around cemetery position was slowly surrounded, which means that they were not heavily engaged, the main attacks came after the grey horse troop had their horses scattered.

There are many many more Indian accounts that explain how most of the companies fell, so lets stick to the JSIT narrative and more importantly look at his map, as this shows a lot of movement from both ends of the battlefield.

I tried to show this by placing those movements onto a modern map and they fit in rather well, to well in fact, but this prompted no interest.