Custer Moves to Ford D with Five Companies Part A

[quincannon]

I believe what it tells you with the Colt and carbine cartridges in nearly the same location, is something about the length of time the position was occupied. No one is going to waste a pistol round at long range. but as the target gets closer some few may discharge their pistols. So my conclusion is that locations that have both carbine and pistol cartridges comingled were in all probability occupied longer than those with carbine cartridges alone.

Why would you be surprised in not finding cartridges at a place they apparently did not go. Once again Ford B is a "must be" if you subscribe to the leaving three behind on Calhoun Hill theory. If you do not think three were left behind, then Ford B is not only unnecessary, but also an exercise in tactical foolishness.

To be fair though. Ford B could have been well picked over early on in the late 19th century, and there was nothing left to find for the recent explorer.

[yanmacca]

Just saying that if this was a crossing point like many say, then evidence is low.

As you said that the ford B would have been well trodden over the years, and I would expect cartridge cases to be visible to the collector, but not bullets, as these would be hidden to view by the penetration into the soil.

But to be fair again, there is not much evidence on those maps to show any firing at ford D, but I don't know just how far the map stretches and his finds may not cover this area.

[quincannon]

Was it not Godfrey that said he did not see anything there except evidence of a large number of shod horses crossing, and that was two days after the battle?

If you intention was to go to Ford B, after leaving the 3411 vicinity, and speed in helping Reno in the valley was deemed of paramount importance, one would think, assuming someone had knowledge of a ford being there in the first place, that you would take the shortest, thus fastest route along the bluffs to Weir, despite the disadvantages of that route, and not go to the east along N-Y-C.

The only good reason to go to L-N-C, is to keep yourself hidden as much as possible, as to mask your intention of striking much further north.

I can't get all that excited about not finding a lot of evidence at Ford D. Since the battle two highways (one an Interstate) and a railroad have been built right through that area. I can't let my short get in a twist either about not finding anything further north on BRE where Highway 212 cuts across, and for the same reason. Bulldozers and road graders do not have an historical conscience. Then there are our friends in the gravel business. That pit is like knowing something must have happened at a given place, but having no earthly idea how it transpired.

[yanmacca]

Yes he kept to the ridges to be hidden alright, which pretty much rules out an attack through ford B, if this ford was the focal point of his attack then why make such a wide detour, it just doesn't make sense, especially if he wanted to take the pressure off Reno.

If this was his goal then speed would be paramount and the best way to make up time would be a direct route to the objective and that would be straight across from SSR and down MTC, so going around the back and over the high ridge lines is not a direct route to ford B, but it is for ford D.

[mac]

Really interesting maps Ian.
The colt case find was attributed to Company C and matches were found to a case below GG ridge and some cases in a ravine behind LSH. I think we can see these positions on the map. The position behind LSH is, to me, exactly where I had expected it to be to conform to this theory.
Revisiting SSL
In the extract Ian posted there is fighting along the marker trail, which is to be expected, but coming back to the cluster of markers at the crest of the intervening ridge; I suggest that such a ridge is where some men might stop and use the terrain to try to stand and halt the pursuit by warriors off Cemetery Ridge. In a flight from LSH to the river this would make no sense.
Cheers

[chardvc]

Nov 15, 2016 14:33:15 GMT yanmacca said:

Strangely enough ford B is void of anything.

Morning all

"Archeaology of the Custer Battlefield (or something similar)" by Scott and Fox doesn't show any maps of studies at Ford B or D (or lots of other places). Ian - where were the maps you posted published?

[yanmacca]

Good morning to you too Mark.
The maps where from that link I posted earlier, there are a few more in there too.

[mac]

I have said this before. The archaeology at Ford B is underwhelming in supporting an approach to the river by Custer at that location. I doubt anyone looking at the maps with an open mind would ever suggest that anything major happened in MTC.
The finds in Deep Coulee are consistent with Company C being smashed on FF Ridge.
The map then is consistent with the attack being at Ford D.
The finds north of LSH are extensive and support the theory offered here.
Remember that John Stands In Timber (JSIT) indicated that "Ford D" was where the railway bridge now stands. As Ian and QC have stated before, this and other constructions will have obliterated archaeological traces. Researching adjacent areas though may be worthwhile. (Break out the equipment AZ and Tom )
Cheers

[yanmacca]

The evidence that E Company fled into a ravine (either deep ravine or some other prominent feature) is down to the men identified in or around that feature, here are the names that I have gathered from various sources over the years;

E Company men;
1st Sergeant F. Hohmeyer
Sergeant J Ogden
Corporal G Brown
Corporal A Meyer
Privates; R Farrell, W Huber, A Knecht and W Rees

Others;
Sergeant R Hughes (K Company detached to HQ)
Private T Donnelly (F Company)

[yanmacca]

You guys have visited the battlefield, now if there was a huge village stretching along that river from south of Bouyer’s bluff to well past MTF, would you be able to see the northern end of it if you were either on LNC ridges or Calhoun hill?

If Custer couldn’t locate the northern end of the village and the location of this point was paramount to his plan, then this could be why he carried on north.

If he did see the end of the village, but without a suitable crossing point, then this too would force him north.

It could be that he wanted to cross north of his objective and the only suitable place was ford D, as it offered him a ford which was far enough from the circles to cross and reform his battalion before attacking south or even round up any no-coms.

I know we have all said this before and forgive me for bringing the obvious to the table, but it really could be that simple.

[quincannon]

Ian: There is not one darn thing wrong with simple. In fact the more simple things are, when speaking of battle, the more likely they are to be correct.

Simple solutions are in fact the best solutions, for in the high stress environment of battle, you want simple, While everything is hard to execute in battle, any complication you introduce into what you are doing, makes the task all the harder, and your chances of success diminish.

If you take the conventional theory of LBH and apply what I just wrote, you find that it is both convoluted and overcomplicated. The JSIT, simple and straightforward - you head directly to the place where you think you can do the most good for yourself, and with everything you have. NO SHIM, NO SHAM, NO SHUFFEL, NO JIVE.

[quincannon]

Other than the fact that Custer forgot to wear a watch, and/or thought Reno's actual name was Clark Kent, and there would be a readily available phone booth nearby, his intentions were simple and straightforward.

Had Reno had 400 or so, and had he himself another 400, it may very well have worked. So we are led back to the point often made. that the poor boy still thought he was a major general commanding a division of seasoned soldiers, instead of a LTC commanding the dregs that he himself had allowed to get that way.

[chardvc]

Cheers Ian,

On the "why did GAC go to Ford D?" question, I always quite like the premise that he was tracking the non-combatants after the Reno attack. A couple of the NA accounts say that it is whilst they are taking the non-coms up toward Squaw Creek that they spot some or all of the 5 companies on the ridges. It would then follow that warriors would move towards the logical crossing at D to protect the non-coms and in the process head off the troopers. We then have the discussion we have had so far on this thread, pushing and harrying the 5 companies from D with the NAs released from Reno swinging across MTC and smacking L and C in the nose.

side bar: Chuck I think you're spot on with the numbers game and Custer's belief he was in charge of a Division.

[quincannon]

If you are in the mechanical trades Mark and you carry a box full of tools around with you, there is no guarantee that you can fix a problem if you only have a Swiss Army Knife at hand. Maybe you can, and maybe you do not have the adaptability.

On the other hand if you are very familiar with the use of the Swiss Army Knife, you have little trouble in fixing anything when someone gives you a box full of the proper tools.

It is in how you were taught the trade. If you skipped over the place where you learn the fundamentals at low levels, then most times you are lost in knowing how to adapt to a given situation. The answer always lies in the manner in which you were taught the trade.

[mac]

Nov 16, 2016 12:01:07 GMT yanmacca said:

The evidence that E Company fled into a ravine (either deep ravine or some other prominent feature) is down to the men identified in or around that feature, here are the names that I have gathered from various sources over the years;

E Company men;
1st Sergeant F. Hohmeyer
Sergeant J Ogden
Corporal G Brown
Corporal A Meyer
Privates; R Farrell, W Huber, A Knecht and W Rees

Others;
Sergeant R Hughes (K Company detached to HQ)
Private T Donnelly (F Company)

Thank you Ian.
The Company F man has been mentioned before I think. I find it interesting that Sergeant R Hughes from HQ is there.
I have been contemplating the placement of the Sgt Sharrow marker. If there was some shuffling (thanks for that word QC) going on to thin lines and break contact then Sergeants like Sharrow and Hughes could be distributed so that Sharrow marks a point where the northern line was retracting towards LSH and Hughes could be organizing the Company E line since Smith is wounded/dead on LSH.
Cheers