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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Jun 19, 2016 19:55:46 GMT
Keeping with the thread's original theme: en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Braddock_ExpeditionAlways found this one interesting. Poor logistics, a little hubris and failure to adapt to an unfamiliar situation. Note to Chuck-have recovered from EP withdrawal. Unfortunately get daily reminders on 'how did she grow up so fast". Best, David
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Jun 19, 2016 22:06:21 GMT
I had to post it Chuck, it was from a book I saw online and I knew it would spoil a few Father's day celebrations. linkThis comes from page 20 of the book; The 7th Cavalry, spearhead of the campaign, was quickly whipped into shape by Colonel Custer. This recently formed unit was notably poor in morale when Sheridan called Custer to command it. Within a few weeks, devoted to improving the horsemanship and marksmanship of the troopers, Custer had made the 800-man command an elite corps.I must admit that you are correct and that it needs tossing into the waste paper bin. An interesting quote from your link Ian (page 20) "The Osages were appalled at the thought of attacking with such scant information concerning the numbers and position of the enemy. But Custer believed that surprise would win the day, and he feared that if he waited beyond daylight to launch the attack, the Indians would be alerted and flee. Colonel Nye in his excellent book, Carbine & Lance, evidently agrees with the Osages: This plan involved an advance over unexplored terrain against an enemy of unknown strength, culminating in a double envelopment. Such a maneuver implies overwhelming superiority of numbers. Custer had no information as to his relative strength. As it turned out, the village which he was about to assault consisted of only fifty-one lodges, with perhaps two hundred warriors under the illfated Cheyenne chieftain, Black Kettle. But below this camp, for a distance of fifteen miles, extended the entire winter encampment of the Cheyenne and Arapaho tribes, together with small bands of Kiowas . . . Thus there were present In the immediate vicinity hostile reinforcements numbering Into the thousands. The danger inherent in a plan calling for such a wide dispersion of forces, especially since no reserve was held out, is quite apparent, It reflected, however, the impetuous nature of its author. This time luck was with Custer. But on another field, eight years later, his famous star of fortune was to be blotted out. It may well be that his decision on that later field was influenced largely by the favorable outcome of the action of this winter morning on the Washita." History repeats! Bad habits always bring bad results. Cheers Appreciate you bringing us back on thread Dave..maybe the relevant posts should go to a thread in After 3411.
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Jun 19, 2016 22:50:21 GMT
I had to post it Chuck, it was from a book I saw online and I knew it would spoil a few Father's day celebrations. linkThis comes from page 20 of the book; The 7th Cavalry, spearhead of the campaign, was quickly whipped into shape by Colonel Custer. This recently formed unit was notably poor in morale when Sheridan called Custer to command it. Within a few weeks, devoted to improving the horsemanship and marksmanship of the troopers, Custer had made the 800-man command an elite corps.I must admit that you are correct and that it needs tossing into the waste paper bin. By some chance is Count von B an author now?
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Jun 19, 2016 23:46:15 GMT
All of you missed the most important part of the report. Historian printed under the author's name which makes it official. Brother Dave, I don't think even the F Troop Commander himself would have called the 7th "elite" but you never can tell with a self proclaimed historian of such high status. Regards Dave
PS Happy Father's Day!
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Jun 20, 2016 2:06:53 GMT
All of you missed the most important part of the report. Historian printed under the author's name which makes it official. Brother Dave, I don't think even the F Troop Commander himself would have called the 7th "elite" but you never can tell with a self proclaimed historian of such high status. Regards Dave PS Happy Father's Day! Back atcha and all the other masculine miscreants who hang out on this board.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 20, 2016 12:42:19 GMT
Sorry David, I cannot comment on your link, as it was a French victory in which 500 British soldiers were killed, I don't have any truck with the French at the best of times and certainly not a victory. I do have standards you know. On the other hand; link
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 20, 2016 13:09:22 GMT
Appreciate you bringing us back on thread Dave..maybe the relevant posts should go to a thread in After 3411. Mac, even though I am down as a moderator, I don't know how you move threads and posts, Beth is the person for that, but unfortunately I don't think that she is available at the moment.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 20, 2016 13:30:42 GMT
We speak here of Custer not supporting his advance guard. With Braddock, he moved forward far too quickly to support that advance guard, when they really didn't need that support. They were doing just fine, and were in the process of developing the situation started by a meeting engagement.
The result of this coming forward was a conglomeration of forces in a relatively small area and in very restrictive terrain, allowing the inferior French force the ability to do a double envelopment on the Brits.
The French did a great job of making bricks without straw. The Brits not so much.
Learning to appreciate the technique, is where we learn, not necessarily important if your side won or lost. Wise men learn more from their defeats, than they do from every victory ever gained.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 20, 2016 13:59:09 GMT
Another battle in which I was not aware of; link
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 20, 2016 14:16:07 GMT
When I see that we have lost a battle by making stupid mistakes, it makes me wonder how some of our officer’s should have been left at home doing what they did best, which was being idle, rich and kicking the peasants about. Just look at Bunker Hill for instance and how the officers alone suffered 100 casualties. This was down to dumb tactics which virtually meant that infantry companies were walking in range of the Colonial’s muskets and carrying out manoeuvres in which to assault the defences, this also meant walking up hill to try and take a fortified position, which was very costly indeed and only for the Continentals running out of ammo the death toll would have been higher.
I don’t know if it is because I have been interested in military stuff and battles since I was a kid, but to me most tactics are really only common sense, and if you see the lie of the land in which you are fighting over and use it to your advantage then you are using tactics, after all that’s what the Indians did it at the BLBH.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 20, 2016 14:37:10 GMT
Chuck, Dade recalled his flankers in an attempt to speed up his advance, these men were initially there to prevent the column from being ambushed, so what was he playing at and what made him think that this column was above being attacked. Again it is another example of making mistakes as no force should be left blind in enemy territory.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 20, 2016 14:48:29 GMT
There are no dumb tactics. There are dumb choices in what tactic to use.
Speaking of position. Take a look at the Continental position on Breed's (not Bunker) Hill. It could only be taken by frontal assault. It was imperative that the position be taken in a timely manner. Big guns up there, and give time there surely would have been, would block access and egress to Boston Harbor. Absolutely no option in the matter from the Brit perspective. Sometimes the imperative of the action to be taken trumps getting your brains beat in, in the process.
Get out a street map of Boston. Find the Bunker Hill Monument, then imagine in your minds eye all that built up area now shown to be completely vacant and see what your fields of fire are from the monument all the way to the harbor. Clear and pure as the raindrops in springtime.
Dade: For Christ sake don't ask me. I did not move to the toilet without advance, flank, and rear guards. March security is the one thing you must always do right the first time.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 20, 2016 15:06:37 GMT
That was a dam bad place to fight a battle, it was like a mini Iwo Jima, it was really an island which contained two or three hills, which the Colonials fortified, so not only did they controlled the high ground, but they had a birds eye view of everything the British did, so really no matter how you looked at it this was going to be a costly action, but why storm it in the first place, the Colonial's weren't going any place so why fight them on the ground of their own choosing, was it a matter of honor?
Personally I would have took my time with long range skirmishing, as anyone must know that any force occupying that island would have limited amounts of ammunition, so my plan would be to make them expend it plus use up their food and water.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 20, 2016 15:10:56 GMT
Sometimes you wish old DC was still around. After all his diatribes about Indians not having any command and control you would just need to say four words in rebuttal --- Buffalo Hump's Great Raid.
Keep in mind all those not familiar, the objectives of the raid were along the Gulf Coast of Texas, and they were launched from the Comanche stronghold of the Llano Estacado (near where Colt is from --- Amarillo). Also keep in mind that the Llano is nearer to me here in Colorado than it was to the raid's objectives.
Just getting there alone required a high degree of C&C.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 20, 2016 15:15:29 GMT
The reason for the assault Ian was the potential of mounting large caliber and capacity artillery on those hills. Knox had already brought the guns to Boston from Fort Ticonderoga, a momentous achievement itself. Those guns already were on the high ground around Boston to the south. Guns on Bunker and Breed's would put the cork in the bottle. The Brits had three choices - assault - starve to death - surrender. Simple as that.
There was no time available to the Brits. They had to do it and they had to do it now. Those guns were coming, and when and if they got there it was game-set-match, and they knew it. You don't pussyfoot around with skirmishing and bull shit, when it's the ninth inning, two are out, and only a home run, not a bunt will save your sweet young ass from complete defeat.
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