Indian Tactics

[quincannon]

Like I said Ian, these flights of WHIFF are healthy. What is unhealthy is to accept conventional wisdom blindly, without putting that "wisdom" to the test to see if it is as wise as it supposed to be.

I don't think Custer was much of a commander, but that said, I don't think he is going to do anything overly stupid once contact has been made. I am making the assumption he would act as a reasonable man, but a reasonable man, which in this instance is unaware of all that confronts him. Very easy in that terrain.

It is also improbable in my estimation that Keogh would be caught like a deer in the headlights, locked in place, while everything around him is circling the toilet bowl. If we follow the convention, then he must have been occupied with someone while C and L were getting the crap beat out of them. If we look in other places going to where he got caught, a place where angels fear to tread, then again there must have been some purpose, because no one would purposefully position themselves there for any defensive purpose.

[yanmacca]

I would expect though that this battle was fluid and the battle space could changed rapidly, even in minutes, so what Keogh was expecting to do when he got to the swale, could change and this rapid change could have caught him out.

[quincannon]

Using the conventional scenario Ian, I think he was down on that ground playing with the leakers coming around Company L's left flank. That would seem the most logical reason. He was probably further south in the swale area at he time, unaware or unmindful of the gap. He started to get people between him and Companies L and C. When L and C finally broke some got through to him and he started to move northward, but by then the gap was a faucet with Indian water building to overflow. Seems a reasonable explanation, but there are possibly two or three other variations of that, which would be reasonable as well.

I think it is well to remember that none of these companies were defending, as we normally use the word, but rather skirmishing, and what started and stayed as a skirmish got well out of hand rather quickly. Defending is a deliberate attempt to deny, while a skirmish is disputing possession. There is a very solid difference between the two.

[Beth]

Mar 18, 2016 20:35:31 GMT yanmacca said:

I would expect though that this battle was fluid and the battle space could changed rapidly, even in minutes, so what Keogh was expecting to do when he got to the swale, could change and this rapid change could have caught him out.

Couldn't the swale be used as sort of a highway and shield between two points?  Perhaps Keogh was just trying to get either to Calhoun to reinforce his numbers or to LSH and the NA just poured in from all directions and trapped him.  Kind of like how the NA describe the action at Deep Ravine.

[dave]

Conrad
Loved your post sited below:

"I agree QC, which is why I've said before that I think Custer saw the running village as a chance to wrap everything up the same as Grant and Sheridan had done at Appomattox. You've got Reno / Union infantry pushing a fleeing but still dangerous mass forward, Keogh's troops discouraging a move in a safer direction (south in Lee's case, east here) by taking up a blocking position like the Union held for days at Jetersville, and then the end-run to set up a blocking force, just like Custer and his cavalry had done at Appomattox itself."

I would love to have the opportunity to show you around Shiloh, Vicksburg, Franklin, Chickamauga, Gettysburg and then on to Deadwood's home turf Virginia. If you make it over here you have a place to stay and we will load up the old car and hit the road.
Regards
Dave
        

[quincannon]

Dave I disagree vehemently with the posts about Ewell on the other board, which is completely off topic, but maybe not so much.

Ewell was one hell of a division commander up to Second Manassas where he was severely wounded, then wounded later again losing both arm and leg in the process. He was a poor choice for a corps commander, for he was not the same man, nor was Hood after similar circumstances.

The lesson here is pertinent to LBH for you cannot judge what a commander will be like in the future, based only on what they were in the past. Wounding took the martial life from both of those men, just like the numerous character flaws Custer displayed from 66 to 76 took what he possibly was and made a complete sham of it.

We see the same thing today, or at least the near recent past. One four star was the darling of all the swells until he forgot that the rules apply to him, even more than they apply to the rest of us mere mortals. There is a lesson for all of us here.

[dave]

QC
I understand your point regarding Ewell but he is judged mostly on his 1st day's performance at Gettysburg. Right or wrong that is just what it is. Early was vile individual who would have been a great trial lawyer suing the Tobacco Industry. I wished I could have seen it when Armistead busted that mess plate over Ole Jube's bald noggin at West Point. Ewell, I believe, allowed Early to steer him and paid the price for his lack of fortitude with him.
Regards
Dave

[quincannon]

The fault was Lee's Dave. Lee's order should have been - Get your ass up that goddamned hill and take it or I will find someone who can.

[deadwoodgultch]

Mar 19, 2016 1:52:05 GMT quincannon said:

Dave I disagree vehemently with the posts about Ewell on the other board, which is completely off topic, but maybe not so much.

Ewell was one hell of a division commander up to Second Manassas where he was severely wounded, then wounded later again losing both arm and leg in the process. He was a poor choice for a corps commander, for he was not the same man, nor was Hood after similar circumstances.

The lesson here is pertinent to LBH for you cannot judge what a commander will be like in the future, based only on what they were in the past. Wounding took the martial life from both of those men, just like the numerous character flaws Custer displayed from 66 to 76 took what he possibly was and made a complete sham of it.

We see the same thing today, or at least the near recent past. One four star was the darling of all the swells until he forgot that the rules apply to him, even more than they apply to the rest of us mere mortals. There is a lesson for all of us here.

I in general agree with your assessment of Ewell and to some degree with JBH. I find some cracks with your last. That four star took a job where he was out of his element and  I am not sure if he was not set up and entrapped. Sometimes it is better to take the deal, than to drag everyone through the dirt. Again off topic, but again maybe not completely as a Lt. Col (140 years ago)tried to drag down an administration rather than do what an officer should have done and stayed out of politics. Two different approaches, By two very different personalities.

Regards,

Tom 

[mac]

One thing to consider with respect to why Keogh may have been "sitting on his hands" while C and L were falling apart. He has no visible contact and is some distance away so all the imput he has is the sound of fire. When the disaster happens it happens as hand to hand contact. Audibly this may not sound too different and so not alert Company I to the change in situation.
You are mounting a good argument Ian!
I am not on board..but it is a good one!
Cheers

[deadwoodgultch]

Mac,
I don't see Keogh "sitting on his hands." Are you sure he had no visual contact? Maybe he did, was maybe he was shot and taken to the swale. This to take him out of the line of fire. Could he have been the bravest man the Indians had ever seen, their words. Was he attempting to rally this portion of the field, when wounded?

Regards,
Tom

[yanmacca]

Makes you wonder about Keogh’s role as a battalion commander, just look at how Benteen commanded his own three company battalion or even how Reno over under took his role, I know Reno was a Major and not a Captain, but he still had three companies under his command and he detached himself like Benteen did and over looked the welfare of all three.

Keogh’s first job should have been to find a position to oversee the three companies under his command, as that is what a battalion commander should do, but hey he may have done just that but I have a feeling he didn’t grasp the severity of what was happening until it was too late.

Yan.

[azranger]

Back from ARTS and doing simulation (MILO) shoots for NAU class today.

I think the Ford D  area needs to be fully explored before being eliminated. Benteen's hand drawn map is a good start. He has some marks indicating travel to and casualties on the north and east side of the cemetery area.

The land in the Ford D area and even in CH draw is private property. Based upon what we know about the lack of markers in the valley would the same thing have applied in other area for markers that should have been placed on private property.

The Kellogg marker was placed on private property but it was in road right of way for the older entrance road. The Kellogg marker bothers me on why would he have been there without others. Not impossible but suspect. The marker fits in a location found on Benteen's map if I recall correctly and on the map it has several other causalities.

Regards

AZ Ranger

 

[yanmacca]

Good morning to you Steve, hope you had a good trip.

Here is the portion of the Benteen map, can you use it to find any other markers?

[deadwoodgultch]

AZ,
Is there or was there gravel pit slightly north and west of the Veterans Cemetery? It is adjacent to the big loop in the river, in the Ford D area. I wonder if anything was lost there.

Regards,
Tom