mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,800
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Post by mac on Mar 15, 2016 12:01:32 GMT
One of the great movie bits is the warriors circling around wagons and this may well have happened. One circling technique of the indians was quite different and more deadly. The circle was deployed in front of the enemy and as they circled they reloaded their weapons. When each warrior faced the enemy he discharged his weapon. This meant a high rate of continuous fire on one particular point in the enemy defence. Moving on. Viewing the Calhoun / Keogh region. This is one part of the battlefield that I would like to revisit. From the point of view of warrior tactics I envisage groups trying to infiltrate to and past the flanks of the Company L skirmish line. I also see them moving from behind Greasy Grass to do the same positioning for the mounted line of Company C on the ridge. I am thinking that Harrington actually rode his men into this tactical trap. Side thought. The thing about Sgt Finckle (Company C) claiming to have survived the battle that has always bothered me is that his description of riding along and then having lots of warriors suddenly pop up all around them sounds eerily like what may have happened to Company C. Cheers
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Mar 15, 2016 12:59:09 GMT
As Colt says it is a long way from LSH down to the ravine. Many of the markers are spurious and I think were the result of having lots of markers for men who died in the ravine. One marker is for Sturgis who was never found! I am also open to the possibility of some breaking towards the ravine when LSH falls and so adding to the higher part of the line of markers going that way. I can see a last desperate break in that direction if there is still some firing from Company E men in the ravine. I doubt anyone would get too far in that direction on foot. Cheers Weren't some of the extra stones also for those who died in the Valley or on Reno Hill? I seem to recall there are hardly any markers in that area. That is my understanding. I have seen four markers on the village side of the river and one at retreat crossing.
Dorman Reynolds McIntosh Hodgson Unknown soldier (found by Weibert)
Steve
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Mar 15, 2016 13:42:01 GMT
AZ, Last year chatting with the guy playing Custer he said he rode down to Reynolds grave site. He says it gives you a great perspective on the lay of the land for any number of happenings on 6/25/76. I know you have done it. With the number of people who say they are coming, this might be a good visit.
Regards, Tom
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Post by yanmacca on Mar 15, 2016 22:32:49 GMT
Ian: I would be amazed if they were as close as 50 to 100 meters. That is actually quite close for tactical purposes. We have this vision of a column of cavalry marching as we would see it in Yellow Ribbon and Fort Apache. That is strictly the Captain Pretend version of things. Reality is that a prudent commander would have each of those companies spread on the march a couple of hundred meters apart and echeloned left and right off of the principle direction of the march centerline. It would be done for a number of reasons, the primary of which are security and keeping the dust down to a minimum. All the security and dust reduction does you no good though if you can't ball up that fist FAST, and the terrain being traversed inhibited that. Tactical movement is a series of compromises that must be made, and made to fit the terrain and the situation. So we both agree then Chuck, that these companies could be spread out over a large area with a possible distance of up to a couple of football pitches between each one of them. Now if we are still looking at what JSIT said about the whole column minus one company rode north, well these four companies had something in common and that’s their strength as all four had between 36-38 men each. Now these small groups of men that were possibly out of audible range of each other, were scattered about over a landscape full of gullies, ravines and sage brushes, which were steadily being controlled by the enemy, so a couple of large surprise attacks followed by one strong mounted attack would splinter this group and scatter them to the four winds.
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Post by Beth on Mar 15, 2016 23:17:56 GMT
If Custer scattered his men in such small groups and out of sight line of each other then the NA really didn't need to rely on their superior numbers. A small party of NA could swoop in and dominate the fight.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Mar 15, 2016 23:29:03 GMT
If Custer scattered his men in such small groups and out of sight line of each other then the NA really didn't need to rely on their superior numbers. A small party of NA could swoop in and dominate the fight. Exactly! That was part of the disagreement I had with a small minded moderator about the decision process of Custer. I believe there is a military maxim that there is strength in numbers and GAC certainly disregarded that pearl of wisdom. He had been warned and advised several times that there was a very large number of hostiles before he left Terry and the scouts advised him prior to the battle. The old adage about leading a horse to water seems to apply. Regards Dave
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Mar 16, 2016 1:53:43 GMT
Someone somewhere mentioned to a superior officer how difficult it might be to surround 3 indians with 1 trooper.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 16, 2016 3:18:35 GMT
Distance alone was not the culprit. Terrain alone was not the culprit. Distance and the terrain were the culprits.
It is real easy to fiddle with Fido if you are not constantly aware of what these twin factors do to your tactical plans.
Spread to march. Consolidate to fight. You miss the gate on coming together to fight and you are bound to have a bad day.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Mar 16, 2016 4:29:22 GMT
QC I always get nervous "talking shop" with real mechanics but like Brevet mentioned it is hard to beat 3 to 1 odds if you are not on your game. To me and only me, I see that Custer performed more like a amateur than a professional that day by splitting up his command into smaller segments without mutual support, was constantly attempting to find the end of the village, had no idea of where all his own command was as he traveled north and failed to understand just how many hostiles there were to his port side and forward.
You mention that it was a combination of distance and terrain that did him in and I have no doubts that you are correct. I know that Yan, Deadwood, AZ, Mac, Colt, Carl and you and others are all serious students of this seminal event and I have more interest in the War from 1861-1865 but Custer sure had a bad day of being a soldier. From all that I have read and learned from these boards I know Custer was an excellent cavalryman in his younger days but I believe he kinda went to pot post 1865 and never recovered.
I know we have batted the Indian C&C ball all around but they did have form and function in assaulting the 7th that day. I know that Crazy Horse lead by example if not by command and that certainly indicates the organization of the hostiles that day, does it not? The Cheyenne followed Lame White Man as he lead his braves and that is a form C&C is it not?
I really enjoy these posts as I always am interested in learning more about this battle and see the various viewpoints of members who are willing to share. I especially appreciate the kind treatment received in evaluating and discussing my sometimes warped ideas and vision. Regards Dave
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Post by yanmacca on Mar 16, 2016 13:08:06 GMT
Dave everyone holds their end up on this board and no one wings it.
You could say that Crazy Horse defeated Custer at his own game as Indians on foot fixed his troopers and he swung round and clobbered them. Custer wanted Reno to play a similar role to the Indians on foot and he was going to act out what Crazy Horse did later, but failed.
Yan.
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Post by Beth on Mar 16, 2016 15:00:42 GMT
Dave, we each see the battle based on our own experiences and the knowledge we've gained throughout life and everyone brings their own talents to the table. Don't ever sell short your contributions to the conversation.
This is just spitballing and I could totally be on some sort of wild idea that is totally crackers but perhaps one of the biggest mistakes Custer made that day was to only see the battle through the eyes of a ACW cavalry officer and not as the leader of what was a dragoon regiment. He viewed the battlefield from the back of a horse, covering the distance at the speed of a brisk walk or trot.
When the 7th dismounted it changed what they could see around them and the speed they could react to the needs of other companies. High foliage that was might have been a bother on horseback becomes a duck blind on foot. Ravines become barriers that keep companies from communicating and slows the speed. Horses all held together in a group become easy targets of attack. (Makes me think of the airplanes on the tarmac in Hawaii in Dec. 1941)
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Post by quincannon on Mar 16, 2016 15:45:14 GMT
Some of the best mechanics I ever met were the shade tree variety. Anyone endowed with common sense can understand tactics, for all they are is the practical application of common sense.
I fully agree with Beth here, Custer fought as if he were fighting Confederates as opposed to the Indian Confederation. He maneuvered as if he were a division commander. There is nothing wrong with the way Custer maneuvered were he that division commander. Nothing at all. Look at the map, Reno's brigade to the south cutting off the escape route to the Big Horns, Keogh's brigade in the center, guarding Custer's center and cutting off the east escape route, McDougal's brigade forming an operational reserve and securing the logistics, and Yates' brigade ready to strike the hostiles that were being forced into a premature retreat.
Maneuvering tiny battalions though are not the same in terms of what they can do with the same scheme of maneuver. It is on the order of taking a pen knife to an atomic conflagration. Brigades are self contained with a lot of combat power. Their organization gives them great capability to fight the battle on their own with not nearly the outside support, required by smaller units. So if each of these mythical brigades Custer had, could have operated in the manner of a brigade then Custer would have won the great victory he desired.
Anyone who does not first access the cards he holds in his hand, then take a close look at the interrelationships of terrain, distance, and capabilities (both sides), but rather goes off into the great unknown of Adventureland completely unprepared, deserves what they get. The rub is though, that those that followed did not deserve what they got, at the hand of a criminally incompetent leader.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Mar 16, 2016 17:45:54 GMT
I am not being immodest just realistic. I have enjoyed every minute of participation with members of this board and look forward to more conversations ala electronically. I have been shown kindness and patience and tolerance which is exceptional in this day and time for some cockeyed opinions.
I am not a very good military strategist but really enjoy everyone's contributions as I can always steal others ideas and sound so much smarter!
As to your remark about "shade tree" mechanics my last efforts ended by 1970 when it got too complicated to work on cars. I do remember the firing order of the six cylinder engine of the 1965 Mustang. 15 is too young 36 too old and 24 just right! Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Mar 16, 2016 18:46:15 GMT
Dave: I think your greatest attribute here is to know what wrong smells like, and are not afraid to say that something smells wrong.
You may not be able to immediately determine what right is, but then again that is the hardest part for all of us, not just you.
For many, primarily on the Lies and Lunatics board they blindly accept the pronouncements of the button shiner, and have no earthly idea of what truth and facts are, or how to discern them. That's where the common sense of tactical application come in. If it looks wrong it probably is, REGARDLESS of that all enlightening conversation with the Colonel at the ROTC dinner.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Mar 16, 2016 19:50:00 GMT
QC The saddest aspect to the keogh board is the amount of disinformation and outright lies presented as military tactics, facts and standards. So many visitors and members are fairly naive and unable to separate fact from fiction. Those who point out inconsistencies or disagree with an incorrect or just downright dishonest statements are labeled trolls or denied full board member privileges as Deadwood and I were recently.
All too often these days people are to lazy to do their own studies about events but take the short cut of reading other's ideas as facts. They know so little they are unable to separate the sheep from the goats with all that is online. People like keogh are afforded a status they are unworthy of and enabled to spread their so called scholarship.
I have no trouble admitting to ignorance about many matters or when wrong and that is keogh's weakness. The facade he has carefully constructed prevents him from making and admitting mistakes which leads to his selective editorship with posts and misquoting. A reputation built on such shaky talents does not permit questioning and must be protected from the truth. Regards Dave
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