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Post by yanmacca on Jun 2, 2016 15:32:28 GMT
Apparently Vandegrift was not happy at Fletchers decision to pull out his carriers and thought that he was running away, the marines called this withdrawal, the navy bugout. Probable because a lot of their equipment including their 155mm guns was not yet unloaded.
I can’t help thinking that Admiral Crutchley was left holding the baby and that it was Admiral Mikawa’s audacity that actually won the day for the Japanese.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 2, 2016 16:25:23 GMT
Dave there are two authors that are must reads if you want to understand the ethos of the Corps, both are works of fiction, but both based upon facts and factual incidents, WEB Griffin's Corps series and John Thomason's Fix Bayonets.
You will recall the Goettge incident from the Corps series, and Killer McCoy is the arch typical Marine whose rises from China Marine into what the Corps does best. His depiction of Corps aviation is right on the mark as well.
I am often asked by my Army friends why I admire the Corps so much, and my answer is always the same, Their ethos in the making of a Marine, their basic organizational structure, unchanged, but ever changing by adaptation, and their total dedication to the combined arms concept, they live and breath it while others only give it lip service. My Army friends don't like that answer much, in fact not at all, as it says a hell of a lot more about lackluster Army leadership than it does about the Marines.
Ian: I am not at all sure when the Marines went to the camouflaged dungarees, and I don't think it was universal in the Corps. On Guadalcanal I think they were just green, perhaps with the 1st and 2nd Raider and 1st Parachute Battalions having the camouflage model.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 2, 2016 18:41:36 GMT
Chuck the uniform was called the P43 Camo, so I would think that we are talking about circa 1943, you are correct that it was not in widespread issue, maybe the helmet cover was more common, but it has that iconic look about it. They issued a similar uniform in Europe in 1944 but this was soon dropped as it cause blue on blue incidents with resemblance to the SS smock.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Jun 3, 2016 3:47:55 GMT
One of the consequences of Custer being sighted from the valley at 3411 is that the warriors would also see him. Would this not impact on the number of men waiting to greet him at the village be it Ford B or D?
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Jun 3, 2016 3:53:35 GMT
If Companies C and I were always in place with Company L at the south end of the ridge why would they simply wait in place as the L skirmish line is pushed back up the slope at Calhoun Hill?
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 3, 2016 8:42:27 GMT
Hi Mac, if the Indians spotted Custer looking down from 3411, then their reaction would depend if they thought that two or three mounted men would pose a threat, as I would imagine that the rest of the column would be hidden behind the bluffs.
To answer your second question we would have to speculate just were C and I were situated, if they were either side of the ridge (which makes sense to prevent from sky lining) then they would have no LOS of each other, so really they would be acting independent of each other and if this was true then Keogh was maybe keeping his own company over on the eastern side to give them command of that slope, and Harrington was doing the same over on the western side.
In a way Calhoun could have withdrew into the pocket in between these two companies, but this would require orders and it looks like he died carrying out his original orders to hold.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Jun 4, 2016 3:21:33 GMT
Hi Mac, if the Indians spotted Custer looking down from 3411, then their reaction would depend if they thought that two or three mounted men would pose a threat, as I would imagine that the rest of the column would be hidden behind the bluffs. To answer your second question we would have to speculate just were C and I were situated, if they were either side of the ridge (which makes sense to prevent from sky lining) then they would have no LOS of each other, so really they would be acting independent of each other and if this was true then Keogh was maybe keeping his own company over on the eastern side to give them command of that slope, and Harrington was doing the same over on the western side. In a way Calhoun could have withdrew into the pocket in between these two companies, but this would require orders and it looks like he died carrying out his original orders to hold. My thought re seeing Custer was that a warrior would see a hat waving white guy and figure he was not alone and that something smelled out there. I like your Calhoun analysis. My thought was that as Calhoun felt pressured enough to move up slope he may send a message to one or the other for some help on the line rather than a charge into the coulee. Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 4, 2016 10:25:25 GMT
Thinking about C Company charging down into Calhoun coulee and its reasons, makes me wonder just how much pressure L Company was under, as it seems to me that C Company was surprised by the number of Indians hiding in the coulee itself so maybe the rump of those in view would be up on greasy grass hill or ridge, but this supposed charge would have done nothing to alleviate any pressure to Calhoun’s front or left flank.
This brings up a couple of options and the first would be that the Indians had not yet moved right up deep coulee and circled around the eastern side of battle ridge, or if they did then they were not in large numbers and secondly at this stage the pressure to Calhoun’s front may have been just long range sniping fire.
So for this charge to be initiated then the main threat must have come from Calhoun’s right.
Yan.
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