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Post by quincannon on Jan 15, 2016 2:17:31 GMT
The insanity board is dominated by one individual, who has the tactical knowledge and ability of Clarabell The Clown. It is a shame that his conduct is tolerated over there, even though he controls that board. He represents an association that seemingly has a lot of merit, although I am not a member and have no dog in the fight. Absent his presence, that board could excel. That is why it is so important that this board set and maintain a new standard for discussion.
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Post by Beth on Jan 15, 2016 5:40:16 GMT
GAC is considered a 'boy genius' only because he obtained his success at a much younger age than his peers--and had the good fortune to be born with the type of face that looks a lot younger than his actual years--after all both Reno and Benteen were only 5 years older than GAC though they looked much older. If Custer had was a few years older he wouldn't have received near a much attention or accolades--he would have been another face amid all the rest of brave, young officers in a war that chewed up and spit out a whole generation of young men.
Custer had the fortune (as far as he was concerned) to leave West Point at the absolute perfect time--if he had been any older he would have already have been assigned a duty, the same if he hadn't been delayed from leaving WP because of the hearing. Instead he arrived in Washington alone and without a duty assignment. He was able from that point on to use his determination and charisma to make the best of every opportunity that came his way. Custer also learned from some of the best on how to mold his image in the press, how to make himself a household word. Everything about Custer in 1876 was a carefully crafted image, done with the skills that probably would make him the envy of many of today's celebrity personalities. There is a world for the mythical image of Custer--perhaps if he would have survived the Sioux Wars, he could have ridden off into the sunset with the likes of Buffalo Bill and his Wild West show--preserving the western fantasy for generations to come. Custer is an interesting person to read about especially when you can see him as balanced as possible, as a man with both admirable traits and serious flaws.
The Battle of Little Bighorn needs to be looked at though through neutral eyes. The failure to do so is a disservice to Custer as well as every other man (and woman) on the battlefield that day. It honors no one to have to twist facts in order to preserve a myth.
For example when you say that Custer was betrayed by inferior subordinates, that can only reflex badly on Custer as their commander. A good commander I suspect would either have been able to get the most out of those under him, work around their weaknesses or move them on to different assignments. It seems like Custer took as little of interest as possible in the 7th. He used it to further his image while remaining away from FAL as much as possible.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 15, 2016 13:22:55 GMT
Chuck your decision to allow the trooper packers to return to their companies would increase you carbine strength by 92, which is incredible really, when you think of it Custer had detached nearly two companies from his combat strength (given that the average company on the 25th contained around 40 men).
Yes 92 and considering that Benteen commanded a battalion of 115 clearly shows that the pack train had a strength touching that of a small battalion and that is with out the 45 in McDougall's company, so in reality did the pack train really need B Company?
Now I am not suggesting that one extra unit would have given Reno the combat power to ride through that village, but imagine how those extra troops could have been deployed. If Reno had B Company he could have kept them in a mounted reserve role and used them if his line was flanked.
Yan.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jan 15, 2016 14:03:20 GMT
Had he done his homework, that being a thorough reconnaissance of the battle space, Custer is presented with a simple and straightforward tactical problem, well within the capabilities of any half bright second lieutenant at Benning. The solution is a movement to contact on an axis Ford A to the southernmost circle. To accomplish this you task organize into four battalions, each of three companies, leaving the pack train three to four miles in the rear out of the immediate battle space, under the guard of the civilians ONLY. You take from the train enough mules to form a combat train, that carries only ammunition and extra medical supplies. The combat train stays with the main body initially until contact is made, and then stays the hell out of the way. You move to contact with a one battalion advanced guard. The main body of two battalions follow anywhere from six hundred to one thousand meters behind the advanced guard. The rear guard consisting of the fourth battalion is approximately six hundred meters to the rear of the main body. The advanced guard makes initial contact and develops the situation and defines the battle space, staying to the right nearest the river. The main body comes up on the left, and either extends the line or continues to move forward, taking advantage of the shock effect caused by their appearance and the shock action of their first contact. The rear guard at this time becomes the regimental reserve. Continue the attack mounted or in the dragoon style of mounted/dismounted acting in coordination. When and if resistance build to the point the attack stalls - STOP - Don't get greedy. If it shows no sign of stopping clear every damned Indian out of that valley heading in a northerly direct. Then consolidate, reorganize if necessary, replenish, THEN PURSUE. Repeat the process as many times as necessary until they either give up and go back to the reservation or they are all dead. I am prepared for incoming. Solid plan of attack Quincannon.
If we assume all the necessary homework was done, rather than attacking from Ford A, I would have swung west, advanced north and then attacked. Number one priority for me would have been to disperse the pony herd. Approaching from the south still leaves my left wide open and the attack would come to a standstill once the dry ravine (stalled Reno) was encountered. In this scenario I could see the whole outfit falling into the same predicament that Reno found himself in. The odds would be a little better but I would still be dramatically outnumbered and potentially lose every man and the unprotected pack train in the rear.
Matt, I am sure QC agrees regarding pony herd, as I have read many of his posts stating the same. But,we must remember he got his butter bars shortly prior to jolning TR at San Juan Hill, shortly after the Indian Wars so it may have slipped his mind.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 15, 2016 16:17:51 GMT
I was just telling TR the other day that the pony herd was an important factor Tom.
It is not so important though that I would change the main thrust of my movement. Instead I would detail some small element, an officer, a few soldiers, and some of the native scouts, to start fires out that way. A dry grass prairie fire set just before or concurrent with my northward movement ought to be enough of a distraction.
Matt: If you look at a map of the area southwest of the southernmost circle, you will find a gravel pit on high ground. Draw a line from that gravel pit directly eastward toward the river. That is the area that I anticipate first contact, and the area I would choose for the initial phase of battle. At that point both my flanks would be secure, as the Athenians flanks were secure at Marathon. That ditch then would play no part in the initial stages.
Reno was not initially outnumbered or flanked. That would come a few moments after the skirmish line was established. Reno did not have sufficient manpower to avoid being flanked. The plan I outlined does not address the build up of numbers, but by coming up and using my advanced guard as a pivot, I would have the required numbers to stretch from Reno's left to the high ground.
I have looked many times at that ground to the west. It is quite difficult, and I would not like to conduct a night march over it to reach an attack position. On the other hand following Reno Creek at night down to where it meets the LBHR, is relatively easy.
I did not include a preferred time for my MTC but my preferred time would be crossing at Ford A about an hour after dawn on 26 June.
Of themselves Matt, overall numbers have little meaning. What has meaning are numbers at the point of contact. Here we have a situation where Custer is relatively close in time and space, and can assemble all his combat power faster than the Indians can. Something like the first day at Gettysburg where Lee came together much faster than Reynolds and Howard could get positioned, with the rest of the Union Army strung out back into Maryland
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Jan 15, 2016 16:24:42 GMT
Some random thoughts
I think dismounting was not the only choice Reno had even after deciding to not move forward. I think staying mounted and drawing the Indians from the village was also an option.
I also think that taking the horses to the timber seems like a protective measure but in reality it put distance between the trooper and his horse. If the cover and concealment of the location is good then the troopers can't see their horses.
As soon as any horse is shot every trooper wants to know if it was his horse. This introduces divided attention.
One of the tactics used by cavalry during ACW was to fight to the last second and then run to the horses. I suspect that French had this in mind when his troopers went to their horses.
That being said my own personal filters is that it is better to move as soon as you recognize that the situation can only get worse. I rely more on what Sgt Ryan has to state then his company commander. He believes they were minutes away from being there for an eternity.
Sometimes I think we view things without thinking it through in different scenarios. If you read Benteen's comments he alludes to it. Do we think ammunition use would be exactly the same per trooper and that as long as there was ammunition there would be no causalities.
At what point would there be sufficient causalities that the Indians could infiltrate at will. Reno believed it was not defensible but even those that do should have to answer that question. How much ammunition in reserve should be held out to retrograde at a later time or do you assume they die in place when it runs out.
The amount of time it would take for the Indians to fix Reno in the timber I believe would sooner than the casualty rate or loss of ammunition factors leading to their complete destruction. The only time to have a choice in a decision is before the Indians fix Reno's battalion.
Ryan thought it was within minutes.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 15, 2016 16:39:26 GMT
Steve, I agree the tactic of drawing out the Indians would be a good idea and keeping units mounted would still allow them freedom to operate. I also agree with French that once they had drawn the enemy forward they could mount up and shift position. This would help the cavalry keep one step ahead of the Indians and not allow them to be fixed.
All this though would need orders and Custer never mentioned the role of Reno being a foil when he issued his orders via Cook. But having said that if Reno did halt then why wasn’t this option considered? Reno could have drew out every warrior in the southern end of the village and kept his distance to prevent him being out flanked.
But at the end of the day Reno just acted on what rudimentary orders he was given and was sure Custer would be in the vicinity to support him.
BTW; French touched on the fall back tactics used in the ACW, but was the 7th cavalry fully trained on this military maneuver? to fire until your enemy is virtually upon you not only takes guts but skill and training, so I would imagine that any green troopers would be feeling the pressure whilst attempting this procedure.
Yan.
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Post by Beth on Jan 15, 2016 21:54:09 GMT
Would Reno have had the latitude in his orders to do such a maneuver? Or enough manpower?
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 16, 2016 12:36:02 GMT
No Beth I don’t think he would have any leeway at all giving what he was ordered to do. I think fighting the way French mentioned would be a better option then simply standing their ground and being outflanked. By the sounds of it the troopers dismounted and then moved away from their horses, and formed skirmish lines, they then moved forward again and took up positions, whilst this was going on their horses were moved into the timber (well maybe M Company kept theirs, they were after all stuck out on a limb), so once they had deployed then the chance to use this tactic of drawing the enemy and withdrawing was lost.
I suppose that kind of tactic had to be well rehearsed with each company working together and as a team, I suppose too that timing would be crucial and if one company got caught between skirmishing and re-mounting then the whole thing collapses.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 16, 2016 17:48:08 GMT
A commander in combat is free to employ any fighting technique he feels to be the best for the situation at hand, unless his orders he receives are restrictive meaning - you will not. Don't believe Reno had any such restrictions placed upon him. He probably should have.
Freedom of action though is in itself restrictive in that you can only do what your force has been trained to do. I don't think the state of training in the 7th Cavalry was enough advanced to try anything fancy. Having your officers know what to do is only as good as the ability to carry out those instructions by the people that have to execute them.
The National Guard over the years has been constantly reorganized, as force structure needs of the Army have changed. We do this quite differently than the Regular Army. A battery of artillery one day, may be part of a rifle company the next. Carl knows what I mean. My first platoon, upon commissioning was part of a field artillery battery that had been so reorganized. Needless to say they did not know jack about being riflemen. I was given a very experienced Infantry trained NCO, Pat Thomas, as my platoon sergeant, and started from scratch. It was a rough couple of months, but having a full platoon 44 including myself, during SRF (Selective Reserve Force = increased readiness posture = more time available both paid and unpaid) days and we were fairly ready in a relatively short time. I suspect the readiness for combat level of my platoon the day I took them over was far better than that of the 7th Cavalry on 25 June 76. At least they could shoot and walk.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 16, 2016 18:02:05 GMT
That’s very interesting, you expect that even artillerymen would still be well trained in the basics even if they were specialists *. My brother in law was in the Royal Engineers (REME) and he had to do a couple of tours in Northern Ireland as a standard Infantryman as all troops were expected to do their bit. * I generally refer gun and tank crew’s specialist and I recall reading that all sides during WW2 would kill any gun or tanks crew if they ran because it took a lot of time to train and replace them.
Yan.
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Post by Beth on Jan 16, 2016 20:17:15 GMT
From everything I've read from you guys the 7th did not fall into the 'well-trained' category. I know that they left the greenest of the green at Power River but I remember reading a narrative from someone in the valley fight where he commented that he had never been on a horse moving so fast as when he did when they advanced into the valley.
People tend to think that it was the age of the horse and buggy so everyone knew how to ride but a lot of those men came from the cities or towns with mass transit where maintaining a horse would have been either unnecessary or too expensive. They might have had very little exposure to horses, guns, and even living 'rough.' There is a huge juxtaposition between life in the west and life in the cities.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 16, 2016 20:25:06 GMT
Artillerymen Ian are a different breed. They normally require an attitude adjustment before they can raise themselves to the lofty position of "The Monarch's Children" - Les Infants. Right Carl?
Seriously though, while the basic training is the same, it takes a lot of hard work and practice to turn those basically trained soldiers into tactically proficient Infantry soldiers. Same thing in reverse. Try turning an Infantryman into a cannon cocker. Hard work. It is easier if they are Infantrymen that served in weapons platoons or heavy mortar platoons, but still it has its challenges.
Don't know about the British Army, but here a combat engineer is fully conversant with Infantry skills. That is one reason they were so valuable in the Bulge, as a hidden reserve. Same thing in Korea. The 2nd and 8th Engineer Battalions, from the 2nd ID and 1st CD respectively, spent just as much time being Infantrymen from Aug 50 to the late spring of 51, as the Infantry Regiments did. They were in effect an extra maneuver battalion.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 16, 2016 20:44:50 GMT
Beth: Since the landing on Plymouth Rock, the nonsense peddlers have insisted that every true American, can ride a horse, shoot a rifle, and live rough. That is what gives rise to the Custer fan boys and fanatics. They don't have a clue as to reality.
Military training is designed to take people from all walks of life, and through a phased program of training turn the unwashed into soldiers. If they have previous skills that's good, but the training is geared to the lowest common denominator, the Martinis of this world. It starts with individual soldier skills including physical training, marksmanship, and some life in the field. The training advances to the specialty requirements, today we would call it MOS training, but then it would be subjects like horsemanship and the like. The last formal phase is basic unit training, where the individuals are brought together and taught to work as a team. The training, if it is to be successful must be repetitive (skills grow state). Then the units so built usually advance to large scale field exercises, with the idea of building teams of teams.
To keep sharp, you must train hard. There is no indication that any of this was present in the 7th Cavalry. That fault is the commander's fault.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Jan 16, 2016 21:34:40 GMT
I hope AZ will jump in here regarding the horse riding skills of the novice cavalry trooper in 1876 with the 7th. I imagine, don't know, that there is a world of difference between riding and being a trooper as Beth mentioned. Soldiers needed to have the skills required to ride but also perform as required and ordered by their superiors.
Montrose has posted often that GAC was the worst of all LTC in the army at the time of the LBH. Wished I knew more about his deficiencies as compared to the other LTCs. Perhaps Montrose will jump in and share his ideas and thoughts with us.
QC shared excellent points about how the 7th should have been training and teaching the new recruits to be soldiers. I am interested in what Custer and the 7th did right in preparing for and conducting the 1876 campaign. Regards Dave
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