Custer, Benteen, Reno

[yanmacca]

Beth MTC is very broad, but like any coulee it has sloped sides, ford B itself looks quite open today and because of land fill and work done on the roads and paths, the area has changed with soil and rocks dumped there by workers, deep ravine is very narrow compared with ford B, here is the area today (dam some fool has added text right over the area);

[Beth]

Matt, how does Custer fight if he doesn't dismount?

[quincannon]

Remind me never to appoint you my S-4, advising me on how to secure my logistics Matt. I am very adverse to any move that would place my short and long term sustainability in any jeopardy. A win, a so-so win, or a draw, and having lost my logistics in the process, means a hollow victory, and absolutely no follow up. That puts the campaign itself in jeopardy. I think you are bidding all too much on the come, and not making the most of the cards you already have in your hand.

Yes, how does Custer fight if he does not dismount? Crossing at Ford B only changes the location of a couple a hundred marble markers.

I believe you are placing all too much faith in shock action and effect.

[mac]

If you use Fred Wagner's timings (and I think they are good) then 15 minutes extra by Reno does not get Benteen into the valley. It could be just me but another 15 minutes by Reno seems likely to be a die in place situation for him. So given Reno's experience his breakout looks like the best option for saving his command which is, in my view, his first responsibility at that time given he has (perhaps) seen Custer on the bluffs and is not expecting the promosed support.
Interesting discussion!
As Colt has pointed out crossing at Ford B is not something anyone (including GAC) would want to do.
Cheers

[quincannon]

Had he done his homework, that being a thorough reconnaissance of the battle space, Custer is presented with a simple and straightforward tactical problem, well within the capabilities of any half bright second lieutenant at Benning.

The solution is a movement to contact on an axis Ford A to the southernmost circle.

To accomplish this you task organize into four battalions, each of three companies, leaving the pack train three to four miles in the rear out of the immediate battle space, under the guard of the civilians ONLY. You take from the train enough mules to form a combat train, that carries only ammunition and extra medical supplies. The combat train stays with the main body initially until contact is made, and then stays the hell out of the way.

You move to contact with a one battalion advanced guard. The main body of two battalions follow anywhere from six hundred to one thousand meters behind the advanced guard. The rear guard consisting of the fourth battalion is approximately six hundred meters to the rear of the main body.

The advanced guard makes initial contact and develops the situation and defines the battle space, staying to the right nearest the river. The main body comes up on the left, and either extends the line or continues to move forward, taking advantage of the shock effect caused by their appearance and the shock action of their first contact. The rear guard at this time becomes the regimental reserve.

Continue the attack mounted or in the dragoon style of mounted/dismounted acting in coordination.

When and if resistance build to the point the attack stalls - STOP - Don't get greedy. If it shows no sign of stopping clear every damned Indian out of that valley heading in a northerly direct. Then consolidate, reorganize if necessary, replenish, THEN PURSUE. Repeat the process as many times as necessary until they either give up and go back to the reservation or they are all dead.

I am prepared for incoming.

[yanmacca]

Chuck, am I right in assuming that you Regimental line up would look something like this? (distances not gauged and Bn Co optional)

[quincannon]

Ian: The initial formation for the movement to contact would be in battalions in column, companies in column. The RHQ would be with the leading battalion of the main body, that you have labeled Benteen. The combat trains would travel with the second battalion of the main body which you have labeled Yates.

The advance guard would deploy into line at first contact, OR, when it became apparent by visual contact that Indians were coming out. The main body would swing to the left and move forward toward contact initially still in column, and as they came closer deploy into line. Stay in column as long as possible. It is faster, and more easily controlled than a line. The reserve remains in a column of companies until it is needed, again for the same reasons, ease and speed of travel.

[yanmacca]

Like this you mean;

[quincannon]

Yes, just like that. keep in mind those packs are just five or six led mules, with an immediate after action resupply of your most critical requirements, bullets and band aids. A prudent commander would have his soldiers draw rations for two or three days during pre-combat preparation.

[dave]

QC
I am lead to believe you have put some time, thought and expertise into your recent post with the proposed plan of action for a regimental attack on hostile Indians. Obviously you are not using the right mindset to propose such a well planned, sensible and easily understood movement. The keogh board would hand you your head quickly.

Fortunately I don't know enough to be infected by your common sense and intelligent vision. I agree with you because I admire the symmetry of your battalions. I actually comprehend what you are presenting and it makes sense to me. The kiss of death for your proposal.
Regards
Dave

[mac]

Very nice explanation of what should have happened and what most would do.
Was it too "ordinary" for the mind/ego of a boy genius?
Cheers

[quincannon]

Dave: I have made a movement to contact so damned many times in training as a platoon leader and company commander I can still focus on what my actions and orders would be nearly fifty years removed for that time.

What I outlined is nothing more than a scaled up version of what I did as a platoon leader. The only new thing in that narrative is having a flank protecting obstacle (the river) on my right, made it very easy to decide to deploy by swinging left coming around my advanced guard.

The most practical solutions to tactical problems are usually also the most simple. When you overcomplicate matters you chances of tactical failure rise considerably.

Keep in mind though there are no off the shelf solutions. Each course of action must be weighed against the factors of METT-TC.

I take it as a compliment that the insanity board would neither understand or approve. To me that means I must be doing something right.

There are times when the frontal attack resulting from a movement to contact is the correct thing to do. This is one of those times. Were the Indians dug in with interlocking defenses it would be another matter. No one on that other board would know the difference though.

[Beth]

Custer may have been a boy genius but by 1876 he was a lazy commander.

[colt45]

Chuck,
The other board wouldn't know the difference between interlocking defenses and your neighbor's picket fences. They also don't know a frontal assault from a frontal lobotomy.

[dave]

I have noticed that the Custer supporters, both sane and insane, seldom compliment GAC on his actions and decisions as much as they fault everyone else at the LBH. One poster concedes Custer's only mistake was relying on inferior subordinates. It is futile to discuss a subject with individuals who will not concede their idol has feet of clay like any other human.

QC has presented a well thought out plan of attack against the Indians that is based on the training and experience of a Lieutenant. Montrose has stated that Custer, who as a Lieutenant Colonel had the training and experience required to succeed, perform so poorly as to be the most inept LTC in the army. 

I do not believe GAC was a genius or an above average commander. He was brave and rash in his military actions but failed to plan effectively. His inability to command and control his regiment was displayed for 10 years. Others hold that Custer was not to be held accountable for the lack of training of the regiment but he was the de facto commander. He never realized that with the glory came the mantle of leadership he never possessed.
Regards
Dave