The Stands in Timber Narrative - A Road Less Often Taken

[yanmacca]

I agree Colt, one of the reasons I feel the C company men didn’t run north from Calhoun coulee would be that the place was a death trap, why would anyone want to ride through that area when there are friendly troops and a clearer passage to their left and rear, don’t forget if any charge off battle ridge would be to clear hostiles away so they are already in the area.

I would guess that if Custer wanted a rear guard then L company would be the unit to use, seeing it had about 44 all ranks made it the largest in Custer’s battalion and it had two officers, so if I was going to leave a single company as a rear guard, then it had to be Calhoun’s command.

Yan.

[mac]

Was not the doctrine of the day 2 companies?

[yanmacca]

Hi Mac, the idea that Custer would cross at ford D is really down to what he thought he was facing, old folks, women and kids will not put up much of a fight, I wonder just how this area looked on that day and just how much cover there was available, as the thought of all these no-coms neatly packaged in a ravine somewhere would be a tempting target, but let’s cast our minds back to some of the Indian accounts, now some say that Custer came down a dry coulee and tried to cross the river, he sent the grey horse soldiers first and they were stopped by fire from a bunch of old men and an officer was shot off his horse, now lets just look at this again;

Dry coulee
River and ford
Grey horse soldiers
Failed to cross and lost an officer to enemy fire
Old folks

Now I am not trying cause one hell of a WHIFF here but all of these things could have happened at ford D.

Yan.

[yanmacca]

Dec 16, 2015 11:30:43 GMT mac said:

Was not the doctrine of the day 2 companies?

Mac, maybe if Custer had L company in skirmish and I company in some kind of waiting role then he maybe didn't have the men to leave three behind, and if Tom Custer was with this proposed move north then why wouldn't he want his own company involved.

Yan.

[quincannon]

Dragoon doctrine was (where possible) two companies would operate together. One mounted while the other dismounts.

Doctrine for a rear guard is to use only a certain reasonable portion of your whole to perform that function. The same as advance and flank guards. Under the circumstances we would be talking here, the threat being a mobile band or bands of Indians, I would think the allocation of 20% would be sufficient.

At the end of this we may all come back to the "conventional" scenario we all know, but this is healthy

[yanmacca]

Dec 16, 2015 14:38:07 GMT quincannon said:

At the end of this we may all come back to the "conventional" scenario we all know, but this is healthy

We may well Chuck, but I will need some convincing that Custer used MTC to get to the river.

[quincannon]

I have a lot of problems with Custer coming down Cedar Coulee and into Medicine Tail Coulee and using that drainage to get to MTC Ford (Ford B). Does not make any sense to use an avenue of approach with high ground on both sides in the near presence of the enemy.

The high ground approach over the ridges, preferably the back sides of those ridges, makes a lot more sense, REGARDLESS if he sent two companies from that ridge line down to Ford B or not.

Use of the ridge line to travel does not preclude an excursion to Ford B. Common sense precludes an excursion to Ford B.

The problem with the conventional scenario is that a lot of people believe it, with some minor variation. It may well be correct, BUT one thing is for sure. Any WHIFF brought up to challenge that conventional must cover every known base, and be prepared to explain a new theory while accounting for all of the known in a reasonable manner. In this WHIFF, any unit position that cannot be reasonably inserted into overall picture, bring the whole thing into question.

If I recall correctly the excursion to Ford B predates the movement to Ford D by many years, in the telling of this story. Ford D was a hard sell initially, and now it is commonly accepted.

[yanmacca]

I suppose it is all down to Indian accounts and army accounts, we all recognise that these Indian accounts are fraught and many of the Indians telling these accounts were not even at the battle, some may embellish certain things as not to bring any heat on themselves, some went down the “well if you want a story then pay me and I will give you what you want” route, some of the points that relate to ford B actually come from soldiers, even Benteen has them coming down MTC, but some of these same soldiers probably made mistakes too, which would be easy in the circumstances as they had never seen this area before and it would be littered with dead men and horses.

We can use the RCOI for some ideas, like Martini saying that Custer never went to the same high place that the Crow scouts went to, the scouts were adamant that they went to Weir Point with Bouyer, which would rule out that Custer actually went there, Martini could also be talking rubbish of course the same way he embellished his story.

But if just the first part of the Wolftooth story is true then we can rule out MTC at least, and if he did track the Custer column as it went from the ridge line to Calhoun, along battle ridge to the ford then he must be thick as a brick if he didn’t notice that three companies had suddenly disappeared.

[Beth]

There is no reason not to believe that many of the soldiers account were also fraught with embellishments and inaccuracies--as well as perhap making themselves more of a hero of the moment than they are. I think one of the main problems with the Indian accounts is many tend not to tell their stories in a linear fashion--from start to finish. I don't know if this is because of the way they were interviewed and translated or a cultural difference.

[mac]

If Custer was in a desperate hurry to get to the village then an approach down Cedar to MTC would be attractive. Just to be specific, in my mind "in Cedar" does not mean down in the scrub choked bottom but rather just below the western edge for concealment from the village.
Once Custer sees the village I do not believe he was in such a rush. What he expected was one of a number of discrete circles, what he saw was a large, dense mass. He must change the plan. Now he has arrived, there is no chance of them getting away from him. In fact they are already occupied with Reno.
Sharpshooters absolutely looms over this position, and now on reflection I see the wisdom of moving behind it to go past the village. The opportunity for Custer is to cut them up in the valley beyond the village as they try to escape.
If he chooses this route further east then a trip down MTC to the ford seems less necessary/likely. A trip some way down to accelerate their flight into his northern kill zone may be more likely and more in tune with accounts of approaching the ford. Then move back and leave L as a rear guard and I to facilitate Benteen.
Now if he takes C north we would need a scenario where C end up chased along south then up towards L as a part of a retreat from ford D.
The fate of E should be considered. Smith on LSH, 6 on Cemmetery and lots in Deep Ravine.
If he tries to attack at ford D it is only with 130 or so men.
Suggestions?
Enjoying this game!
Cheers

[deadwoodgultch]

Guy's,
You all could be setting up a belief in Gordy's book, that at some point this became a north to south battle flow. As you may know Gordy spent something like 10 years living with and becoming friends with the Cheyenne. This would make Tories day. I read the book, but Steve had copies of many of the notes that were used to put that book together. I would love for him to step. in here.

For argument sake let us say Ian has it right, one company rear guard. The remainder of the command moves north to D, they are met by an overwhelming force, frontally. Lets say this NA force used the internal route through the village to meet Custer's threat from the north. Lets say this force was led by CH, then we can figure out why Crazy Horse ravine was located in this area. Also, we must remember numerous NA accounts say that the non-combatants actually went to the bench lands behind/west of the village. The route through the village would have been clear. So with the origional rear guard already under substantial threat and pressure, GAC sees he is cut off from his objective and is also being encapsulated. He has his force wheel and he effectively becomes the rear of the main command. His portion of the command makes it as far as LSH, some make it further. Same results different means of getting there.

Regards,
Tom

[yanmacca]

I have mentioned a few times in the past about Crazy Horse using deep ravine, I have no problem with the Indians using as an avenue of attack but not 200 mounted warriors.

But now that causes another problem, did Crazy Horse know that the soldiers had split into two groups? As many people have wrote that he planned to get around the back on the soldiers on the hill (Calhoun) and he didn’t know that Custer was further north, but what if CH knew that a path lay directly north of the village and that path ran right up behind the long ridge.

Yan.

[Deleted]

Dec 17, 2015 11:58:31 GMT mac said:

If Custer was in a desperate hurry to get to the village then an approach down Cedar to MTC would be attractive. Just to be specific, in my mind "in Cedar" does not mean down in the scrub choked bottom but rather just below the western edge for concealment from the village.
Once Custer sees the village I do not believe he was in such a rush. What he expected was one of a number of discrete circles, what he saw was a large, dense mass. He must change the plan. Now he has arrived, there is no chance of them getting away from him. In fact they are already occupied with Reno.
Sharpshooters absolutely looms over this position, and now on reflection I see the wisdom of moving behind it to go past the village. The opportunity for Custer is to cut them up in the valley beyond the village as they try to escape.
If he chooses this route further east then a trip down MTC to the ford seems less necessary/likely. A trip some way down to accelerate their flight into his northern kill zone may be more likely and more in tune with accounts of approaching the ford. Then move back and leave L as a rear guard and I to facilitate Benteen.
Now if he takes C north we would need a scenario where C end up chased along south then up towards L as a part of a retreat from ford D.
The fate of E should be considered. Smith on LSH, 6 on Cemmetery and lots in Deep Ravine.
If he tries to attack at ford D it is only with 130 or so men.
Suggestions?
Enjoying this game!
Cheers

Hi Mac,

I agree with the general thrust of your post, but I'd like to point out there's no evidence at all that the 6 markers on Cemetery Ridge were Company E men, and very little evidence that they ever really existed.

Also, I think an "attack" at Ford D is less likely than setting up a blocking force at Ford D.  But as I've said before, I'm still playing with the idea that Custer was attempting an Appomattox-Campaign-in-miniature at LBH. 


Cheers,

conrad

[deadwoodgultch]

Conrad,
This may not be germane, but 6 markers were where the welcome center now resides, the are now inside the LSH fence.

Regards,
Tom

[Deleted]

Hi Tom,

See this post by pjsolla who emailed Fox about the origins of the story: lbha.proboards.com/post/47196/thread and also read the first couple of posts below it.  Later in the thread HR put up a circa 1900 photo that shows no visible markers in the Visitor Center area.

Has there been more evidence besides an old man remembering that six markers were in a location 30-40 years ago in the face of counter-facts?

I'm not trying to be snarky, but if there's evidence I really would like to see it, otherwise I don't get why people act like it's a fact.

Cheers,

conrad