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Post by quincannon on Nov 18, 2015 18:14:12 GMT
Don't know why anyone would be surprised at that Ian. There was no established chain of command by organizational construct.
One man is not a battalion headquarters, and neither is two or ten. A battalion to be effective as a battalion must have the ability to command, communicate, and administer.
What you had is a span of control of seven to one, and eight to one if you consider the pack train.
In the absence of an effective means to command, communicate, and administer, why would anyone think it would be anything more, than seven companies operating on their own hook? It gets worse when you realize that there was no organizational structure between the company commander and the lowest ranking private.
That is why we take great care in force design to insure that a given organization is properly echeloned to facilitate these functions.
The first thing we ask as force designers is what is to be controlled, and what will it take to do it. I assure you the answer is never one man, assisted by an ad hoc adjutant, and a couple of couriers taken out of combat power.
You must remember that these structures were the creation of Congress, designed for budgetary efficiency, not combat efficiency.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 18, 2015 18:21:03 GMT
Chuck I could add that the US army in ww2 should have made one .30 cal m1919 team organic to every Infantry platoon HQ, it may have increased the size of the platoon by two or three men, but it would have gave the platoon commander a base of fire to cover the three rifle squads, but that’s my take on it.
Sorry for the change of topic, but I wanted to get that off my chest.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 18, 2015 18:40:12 GMT
Why? They could be attached to a rifle platoon if required. The Marines still do it that way, where the weapons platoon leader decides how to farm out supporting weapons assets.
Why do you have machine guns in the first place? The answer is to provide a high volume of automatic fire in areas where you have relatively clear field of fire. What if the rifle platoon you have this machine gun belonging to, has no really good area to deploy that gun, while the platoon next door has four or five places where they could use as many of those guns as they could get, not just the one
My choice would always be for the commander in conjunction with the weapons platoon leader to personally allocate the systems that contain his greatest and most lethal fire power.
In days gone by the weapons company of each Marine battalion was commanded by a Major, indicating how must emphasis the Marines place on the allocation and employment of supporting weapons systems. It was not unknown for a captain to command a weapons platoon at company level either.
The placement of supporting weapons is an art form, and the WWII Army and Marine Corps had the organization just about right. Nothing ever precluded attachment out, and that was most often the case, but that attachment for me must be decided upon by the commander who is responsible, and aided in his effort by his supporting weapons expert.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 18, 2015 18:42:08 GMT
I would have thought that the five senior captains should have chipped in more, Benteen, Weir, French, Moylan and McDougal had a lot of experience along with remaining eight lieutenants, so there was still a lot of brass knocking around.
Yan.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 18, 2015 18:46:44 GMT
Chuck the weapons platoons could be equipped with the .30 cal m1917, I am sure the weapons platoons organic to the Marines had both the m1919 and the heavier m1917, to me why have both weapons but only crews to operate half of them, move the lighter m1919s to platoon and get the m1917s in the fray for sustained fire, you may have to add extra gunners to the weapons platoon but think of the fire power.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 18, 2015 21:15:03 GMT
My answer is on the other thread.
For everything you add to a company there is a price to be paid in mobility, and more of a burden placed on logistics. Often it is found that the addition of items and personnel is counterproductive.
Firepower is nice, but flexibility and mobility is much nicer.
There is quite a trick to the determination of at what level assets are required. Do you give everybody some, knowing full well that these distributed assets may be either used properly or more often misused or not used to the greatest advantage, or do you pool assets and place them where there is the most need.
While you are at the process of adding thirty or more spaces to a rifle company, why don't you add an engineer platoon, and a tank platoon, and an electronic warfare section, and a platoon of 81mm mortars, and if you want real firepower a 120 mm mortar platoon, a section of 155mm howitzers, and a medical platoon, and on and on, for there are many things that a rifle company find useful from time to time. All of these of course are found at other levels, and all of them are available to that rifle company commander when required. As long as "available when needed" is maintained there is no need to give a company EVERYTHING it might sometimes need.
In WWII and Korea, each battalion had a water cooled machine gun platoon in its weapons company. They were always farmed out to the rifle companies, based upon who needed them. What would you rather have, eight guns placed where the need is, or 18 guns, half to thirds of which cannot be properly employed?
The guiding principle of American force structure is design a unit around what it needs, and what it needs to do ALL THE TIME, and pool resources needed some of the time at higher levels to they may be attached, placed under operational control, or in direct or indirect support of the maneuver unit.
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