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Post by quincannon on Nov 14, 2015 16:23:52 GMT
The problem is that three separate, but linked, battles were being fought around the Calhoun Hill area led by three different people, when it should have been one battle fought by three companies with one man exercising command.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 14, 2015 20:00:38 GMT
The problem I find is at what point did Keogh find that he was being sucked into a pitched battle, I obviously don't know what orders Custer gave him but if they were along the lines of "you come to me" then once he committed his force to three separate fracas then was unable to follow anyone, oh and what of Benteen, if he showed up then he would have a battle on his hands just to break through to Keogh and then pull his chestnuts out of the fire.
Custer and Keogh should have stayed united, leaving three companies to bring in two other units is just stupid, they could I suppose just follow his trail as they would be doing anyway from the bluffs to LNC ridge lines.
Yan.
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Post by Beth on Nov 14, 2015 20:37:32 GMT
I agree that leaving 3 companies to bring in two others is stupid which is why I don't think that is what happened. Perhaps "Oh by the way keep an eye out for Benteen' might have entered the conversation but the rest of the conversation-and the main reason for Keogh being where he was is lost to time.
I think the "Waiting for Benteen" school of thought was developed just to add to the 'see Custer would be alive if Reno and Benteen had just...." camp.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Nov 15, 2015 12:14:07 GMT
Nice maps conrad and I like your thoughts..especially since they are evidence based! I also think QC is correct about entering the coulee. I will continue that thought.. I spent a long time looking down from near Calhoun Hill picturing where C would gallop to and I could not imagine them literally in the coulee because it appears so narrow. If we define it broadly as a drainage then okay they could gallop down the coulee. I suspect that is what they did with men on either side. The problem then is two fold. You don't really clear the bottom of the coulee. There is a second arm of the coulee below GG ridge that is probably still full of warriors and runs away to the south. I like conrad's possibility of chasing horses, and I contemplate Ian's idea of seeing men to the north. A simple thing is if a counter attack splits C then those in the coulee or north of it must head north or east. Warriors coming out from behind may block the east exit. The bulk move up the ridge. the cluster on the ridge are at a step which looks to me like a place to make a stand (I did discuss this with QC) and I reckon that may be about where conrad places the point from which GGR can be fired upon. The silence and lack of a sight line from I and L certainly, in my mind, are important in how the disaster developed without each company being aware of what was happening. Cheers
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 15, 2015 13:05:53 GMT
Mac, This is not new, but when the dominos began to fall, so did command and control. There was no defensive plan, or location picked to defend. There were too many holes in the dike. There was no exit plan and they were spread too thin. Just too much terrain, too many lanes for egress, and too many NA's. C could clear any place they chose, but losses grew and confusion ruled command. Instead of one united command they became three.
Regards, Tom
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Nov 15, 2015 13:27:07 GMT
Just thinking on how Keogh should of reacted, now if he was ordered to link up with Custer, then at the point that C and L got into trouble and he had to commit his own company to defend his rear, why didn’t he try to contact Custer, sure he may have realised late that all these issues were evolving around him but he could have sent out a rider to tell his commander that he won’t be showing up over on his side of the ridge any time soon because he had committed all of his battalion to battle and was totally fixed. Yan. Hi Yan, Why do you assume he didn't send one? Cheers, conrad
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Nov 15, 2015 13:54:45 GMT
Thanks for the kind words Mac. I'd like to get to the LBH and actually see and judge that ground (is that 390 metre mark really out of sight from GGR and able to accomodate the held horses, for example?) but that will be at least a few years away.
Cheers,
conrad
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 15, 2015 14:06:46 GMT
Hello Conrad, maybe he sent Mitchell and McLlhargey.
Yan.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Nov 15, 2015 21:26:03 GMT
Thanks for the kind words Mac. I'd like to get to the LBH and actually see and judge that ground (is that 390 metre mark really out of sight from GGR and able to accomodate the held horses, for example?) but that will be at least a few years away. Cheers, conrad conrad The sight lines are very difficult. Vision impacts completely on how far is too far and From the ridge there would be no way to be sure what was down there. GGR seemed to me to be much closer than I expected but this may be a visual trick too. This was one of the main things I discovered there are so many small drops, rolls that are just enough to stop you having a clear view of all the ground in front (or importantly around) you. You may be right about that area, Tom and certainly AZ have spent more time there than most and may have a more informed opinion. The problem is knowing why Harrington moved. Was he ordered or did he just make his own decision? Obviously this goes directly to tactical intent. Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 16, 2015 13:22:21 GMT
That's the big question Mac, was he ordered and by whom (Keogh or Calhoun) or was this move made on his own volition.
Then we have the other question, was it a sweep or a direct move to set up and defend a position covering L company's right flank.
Yan.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Nov 16, 2015 15:19:18 GMT
My gut feel is that the move was intended to relieve the indirect fire pressure being put on L. The problem was in charging mounted and in going too far down the coulee. Forming a skirmish line on foot, then proceeding slowly and carefully down the coulee, using the rifle's longer range advantage, would have worked better than a mounted charge, plus it would have allowed the soldiers to find all the Indians down in all the nooks and crannies who were not visible from Calhoun hill, and it would have prevented the soldiers from going too far down the coulee. Now, who ordered that move? That is the $64,000 question.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 16, 2015 15:52:14 GMT
It depends on where Keogh was in relation to C Company, if he was down were his body was found then I don’t think he was in any position to see what was going on, so that would leave both Harrington and Calhoun as these had a better view on what was going on, but were these two companies close enough to interact especially when things got hot.
Keogh could have formed a small BHQ, he could have left each company with only one officer, as these were reduced formations and C was down to one officer anyway, that way Keogh could be joined by Calhoun in the same way Reno joined by Hodgeson (Co & Adjutant) plus a few couriers.
We could say that the demise of C Company was down to unforeseen circumstances.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 16, 2015 19:06:03 GMT
I disagree.
The first question that must be asked is where was Company C originally deployed in relation to Company L.
I see no reason to think that they would be anywhere but where their governing doctrine says they would be, that being close by, but not so close that they get sucked into Company L fight. They would most assuredly be mounted, and far enough away from Company L to avoid becoming entangled, but close enough to support Company L by reacting to and emerging threat to Company L.
The question then becomes where was Company L when Company C reacted to that threat? My guess, and it is only that, is that Company L was either in its bent position at the top of Calhoun Hill or that they were in the process of retrograding from the military crest of Calhoun Hill back to the top and bending. That would seem to me to be the trigger point for any offensive move by Company C. If I am correct than Company C would be a hundred meters or so north of the Calhoun hilltop.
Now that I fully understand the points made much earlier by Montrose, I don't believe Keogh and Company I were anywhere near these other two companies at that time or any time. Keogh had staked out his own territory in the swale, watching for any reinforcements, securing the proposed regimental(-) attack position, and attempting to keep the lanes clear between the swale and the L-N-C ridge complex (the expected route the reinforcements would come) That precludes Keogh giving any order.
It is then down to Calhoun and Harrington. Either one could have given the order for Company C to advance. At that point my money would be on Harrington. He had the choice, mounted or dismounted. He chose badly and let his move forward get out of hand, advanced to far, and found himself in a bag of his own making.
Ian, commanders are paid to gaze into their crystal balls and foresee the unforeseen. If it looks easy, its a trap.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 16, 2015 20:19:30 GMT
Some say that Calhoun occupied Henryville before he reached the hill that was named after him, but what may have given him the reason to shorten his line and tie in closer to Keogh, was this retrograde because his right flank was compromised by Indians moving through the coulee below? I ask this question because Harrington may have seen this situation developing, he saw Calhoun react to the threat to his flank, he also saw how this threat was growing, he then sees Calhoun moving up hill and this sparked the move to protect the flank whilst Calhoun’s company is in transit.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 16, 2015 21:27:08 GMT
I don't think Calhoun occupied Henryville. Had he done so he would be firing uphill I believe.
More probably Calhoun occupied two successive positions in the south side of Calhoun Hill, one about midway down, and the other being the military crest, before he was forced back to the top by fire, and also forced to adopt a position facing south with a bend to westward, his third and final position on top of the hill. To me he did not face a crisis until he had to bend part of that line westward, and it was the bending of that line that Harrington reacted to.
The reality is that Company L was flanked right and left almost from the outset, and certainly as he deployed on the first of his probable three positions. He probably did not realize either one, at the outset. Both of his flanks were always hanging in the air. I don't think Calhoun had a clear picture of what he was facing on his left. Keogh probably did from the swale, for those flanking Calhoun's left would present themselves in the lane between the swale and the L-N-C ridge complex. Harrington would not have seen that threat either, if he was anywhere near where he should be according to doctrine. Had either Company C or L seen those people off to the left of L's line, they would have known the game was up, and the time had come to move out briskly. Instead they stayed. Companies C and L were dead meat the moment those Indians moved around Calhoun's left flank. Game, set, match.
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