colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Nov 16, 2015 22:18:13 GMT
Keogh's people in the swale, watching for Benteen, should have seen the threat to Calhoun's left flank and a messenger sent to tell them to get the heck out of there and fallback toward I company. C company was only able to cover the right flank of L. We don't know if a messenger with such a message was sent or not. It is quite possible I company was being well entertained by Indians coming through the gap Fred discovered or the gap between I company and C company. Most likely the gap between the companies was fully exploited after C company charged and disintegrated.
In any event, the Keogh battalion should have executed a mobile defense and not a fixed defense, which was impossible to handle correctly, given the shortage of troops and the poor terrain for such a defense. The fact Keogh and I company all appear to have died in place at almost the same time indicates Keogh was not aware of what was happening with C and L, and that means he did a very poor job of commanding his battalion during that phase of the battle. I company was probably overwhelmed very quickly, from the way the markers are laid out.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 16, 2015 23:31:00 GMT
Mobile Defense ---- agreed, BUT that also depends upon the orders he was given, and how much freedom of action those orders gave him.
Personally I would have conducted a mobile defense, and sorted out any orders given later, but that's me.
I don't think Keogh was the sharpest tool in the shed, and you are quite correct, mobile defense or not Colt, that Keogh did a piss poor job of commanding. In a situation that called for the tightest control, he chose a loose, disjointed defense, of a place he should have known was indefensible.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Nov 17, 2015 11:40:33 GMT
I don't think Calhoun occupied Henryville. Had he done so he would be firing uphill I believe.
More probably Calhoun occupied two successive positions in the south side of Calhoun Hill, one about midway down, and the other being the military crest, before he was forced back to the top by fire, and also forced to adopt a position facing south with a bend to westward, his third and final position on top of the hill. To me he did not face a crisis until he had to bend part of that line westward, and it was the bending of that line that Harrington reacted to.
The reality is that Company L was flanked right and left almost from the outset, and certainly as he deployed on the first of his probable three positions. He probably did not realize either one, at the outset. Both of his flanks were always hanging in the air. I don't think Calhoun had a clear picture of what he was facing on his left. Keogh probably did from the swale, for those flanking Calhoun's left would present themselves in the lane between the swale and the L-N-C ridge complex. Harrington would not have seen that threat either, if he was anywhere near where he should be according to doctrine. Had either Company C or L seen those people off to the left of L's line, they would have known the game was up, and the time had come to move out briskly. Instead they stayed. Companies C and L were dead meat the moment those Indians moved around Calhoun's left flank. Game, set, match. This is the important thing to consider. The kind of slope conrad mentions for C to move to also acts along that ridge to allow warriors to fire into the right flank of the L skirmish line I think. From where C was likely deployed the slope down to the coulee is fairly observable, probably more so if mounted. What if the move by C was not into the coulee botttom, as I have said I could not picture doing that at a gallop with a whole company. What if the move was anchored on the left along the ridge to drive warriors off the slopes to the right flank of L and then sweeping along the coulee to the ridge between Calhoun Coulee east arm and the arm below GGR. This would put them way too close to GGR and account for the warriors saying they initially jumped back into the coulee, this being the one below GGR, and the soldiers occupied a ridge they had vacated. Certainly there would still be warriors in the east arm of the coulee as well. This I could picture as a gallop. Then as montrose suggests they take some hits and dismount. Cheers Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 17, 2015 13:47:09 GMT
Well thought out Mac, just shows the benefits of visiting the battlefield and taking stock of the topography.
If Keogh was ordered to keep it simply and leave the rump of his battalion mounted then he would be under the illusion that his stay around this sector would be brief and because of this he only wanted to commit one company to dismounted action or skirmish line, so keeping this in mind the charge by C Company would be just that, a mounted sweep through the area to buy some more time in their quest to wait for Benteen, the fact that they may have took casualties would impede this sweep and a halt would be called to pick any wounded, this halt may have forced Harrington to dismount a portion of his force to cover the halt and things just spiralled from there.
Yan.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Nov 17, 2015 15:14:43 GMT
QC, I too would have left the order sorting out for later, and conducted a defense that allows me and my unit to survive, or at least allows for the chance to survive. It is always better to be tried by 12 than to be carried by 6.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 17, 2015 17:11:39 GMT
From Fort Apache: "Captain York when you command this regiment, and you probably will, Command".
When you are given an order your obligation is to carry it out (OBEY) to the best of your ability, and if necessary using the command prerogative of judgment, to change and/or adapt to the circumstance that appears after the order was given(COMMANDING)
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 17, 2015 19:19:41 GMT
Do you get the idea that these company and battalion commanders just couldn’t agree on anything without Custer? If Keogh dithered on battle ridge then the same could be said about those on Reno hill, as it looks like Capt. Weir doesn’t care a hoot about what Reno and Benteen thinks he just acts and makes decisions on his own bat, Reno then deserts his post and goes looking for a dead body, Benteen himself sounds happy enough for Reno to make the decisions (well he was the senior officer after all).
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 17, 2015 19:34:01 GMT
What you describe above is a command climate in disarray Ian.
Leaders at every level are paid to make decision and take decisive action when called for. When you do so you are betting your bars (oak leaves, eagles, stars whatever) that you are doing the correct thing, taking the right action. When a leader is afraid to do so, because his organization is a one man show, and he fears repercussions, two things are evident, the one man show commander should not command, and the leader who fears is not a leader.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 17, 2015 21:32:29 GMT
I want to attempt to put this disobedience of orders to bed once and for all.
I will use as an analogy American football. Most if not all are familiar enough with it, even our friends from the UK and Oz.
Most of you know the plays are called from the sidelines. Either the offensive or defensive coach will call them for their respective offenses and defenses. At times it will be the head coach.
When a play is called from the sidelines, that is what the coach wants done. Most times it is. There are times though that the quarterback sees something subsequent to the play call, an opportunity, or a defensive array that is unanticipated at the time the coach sends in the play. A quarterback then has the choice, do what the coach says or act instinctively to what he himself sees.
Acting on instinct and experience the quarterback, like the subordinate commander does what he feels best for the situation. If it works he is a hero. If it does not he is the goat. Billy Kilmer won a Super Bowl back in the day, by modifying a play sent in by the coach. He saw an opportunity to send John Riggins through the line, and took it, despite instructions to the contrary. Many a commander has done the same thing, despite instructions to the contrary.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 18, 2015 12:00:31 GMT
Chuck, The above is appropriate, the stakes are different in war as opposed to the game. The above happens every week, in every game unless the coach has little confidence in his QB. Then again you have dictatorial coaches, which stunts the growth of the team. Which was the problem at the LBH? Weak QB or dictatorial Coach or both? Were we dealing with a player/coach?
Regards, Tom
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 18, 2015 14:35:00 GMT
We have spoken on how Custer started as a regimental commander and ended up a company commander, now both Keogh and Benteen commanded battalions and in reality both men ended up commanding their companies.
This would be understandable seeing that the rank of captain was a company commanders rank and they were in fact commanding above their station when given a battalion to run, would this show in their performance on the day? Keogh may have let Calhoun run the show on battle ridge whilst he was with his company in the swale.
Benteen too was not really in charge, Weir and company D was under Benteens control but this never bothered Weir as he continued to badger Benteen during the battle and left without orders, Lt. Godfrey also said that during the retreat from Weir Point his company (K) covered the withdrawal by staying in skirmish line and that it was he who made this decision, company K was also in Benteen's battalion.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 18, 2015 15:53:47 GMT
Yes Tom the stakes are much higher, and I am amazed that someone did not take me to task equating combat to a game of football, BUT the principle is the same, and that principle revolves around trusting the subordinate to do the right thing.
Ian
Keogh was given a battalion, and instead of commanding the whole, he chose to stay and command his company, probably after a few perfunctory instruction to Calhoun and Harrington. In that instance any trust Custer had in Keogh was misplaced.
I don't know if anyone has a real handle on Benteen's role, after the link up, and if his battalion stayed intact as a battalion, or was dissolved, Benteen returning to command his company. My personal view is that no attention was paid to this either way, but I do not know. Regardless, Godfrey did the right thing, with or without orders.
A wise coach, like a wise commander, must place faith, confidence, and trust, in his offensive, defensive, and special teams coaches. Why have them otherwise? Why were they hired? A coach, like a commander cannot do it all alone. If he tries he will eventually fail.
You must also realize Ian that these so called battalion were not like the modern battalion, nor are they like the British battalions that fought the your wars of the 18th and 19th centuries. They are and were fixed organizations with one commander, and formed part of a solid and stable chain of command. The ones we deal with here are a VERY temporary grouping of companies, that are liable to be differently configured five minutes from now with a new commander. To us the lowest tactical and administrative entity was the regiment, and we never got a handle on how to operate below that level. In your army the battalion was the lowest tactical and administrative entity. It was the same tomorrow as it is today. In those days your brigade and our regiment were at the same command levels. If one of your brigadiers needed to detach a part of his force, he sent a battalion. If one of our regimental commanders needed to detach a force, it was a case of you and you company, and the senior you company commander was in charge.
A fixed battalion is always superior in all resects to a battalion of you and you.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 18, 2015 16:09:59 GMT
Hi Chuck and good morning (afternoon), yes concerning the move forward to Weir Point it is hard to fathom out who was doing what, I would hazard a guess and say that Benteen handled to move (minus D company of course) whilst Reno took charge of the slow moving train containing the wounded.
I do get the impression that Benteen left Reno to take control, from the move to Weir and even when they reconvened later on Reno hill, if Reno was not fully with it after the valley fight then he should have stepped up and helped him more.
I trust you are both keeping warm.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 18, 2015 17:32:37 GMT
The whole thing on Reno Hill from the time of initial link up until the end of the battle, and the arrival of Terry was a monumental cock up, brought about by a completely defective organizational construct, with a poor, Custer generated, command climate mixed into something that was bad by design.
It was a structure designed to fail, because it had no solid substructure to support the whole.
There is a reason why we have a capable headquarters element (read capable and having both the tools of command and administration present) for each three or four companies. There is also a reason why a commander should operate with a span of control of no less than three to no more than five subordinate elements. Anything beyond that cannot be effectively controlled, even with today's technology.
Those people were operating with a span of control of 1 to 12, with temporary groupings, instead of a fixed and robust command structures inserted between, so control may be effectively established and maintained.
The whole blizzard thing in my area, amounted to absolutely nothing, and if I go out this afternoon it will be in shirtsleeves.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 18, 2015 17:48:05 GMT
I don't think Reno every replaced his initial battalion HQ of himself and Hodgson, the only area that was set up was the aid station and that was probably done by the remaining medical staff, Reno was probably there in some sort of capacity and company officers probably had to seek him if they wanted to speak to him over something. But it sounds like it was every company commander for himself once it went dark.
Lucky you, I have three layers of clothing on whilst I type this reply, fingers are cold too, just put the central heating on for when she gets back.
Yan.
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