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Post by yanmacca on Nov 23, 2015 20:16:05 GMT
All the likely avenues for attack should have been seen from the get go, the officers should also have a go idea about how the NAs operate and their fighting techniques, being natives they would fight just like most irregulars and have no real formation, it seems natural then that any coulee or ravine would be utilised in any attack and likely that they will keep low and parry with you until they can surround you, so if I can see that then why couldn’t the officers, and the only reason I can think off in initially they thought that they were safe enough in force on the high ground, but once it was clear that these Indians were crossing the river in force then the longer they hung around the more they were playing into the Indians hands.
Yan.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Nov 23, 2015 21:11:24 GMT
Not so sure I agree with this. There are plenty of places that provide for assembly areas and attack positions for the Indians that are both covered and concealed. No issue there at all. There are several avenues of approach to the Calhoun Hill (the entire Keogh area) that are also covered and concealed, facilitating dismounted infiltration. Again no issue. Looking at the battle though, it was the Indians that were seen, mostly the mounted, who attracted the attention of each of those companies initially, freezing them in place (not fixing) that allowed the infiltrators the time to get into place, and all (both mounted and dismounted) mass in time and space at the point(s) of contact. This I important I think because the mounted alone could not completely force the issue. I really like this observation. I was looking at the photo last night and thinking exactly this about that terrain and especially at Calhoun Hill and Keogh area. Ian is helping expedite the posting of the photo (thanks again Ian). Do not get too excited but I think it shows the roll of the terrain that facilitates exactly what QC is getting at. To follow Ian's post above I wonder if they really understood the tactics of the warriors who were known to favour movements to the flanks and behind. If they did then they must have realised they needed to stay mobile in that terrain. I wonder what would a mobile defence look like there? Cheers
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Post by Beth on Nov 23, 2015 21:25:18 GMT
my point about the unseen approach was I thought I had read about NA approaching at least at Reno Hill unmounted and low in the grass then popping up to fire.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 24, 2015 1:33:59 GMT
Beth: Merely coming together is not mass, not in a military sense anyway. You could say that the enemy massed behind greasy Grass Ridge, meaning that a lot of them gathered in that place.
Achieving mass as it is used as one of the Principles of War is coming together both in time and space at the point of contact. At this battle that mass was achieved by both the seen and unseen.
Nothing in the Reno-Benteen hilltop fight suggests that the Indians ever achieved mass. They did however, as you suggest, use the to infiltrate.
Mass is the synergy of movement-time-space-objective.
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Post by Beth on Nov 24, 2015 2:00:00 GMT
I'm not quite sure what you meant by movement-time-space-objective and would like it clearer in my head.
at what point would a group gathering at a common point be considered a mass? If they share a common battle plan,goal and time table for attack?
If a group was gathered behind a common feature, like a wall, but each has their own goal and plan are they just using the feature as a shield but not using their numbers for a massed attack?
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Post by quincannon on Nov 24, 2015 5:45:38 GMT
Beth: Any coming together in time and space is mass.
For a military purpose though, and the meaning of Mass as a Principle of War there must be deliberate movement into that time and space, for a given purpose (objective)
For the Keogh portion of the fight, groups of Indians were coming from several different direction toward roughly the same place. They used different routes. Some traveled mounted, some chose to infiltrate dismounted. All of them converged upon the Keogh area, arriving at different times. Some attracted attention away from others. Some sniped and harassed from concealed venues. There came a tipping point, the Company C excursion, that allowed the Indians to truly achieve mass against Keogh's battalion. It is pretty obvious that the first Indians into the fight did not pose great danger. They facilitated mass though by holding/freezing friendly attention until full combat power could mass uon that one objective
If you are familiar with Midway, most books take you through a litany of unsuccessful ill coordinated attacks upon Kido Butai on the morning of 4 June 42. Most writers make you think by their narrative that none of these events were related in time and space, just a series of largely unconnected events. The timeline though when laid out before you suggests something completely different. Instead of a series of attacks the time line tells you that this was an unending series of attacks for more than an hour, prior to the arrival of the dive bombers that finished the game. Everything leading up to the attack of the dive bombers was unsuccessful, BUT Kido Butai was frozen, unable to do anything but react, and they remained that way until mass was finally achieved. The same could be said of the Keogh battalion. Midway and the Keogh portion of LBH are very similar in that respect.
Forget the idea of massed attack and all the visions that conjures up. Forget also the massing of people.
Mass is to focus of all your combat power at the same place and time, for a common objective, and accomplished by maneuver supported by fire.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 24, 2015 14:55:10 GMT
Macs image of the gap in battle ridge. He will explain further when he gets on line but he told me that the gap is the dark shaded area behind the car which stands out quite good. Attachments:
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Post by Beth on Nov 24, 2015 19:23:50 GMT
Chuck--thanks for the explanation.
Ian--thanks for posting the picture for Mac and thanks Mac. The reason I really appreciate the pictures is because you become my eyes. You are able to get to places and angles that I would never be able to reach. Thank you.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Nov 24, 2015 21:21:55 GMT
Thank you Ian much appreciated! This photo is taken looking along the ridge towards LSH and on the east side of the ridge. My back is towards the two large groupings of markers in the Keogh swale. The markers in front are the last ones before the gap. The gap is the darker coloured earth under the road and begins just under the vehicle on the road. My guess is that the fill used to level the road was scrapped off the ridge on either side of the gap thus levelling the roadway. As well as the gap you can see the markers are at the top of a rise or roll in the terrain the marker to the right is slightly over the crest. These types of features are the things that destroy visibility. From my view when taking this shot I could have no idea what was over that rise, until I actually mounted it. Infiltration through the gap to behind that rise would be quite easy as the mass of markers are well behind me. From that position one could move further east to behind the ridge east of the Keogh swale or if bold maybe even into the gully running through the swale. In the distance one can see the next markers and interestingly there are no markers in the space opposite the gap. It has been suggested that Keogh was guarding the gap but I doubt that as I would think you cannot guard it from that distance but happy to have more qualified advice on that. Work calls. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Nov 25, 2015 4:26:34 GMT
ADVICE, Qualified or not, take your pick.
You cannot guard the gate to your front yard from the swing in your back garden.
Your observations add much more credibility to Montrose's theory.
Now ask yourself the 64 dollar questions. Were there no gap, would the danger from that quarter still be there? Does the existence of the gap make any difference one way or the other? Could Keogh's knowledge of that gap help or hinder him, as he deployed? Was he as far back as he was because of that gap? Could he have possibly better executed his keep the lanes open mission by ignoring the gap? Did the existence of the gap have any influence on how Calhoun and Harrington were deployed? Were Calhoun and Harrington aware of the gaps existence? Should Calhoun and Harington have been deployed in the first place? Was there a better place to deploy Calhoun and Harrington that was more consistent with the overall mission of the Keogh battalion?
That ought to keep you all busy through the holiday, and the following weekend.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 25, 2015 11:17:34 GMT
I would say that looking at the map I have done (and if I have Keogh's positions correct) then Keogh had no need to place I Coy in the area he had them, if he thought that his men would be needed to plow a furrow for Benteen to get through then his own position must have been almost surrounded. I still think that the prospect of warriors being on the east side of battle ridge this early in the piece would be very slim, the same could be said about the trail Custer cut to go north, these areas would be clear and Keogh's only concern would be coming from the river, so if he knew about the gap then why waste all of his company in the swale area when a possible danger area lay behind him, was C coy suppose to cover this area? did Harrington bring his company too far south? Keogh could have placed the rump of his company to cover his rear (the gap) and held a small detail to bring forward Benteen (say himself a trumpeter, a guidon carrier and an NCO, the rest under porter could be further back covering the main ingress points to his rear. Yan. Attachments:
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Post by quincannon on Nov 25, 2015 15:53:22 GMT
The gap is a red herring. What disturbs me is that I fell for it in a big way, and for a long time. I am quite ashamed that I did so, for I do known better, or at least I thought I did. Montrose has the answer to why Keogh was where he was. To me the gap falls somewhere between being of no importance to the possibility of being a secondary consideration.
Ask yourself this. Absent the gap would the south fork of Deep Ravine still be used as an avenue of approach to the Keogh battalion position? If your answer is yes, then the gap itself is of no significance. The gap does not make the avenue approach more desirable. If you think about it for a bit, the gap makes it less desirable.
Calhoun was flanked to his left very early on, perhaps not by many but flanked all the same. Assaults flow like water around a rock. In this instance the rock was Company L. Any incursion around Company L's left flank would impede any future link up with Benteen and reinforcements. Preventing that would be Company I's primary mission,
There remains then the question of the deployments of Companies C and L. Could they have been better employed elsewhere. Where they were they became a magnet to draw every Indian west of the Mississippi. As far as the Indians initially knew those two companies constituted the entire cavalry strength in that area. Where they were deployed, they might as well have placed a kick me sign on themselves. Look how those red arrows of known movements portrayed on Ian's map converge on that area.
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Post by Beth on Nov 25, 2015 20:46:08 GMT
Consider this yet another stupid question.
So if as Ian's map show the NA were converging on Keogh, did Custer just sort of bumble into his own massacre by returning to Keogh, was he coming to support Keogh or is there other possibilities.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Nov 25, 2015 21:19:52 GMT
The gap is a red herring. What disturbs me is that I fell for it in a big way, and for a long time. I am quite ashamed that I did so, for I do known better, or at least I thought I did. Montrose has the answer to why Keogh was where he was. To me the gap falls somewhere between being of no importance to the possibility of being a secondary consideration.
Ask yourself this. Absent the gap would the south fork of Deep Ravine still be used as an avenue of approach to the Keogh battalion position? If your answer is yes, then the gap itself is of no significance. The gap does not make the avenue approach more desirable. If you think about it for a bit, the gap makes it less desirable.
Calhoun was flanked to his left very early on, perhaps not by many but flanked all the same. Assaults flow like water around a rock. In this instance the rock was Company L. Any incursion around Company L's left flank would impede any future link up with Benteen and reinforcements. Preventing that would be Company I's primary mission,
There remains then the question of the deployments of Companies C and L. Could they have been better employed elsewhere. Where they were they became a magnet to draw every Indian west of the Mississippi. As far as the Indians initially knew those two companies constituted the entire cavalry strength in that area. Where they were deployed, they might as well have placed a kick me sign on themselves. Look how those red arrows of known movements portrayed on Ian's map converge on that area. The gap does assume less importance other than as an access point through the ridge but they could just as easily simply ride over the ridge. The lack of markers opposite the gap suggests to me that it was used. The left flank of Calhoun has been on my mind and the Company C move was futile as in time the position of L was untenable. Again the slope to the left of L offered plenty of opportunity to infiltrate to fairly close proximity as does the right flank. All of which says why was I hidden in the swale? I can only suggest that there was no expectation of significant enemy approach to the position just the old 'they will screen and run theory' perhaps. Certainly there are indian accounts that say the soldiers were set up in full view on the hill. I have wondered if this was a deliberate action to make them a focus while Custer slipped away. A bit of intimidation "we are up here so you better start running" kind of thing. Sorry must go now. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Nov 26, 2015 1:45:33 GMT
Two separate and nearly unconnected battles Beth, from the time Custer left Keogh.
Ian's map does not show any movement against Custer, but had it you would probably see two or three intersecting lines coming into Custer's original position, then at least two and probably three converging on his final position.
From the Indian Perspective: They knew that about 80 or so troops were down at Ford B and that those same 80 withdrew in the direction of Calhoun Hill. It is unlikely they were aware of Keogh's presence, or that those they saw in the Calhoun Hill area were in fact a different 80. Remember all the could see were Companies C and L. Company I was hidden from view from those approaching from the south and west.
They had no knowledge of Custer's whereabouts until he appeared down in the Ford D vicinity.
It is natural to assume then that the Indians thought they were still after those that appeared at Ford B. When the came around Company L's left flank, I am sure Company I was a surprise to them. Not for long.
Both instances were the classic massing of combat power at the decisive place and time.
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