Calhoun Hill

[mac]

A few things impressed on my mind recently as I walked across MTC and around on the Calhoun  Hill area.
First
Henryville is a very good place to put pressure on a line on Calhoun Hill flank. I had read accounts by warriors saying they had a clear view of the soldiers and I can now see that they probably did but that the reverse would not be true; plenty of cover in Henryville. Easy to see how the L line would be forced to gradually ascend the slope.
Second
From the area around the hill and on the hill itself there is never anything other than restricted visibility. Moving only a small distance can completely mask some areas from view. My feeling is this area is not defensible especially by the small number of men available.
Third
Distance
-Greasy Grass felt much closer to me than I expected.
-L and C seemed further apart from each other than I expected and even to the feeling of some isolation rather than support. Company I seemed very isolated and far away.
Company C move
QC asked me to consider how C would move off the hill. I feel he is right in suggesting they must move in file. I could not imagine how a fast deployment could be made by men abreast. This now made sense for me of Montrose's idea that they actually moved past warrior positions and were vulnerable from the rear.
I was interested to see that the cluster of markers on F/F ridge are actually atop a step in the ridge. It seems obvious to me that they attempted a defensive stand there as they retreated up the ridge.
I find it hard to believe that any officer would think this piece of ground could be defended for any length of time in the circumstances.
Comments?
Cheers

[quincannon]

Well if it was not good for defense, or observation, it makes you wonder why they were there in the first place, and more importantly who placed them there. I happen to agree with Mac here.

Mac: Did you mean file (one behind the other) or did you mean column (as in a column of twos)? I remember the entrance off the ridge to Calhoun Coulee being restricted/narrow, but can't remember just how narrow.

[yanmacca]

Chuck, that was a question I asked myself a few weeks ago, as C company would probably around 80-100 yards either in column of twos or in line (file).

Yan.

[mac]

Perhaps column of two but the coulee, I think, would have been deeper and with the head further down slope in the past. This as a consequence of road building changing the drainage as elsewhere.
I found it very hard to visualise what they would do. Any move past the coulee seemed to me to go terribly close to Greasy Grass which, as I said, seems closer than I expected. From past the coulee any move off Greasy Grass would be on them very quickly.
As would a counter attack up the coulee and around the north end of Greasy Grass. In the end that was my thought as to the direction. It is certainly a bad place to go and a worse place to stop.
Cheers

[yanmacca]

Hi Mac, you pose a good question, we can try and gauge any movements by C company after they presumably got repulsed with markers around FFR and other places, but you are correct that we don’t know where they started any move into the coulee or what rout they took, but my money would be on any elevated ground that led towards the coulee and gave a fast rout to FFR.

Yan

[mac]

I agree Ian.
The thing I see now from Calhoun Hill is that when C moves down the slope they take themselves away from L and very close to the Warriors at GG ridge area. In effect L and C and I are now out of direct support (more on this in a Keogh thread soon) of each other. This means that when C are assaulted and retreat L are not able to respond in enough force to halt the attack. Similarly with C in retreat and L distracted there is not enough mass to stop an assault from the south.
On the ground the area that needs to be defended is big and difficult to observe and this allows the Warriors to approach to distances where a quick assault is a easily possible.
Defending this place was never possible but I wonder if they could have held longer if C had dismounted and moved in skirmish line down the slope to push back the infiltration up the coulée?
Cheers

[quincannon]

Don't know what Ian thinks about a dismounted attack by C, but I sure think so. It would be so much easier to control, and no one could come in from behind them. Limit that attack to 150 or so meters, then gradually pull back.

Don't know that it would have changed the outcome, but it would have bought time, and with time anything is possible.

That mounted attack probably gave away a half hour or so of stayability.

[yanmacca]

Yes a foray on foot would have been a good option by C company, I am not sure if L company did something similar as some writers say that L coy initially occupied Henryville area before pulling back to Calhoun hill, so if their horses were back higher up the slope then this would probably be similar to what Chuck is suggesting (has anyone else ever read a similar account about L company being on Henryville?).

To me the best two choices are to do what Chuck eluded to and fight a delaying action on foot or draw pistols and sweep the area clear and then return to battle ridge, because if this mission was to ride unsupported and out of the LOS, finally to dismount and form skirmish, then who ever gave this order should have been fragged.

Yan.

[quincannon]

What was Company C's mission? Was it to assault Greasy Grass Ridge, drive the hostiles back across the river? Was it to clear every nook and cranny of Calhoun Coulee? Or was it the much more immediate mission of driving the hostiles out of effective range of direct fire from rifles, and the indirect capability they had to place fire on battle ridge by arrows?

If you conclude, as I do, that it was this last, then the limit of advance off battle ridge should have been in the 150-200 meter range. What was the most effective weapon Company C could employ to do this? Was in a mounted solder with a six shot revolving pistol that has limited range and accuracy, or was it the dismounted soldier with the carbine?

I think it does not take more than a fraction of a second to conclude it was the carbine, and the best way to employ that weapon was dismounted.

If it does not make sense, or you cannot make any sense of an action, then it is not a great leap of faith to conclude that someone screwed up - big time, or the action did not happen. We know that the Company C episode happened, so that leaves you with the first alternative.

[yanmacca]

Have you ever thought that this part of the battle was fought by three companies in three different locations with each fighting their own battle? Let’s try it this way, Custer deploys Keogh’s troops for him and sends the three companies to hold three locations, Keogh and his “company I” was out of sight of both Calhoun’s and Harrington’s men, here was also a considerable gap between L and C.

Keogh may have took his men to the location ordered by Custer and when he left the Indian threat to L and C companies was low, so now he is in position and following orders plus he has no idea of the growing threat over the ridge. Meanwhile things are getting hot on Calhoun hill so Harrington decides to deploy on Calhoun’s right flank, thus riding to a point to be able to bring his carbines to bare, but due to the terrain this foray has caused him to stray too far in which to find a suitable position and is suddenly being out gunned, causing panic and a sudden withdraw to a higher point, in which they find that they are still vulnerable to enemy fire and break, leaving two sergeant’s to try and rally the men.

Yan.

[quincannon]

I think that unlikely Ian, not that it could not have happened, but had Custer ordered specific places for each of the three companies, he would have thrown a wrench into normal protocol, and announced for all the world to hear that he had no confidence in Keogh.

A higher commander may tell a subordinate battalion commander to hold this, or be mindful of that, but normally he would give the subordinate the mission, and rely on him to position his companies in a manner that best accomplishes the mission.

Commanders are decision makers. They may have two, three, four or more options, or courses of action. Invariably all but one are wrong. You go for the best available course of action or decision.

[Beth]

This is sort of brain strain day for me so I might be asking something obvious. Did the other orders that we know that Custer gave that day support that Custer would have just given Keogh a mission or micromanaged the placement of companies?

[mac]

I don't think so Beth.
Cheers

[yanmacca]

How about the option of Custer wanting to keep a channel open for Benteen to contact Keogh and then for the two (or three if McDougal was involved) to meet up with Custer and Yates further north, if so then I company was positioned (aka Montrose) to keep an opening and bring in the support from LNC area, C was also in position to keep an eye on the rout north and L was position to suppress any move over the ford below.

One of the reasons why I thought that Custer and Keogh had discussed the positioning of companies is the notion that Custer may have noticed the gap (aka Fred’s gap) that led behind Keogh’s position and like any officer worth his salt he could have saw that this was a danger area with the added possibility of the enemy driving a wedge between both battalions, so C had a mounted role of watching this area, but if the first sign of danger came from greasy grass hill then this may have dragged him out of position leaving the area un-protected and this was exploited later.

Yan.

[Beth]

I'm curious, if you take out the 'waiting for Benteen' factor from the formula, what happens? We assume that waiting for Benteen is a factor but we can't know for certain. Just suppose the order Custer gave was different from what Cooke wrote? Perhaps Custer's order was to bring the packs forward to Ford A area to have them in reserve there or perhaps to use as the promised support for Reno. At the time he gave the order Custer couldn't have foreseen ranging so far from the place the order was given. He did have Reno and the village in the valley with Reno making contact and he had promised Reno support.

I guess I am not totally convinced that Custer was waiting for Benteen to arrive at his location vrs Reno's.