Calhoun Hill

[yanmacca]

Good morning Beth, yes I too have often wondered why Custer would expect Benteen to travel over the high ground with packs in tow on what would be tired horses in such heat, also he must have liked what he saw in valley to deny Reno any much needed support, but what does intrigue me is why he wanted to leave the rump of his force on the heights facing the ford (B), surly if he didn’t expect Benteen to arrive then the idea of holding this position is rather pointless.

There must have been a reason to have Keogh hanging back with three companies, it looks also as if Custer had no intentions of moving back to meet up with Keogh, although he did back track from the northern ford (D) and halted midway, so I have lent towards the notion of Custer expecting something to happen south of Keogh, or else why leave Keogh and also move back to cemetery ridge.
In my mind if Custer saw that he needed to cap off the northern end, then what would stop him from moving north with his full 209, he must have had faith in his five company force to continue after the incident at 3411.

Yan.

[Beth]

I tend to think we can't make sense out of the something then perhaps it's because we are missing key pieces of information that sadly can never be recovered.

Perhaps Custer 'parked' Keogh with the basic information to keep an eye out to make sure no one comes up the ravines because he didn't exhaust the bulk of the men and horses even more. Give them a period of time to rest then be fresher when he needs to call on them.

[quincannon]

Ian, Benteen would use the high ground of L-N-C Ridges, because his only two alternatives were MTC (low ground with high on three sides) , or the route along the edge of the bluffs that leads to Weir Peak (exposure). He could mask his exposure on L-N-C by sticking to the east side along the military crest.

Beth: Keeping an eye out is what deep supporting units do in a recon.

The choice of place to post the Keogh battalion was made to secure an attack position, once Benteen and the packs show up. That swale Keogh was found in is the perfect place. Big enough to hold seven companies, masked by battle ridge from the low ground down by the river, and a place to keep the packs secure, while the assault was taking place, while at the same time being well in hand as a location to provide after battle replenishment.

The only fly in your beer is that those guys sporting feathers HAVE A VOTE.

[yanmacca]

That’s the million pound question Chuck, just where would the main assault fall, Custer would have had two options, one was the main ford into the village (ford B), the second was the northern ford (ford D), now let’s say for instance that Custer has nine companies at his disposal and the pack trail containing around 80-90 men was secure behind the ridge line, now Custer has two options and the first was a supporting attack across ford B to aid Reno, the second was to cause death and destruction further north at ford D, now could he do both?

Yan.

[mac]

I think the intention is that troops at Calhoun Hill keep the warriors at bay while Custer checks out Ford D and that Custer's expectation was that Keogh et al join him at Cemetery for an assault at Ford D. This is thwarted by lots more warriors than expected attacking Calhoun Hill.
Cheers

[Beth]

Oct 7, 2015 21:41:13 GMT quincannon said:

Ian, Benteen would use the high ground of L-N-C Ridges, because his only two alternatives were MTC (low ground with high on three sides) , or the route along the edge of the bluffs that leads to Weir Peak (exposure). He could mask his exposure on L-N-C by sticking to the east side along the military crest.

Beth: Keeping an eye out is what deep supporting units do in a recon.

The choice of place to post the Keogh battalion was made to secure an attack position, once Benteen and the packs show up. That swale Keogh was found in is the perfect place. Big enough to hold seven companies, masked by battle ridge from the low ground down by the river, and a place to keep the packs secure, while the assault was taking place, while at the same time being well in hand as a location to provide after battle replenishment.

The only fly in your beer is that those guys sporting feathers HAVE A VOTE.

But if it weren't for the timing of Reno's breakout would Benteen have gone into the valley where he might see fighting or would he have gone up the bluffs?  There is nothing in Cooke's message to direct Benteen in any given location--unless Martin was directed to lead Benteen back to Custer but I don't think I have ever seen that statement.

[quincannon]

And that is but one of the reasons the note is inadequate as a military communication.

Benteen had no idea of the situation, particularly the split. We can say that Martini knew which way Custer went, but no indication (by testimony) that Benteen ask him. He may very well have inquired, but we just don't know either way. Benteen may very well be tempted to move toward Reno's direction upon hearing the sounds of battle in the valley.

Benteen, even knowing the direction Custer went, may have concluded that Custer had indeed found an open ford, had made his assault, and was also in the valley, further down stream. He may have indeed thought this and decided to go the shortest and most direct route into the valley.

There is only one proper thing to do here though, unless Benteen had a gift of mind reading. Seeing the split in the trail Benteen should have followed the largest (Custer's)trail. If there was any doubt inquire of Martini. Benteen knows nothing of any plan Custer has, and this is no time for assumptions

[Beth]

If you were at the point where Custer headed up to the bluff, would you have seen the battle in the valley? If Benteen had arrived while Reno was still in the timber would he have been able to see him? My point is if Benteen had seen Reno in the valley would he still have selected to head up the bluff?

[yanmacca]

If Martini was ordered to hook up with his company after delivering the note to Benteen, then what are the chances that Martini would see that his commander was veering off course and ride up and say "no sir" the general went that way,because by the sounds of it Benteen rode detached from his company K and acted the role of battalion commander.
My guess is that Martini would would stay silent and leave Benteen to his own devices.
Yan.

[dave]

Oct 8, 2015 16:01:08 GMT quincannon said:

And that is but one of the reasons the note is inadequate as a military communication.

Benteen had no idea of the situation, particularly the split. We can say that Martini knew which way Custer went, but no indication (by testimony) that Benteen ask him. He may very well have inquired, but we just don't know either way. Benteen may very well be tempted to move toward Reno's direction upon hearing the sounds of battle in the valley.

Benteen, even knowing the direction Custer went, may have concluded that Custer had indeed found an open ford, had made his assault, and was also in the valley, further down stream. He may have indeed thought this and decided to go the shortest and most direct route into the valley.

There is only one proper thing to do here though, unless Benteen had a gift of mind reading. Seeing the split in the trail Benteen should have followed the largest (Custer's)trail. If there was any doubt inquire of Martini. Benteen knows nothing of any plan Custer has, and this is no time for assumptions

QC
The order from Cooke to Benteen has been discussed recently on Rini's board and found to be very concise and explicit. Only fools who defend Benteen fail to see the clarity of the written word. I have failed in the discussion to share the order was a conundrum to Benteen and impossible to follow. I am a poor debater and have found that it is impossible to deliberate with closed minds.
I am a non veteran, though educated past the 8th grade, who has read the order and attempted to understand the context of the order. I find it to be very poorly written with diametrically proposed objectives.
Be quick and bring packs. He can not do both at the same time nor does the order direct where to go except big village. I am being obtuse in not understanding the order meant to bring the ammo packs and go to Custer without stopping at Reno's posiition?
I am always looking for guidance and seemed to really need some now.
Regards
Dave

[Beth]

We all know that that other board is able to divine the truth from facts that have stumped scholars for over a century. Maybe they have there ouija boards tuned finer than most. I bet they believe that they totally understand Stonehenge, the Nazca lines and the code in the Pyramids as well.

Personally my mantra is if it doesn't make sense you don't have all the facts and considering it will always be impossible to gather all the facts about LBH the best we can do towards getting answers are assumptions. Some people are willing to say they know all about Custer from reading only sources that support their view of the battle, others understand you have to look at all sources to make heads or tales of what makes sense and what doesn't.

[quincannon]

Having matriculated beyond kindergarten you obviously do not have a cavalry mindset (as defined by people who would not know how cavalry operates from a pile of dung), and frankly you are unlikely to acquire one at this late stage of life.

Thank God that your parents raised you to be a rational, thoughtful human being.

Listen to what Colt says.

COMPLETE CHANGE OF SUBJECT FOR WHICH I WILL NOT APOLOGIZE

Ian Toll has a new book out (forget the name) that picks up where his "Pacific Crucible" left off at the end of Guadalcanal and goes through 1944. I ordered mine yesterday, and if it is as good as Pacific Crucible and Six Frigates it's going to be a winner. Toll, unlike so many others, tells a story that is readable, while not bogging you down in so much detail you lose interest. That is not to say the "detail warriors" don't serve their purpose, but every now and again you want a fun read, and Toll provides that.

Also received yesterday a new biography of Rommel called Field Marshall. Have not gotten into it yet, but if it turns out to be worthy of your attention I will report on it.

[mac]

Following the Company C thread discussion I thought it best to post this here.
If Company C had not made a move off the ridge then the outcome would have simply been delayed. Whatever the mechanics, there were not enough men there to hold that position for any appreciable time longer. Once the gap north of Company I was penetrated the three companies were surrounded and trapped on a hill which is indefensible. We would simply be debating a different arrangement of markers.
It is a surprise in some ways that any of them made it to LSH.
Cheers

[deadwoodgultch]

Mac,

Excellent summation. I think the reason the few arrived at LSH, was that the vast majority of the NA's were scalping, counting coup, and generally wrapping up their victory against C,I,&L. Where were they going anyway, on this field no enemy was getting out, even if they did what could they do, they would be hunted down.

Regards,
Tom

[yanmacca]

It also depends on how long Keogh would have hung around, with C company still in position the Indians may have not gone for the gap behind Keogh, just think as they rode up Calhoun coulee the first thing they would have saw was a company of solders mounted up and looking right at them, would they stop? Would they forget about the gap and engage the threat on the ridge?

If the Indians stalled when facing C company then Keogh would have time recall Calhoun and plan his next move, and maybe a pull out, but with so many mounted warriors now in the area the withdrawal would be similar to Reno’s charge back up the valley.

Sorry about ruining the other thread Mac, it wasn’t my intention and I have moved the topic across to another thread.

Yan.