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Post by quincannon on Apr 10, 2018 1:08:04 GMT
Weir wasn't around to testify at the RCOI.
Another explanation for Reno's actions would be trying to cover Weir. Two sides of the same coin as far as I am concerned.
I have said this many times before, but possibly before you joined this august body. It is my belief that all these people were trying to do the best they could. Some of their decisions were very good, some others very bad, others seem that they could go either way depending upon the context that the action was taken, and a balanced look at the existing circumstances. I take no favorites, nor do I hang the goat collar on anyone EXCEPT the man who was responsible for everything that happened or failed to happen. That someone was the commander. He set the conditions for failure by his own hand. For instance if he had not gone so goddamned far north, we would not be having this conversation. Benteen and Reno are blameless in that regard, so while you may hold them accountable for actions or inaction that were in their area of influence, they cannot be blamed for not being able to reach Custer, and anyone who tells you they could have is not in possession of allotted number of Jacks and Queens in their deck.
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Apr 10, 2018 11:22:38 GMT
I don't think Reno lied. He sent Hare to order Weir to open communications. We know that Hare went to Weir's location on WP. So the starting point of where Hare was to give Weir the order was WP and not Reno Hill. Weir was ordered to continue toward Custer from Weir point but lots of Indians willing to fight.
There would be no need to make Weir go back to Reno to undo his activity from Reno Hill and WP. Just like in Reno Creek Benteen did not make Weir go back to the morass and start over.
Reno doesn't claim to have had Hare order Weir on Reno Hill. Hare went to WP.
As far as the terrain anyone at the Weir Point vicinity can see that CH with soldiers on it is not on the other side of MTC. The routes out of MTC and moving north are easy to discern while sitting on a horse near WP and looking north. So the Custer, Reno, and Benteen would know sufficient terrain characteristics without having to ride them.
I believe it is the reason the Indians knew where to go to engage Custer. NC and Luce were not random meeting locations in my opinion. The Indians chose those locations to engage. Custer was not attempting to engage the Indians in those locations. I believe he was heading north. The Indians chose to engage Custer there because of favorable terrain features.
If Custer wanted to facilitate Benteen moving north with pack mules then why not send that support to MTC where they could actually observe Benteen and Indians that may not want Benteen to climb out of MTC. One of the comments of General Miles is that Benteen would catch the Indians in a cross fire with those troopers on CH. That assumes that Benteen makes the first 3,300 yards on his own and that still leaves close to 700 yards distance of rough terrain between Benteen and Calhoun.
I would like to know more from those that think Keogh was waiting for Benteen at the CH location. How is Calhoun Hill any support for Benteen crossing MTC. Moving uphill with animals out of MTC slows them and makes them vulnerable. Custer would know that because that is where he got attacked.
Regards
Steve
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 10, 2018 11:54:50 GMT
How many pairs of eyes are required to locate Custer, if indeed he could be located? What happens if Indians get between the four companies sent north and the remainder left on Reno Hill? At that point was there a pressing need to make contact with Custer? If not, what was the pressing need at that point in the battle? If so, how could that pressing need be best accomplished? I think the point here is that we have two seasoned officers in the shape of Maj. Reno and Capt. Benteen, now from what I have read on what happened on Reno Hill, is that both of these officers found no problems in going north with whoever could mount a horse. When I mentioned about how I would have done it, I had to take into consideration that these two officers, who remember where there, did almost exactly what I proposed, the only difference being that I wouldn't of took the wounded, the beaten up companies and the pack train, I wouldn't of even took Reno, but added Company B to Benteen's battalion. So we have to be careful when making assumptions, because as I said, main elements went north to Weir Point and the only real reasons I can find for this are accounts from Reno and Benteen, Benteen said he simply went to see what was going on and Reno said that he heard from Lt. Hare that Weir had found Custer's trail. I also have a feeling that, if no real action had been made to find Custer's trail and offer some assistance, then not only Reno but Benteen too would have been in the dock, just look at the way they picked Reno clean after he halted his battalion and formed skirmish, Reno had a been blocked by a major force, but this didn't stop the court from turning over every stone in an effort to find any evidence of cowardice. Another thing we have to be careful with is the ROCI, when I first joined these boards, a friend of mine advised me to obtain a copy of the RCOI and read it, he later went on to say that I will soon realize that many of the officers protected their fellow officers, which comes as no surprise as you will always find this sort of thing in any large establishment, with the major players telling you just what they think you to know rather then what they themselves think, we should realize that as the only to officers who get any sort of rebuff are Custer and Weir, and as you all know these two were dead. The only proper way to find out just what these officers actually thought would be to get them all around a poker table with a deck of cards and a few bottles of brandy, then bug the table and retire. Now that may sound sarcastic but I have been posting on a number of different boards for about ten years and the ex-military always favour each other against the novice civilian, and I can't help but see this happening with the RCOI too.
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Apr 10, 2018 12:58:23 GMT
QC, I agree, if Reno had denied permission for Weir to leave, then Weir attempted to leave that was insubordination. As for Reno lying or not lying, let me explain. Capt. Weir left Reno Hill without permission. On July 5, 1876 Reno wrote an official report about what happened at the LBH. In this report Reno said that he (Reno) sent Capt. Weir and his company to open communications with Gen. Custer. This is the lie, Reno didn't send Weir. Here is the link to read that report. www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=4021 Then at his own court of inquiry, Reno finally tells the truth. Reno said that he (Reno) sent Lt. hare to go to Capt. Weir, who on his own hook had moved out his company, and tell him (Capt. Weir) to communicate with Gen. Custer. Here is the link to that page. digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?type=turn&entity=History.Reno.p0530&id=History.Reno&isize=M2 different stories about the same event. I think they are exactly the same accounts. In reports that are a combination of accounts such as Reno's Report I sometimes find substituting "my command" for I may be appropriate. When states they moved to the summit it would be those forward of RH either following orders or not. There would be no need to order Weir to go back to RH if Reno wanted him to open communications. Benteen did not make Weir go back to the morass and start over even though his movement down Reno Creek started with moving without orders. There is plenty of time later to address the situation if deemed necessary.
digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?type=turn&entity=History.Reno.p0268&id=History.Reno&isize=M
If you look at Hare's testimony he tells us his location from which Reno sent him to Weir. Hare was gone when Weir left so he has no first hand knowledge of where to go to find Weir. Reno told Hare he would move up when the rest of the pack train came. Neither Reno nor Hare would know what Weir had observed or done nor what Edgerly had done with the company.
I think Reno has every reason to be correct that he ordered Weir forward if he sends Hare to communicate the order. I see no difference from the Sgt. Major telling Benteen information from Custer.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by chardvc on Apr 10, 2018 14:54:37 GMT
There is something I read somewhere, probably in one of the RCOI transcripts that said that they were in the process of moving the hospital when word came to stay put. Not only the hospital but others never moved off Reno Hill.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 10, 2018 15:32:19 GMT
Ian: The only difference we have is that I would have sent out a small reconnaissance patrol instead of moving without doing that. If that reconnaissance reported that there was ample reason to make that move,it would have been done. My belief is that reconnaissance patrol would have seen the same thing that first Weir, and then the rest saw when they reached Weir Point. Had that been the case there would have been no movement.
As the commander on site, I (playing Reno) would not have given a rats ass if anyone or everyone thought I was wrong or a coward. It was my command, and I base all movements and actions on what I feel is best. It's called moral courage. When you command you must be prepared for the fact that some others may think you wrong, even to the point of carrying the issue as far as court martial. That is what you sign up for when you first place shoulder straps on your uniform. You hope you are always right, but you must be prepared to take the consequences if you are wrong.
The idea of moving four companies up to Weir, over unknown territory, while leaving three companies behind is a move that only opens you up to those four companies being cut off, then the three remaining destroyed in turn. It is called defeat in detail, and the only way you can guard against such an event is to first know the ground you are moving over, and determining if it is occupied before you move. The method of knowing is reconnaissance. Even today before any attack is planned and made reconnaissance is performed by some means, usually patrols, backed up by maps, photos and electronic real time imagery. That's the way these things are done, and I am fully by the book in that regard.
It seems to me that the thing that Custer gets the most blame for is launching an attack without that attack be preceded by extensive or even adequate reconnaissance, and it looks to me like you are suggesting that Reno do the same with regard to any movement to Weir Point.
CVC: I have seen the same thing, but I'll be damned if I can remember where I saw it.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 10, 2018 16:34:48 GMT
No Chuck, I am not suggesting anything, all I am saying is that these two commanders did what I have suggested, so all I am doing is embellishing what they did. These two men made their own decisions and they were there on the day. Their decisions may seem wrong to us, but they did move north in strength. I cannot find any references from any officers to say that they held any worries over the Indians moving back around them and cutting the rear units off from the main body, in fact I have always thought that none of these officers held any fear of moving north, even after what happened to Reno in the valley, some like Varnum and Hare simply rode ahead alone.
Also I think it is wrong to compare officers from 1960s to 1860s, you made plenty of valid points in your post and rightly so, but only ten years before this battle, officers from the same ilk as the ones in this battle, where sending their men into grape shot and musket fire as if it was the right thing to do.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 10, 2018 18:16:57 GMT
I am quite well aware of what they did, and what I am saying is that it was a very bad decision on their part, without first conducting a reconnaissance. The Principle holds regardless of the time period be it 1066 - 1876 - 1962 or 2018. You never leap headlong into anything without first knowing what is there. You don't go out on a job not knowing what to expect do you? No I did not think so. You estimate the situation first before you get all the tools in the truck and set off to fix whatever needs fixing. Commanders do the same thing, just as you do. There is no great secret to the process, nor is it a military specific action. All of us conduct reconnaissance every day. We just may not realize what we are doing, but we do it just the same.
If they held no fear or apprehension about moving north, then they were a bigger bunch of dumb shits than I had imagined.
These same officers who had sent their men into grape shot and musketry were doing the right thing. In fact it was the only thing. There were only 11 years between the end of the ACW and LBH, but over that time the application of firepower had changed greatly.
For the record the methods and procedures that I mention here are not my rules, or 1960 or 2018 rules. They are timeless. Joshua did the same thing at Jericho and Gideon the same before he attacked the enemy encampment with his chose few. They are the Principles of War, handed down from the ancients to today, and when you ignore or violate one or more, you are going to get your ass kicked.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 10, 2018 18:47:42 GMT
Lets just look at the facts, Weir rides off with his striker apparently without orders, his 2/IC of D Company decides to follow him with the rest of his company, now a while after this a army scout was ordered to follow Weirs trail and make contact, which he does and is told that they have located Custer's trail, now the army scout returns to the major who gave him the orders in the first place and the then other companies start to move out and follow the trail.
So I guess that these officers think that the trail ahead is open and it is safe to move, because they have had no warning from Weir saying that they must not move forward and there are large bands of Indians heading their way.
Reno also stated that when the pack train arrived, he placed three companies on his left and two on his right, then he placed the train in the center, he also had skirmishers on both flanks and more on the river bank, and after this they moved down stream.
So Reno has not done much wrong and probably followed protocol.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 10, 2018 19:04:57 GMT
I do not dispute what happened. What I dispute is the wisdom of sending forty men to do the same job as could have been accomplished by four.
The reconnaissance of the area between Reno Hill and Weir Point was conducted, but conducted by a force overlarge for the mission. What happens when you send a company and no one returns (they are dead) and you have lost 15 percent of your total force. Much better to send three or four and if they meet the same fate you are no worse off then you were before they were sent. The four may not agree, but another one of those nasty little axioms come in to play, - It is better to sacrifice a few to save the many
What was wrong was when they got there they found they could go no further, and the a lot of Indians were between them and wherever Custer might be.
The whole skirmish at Weir Point, which in fact did separate the two parts of Reno's command need never have been fought. It was a waste of lives and resources, and posed an imminent danger to all involved had the Indians reacted just a bit quicker. Reconnaissance could have prevented that.
Look, I am saying that these actions were all bad with relationship to how these things are done. That saying is a product of both my training and study. I don't expect everyone should agree. In my opinion the entire move northward was a horses's ass play, and completely contradictory to at least three of the Principles of War Economy of Force - Security - Simplicity. That is why they are called Military Operations, the combination of the Art and Science of War.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 10, 2018 19:11:27 GMT
Mark, I have had a quick shufty and Moylan says this about any move forward;
We stripped blankets from some of our horses to carry the wounded. It took four men to carry each of the five wounded. Other men led their horses. After beginning to move, I sent a man forward to tell Reno he needed help moving his men. Moylan moved forward and spoke with McDougall who sent back half his company. Moylan then reached Reno who told him it wouldn’t be necessary to move forward any more as the whole force of Indians was in front of Captain Weir’s command.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 10, 2018 19:23:08 GMT
I know that this has been broached before, probably many years ago now, but it does sound that Reno was losing control, I can understand him for being rattled as he was no Randolph Scott. So should Benteen have taken control?
The actions on Reno hill do seem rather shoddy with no apparent order and I can see the option in sending Varnum and Hare with their orderlies to find Custer's trail and see what was happening ahead and just where this firing was coming from.
It does sound to me as Benteen didn't want the responsibility for leading this outfit, was Benteen in charge of the three companies that followed Weir? If so then he certainly made a hash of the pull back and only for Lt. Godfrey this pull back could have been a fiasco as companies simply did their own thing and never gave a thought for any other companies but their own.
It does seem like Benteen redeemed himself later on Reno Hill, but up till then he seemed to be happy for Reno to make the decisions.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 10, 2018 21:02:29 GMT
Benteen had seen an advanced showing of the Caine Mutiny and had no desire to play Van Johnson's role.
Reno knew that someone had eaten the strawberries, but he was not so bad as to foul the mine sweeping gear, collect all the keys on board his ship. or roll two little steel balls around in his hand.
Old Yellow Stain was unfair to Queeg as it turned out, and equally unfair to be applied to Reno.
It is a very severe thing for a junior officer to relieve his commanding officer in combat. That junior officer better be right, and right means that the commanding officer was one step away from the funny farm. Reno was obviously very shaken by what had transpired in the valley. I don't blame him, because but for the grace of God, any of us could stand in his shoes. A general officer I once knew who was the S-3 of the 38th Infantry told me personally that Dutch Kaiser was in that very state after two thirds of his 2nd Infantry Division passed through the Valley of Death in late 1950 Korea. We seem to think that all soldiers are made of stern stuff, unbreakable, like cardboard cutouts. Reality is that they are just human and subject both to human emotion and breakdown.
None of these people performed well, and Godfrey was probably the one that made the fewest mistakes. Battles are not decided by those who do everything right. They are decided by those that makes the fewest mistakes.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 10, 2018 22:57:49 GMT
Well is does sound like the need for a strong leader was needed on Reno Hill. In many ways the various companies were really running around like headless chickens. The EMs and the officers on Reno Hill deeded someone to take the situation by the scruff of the neck and instead they see Maj. Reno swanning off to find the body of his Adjutant, one of the Captains apparently riding away in a huff closely followed by an entire company. Just reading through what the officer thought of the situation is laughable.
McDougall had his men in skirmish order when the trumpet call came to mount up and move down stream. Mathey said he received no orders to move off Reno Hill, he just followed the troops.
So these two officers who where in charge of the pack train, received no direct orders and took their vulnerable slow moving cargo trailing along behind the forward companies.
In a way it looks like what was keeping this regiment together was a strong leader like Custer, without him any resentment seemed to show and no one was capable of showing any leadership.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Apr 10, 2018 23:25:07 GMT
Ian, you must remember that the ACW officers knew the ground they were going to fight on, they knew the battle space, it was well mapped and well traveled( you mentioned officers of the 1860' and 1960's). Not so the ground terrain on 26 June 1876. Custer did know where his objective was, the village. It would be easy for Steve or I to give Chuck the info to plan his attack. GAC did not have that luxury, yet he distanced himself from his support without knowing the results of Benteen's scout or where he was. He allowed Reno to attack an unknown objective location.
Reno nearly allowed Weir to drag him into the same situation and it would have been his second disaster of the day. He planned neither. But, we know that this 2nd disaster would have been on his hook.
Regards, Tom
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