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Post by quincannon on Sept 10, 2015 17:28:46 GMT
Armies are not static organizations. That is particularly true with armies based upon the principle of mass mobilization, where the small peacetime cadre expands the organizational construct to produce a wartime army that simply falls in on the skeleton provided by the cadre and is usually only good for the duration of conflict.
It is that peacetime cadre that must be strong to make all of that work. If it is not we see nothing more than a bigger version of poor.
In the demobilization that followed the ACW the brightest and best went into other pursuits utilizing the gifts of discipline, initiative, and confidence they gained through service to build businesses, and expand the nation. We saw this also within most of our lifetimes. The GI Bill for instance built the present middle class in this country.
That is how it has always worked here since the time of the American Revolution. In a way the Army and its sister services have provided the greatest educational tool this nation has ever has.
Meanwhile post-demobilization armies have followed a similar track, but that track is downward. Such it was in 1876 when the army was not made up of the hard bitten professionals of the John Ford movie, but one composed largely of the misfits of society. That would have been OK too if the officers were of such caliber to mold and shape these newcomers into a small but professional force, made steel by hard, and unrelenting training.
With training, and something our fellows elsewhere do not have a clue about, what you did last week satisfactorily does not equate to doing it equally well tomorrow. What an officer did well ten years before in one situational environment does not mean he will be equally proficient today, in what is perhaps a completely different environment.
Armies must constantly grow intellectually as well. There is an old expression in business - If you do business today like you did yesterday, you will be out of business tomorrow. Therefore, officers especially, but it applies to the enlisted ranks as well, must be constantly seeking to do the same things you did before (tactics don't change) in newer, and more innovative ways. That takes education well beyond the basic level of a West Point or recruit barracks.
If an army or those in it are ever satisfied, then they begin the downhill slide at the very moment of self satisfaction.
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Post by yanmacca on Sept 13, 2015 11:37:12 GMT
Most countries in Europe had between the wars, a standing army mostly consisting of a small cadre of professionals whose sole purpose was to maintain and train the intake of conscripts, who by law would have to do one or two years of service in the army.
Britain was the exception she had her regular army divisions made up of men who choose to be professional soldiers and around 14 divisions of territorials who were really weekend soldiers, but no conscription.
But European nations with the exception of Russia, were only small in relation to the USA, so I don’t know if either conscription or territorials would work in the states around 1865-1900, the US army was probably made up of men who joined up just to get a meal and a bed and most of these were probably immigrants.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Sept 14, 2015 16:50:58 GMT
Ian: The United States Army was based from the founding to the just recent past on the principle of mass mobilization.
During the 19th century there was a very small regular army, which in times of small but immediate crisis would be reinforced by the organized militia of the several states. This organized militia was similar to the Territorials in the UK, but had no standard of organization. In other words it was rare if two such organizations looked and were equipped alike. It was like mustering a volunteer fire company to fight your wars. In fact there were a few of these organizations that were indeed volunteer fire companies. One of the brigade headquarters companies of the present 28th ID descends from one of these. This organized militia from the several states morfed into the Army (and Air) National Guard of today.
The next echelon of mass mobilization were the volunteers. These volunteer units had no existence before the crisis loomed, and for the most part disbanded at its conclusion.
Then, and only then would we resort to involuntary conscription. Our early history gave us an ingrained resistance to such measures.
The last was the unorganized militia, every man between certain ages to maintain a weapon, and be subject to call. In effect the unorganized militia was nothing more than a manpower pool upon which the other non-regular forces could call upon to fill their ranks.
By the end of the Spanish American War and sending expeditionary units to the Philippines it became apparent that such a construct was totally inadequate.
One could I believe successfully argue that it was not internal reformation, or the emergence within the ranks of military reformers, that changed to construct that began to change the army into what we have today, but rather the practical necessity of becoming a world power.
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Post by quincannon on Sept 14, 2015 17:08:32 GMT
Interesting discussion between Fuchs and Montrose on the other board, and one relevant on this thread. Were the numbers inflated as an excuse, or were they not as a reason?
Interior lines, an accident of nature, gave the Indians a distinct advantage. They could shift location and emphasis faster than forces could be assembled to challenge them at any given location. In such situations a double count is almost inevitable.
At one time I was stuck on a number just above two thousand. I am coming to the conclusion though that the total number of actual participating warriors was in the fourteen to sixteen hundred range. Like to hear what you all have to say about this.
Meeting Mac and his daughter tonight for dinner, and am greatly looking forward to it. Anxious to hear his conclusions from his recent LBH adventure, and will report either late tonight of tomorrow.
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Post by yanmacca on Sept 14, 2015 18:32:14 GMT
Thanks Chuck;
The Indians who initially went against Custer’s battalion would probably be in the low hundreds and gradually increased as time went on, but I don’t think that they all hit him together, the problem Custer faced was many large bands probably a couple of hundred each, that crossed the LBH river at various points and arrived to attack from different locations, and these locations would enable them to attack from a different direction.
Example: if Calhoun was holding off a band that came via ford B and moved up deep coulee then this band would probably be a 100 or so, but that is enough to keep him occupied, now that band alone would probably not be strong enough to push him off that hill, but add it to another band of around a 100 or so that came via Calhoun coulee and then the situation changes, plus we could reckon that another band could have infiltrated right up deep coulee and struck from Calhoun’s left flank.
So in all each band would not venture into full view and into carbine effective range, but rely on long range sniping, but if the attack collectively then this was another ball game.
So this would have repeated itself in every sector of the battle field, and going on events as we perceive them, then a group of 600-800 to could have walloped Keogh’s battalion and progressed towards Custer once the job was done, Custer in the meantime would be struggling against a force that could be a low as 200-400, but when these two forces meet and hit from different directions, then Custer’s meagre force of 80-90 had no chance.
So if anyone are asking me if Custer could be defeated by a force of around a 1000, then I would say yes it was possible.
Chuck, give my regards to Mac and his daughter this evening and I hope you have a wonderful time. Yan.
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Post by Beth on Sept 14, 2015 19:13:17 GMT
QC, tell Mac I said hi
As I said on the other board, I finally 'got it' when people said that defeat of the 7th was on Custer's shoulders. Once I was able to remove the teaming masses of NA from my mental image of the battle--I could see how even if the two sides were equal in skill and resources. Custer by parceling out his forces and feeding them to the NA a few hundred at a time was never able to face the NA with his whole fighting forces.
It also perhaps explains Custer's movements north of 3411. He saw a large village but in his head it was a number of warriors he should have been able to handle. Custer continued to divide his forces as he moved north, not understanding how the NA would use the inside lines to their advantage.
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Post by quincannon on Sept 14, 2015 19:16:46 GMT
Ian: I will certainly do that.
I have often said that total numbers in and of themselves do not really matter. What matters is the numbers engaged at the point of contact. I think given the dispersion of Custer's force, in particular the numbers arrayed in two general areas on the bluffs, that a total force of 800 to a 1000 could have done the job very easily. Splitting that for the two Indian points of focus, that would put odds of 4 to 5 to one against either Keogh or Custer himself. Certainly enough to fix and overcome.
As you stated, of those that had finished with Keogh at least some would probably turn their attention northward toward Custer, compounding his problems and raising the odds to six or seven to one.
I do like the way you express yourself in bands. While they are not companies and battalions as we come to think of them, it is sure they did exist as such (bands of varying numbers) as no man wishes to fight alone. We recognize some immature means of command and control, and to what degree that C&C had matured is debatable, but it is absolute nonsense to think that some measure did not exist, and upwards of fifteen hundred were all doing their own thing as individuals.
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Post by yanmacca on Sept 15, 2015 13:41:17 GMT
When people view this battle they tend to think that a swarm of Indians came rushing over ford B overwhelming Custer’s 210 in one fell swoop, and the remnants of his command just about made it to LSH before being surrounded and killed, but it could be possible that bands of Indians never faced more than 36-50 soldiers at one given point in the battle.
C company were outside the protection of the rest of Keogh’s battalion so there's about 37 men routed, Calhoun’s L company could have taken in a few shattered survivors after C company had scattered probably adding a few to his total of 44 (less if we take out the horse holders), so there again we don’t have that big of a group.
Keogh’s L company with the strength of 38 would again be ineffectual against a band of mounted warriors “aka” Crazy Horse’s band of 100-200, so even with accepting the remnants of the other two companies Keogh still wouldn’t have enough strength to hold out.
Smith’s E company again another 37, would be easily wiped out by a 100 to 200 and I would suspect that once E coy had been chased either back to LSH or deep ravine (depending on your own theory) then these 100-200 would carry the fight to Custer and Yates.
That would leave about 50 or so, which would be totally surrounded and facing hundreds of Indians.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Sept 15, 2015 18:57:42 GMT
Something that came up at dinner last night, and is somewhat related here to excuse or reason - What picture does the battlefield itself today paint, if you took no account of Indian testimony, no artifact finds. In other words just using the markers (and we know they are flawed) how did the Custer/Keogh portion of the battle play out?
Is it the Indian testimony that glues this thing together, reinforced by artifacts that tells us the how, and the where/
I have my own impression, and I sure most of you do as well, and if not, given a little thought, you will.
Numbers at the point of contact Ian. Splendid job.
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Post by Beth on Sept 15, 2015 20:00:19 GMT
Wouldn't the largest NA/US contact have been Reno in the valley and again at Reno Hill?
As for looking at the battlefield alone for information. It seems that you would get different stories depending on which way you travel. From Reno Hill to LSH it is a running battle with a loss here and there until you reach an area when you possibility could contribute to horses playing out because more people are dying and appear to be following ravines and coulees to escape until you get to LSH where the bulk of the forces can go no further. Beyond LSH there are less than a handful of causalities.
If you start at LSH then perhaps you see a group surprise attacked perhaps from the north with the graves in the coulees and ravines as attempts to flee. They further away you get from LSH the fewer the markers you see as there are fewer left alive.
Something just dawned on me. It seems to me that a number of people chalk up Reno/Benteen's survival on RH as more luck but if Reno/Benteen had behaved as certain fanboys would wish by sending small groups after Custer, they too would have just been swallowed up just like the rest of the 7th.
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Post by quincannon on Sept 15, 2015 20:55:06 GMT
Actually Beth the point came up as an outgrowth of Mac telling me that he first became interested in LBH by picking up a copy of Died With Their Boots On in the buck a pop bargain bin at a supermarket. He said he could not believe the ending for a long time until he realized that Custer did indeed at the last extremity run into a buzz saw.
To me if you look south to north the F-F Ridge position (Company C) and the Calhoun Hill position (Company L) take on the appearance of successive rear guard actions confronting hostiles crossing at Ford B. The Company I position appears as a "run to ground" because no one would deliberately choose to defend where they were found. Finally the LSH, Cemetery Ridge/Ravine portion appears to be that buzz saw, where Indians have short cut into Custer direction of travel and stopped his forward progress.
Remember that for a long time it was very popular to view this as Custer running into a huge preset ambush, and that is how it plays out in DWTBO.
I want to state again that this is how the battle first appears from what we see today, and before someone hands me my head, no Indian testimony or artifact finds were factored in AT ALL.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Sept 15, 2015 21:47:01 GMT
If we had no artifacts of any kind and no Indian testimony, we would have to view the battle with a south to north flow, simply because of the direction of travel the 7th took. We know the village was approached from the south, and that Custer moved north after separating from Reno. Using that information only, QC is right about seeing the battle in the Custer sector as a series of rear guard actions culminating in the grand wipe-out in the Keogh sector and LSH. The markers, as flawed as they are, give the impression of short holding actions at FF ridge and CH, followed by movement north while under duress. The Keogh sector looks for all the world like they were caught and surrounded in that swale, with flight northward for a few folks, with the grand finale occurring at LSH.
If viewed as a north to south flow, assuming one didn't know how the 7th approached the village, one could easily envision the scenario played out in DWTBO, with the southern markers indicating flight away from LSH. Thank goodness we have artifacts, soldier testimony, and Indian testimony to help tell the true story, as best we can know it, incomplete though it is.
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Post by Beth on Sept 15, 2015 22:13:45 GMT
DWTBO isn't exactly a historical documentary. It's a war propaganda film that needed to make Custer a shining American hero standing with his friends even against overwhelming odds. Hollywood and the British film industry started cranking up the propaganda industry in the mid 30's and often in subtle ways. If you want another really good example watch the Greer Garson version of Pride and Prejudice. You will see every stereotypical "We are British and we will survive" symbol in it. Even moving a Jane Austen book squarely into the Victorian era is on purpose.
An a side thought I was just thinking how even the way we describe the battle has changed with time. It used to be the Custer Massacre which implies there really wasn't much of a fight--sort of along the line of that it was a massive ambush. 'Custer's Last Stand' more implies a battle against overwhelming odds. Now current history shows that the overwhelming odds because of Custer's mismanagement of his forces.
Calling it the Battle of Little Bighorn or Battle of the Greasy Grass implies more that it was battle between two forces.
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Post by Beth on Sept 15, 2015 22:25:36 GMT
If we had no artifacts of any kind and no Indian testimony, we would have to view the battle with a south to north flow, simply because of the direction of travel the 7th took. We know the village was approached from the south, and that Custer moved north after separating from Reno. Using that information only, QC is right about seeing the battle in the Custer sector as a series of rear guard actions culminating in the grand wipe-out in the Keogh sector and LSH. The markers, as flawed as they are, give the impression of short holding actions at FF ridge and CH, followed by movement north while under duress. The Keogh sector looks for all the world like they were caught and surrounded in that swale, with flight northward for a few folks, with the grand finale occurring at LSH. If viewed as a north to south flow, assuming one didn't know how the 7th approached the village, one could easily envision the scenario played out in DWTBO, with the southern markers indicating flight away from LSH. Thank goodness we have artifacts, soldier testimony, and Indian testimony to help tell the true story, as best we can know it, incomplete though it is. I was viewing the battle as if I was a Martian tourist and knew nothing about the battle or battle tactics. There is nothing on the battlefield other than information markers that show about Ford A and how the 7th approached the area but as a Martian I can't read them so they just have pretty pictures on them of nearly naked men fighting men with clothes on and a lot of big mammals. If you go from the entrance and follow the road, it would appear there was a big battle followed by chasing and killing the survivors with only the last of few stragglers killed by the time you get to the end of the battle at Reno Hill. However someone might consider that the museum and cemetery would be placed at the end of the battle so the start would be at Reno Hill where you see very few headstones scattered along the way with the amount building until you get to LSH where the losing side was finally run down and destroyed.
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Post by quincannon on Sept 15, 2015 22:56:00 GMT
Factoring in the Martian viewpoint, you are correct Beth, it does resemble a several mile long chase. The markers themselves (those inside the park only) give us no picture of the Reno Hill defense. Of course those depressions that still exist do say defense. but to the untrained eye, or those unfamiliar with the story they could well be just depressions.
The point here is that what we see is not the whole picture.
DWTBO is a propaganda piece on the order of the contemporary Sergeant York, Confessions of a Nazi Spy, and my all time favorite of that era Mrs. Miniver. Waterloo Bridge comes to mind as well, and there was another with Garson as a mother/nurse who had sent her son to war. Bill any two of those in a Saturday Afternoon matinee with a box of popcorn and those green gummy things covered with sugar, add in three episodes of Don Winslow of The Navy and you are juiced up to take on both Hitler and Tojo by supper time.
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