Post by quincannon on Aug 27, 2015 15:30:37 GMT
Beth: The size of these two echelons have varied over time, but the time I am speaking of is consistent with Custer's experience, the ACW and immediate post ACW.
The average division in 1864-65 was between three and four thousand all ranks. It was made up usually of three brigades with an average strength of just over a thousand. Each of these brigades were composed of two or more regiments, that by that time of the war were reduced by casualties and shadows of the number of personnel authorized. Most were in the 350-400 range. So the short answer is that a regiment of that period would be on the order of 1/9 of a division.
The real difference was that each of those three divisional brigades had a sufficiency of combat power to stand alone in a combat environment. The regiment did not. Therefore a regiment's maneuver must be within a smaller battle space if operating independently.
Plot out on a map each of the movements of the four battalions Custer had to maneuver with, leaving off the trains and escort. Now picture this:
Custer detaches one regiment from his first brigade to scout to the west (Benteen). He sends the second brigade to attack the south end of the village (Reno). He turns east onto the bluffs with his third Brigade and the remaining half of his first brigade. He goes to 3411, sees what he is up against, and recalls the other half of his first brigade. He moves north, recons Ford B with the half 1st brigade, then moves away. He stations his second brigade Keogh on Calhoun Hill, then proceeds northward again to Ford D to recon that place, all the while waiting for that other half of his first brigade to join him.
The half of first brigade sent with Reno has about 500 souls, certainly enough for the mission. Reno's second brigade come in at a thousand or so, and that would be enough to handle any situation in that quarter. His third brigade under Keogh is also about a thousand, again enough to keep him out of any real trouble. He is conducting his two personal recons with a half brigade, say around 500 or so, again enough to avoid any real trouble.
The lesson here is that your scheme of maneuver must be consistent with the size and capability of the force you command. You can't maneuver a forty man platoon, the way you would a 150-200 man company. You can't maneuver a 200 man company in the same manner as a 800 man battalion and so forth. You may use the same tactical scheme of maneuver, but on a smaller scale and in a more restricted amount of battle space. All echelons of command from squad to corps have a certain degree of combat power, self sufficiency, and resilience, but they must be used within the parameters for which they were designed. Custer was maneuvering those four battalions of his in a manner far exceeding their capability as individual units.
The average division in 1864-65 was between three and four thousand all ranks. It was made up usually of three brigades with an average strength of just over a thousand. Each of these brigades were composed of two or more regiments, that by that time of the war were reduced by casualties and shadows of the number of personnel authorized. Most were in the 350-400 range. So the short answer is that a regiment of that period would be on the order of 1/9 of a division.
The real difference was that each of those three divisional brigades had a sufficiency of combat power to stand alone in a combat environment. The regiment did not. Therefore a regiment's maneuver must be within a smaller battle space if operating independently.
Plot out on a map each of the movements of the four battalions Custer had to maneuver with, leaving off the trains and escort. Now picture this:
Custer detaches one regiment from his first brigade to scout to the west (Benteen). He sends the second brigade to attack the south end of the village (Reno). He turns east onto the bluffs with his third Brigade and the remaining half of his first brigade. He goes to 3411, sees what he is up against, and recalls the other half of his first brigade. He moves north, recons Ford B with the half 1st brigade, then moves away. He stations his second brigade Keogh on Calhoun Hill, then proceeds northward again to Ford D to recon that place, all the while waiting for that other half of his first brigade to join him.
The half of first brigade sent with Reno has about 500 souls, certainly enough for the mission. Reno's second brigade come in at a thousand or so, and that would be enough to handle any situation in that quarter. His third brigade under Keogh is also about a thousand, again enough to keep him out of any real trouble. He is conducting his two personal recons with a half brigade, say around 500 or so, again enough to avoid any real trouble.
The lesson here is that your scheme of maneuver must be consistent with the size and capability of the force you command. You can't maneuver a forty man platoon, the way you would a 150-200 man company. You can't maneuver a 200 man company in the same manner as a 800 man battalion and so forth. You may use the same tactical scheme of maneuver, but on a smaller scale and in a more restricted amount of battle space. All echelons of command from squad to corps have a certain degree of combat power, self sufficiency, and resilience, but they must be used within the parameters for which they were designed. Custer was maneuvering those four battalions of his in a manner far exceeding their capability as individual units.