Ford B: Prelude to Destruction

[quincannon]

I sure am glad you put this up 41. Two things come to mind

1) Many of the statements from various people seem to contradict one another. In a couple of those statements the person giving the statement contradict themselves.

2) This is the one that really sticks it in the early accounts. Look at the map McGuire supervised but did not draw. You don't see any movement beyond Last Stand Hill, and you certainly do not see anything about some portion or all of Custer's battalion skirmishing with Wolf Tooth on those eastern line of ridges. What we in a latter day know is that both of those things occurred, by virtue of artifact evidence. That alone makes the conclusions indicated by the McGurire map completely invalid. It also makes many of the comments you included in your narrative invalid as well.

Not your fault. You, like all the rest are just trying to make some sense of it all. I would submit to you though that those efforts are like trying to make bread without yeast, or a peanut butter and jelly sandwich without the peanut butter or the jelly.

[johnson1941]

I think we'll have to disagree here - so many of those accounts agree with each other, and describe what seem to be the same points, the same places, the same locations, the same actions. Anything specific you see as contradictions?

They all jive surprisingly quite well. Which of course is why I listed 'em. And including at least to some extent the markings on the known mess that was McGuire's map. Doesn't make them invalid - especially when the witnesses describe what & where &. in context.

But I am always open to see/read something different!
In fact, I'd love to read some specifics from others (who were there) who may say otherwise - i.e. Gall & Godfrey & JSIT are interesting and quite drastic to Martin, Kanipe, Curley, Camp, et. al.  


Cheers!

[quincannon]

Disagreement is good for the soul, and tends to make your dark roast coffee taste better on cold, bitter, rainy mornings. I can go along with that, and perhaps I like a lot of peanut butter along with my jelly, which of course is a matter of personal taste.

As an exercise in due diligence, let me suggest that you examine each of those statements and try insofar as possible to remove agenda from each of those statements. Speculation I know but try it. Martini for instance. Over time every time he told his story he placed himself closer to the field where the critical portion of the fight took place. I would submit to you if you took every statement the man made and put a date/time stamp on them, nothing of what the man had to say, other then I was sent with a message from Cooke to Captain Benteen, is consistent with one another. Things he said he saw one time, were made impossible by what he said the next and so forth.

With Camp, if the man told me the sun was shinning, I would look out the window to verify it. He did everything in his power over his lifetime to place George Custer in a good light.

JSIT: Among the later tellers of the Custer tale, his version holds the most water with me. It's not perfect, and he got the story second hand, but he also got it on the spot from someone who was there. The narrative he passed on to Don Rickey also makes the most sense from a tactical best practices perspective.

The rest of them, make no mistake, I do not think they are lying or obfuscating. I believe they are just mistaken in some details. Out there every goddamned hill, ridge, coulee, gulch, and gully, looks the same. The place is a moonscape, and mistakes in location are pretty damned easy to come buy, considering the fact that when you were there someone was trying to kill you, and you had damned little time for sightseeing.

Take note of that notation at the very bottom of the McGuire map. What it is saying is that the guys who were there could not even agree on the location of Reno valley skirmish line. Also place that map in context. Look where the Indian village is located as it relates to either of those marked skirmish lines. Then tell me how in God's name Galls wives and children were all killed at that distance by carbine fire. These things don't rise to the level of keeping me up at night, but they are still questions to be dug into and answered, and the most probable answer is that these people did not know, and could not accurately relate where in the flying screw they were years after the events took place.

Disagreement is a good thing. If every one was thinking alike there would be a hell of a lot of people not thinking. You are certainly not a lemming. Good on you


 

[johnson1941]

Cheers!

Clearly I haven't progressed very far IN DETAIL - haven't made it past this "Custer's Route' business - and that's just to MTC!
{It'll be VERY messy once if/I get to battle ridge!}

I am with you on trying to answer questions.

For example - reading De Rudio saying he saw Custer 'at the highest point just below DeWolf waving their hats' - well then I am off to find the highest point just below De Wolf. And thanks for the tip - trying NOT to just rely on "7" on McGuire. Hodgson's marker, where Reno retreated, Benteen's horseshoe, and why in hell Weir Point was Weir Peaks and Edgerly Hill and Edgerly Peaks and Reno Peaks LOL!

Camp - he may have had an agenda, and his notions likely evolved some over time (which makes sense), and he wasn't always correct...but at least he takes measurements and bearings and altitudes...often with the same people on the same ground. He too tried to answer the questions and contradictions. He found all this stuff 100+ years ago.  Its good stuff!

Constant investigation - Its interesting as hell!

[herosrest]

I'd like to chip into this pot's broad outline related to the tactical fight but first draw a line qualifying Trumpeter Martin (sic). He stated, that, he did not tell all that he could have, at Chicago. That is important, as is also the matter of at least one 'paid' presentation he gave in very much later years.

It is not clear always, whether and which of Camp's interviews were face to face, or conducted through intermediaries with the questionaire and guidelines he posted to agents.

The Ford D scenario is attractive since it is pure Custer. It smacks very much of his Washita attack. Given the pressure upon his decision making imposed by the cracker-barrel urgency, go with what you know that works and is praticed by the regiment; makes considerable sense. However, not a single surviving Officer was aware of a battle plan which makes the entire exercise futile. Both Benteen and Reno were entirely unreliable and those who do not see that this, are themselves cocking a leg over Greasy Grass hill. This isn't what a lot of battle students wish to hear and so I'm perfectly happy to say it for them.

It was Bouyer, on the bluffs waving his hat and seen by DeRudio. We Know this from timing Trumpeter Martin. Not getting that correct laid John S. Gray's book open as farce. He was selling the White Man Runs Him storytale sold to Curtis which was, complete rubbish. I can say this because of Trumpeter Martin's testimony and march with the message for Benteen. Refuting this simple timing assessment is candyfloss agenda.

Beyond the immediate tactical defeat of 7th Cavalry at LBh, there is no doubt that sufficient hostile forces were present to roll over Montana Column as well, had they chosen to do so - notwithstanding the artillery deployed with that force. It was, and is, easy to blame Custer. Whether that is the actual story is a game of pin the tail...... As modern day belligerents are discovering, some subordinates manage to squeeze their tail into the uniform.

[miker]

... a line qualifying Trumpeter Martin (sic). He stated, that, he did not tell all that he could have, at Chicago.

I suspect there is no disagreement with this amongst us.

It is not clear always, whether and which of Camp's interviews were face to face, or conducted through intermediaries with the questionaire and guidelines he posted to agents.

I don't think Camp was an objective observer or scholar.

The Ford D scenario is attractive since it is pure Custer. It smacks very much of his Washita attack.

Disagree.  At Washita, Custer devised a plan and shared it with his commanders, gave them time to deploy, and had a signal arranged to begin the attack.

Never mind that the camp he did attack was not "hostile" and he failed to reconoitter the surrounding area to determine the full extent of his opposition.

Given the pressure upon his decision making imposed by the cracker-barrel urgency, go with what you know that works and is praticed by the regiment; makes considerable sense. However, not a single surviving Officer was aware of a battle plan which makes the entire exercise futile.

Here is where Custer set himself up for losing what was probably not a winnable battle at any rate. 

Both Benteen and Reno were entirely unreliable and those who do not see that this, are themselves cocking a leg over Greasy Grass hill. This isn't what a lot of battle students wish to hear and so I'm perfectly happy to say it for them.

I am throwing the Bullshit Flag here.  Reno was not popular, but he was at least as competent as Custer.  Here are some points:

Custer.
1.  When he task organized the regiment, he did not inform all his commanders of the organization.  First he task organized TF Benteen, then gave them an order to move to the south.  The only reason Reno had any idea about what was going on is Benteens rather poor communication to him of his task.  Benteen did not know at the time that Reno was about to get his own command.
2.  Custer then formed TF Reno and later ordered him to conduct a movement to contact/pursuit of the small retreating band of Indians.; a perfectly rational move.  Reno believed that Custer, Cooke, or both informed him that he would be supported as he attacked.  At this time, no one had seen the village.
3.  Custer utterly failed to provide support, move his Regiment in a mutually supporting fashion, or inform his subordinate commanders of his plan or intention.

Reno
0.  Reno, in my view, harbors some blame for apparently not training the Regiment while in command.  It seems to me, but I am probably wrong, that he could have at least stressed marksmanship.  He should have also pressed Terry for horses.
1.  During his reconnaissance he determined that there was no enemy to be found on his assigned route.  Based on information from his scouts (which he took), he abandoned the current mission and moved to "find the bastards".  He then returned this valuable information to Terry.  Had he fulfilled his mission to the letter, I believe the Terry Column would not have found the Indians.  (Note:  He failed to "and then pile on" but that is due to the inability of the units operating out of supporting distance of each other to easily communicate.)
2.  He took command of his battalion, crossed the LBH, and made visual contact with the enemy.  There were a total of 3 messengers sent to Custer by him.  Girard, who Reno ignored, took it upon himself to move toward Custer, was intercepted by Cooke, who took the message back to Custer.  Reno then sent two other messengers to Custer informing him of the situation.  Custer ignored all three and did not send any orders back to Reno.
3.  He fulfilled his orders of conducting a movement to contact.  I believe people improperly think his mission was to attack the main Indian village and I do not think that is his mission.  My thinking is his mission was to pursue, close with, and destroy the 60 or so Indians running away in order to prevent them from warning the village.
4.  Upon making contact with the Indian Main Body and (probably) correctly determining he would be unable to defeat them, he deployed his forces and defended.  This is entirely correct cavalry tactics today and then, as best illustrated by Buford at Gettysburg.
5.  Determining he was unable to hold his position in the open, he displaced to the trees.  This was a fairly well controlled move.
SPECIAL NOTE:  Some (many?  Most?  All?) Indians contend that had he continued the charge, he would have been able to win the battle almost single handed.   Attacking against 1:7 odds when the enemy is boiling out of their "assembly area"  and flanking you is not a particularly good tactic.  In the tree line, the Indians were moving around him.  While he may not have been destroyed, he would have been fixed had he stayed there.  He would have had access to water. 
6.  Again, his assessment was he could not hold the trees.  Some agree, some don't.  He made a decision.  I attribute his successful breakout to be more a matter of luck than good decision making, but I'm willing to give him the benefit of the doubt for at least having the plan in his head although he did not (like Custer) properly inform his subordinates as to what he was going to do.
7.  Once he got into his battle position, the first thing he had to do was consolidate and reorganize his battalion.  If anyone thinks he could have immediately ridden to Custer to assist them, they are sadly mistaken.
8.  If Custer had bothered to command his Regiment and sent orders to Reno to hold his ground or to find defensible ground and saying he would attempt to get into the enemy rear, I believe Reno would have done so.

Benteen
1.  If Benteen had followed his orders, he would have emerged into the Little Bighorn Valley far to the south of Ford A.  He would likely have not been able to join the battle.
2.  Upon linking up with Reno he was now under his command.  Reno still had to consolidate and reorganize.  At this point, the Indians had largely begun to move toward Custer, but there was still some opposition.  I suspect by the time they linked up, Custer was already defeated, though probably not destroyed.
3.  Once he followed Weir, he determined that this was no place to fight Indians, and began to move the unit back to more defensible ground.  Whether or not he controlled the withdrawel is questionable, but certainly Godfrey conducted a brilliant cover for the movement.
4.  Once on the defense, except for his failure to dig in, his conduct is beyond reproach.

Godfrey
1.  Godfrey, in spite of his excellent article about the LBJ, had no idea of the Regiments Task Organization after the divide.  He had already moved out with Weir and Benteen to the South before Reno had received command of TF RENO.  No one, except Martini who did not know or communicate the task organization, has any proof of whether the Regiment was broken into four units  consisting of the Custer, Reno, Benteen Battalions, and the Trains or five units Reno, Benteen, Keogh, and Yates battalions and the trains.  As I have repeatedly said, Custer operated most of the way from Fort Abraham Lincoln in a four battalion structure.  Either organization is fine.  But anyone who says they know is just spouting bullshit.
2.  He probably saved the Regiment (-) with his covering /delay movement back to Reno Hill.

It was Bouyer, on the bluffs waving his hat and seen by DeRudio. We Know this from timing Trumpeter Martin. Not getting that correct laid John S. Gray's book open as farce. He was selling the White Man Runs Him storytale sold to Curtis which was, complete rubbish. I can say this because of Trumpeter Martin's testimony and march with the message for Benteen. Refuting this simple timing assessment is candyfloss agenda.

Oh.  The Referee throws another BS flag.  DeRudio says in the RCOI that he thought it was Custer.  Bouyer died with the secret.  No one knows, least of all Martini.

Beyond the immediate tactical defeat of 7th Cavalry at LBh, there is no doubt that sufficient hostile forces were present to roll over Montana Column as well, had they chosen to do so - notwithstanding the artillery deployed with that force. It was, and is, easy to blame Custer. Whether that is the actual story is a game of pin the tail...... As modern day belligerents are discovering, some subordinates manage to squeeze their tail into the uniform.

Custer is at fault for the tactical defeat of the 7th Cavalry.  However, Sherman, Sheridan, Terry, Crooke, and Gibbon are responsible for the operational failure of the campaign.  The defeat partly occurred because he divided the Regiment into 4 or 5 units that were not capable of providing mutual support.  He failed to inform his officers of the task organization and the plan.  I don't think he had a plan or a tactic except to charge.  He does seem to have achieved some surprise.

Sherman:  Other than returning the wayward companies of the 7th Cavalry to the Regiment, Sherman did not allocate any additional troops to the campaign which was arguably the US Army's main effort for 1876.

Using the Great Sioux Wars Order of Battle by Paul Hedren and the US Army in the Plains Indian Wars 1865-1891 by Clayton KS Chun

Sheridan:
Sheridan's Division had three departments:  Missouri, Dakota, and Platte.  There were elements of 14 Infantry Regiments (1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 11th, 14th, 15th, 17th, 19th, 20th, 22nd and 23rd), 6 Cavalry Regiments (2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, and 9th), and 4 Artillery Regiments (1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th) with a total of 173 companies.*  The MO department apparently committed no troops to the LBH and had 47 companies, the Dakota seems to have 47 companies staying behind, while 17 from Fort Abraham Lincoln and 11 from Montana were detached under Terry's command and the Platte had 51 companies of which 21 were dispatched.

*I am somewhat uncertain of this because the Plains Indian Wars separates out the LBH Expeditions from the Departments of Dakotas and Department of the Platte's units but does not specify the number of units in it. It also omits Fort Abraham Lincoln entirely.

Thus we have a total of 49 Companies participating in the Little Bighorn Campaign out of a total of 201 for 24%.  Terry dispatched 28/47 for 59% while Crooke set 21/51 for 41%.

I am -unsurprisingly- unaware of any order detailing Sheridan's concept of the operation for the campaign.
He does not appear to designate a main effort.  Nor did he ensure his units were properly trained or equipped.  The most glaring example to me is the lack of horses for the 7th Cavalry.

I fault Sheridan for staying in Chicago where in my view he should have moved to Fort Abraham Lincoln.  He would have got information from his subordinate commanders (Terry/Crooke) somewhat faster.  He had no business meandering about the Centennial Exposition.  However, the times would not have allowed for much interaction.

He does not appear to have designated a main effort.  In terms of the number of units committed, Terry was the commander of the divisions main effort.

He elected to have units that were far apart and unable to communicate with each other attempt a large concentric attack against a mobile enemy without adequate intelligence about just where the enemy was.

Terry:

Clearly neither a commander or a leader.  His order to Custer was nebulous.  He did designate Custer as the main effort, but then elected to move with the Gibbon Column.  My view is the commander should move with the main effort.  Apparently he did not try to get the department properly resourced with horses nor did he form a coherent team.   He, like Sheridan, attempted to use a concentric attack to bring the enemy to battle.

Crooke

appears to have best prepared for the campaign.  He mounted his infantry.  The Cavalry appeared to be well commanded and trained.
He actively assumed command of his column during the fight, but he failed to properly deploy for his rest halt.

Whether he thinks he won or not, he was whipped.  He held the field, but he retreated and made no real effort to engage.

At least he did not split up his command.




 

                                                             

[herosrest]

Yuo make good points but need to get real.


I agree that Custer set himself up for failure, regardless of method of attack. If I can see this, his senior subordinates could. They were unreliable. I have my own ideas what took place and none of it is noble and Reno and Benteen were unreliable. This is not a defence of Custer but of any commander in dire straights.



I believe there were problems with the carbines, in the valley, which un-nerved people. If you are being surrounded by a dominantly superior force with equal mobility, why run for the hills. That gets you killed and is precisely what happened. River to his rear and enemy on front and flanks, is - already surrounded. The valley fight was brief, very brief. That's why the units downriver were cutoff and forced north.



The ideas which have been embedded since 1926, about Benteen's ride to the south and back, along Reno Ck. are one of my BS flags. Exactly the same with the duration of Reno's skirmish. If it seems I was saying that Reno was a poor officer, that may be. No one really knows other than the record. The move across Ford A and down the valley seems to have been by the book and i'm reasonably sure I never criticised it. The skirmish fell apart and got a lot of men killed. My view is that problems with the ammunition emerged and..... spooky. I'm sure that would worry the bravest who ever served. Knife fight an Ogala! Sarge..... where's my knife?



At critical phases the senior subordinates proved unreliable in the face of stupendous odds.

It happens all the time.

[miker]

You can believe what you want. Reno is culpable for failing to ensure the Regiment was prepared for combat and had adequate supplies and horses for the job. He failed his commander and he failed his troops by not preparing them for combat while in command. I suspect Custer did not issue any orders to him about how to prepare the Regiment.  Apparently, at least Weir felt no need to follow his orders while in garrison or participate in any training that occured.  Custer was more interested in screwing around in NYC, testifying before Congress, and acting like an undisciplined child who is only interested in getting his lollipop.

Once back with the regiment, Custer again failed to provide effective leadership or command of the Regiment, did not build a team, failed to use the time spend in moving toward the theater to improve the regiment's effectiveness and explain to his officers how he intended to fight, failed to issue clear and concise orders, failed to ensure his subordinates understood the plan, split the regiment into detachments unable to provide mutual and logistical support or ability to communicate. Blaming subordinates when the commander totally fails in his duty is BS.

You just go on reading goat livers and hunting for the Holy Grail and speaking in cryptic phrases.

[quincannon]

Well reading goat entrails is not a job for the faint of heart HR, and Sir Percival ultimately concluded that the Holy Grail was a fools errand.

Mike is completely correct. Fault is laid at the feet of the person in command. Reno commanded in the winter of 75-76 while Custer was diddle farting on Broadway with his chums. The winter in Dakota is brutal and it is no fun training in such conditions. Dying though, is not so much fun either. When Custer resumed command in the spring, the onus fell back upon him. He had that regiment consolidated at Lincoln before the campaign started and did nothing to get it combat effective. Nothing. On the trail to LBH there were training opportunities as well, and he did absolutely nothing to sharpen the saber. People who do not know better think there is time for training and time for combat and never the twain shall meet. That is bull shit. Training never stops. Never. Both were responsible for what happened. One was shot and the other should have been, for gross negligence and malfeasance. When a unit fails the commander is culpable and completely responsible for that failure. It can be no other way.

[herosrest]

Gentlemen,



Knowing what we know by its varying degrees, many people have made the journey Custer made and found his reasoning to be sound. This was and probably still is, the staff rides unsertaken over the terrain. I believe that a virtual exercise has now been trialed.

How do you train for irregular warfare in 1876? This isn't me sniping but curious for your ideas. There had been large fights with Sioux from 1865 onwards and earlier if we dip into the Cheyenne sagas. Ride around for ages hunting the camps, attack at dawn, destroy the property and horse herds. There is a modern injection that hostage taking had worked its way into SOP as the principal tactic. I am happy to state forever that problems existed with carried rounds which caused weapon jams during the opening skirmish. From a limited number of accounts available, Reno's battalion went forward with some elan and self belief which simply vapourised on line. There will be a reason and guns jamming is a pretty good one.

I forget off the top of my head the exact number of men taken forth to do battle on that day but intelligence such as existed gave a maximum opposition at 1,500 fighters which pushed the numbers close to 3 to 1 against. Worst case scenario was a tediously high risk undertaking. Indians did not do frontal assault because in their very unique way they were simply to bright to be that stupid. There was a reason why Reno bugged out as he did in panic and that was guns which were not shooting. It seems that French's company exercised fire control and therefore did not suffer jamming weapons shot in rapid fire.

Company A experienced that problem, Company G escorted Reno under cover, one might assume to provide security whilst he worked out wtf was wrong with the guns. It's an interesting scenario and is not unusual with new weapon systems - which the 1873 was. Tactics had altered somewhat as well and yes, how was a regiment scattered across reconstruction to be imbued with the latest theory of battle, which was broadly irrelevat to irregular warfare anyways.

The way things worked then, is not how they happen today and maybe the scattered posts could and should have done better in preparedness but all that mattered worth a damn was riding and shooting with a shortage of horses and ammunition for target practice. No bayonets, and practice sabre all day for six weeks in the field, they were left behind at 12 th June, was it?

Ten companies fought in 1873, and that campaign left its mark. What no-one got their heads around was that that 1876 campaign was the big one for the Sioux. They were ready to make their stand and it is remembered today and for centuries to come.

Custer could attack or be attacked. He chose the former but the later could as easily have been a disaster of losses with the camp wandering away. There was no win to be had on 25th June 1876, but Custer used what he had and what he knew and it failed. Sheridan sent in the three columns expecting each to be able to hold its own. That was his strategy. Crook tried hard and failed. Custer also, and then Terry. Disaster from March to June 1876 and then the ignomony of trapsing all over Montana up and down the Yellowstone looking for ghosts.

The perceptions of Reno and Benteen's parts, that of W.A. Graham also, are unfortunate in masking truth but this is the nature of that beast. Fortunately enough NA accountss exist to paint realistic pictures rather than face saving diatribe which suits and comforts many.

I have said elsewhere that Custer should not have been returned to 7th Cavalry for the campaign. That would be a worthwhile topic.

[herosrest]

www.timeanddate.com/moon/phases/usa/billings

[miker]

Knowing what we know by its varying degrees, many people have made the journey Custer made and found his reasoning to be sound. This was and probably still is, the staff rides unsertaken over the terrain. I believe that a virtual exercise has now been trialed.

I have read staff studies, staff rides, and the results of a JANUS simulation fighting the battle and none of them have said that Custer's actions were sound as well as played manual board games and computer games (as opposed to simulations).  The difference between a game and a simulation is simulations have a training objective and games are for fun.  One may learn from both.

Most results conclude that Custer did not have a good plan and specifically dividing the force was a mistake.  Somewhat interesting is that when the situation is disguised, many officers repeat the same mistakes and get whacked.

For your information, there are three kinds of military simulations:

Live in which real soldiers and euipment exercise on real terrain with simulated or live ammunition to conduct an exercise.  An example of this is paintball but more importantly exercises conducted with live fire and lasers at the various training centers.

Constructive in which units, terrain, and effects are all conducted in a computer.  This is similar to chess.  In the US Army, the training audience does not normally interact directly with the simulation, but rather talks to "role players" from their field command posts by their communications systems.  They can also take place in a manual simulation using communications equipment from the players to their command post or through a double blind system.

Virtual is a live person with simulated equipment (or real equipment adapted for use in the environment) in a simulated environment.  This is typically with a single system like an aircraft or tank.  With a lot of equipment and band width units from squad to to battalion size have been simulated in the US Army fighting against an appropriate unit.
There is also Joint Live Virtual Constructive (JLVC) where units training in the various forms are able to interact.  This is difficult, because constructive or simulated forces can engage live forces, but the live forces have a hard time seeing simulated units.

I have trained, been an observer controller, provided simulation services, developed simulations, trained people to use the simulations, in all four of these environments.  I am very comfortable saying there has been NO Virtual exercise in which the engagement of the 7th Cavalry at the Little Bighorn has been conducted. 

How do you train for irregular warfare in 1876? This isn't me sniping but curious for your ideas. There had been large fights with Sioux from 1865 onwards and earlier if we dip into the Cheyenne sagas. Ride around for ages hunting the camps, attack at dawn, destroy the property and horse herds. There is a modern injection that hostage taking had worked its way into SOP as the principal tactic. I am happy to state forever that problems existed with carried rounds which caused weapon jams during the opening skirmish. From a limited number of accounts available, Reno's battalion went forward with some elan and self belief which simply vapourised on line. There will be a reason and guns jamming is a pretty good one.

Many fundamental training tasks don't care about whether the combat is conventional or not.  Marksmanship, horsemanship, commanding and controlling operations are the same regardless of what type of combat there is.  If you can't move, shoot, and communicate you can't win in anytpe combat. 

I forget off the top of my head the exact number of men taken forth to do battle on that day but intelligence such as existed gave a maximum opposition at 1,500 fighters which pushed the numbers close to 3 to 1 against. Worst case scenario was a tediously high risk undertaking. Indians did not do frontal assault because in their very unique way they were simply to bright to be that stupid. There was a reason why Reno bugged out as he did in panic and that was guns which were not shooting. It seems that French's company exercised fire control and therefore did not suffer jamming weapons shot in rapid fire.

The 7th Cavalry went into battle with a total of about 700 men.  No one really knows the number of enemy combatants.  If there were 10,000 people in the Indian camp, it is reasonable to assume that 15-25% of the force were combatants.  Thus the enemy force could have been 1500 - 2500 soldiers.  The odds for the entire 7th Cavalry in the attack were therefore 1:2.14 to 1:3.57.  Thus, even fully concentrated for attack, the 7th does not have a reasonable expectation of success.  Defending, they could have theoretically succeeded in defeating the enemy force.

Various studies have shown that from about 1600 - 1973 the following results have occured:

Result                Force Ratio >1:1    Force Ratio 1:1    Force Ration <1:1        Total Cases

Attacker won        271                     7                        89                              367

Draw                   35                       0                        6                                41

Defender won       126                    4                        67                              197

Total                    432                    11                       162                            605

Company A experienced that problem, Company G escorted Reno under cover, one might assume to provide security whilst he worked out wtf was wrong with the guns. It's an interesting scenario and is not unusual with new weapon systems - which the 1873 was. Tactics had altered somewhat as well and yes, how was a regiment scattered across reconstruction to be imbued with the latest theory of battle, which was broadly irrelevat to irregular warfare anyways.

Training would likely mitigated against the stoppages issue.  I am sure Reno did not personally try to work out the issue of the stoppages.  Straighter shooting would have helped.  The 7th likely shot high.

Let's analyze a little about firepower.  Today, in order to qualify ones personnel weapon, you need to hit a certain number of targets:

Soldiers fire 40 rounds to qualify with their weapon.
Not qualified:  0 -22 hits out of 40, average of 11/40 0.27
Marksman:  23 - 29 hits out of 40, average of 26/40 or a ph of 0.65
Sharpshooter:  30 - 35 hits out of 40, average of 32.5 or a ph of 0.81
Expert:  36 - 40 hits out of 40, average of 38 or a ph of 0.95

Let's assume:

210 soldiers were on line fighting 1500 Indians who are arrayed in a formation about 500 people wide in three ranks.
We do not allow the Indians to shoot
Both sides are stationary
Lets assign the overall force a ph of 0.67
Lets assign the overall force a pk of 0.33
Hold ph/pk steady throughout the engagement.
The effective range of the carbine was 400 yards.
Rate of Fire = 12 rounds per minute.
Weapons unable to fire due to stoppage = 3.4% or 7
Each soldier has 100 rounds of ammunition or 21000 total rounds
winning requires killing or wounding 50% of the enemy force, or 750.

With controlled fire, unit runs out of ammunition in 10 minutes.
Rounds expended in 8 minutes
Rounds not fired due to stoppage = 21000*.034 = 714.
Rounds fired:  21000-714 = 20286
Hits: 20286 * 0.067=13591
Kills:  13591 * 0.33 = 4485

So, it should be a piece of cake, but we know it was not.  Perhaps 60 - 100 Indians were killed, which usually means 240 - 400 would be wounded 300 - 500 hits.  So the actual ph would be closer to 400/20286 = 0.19% or 3854 hits and the actual pk would be closer to 60/400 = 0.15 or 578 killed.

Note I did not pull out horse holders, officers, senior NCOs, the doctor, guidon bearers or buglers who would not be firing.  That would remove 52 horse holders, 12 - 15 officers, 6 - 8 NCOs, 5-6 flag bearers, and 5 - 6 buglers for a total of  something 80 - 87 shooters, driving the Ph/Pk even lower.

SLA Marshall posited that only 30% of infantrymen fired their weapons.  Sadly, much of his work has been discredited, so we should probably say 50% fired so only 24 to 40 soldiers would have been firing in total.  Officers firing their weapons when not in extremis should be avoided as they lose control of their units.

The way things worked then, is not how they happen today and maybe the scattered posts could and should have done better in preparedness but all that mattered worth a damn was riding and shooting with a shortage of horses and ammunition for target practice. No bayonets, and practice sabre all day for six weeks in the field, they were left behind at 12 th June, was it?

I am not saying there would have been extensive training at these tiny posts where much of their work was devoted to administration of the fort itself.  But, when the 7th concentrated, their should have been a regimen of marksmanship, horsemanship, and maneuver.  I wouldn't have bothered with the sabre.  Pity they did not have bayonets or entrenching tools.

Ten companies fought in 1873, and that campaign left its mark. What no-one got their heads around was that that 1876 campaign was the big one for the Sioux. They were ready to make their stand and it is remembered today and for centuries to come.

Concur.

Custer could attack or be attacked. He chose the former but the later could as easily have been a disaster of losses with the camp wandering away. There was no win to be had on 25th June 1876, but Custer used what he had and what he knew and it failed. Sheridan sent in the three columns expecting each to be able to hold its own. That was his strategy. Crook tried hard and failed. Custer also, and then Terry. Disaster from March to June 1876 and then the ignomony of trapsing all over Montana up and down the Yellowstone looking for ghosts.

As I pointed out in my little analysis, neither attacking or defending in this case would, in my view, be successful.  The difference between the Reno/Benteen and LSH is an all around defense, concentration of force, digging in, more ammunition, and better command and control of the Reno/Benteen Force.

The perceptions of Reno and Benteen's parts, that of W.A. Graham also, are unfortunate in masking truth but this is the nature of that beast. Fortunately enough NA accounts exist to paint realistic pictures rather than face saving diatribe which suits and comforts many.

All accounts of 1st person participants deteriorate over time and invariably migrate toward better display of valor.  They are called War Stories for a reason.  The written word provides a better record than oral history/tradition.  I'm not saying oral history/tradition is wrong, it just drifts more than written works.

I have said elsewhere that Custer should not have been returned to 7th Cavalry for the campaign. That would be a worthwhile topic.

It would be interesting but I think not worthwhile.  Due to the way the 19th Century Army worked, Reno would have commanded.  It is possible some other officer could have been appointed, but he would have a devil of a time ascending to command, but he scarcely would have done worse.

Terry, in my view, should have accompanied the Custer column, but he was an administrator, not a soldier.   But he might have controlled Custer and kept the Regiment together.   On the other hand, Gibbon was no steller performer either.

[herosrest]

Big thank you, I am very much enjoying your posts at the moment. I will re-iterate that comparing today with yesterday (1876) isn't strictly playing cricket   and worth some thought. 

Now, I love it when a plan comes together. I am not alone in the gun issue. There is a good read here link giving the account and views of High Eagle who was of the Arapaho tribe, fought in the WW! trenches, and bombed Berlin, whilst riding cowboy on the Plains and running a circus which failed miserably. He would have us believe he was the happiest man ever. Sheesh............ The guns did not work. 

Again, I thoroughly enjoy your posts. Very different style to mine but full of it. You know what I mean, I hope.

Regards

[herosrest]

I went hunting a military paper by John Watts de Peyster of Tivoli fame. I believe that he was offered genetalship alongside Custer and others during ACW but declined. Who wouldn't!

He is mentioned here en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skirmisher in ACW section. What he espoused came about and was blessed by the 1873 Springfield system which eventually did sterling service. Watts de Peyster is an interesting after dinner chat and belongs in many more footnotes than is the case.

Rifled barrels, cartridge rounds, deadly accuracy and yet it was the 1880's before marksmanship was improved.

[miker]

I will re-iterate that comparing today with yesterday (1876) isn't strictly playing cricket and worth some thought.

What part of my post compares modern tactics and weapons with the battle?

You brought up the use of simulation and staff rides, not I.  You also clearly did not know the different types of simulations.  There are no holodecks which would allow a virtual simulation of the battle to be fought.

How does relating the effects of force ratio from 1600 - 1973 not illustrate the results of battles regardless of era?

My mathematical model, while undoubtedly wrong, provides a way to retroactively predict the results of the battle. All models are wrong. Some are useful and does not rely on modern tactics.

Now, I love it when a plan comes together. I am not alone in the gun issue. There is a good read here link giving the account and views of High Eagle who was of the Arapaho tribe, fought in the WW! trenches, and bombed Berlin, whilst riding cowboy on the Plains and running a circus which failed miserably. He would have us believe he was the happiest man ever. Sheesh............ The guns did not work.

High Eagle was really Colonel Tim McCoy and not an Arapaho, but appears to be adopted in some manner.  In his interview he seems to state during WWI he flew to the US via the Azores, but the first transatlantic flight did not take place until 1919 from 8 - 31 may and flew from Newfoundland to Lisbon with a flight time of 26 hours and 45 minutes.

He was indeed an LTC in the US Cavalry, but unless he was in the 2nd Cavalry - the only US cavalry regiment sent to France in WWI which did not participate in combat, he was stationed along the Mexican Border.  This would not have precluded him being in some other headquarters unit.

The Indians frequently took prisoners, both white and Indian and enslaved them.  Sometimes they would be adopted into the tribe.  However, they did not usually take soldiers prisoners.

I suspect his knowledge was derived from his period as a cowboy/rancher and not so much as a soldier, in spite of him being at aide to Scott.  Still, the Arapahoe interviews I found appear to be much more detailed and coherent than other ones, and he seems to be best known as an actor.  I would not place any great stock in his opinion of the state of training or marksmanship of the 7th.

I am reminded of Lee saying to Longstreet in the movie Gettysburg "An Actor!  An Actor!  We move our army on the word of an actor?"  "Can't afford not to, General" says Longstreet, so perhaps I am wrong on this. 

Marksmanship.  A cheap Congress prohibited much target practice.  Perhaps as few as 10 rounds per man per year sticks in my memory, but I can't document it.  Only after the LBH did the Army start to shoot twice per week.  Later, like in WWI and between the wars, soldiers who qualfied with their weapons got a small bonus for the expertise.  Sadly, we pay pilots extra to fly but we do not reward straight shooting.

At the Rosebud, Crooke shot off a lot of ammunition:

It was true that many of them possessed repeating rifles compared to the soldiers’ single-shot 1873 Springfield carbines and rifles (the weapons selected by General Terry’s munitions board), but this had not prevented the troopers, infantrymen, and scouts from firing off an astounding number of rounds—25,000 cartridges by one estimate, or about 250 rounds per Native casualty.

Philbrick, Nathaniel. The Last Stand (pp. 93-94). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

There were techniques promulgated to mitigate the effects of the poor designs.

*Keep the cartridges clean.

*Take a bullet out of a cartridge, cut it down and form it into a ball, insert it into the muzzle, use the ramrod to push it down and push the cartridge out of the chamber.

*One of the company commanders who used an infantry rifle spend his time on the Reno position clearing stoppages with his rifle's ramrod.

On field exercises, I made my platoons and companies clear their rifles nightly, even though we very seldom fired blank ammunition. With the advent of the MILES laser system, it was even more important to do so because the blanks and blank adapters do not allow the gas/debris to escape from the barrel and foul it. Also, the bullet provides some cleaning effects as it moves out.

In scholarsarchive.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5728&context=facpub is a very interesting publication. Reno reported

On July 11, 1876, only 15 days after the battle, Major Reno reported on the number of rounds used by the army, “Amt. Ammunition exp’d. [Amount Ammunition Expended] –– Carbine, 38,030 rounds: [Amt. Ammunition exp’d.] –– Pistol, 2,954 [rounds].”

Now, this is a little suspect to me.  It is very difficult to know precisely how many rounds are fired.  This number of rounds probably was arrived at by counting the number of unopened boxes and perhaps the remaining ammunition in the soldiers possession after the battle.  It probably does not account for ammunition captured or lost.  But we do know each soldier started with 50 rounds on his person and 50 rounds in his saddlebag.  Assuming each soldier in the regiment carried them, that means there are about 60,000 - 70,000 rounds readily available for use. 

I think each company had 6 ammunition mules in the pack train and each mule carried 2 boxes of 1000 rounds each.  If that is correct, then there were 12000 rounds available for each company and 144,000 rounds for the Regiment.  I think we can easily say that probably at least 50% of the ammunition carried by the Custer battalion and 33% of the ammunition carried by Reno's battalion was lost.

Godfrey says in the same publication:

Third. The defective extraction of the empty cartridge shells from the carbines.  On the third we can only judge by our own experience.

When cartridges were dirty and corroded, the ejectors did not always extract the empty shells from the chambers, and the men were compelled to use knives to get them out. When the shells were clean no great difficulty was experienced. To what extent this was a favor in causing the disaster [Custer’s defeat] we have no means of knowing.

From www.historynet.com/battle-of-little-bighorn-were-the-weapons-the-deciding-factor/ we find that poor marksmanship abounds in the US Army:

In Vietnam, it was estimated that some firefights had 50,000 bullets fired for each soldier killed. In the Battle of the Rosebud, eight days before the Little Bighorn fight, General George Crook’s forces fired about 25,000 rounds and may have caused about 100 Indian casualties — about one hit for every 250 shots. One of the best showings ever made by soldiers was at Rorke’s Drift in an 1879 battle between the Zulus and the British infantry. There, surrounded, barricaded soldiers delivered volley after volley into dense masses of charging natives at point-blank range where it seemed that no shot could miss. The result: one hit for every 13 shots.

At the Little Bighorn, about 42,000 rounds were either expended or lost. At that rate, the soldiers hit one Indian for about every 840 shots. Since much of the ammunition was probably lost — Indians commented on capturing ammunition in cartridge belts and saddlebags — the hit rate must have been higher. Yet the results do not speak highly of a supposedly highly trained, “crack” cavalry regiment. 

So my model is overly generous. 

Ph for the Rosebud:  100/25000 = 0.004
Ph for the LBH:  840/42000 = 0.002
Ph for Rourke's Drift:  = 0.007

Shitty marksmanship is probably much more important than stoppages in the defeat of the 7th.

But you can go on believing it was stoppages and not lack of training and practice that caused the defeat of the 7th.