Ford B: Prelude to Destruction

[miker]

I think it is clear from my remarks that I am undecided. Maybe I would maybe I wouldn't. Martini said the village was empty. Maybe he's lying. I don't know. I think, in contrast to everyone here, you have to go take a look.

Also clearly I didn't get the look at the ground I wanted. I had more pressing tasks at that time to bring my daughter home

With what Custer may have known/thought at the time may have thought he could

1. Capture hostages.
2. Turn toward Reno and catch the Indians between him.

It is apparent some troopers went down there for a look. Its called RECONNAISSANCE. He got repulsed, so the village wasn't empty. Then he went North to Ford D. That turned out pretty shitty. Ford B couldn't have been any worse.

You can only die once. First you try one thing. Then another. Repeat till you run out of choices, bullets, or airspeed. He fucked up.

And I still maintain your conclusions are based on what you know and not what Custer knew. In my view he didn't know squat. Its apparent you went somewhere and came to a conclusion. There weren't any Indians or lodges there when you did. No one was shooting at you. You weren't in command.

I don't know and neither do you.

Somebody please lock the dead horse locker.

[quincannon]

Well, I have already taken a look both on the ground and on a map. I think I can see as well as anyone here, and can read a map better than most, and my conclusion is that there was no need to conduct a reconnaissance to Ford B under the prevailing circumstances. None whatsoever. Anything that could have been seen by close reconnaissance such as the conditions of the river banks would be much too risky, and counterproductive. The general conditions at the Ford, including congestion on the west side, enemy occupation and activity would, and could be seen from a place like Butler Ridge, which was both close enough, and far enough away.

I think we must look at intent here. If Custer crossed MTC heading for the eastern ridges, regardless, if he took Cedar or Middle Coulee, I think we must conclude his intent was to use the eastern ridgeline as his avenue of approach to his intended destination. Wolf Tooth's band scuppered that, and the intent was interrupted because of a need for counteraction against Wolf Tooth. That counter most probably took the form of some sort of hold and flank, which more than likely would have placed the flankers in MTC. It takes no great stretch of the imagination to see that happening, but it takes some great act, a flight of fancy, to think that this flanking move would take any body of men, from two to two companies anywhere near Ford B. There was a fight in the coulee. There was a fight on the eastern ridges. There is nothing at the Ford, no evidence, no bodies, no spent cartridges. There is nothing more than a bunch of Sioux, telling second hand tales of Custer at a ford. That's all.

Intent is the key here. If Custer had any intent of attacking at Ford B, therefore requiring a reconnaissance of any size, he would have kept his command together in Medicine Tail Coulee, and not proceeded across it to the eastern ridges. Keeping everyone in MTC is in itself a death wish, but that's another story altogether.

[miker]

All good points. My indecision remains.

No one knows squat about his intent.

Moderator: please lock the thread so we can quit besting the dead horse. It is obvious there is nothing to discuss.

[quincannon]

On the contrary. His pattern of movements give us indication of intent. If you intend to attack the Safeway, you do not head your force on a route that can only lead to Kroger's. If you intend to attack Kroger's, you have no need to recon the Safeway parking lot. Custer's route indicated an attack further on at Kroger's. Were it otherwise he would not have crossed over the street that leads to the Safeway. He would have turned left, not proceeded straight across the intersection.

All of which reminds me that I must stop at the grocery store today.

I think it is a terrible idea to lock this thread. In so doing you are denying people to read what is here, make up their own minds, and comment on same.

[miker]

Ok. I grant that.

But he had no idea what was in front of him and knew what was in back. In my view he went the wrong way.

But what do I know?

Don’t lock the thread.

[quincannon]

Most commanders start off any operation not knowing what is in front of them, or at least an imperfect knowledge of it.

The way he was heading Ford B was not in front of him. Battle Ridge and Ford D would be to his front. Ford B might be worth watching, but you cannot watch it from Battle Ridge, and it does not take more than one person or a very small detail to do the watching, say, from somewhere around Butler Ridge, where you have an unrestricted view of anyone crossing from west to east, and a jump on them to inform Custer if that happened.

[mac]

Feb 5, 2023 16:24:47 GMT miker said:

 It is obvious there is nothing to discuss.

Don't get me wrong Mike.

I am permanently open to changing my mind and that is why I ask questions. So you may go to the river or you may not.

I certainly agree that Custer had not much knowledge of what was happening in the battle space.

In the end we cannot ever truly know what anyone was thinking, we can only try to understand what happened.

Keep the discussions going; that way we all learn.

Thanks for the Donahue heads up, obviously I will not be able to attend, and from what I know of the finds and his interpretation I will be interested in what he has to say.

Cheers

[miker]

My intent here is not to change people's mind but to present a reasonable scenario as to what happened, present documented evidence new to me (and I note that no one else seems to have read the 1997 study) and see if there is new documented information available which other people know about because I have been unable to find anything. If there is, no one has thrown a bone as to finding it.

We understand what happened, Custer decided to turn right and follow the ridge lines to the WNW. He got waxed. Reno who rightly figured out he could probably not stand and fight in the open retreated first to the timber (which he may have been able to hold) and subsequently, whether through good decision making or luck, broke out, found defensible ground and was reinforced by Benteen, and unlike Custer was able to hold off the Indians until they lost interest. He probably could not have lasted three days up there, though, being away from water.

It is worth contemplating Sun Tzu and comparing his advice to Custer's actions. I suspect Custer never read Sun Tzu and maybe not even Upton:

Sun Tzu says,

Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground: (1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground.

• When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground.
• When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it is facile ground.
• Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is contentious ground.
• Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground.
• Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command, is a ground of intersecting highways.
• When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground.
• Mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground.
• Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground.
• Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without delay, is desperate ground.

On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not.
On facile ground, halt not.
On contentious ground, attack not.
On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way.
On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies.
On serious ground, gather in plunder.
In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.
On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.
On desperate ground, fight. 

The situation ultimately became desperate.  It appears the battalion, once it moved to Calhoun Hill and beyond neither restored to stratagem or fighting effectively.

[quincannon]

If someone had translated Sun Tzu for Georgie Boy, and he had bothered to read it, this board would not exist. So count either your blessings or your frustrations. All of us made our own bed in coming here in the first place.  Life is far too short, to think either one of two things, George Custer was the sharpest saber in the scabbard, or conversely he was dumb as a box of rocks. Neither are true, and we cannot delude ourselves into thinking they are.

Pet the dog. Listen to a little Mozart. Pour yourself a glass from one of the better Glens. Then, move out smartly.

[azranger]

I think Custer did what wanted to do in MTC. Slow the crossing from the Big Village. The eastern soldiers were not slowed from the Big Village. The  first encounter for them was where they exited the north fork of MTC with a returning Cheyenne hunting party. This is where JSIT states the battle started. 

From the brief encounter in MTC Custer moves north. He is parallel those moving north on Battle Ridge. They join near LSH and Custer with E,F moves across Cemetery Ridge. C,I,L move out BRE extension.

Regards

Steve

[miker]

Feb 6, 2023 19:08:32 GMT quincannon said:

If someone had translated Sun Tzu for Georgie Boy, and he had bothered to read it, this board would not exist. So count either your blessings or your frustrations. All of us made our own bed in coming here in the first place.  Life is far too short, to think either one of two things, George Custer was the sharpest saber in the scabbard, or conversely he was dumb as a box of rocks. Neither are true, and we cannot delude ourselves into thinking they are.

Pet the dog. Listen to a little Mozart. Pour yourself a glass from one of the better Glens. Then, move out smartly.

No dog.  Strauss, Mussorgsky, Borodin, Respighi.  Seldom drink alcohol,  but prefer Bourbon.  Sometimes, I can only move out dumbly, but I endeavor to be smart.

[quincannon]

You need a dog. They calm the inner soul. Which Strauss, the Waltz King I presume? Roses From The South" or "Vienna Blood".  Bourbon is one step removed from moonshine. Vile stuff, unfit for the sophisticated palate. Moving out smartly has nothing to do with intelligence. It refers to the briskness of one's step, the joie de vivre of one's attitude, one's sense of romance. Jackson's Corps moved out smartly at Chancellorsville as Thomason reported "There was Jackson, Jackson, in the soft May air"

[miker]

I long for the day there are no pets in the house, but they will provably outlive me. Yes. Blue Danube. Peaceful. I do not claim a sophisticated palette, but lunch with you was excellent. Hmmm. I stand corrected.

[quincannon]

Joie de Vivre old son, but it tastes better with good Scotch, and has more Joie with a scruffy old mutt, who licks your ears, and steals your food from your plate while you are not looking.  Joie de Vivre.

[johnson1941]

Once again I re-visit this...
LOTS of people put Custer on Weir's HILL...Fred found "3411" on the 1967 USGS, but per Camp Custer's viewing/waving spot is apparently a little to the west of there; where in 1891 USGS there is 3500' ring indicator adjacent to SSR.

Anyway - for me it is nice to have all these (agreeing) witnesses in one place...


W.M.R.H.

"Custer and his brother went to the right of us and halted on a small hill. His troops were moving forward below him. Custer turned around as he reached the top of the hill and waved his hat, and the soldiers at the bottom of the hill waved their hats and shouted. Custer then proceeded on up the ridge and his men followed"

Hairy Moccasin

"Custer yelled to us to stop, then told us to go to the high hill ahead (the high point just north of where Reno later entrenched). From here we could see the village and could see Reno fighting."

Goes Ahead

"Custer rode to the edge of the high bank and looked over to the place where Reno's men were, as though planning the next move.

When they had arrived at about the point where Lieutenant Hodgson's headstone was placed later, the three Crow scouts saw the soldiers under Reno dismounting in front of the Dakota camp and thought that the enemy were "too many." Close to where Reno and Benteen later in the day were attacked by the Dakotas, on the ridge of hills above the river, the three Crow scouts were left behind and Custer's command went down the draw toward the lower ford on the run"


De Rudio:

A. I did not see any part of the column of General Custer. The only observation I made was while I was in the woods. General Custer, Lieut. Cook and another man I could not recognize came to the highest point of the bluff and waved their hats and made motions like they were cheering and pretty soon disappeared. I judge by that that probably his column was behind the bluff."

Q. Where was that?
A. It was on the highest point on the right bank of the creek just below where Dr. De Wolf was killed

Q. Did you see the place generally known as the point where Capt Weir went to?
A. Yes Sir I saw it .

Q. Was General Custer on that point?
A . No, on one nearer the river and the highest point on that side. I saw General Custer where the river comes right under the bluff comes in very narrow there hardly wide enough for a horse to stand on in my opinion...

Martin:

"General Custer left that watering place and went 300 yards in a straight line than after that he turned to the right a little more and travelled that way four or five hundred yards then there was a kind of a big bend on the hill - he turned these hills and went on top of the ridge ....We went more to the right from that ridge and went down to a ravine that went to the river."

Q. Could you see the river from that place out there?
A. No Sir the river was right at the foot of the bluff. we could see the village.
...
Q. That place from which you saw the village, dogs, children, and ponies, was it the highest point down the river below where Major Reno made his stand?
A. Yes sir, the highest hill the very highest point around there.

Q. When you moved down afterwards did some of the troops go on that high hill?
A. No sir.

Martin: Custer's command passes below Weir POINT, Scouts go to Weir POINT, he gets sent back:

"We went more to the right from that ridge and went down to a ravine that went to the river.
At the same time General Custer passed that high place on the ridge or a little below it he told his Adjutant to send an order back to Captain Benteen."
....
Q. "Did you go to the top of that high point?
A. "No sir - nobody but the Indian scouts"

Q. Did not you and Gen Custer go to the top of it?
A. No sir.

...After I started from Gen. Custer to go back I travelled 5 or 6OO yards perhaps 3/4 of a mile. I got on the same ridge where general Custer saw the village the first time."

Martin:

“Cooke wrote out the message to Benteen and I started back with it on the trail. I did not follow Dry Creek all way back to coulee running north and south but cut across the high ground.”…
“I Met Boston Custer half way between medium coulee and Weir Hill."

Camp w/ Martin:
"Custer first halted on Weir's hill and took a look at village...Here he turned column to the right and went down {South} coulee to Dry Creek and turned to left and followed Dry Creek straight for village."

WMC...

*It is “1700ft from Reno’s retreat up to Weir Hill”
"From this hill, {Weir Hill}, can only see the Hunkpapa & Black feet lodges”
*"From Weir's Hill to the 2 highest peaks the course is directly northwest"
*"Highest Point - Edgerly Peaks - is almost direct NW from Benteen's horseshoe"
*"Weirs Hill is 60 degrees west of North from same point"
*"Distance Weir Hill to 1st Edgerly Peak is 2500ft"
**"Bearings July 28. N End of Benteen's line to sharpshooters hill N 45 W.

*To Edgerly Peak N 58 W.
*To Weir's hill N 68 W.
*To DeWolf marker N 64 W.

Camp

"Again take bearing from Weir hill to Edgerly peaks (N 43 W) and satisfy myself that Custer could not have seen further than the Blackfoot village but might have seen Ogalalla camp over toward hills. This is correct. He could see no further to right than a course N 71 W which is a full half mile to left of Ford B."


Benteen's G


Camp re: Kanipe
"Custers Route "Kanipe showed me where Custer struck across from Benteen Creek and came out at bluff. He struck bluffs few hundred feet north of where Reno afterward corraled." '1/4 mile further was sent back. Did not go back on same trail, but further east'"

Camp w/Curley
"Custer's Route ...to the bluffs and coming out at a point about 500' north of Reno Corral...passed along the crest of bluffs for 3/4 mile...For some distance south of {Reno peaks} there is a high ridge running parallel with the river...Custer's command passed into the valley of a tributary of Reno creek just behind this ridge and the peaks..."
"Bouyer and his four scouts kept to the left of Custer - on the crest of the ridge and peaks...Custer never went to the peaks or high ridge... peaks..."


Ederly / RCOI:

"We went down about a mile and a half he keeping on the ridge and I going in a sort of valley..."

...I went down this valley Capt. Weir keeping up on the ridge. Pretty soon he saw Indians start for me and he signalled me to swing to the right. I obeyed it and came round up on the hill and saw Capt . Benteen, Capt. French and Capt. Godfrey with their companies...

"we moved out along the ridge, the highest point, that point 7 and then we moved down the valley in the general direction of the point 8. We moved from Major Reno's position about a mile and a half and then swung around on those swells and came up again and met the other companies coming up. We moved out and went to a point which I now mark 9"

Camp re: Edgelry

"so Edgerly mounted up the troop and followed....After going a few hundred yeads I swung off to the right with the troop and went into a little valley which must have been the one followed by Custer and his men, or nearly parallel to it,"

Soon after Benteen joined Reno on hill Capt Weir started to open up communication with Custer and the troop marched out along bluff until came to a jumping - off place from which could look down upon the hollow of Medicine Tail coulee. Men dismounted and put horses behind Edgerly peaks and behind hill to east and men formed line over this hill from east to west..."


Varnum sees the grays...

"That is difficult to answer. I think they were a little farther down than where we struck the bluffs we came up on them, and not quite so far down as the figure "2" in pencil on the map."

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