mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
|
Post by mac on Sept 13, 2022 10:17:36 GMT
Well you certainly spoiled my fun Mike ,but a seriously comprehensive answer. Thanks. As to Indian readiness; I believe they knew Custer was on the way but they did not expect an attack on that day at that time. Wolf Tooth says he and his friends had to sneak out of the camp because it was guarded in readiness. Perhaps the first responders to Reno were a prepared, ready response, group waiting "just in case" trouble showed up early. That would not surprise me. Cheers
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Sept 13, 2022 15:04:27 GMT
Surprise and expectation are two different things in my view.
Mike rightly points to swiming and turnip picking. I have no doubt those in the village were going about their normal daily pursuits. That to me would be a given. However that does not mean they were surprised. Often we read far too much into testimony such as this. Well they must have been surprised if they were off doing these normal things.
I believe the expectation was then, as it is now, that the optimum time to launch an attack would be either in the pre-dawn hours, or just after sunset. That's why military units today, have "stand to" during both those periods. If an attack does not develop then, I am quite sure those folks would go about their daily chores, just as we would today. That does not mean, then or now, that security is not maintained. It is just maintained at a lower level.
I think that lower level of security is what we are talking about in the daylight hours of 25 June, with a security force in readiness, and others going about the business of the day. Wolf Tooth seems to back up this thesis.
I don't know why Wolf Tooth left camp. Being a young fellow, I am going on the assumption that he and his cohort were out looking for bear, as young folks will do, mostly to the frustration of their elders. Regardless, he and his folks constituted a combat patrol, intending to make themselves useful should they meet the enemy. They in fact did both. Were Wolf Tooth under my command, I would bust the bastard down to private for disobedience of my orders, and award him a Bronze Star with V, for his initiative and combativeness.
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Sept 13, 2022 15:21:57 GMT
I think that lower level of security is what we are talking about in the daylight hours of 25 June, with a security force in readiness, and others going about the business of the day. Wolf Tooth seems to back up this thesis. I don't know why Wolf Tooth left camp. Being a young fellow, I am going on the assumption that he and his cohort were out looking for bear, as young folks will do, mostly to the frustration of their elders. Regardless, he and his folks constituted a combat patrol, intending to make themselves useful should they meet the enemy. They in fact did both. Were Wolf Tooth under my command, I would bust the bastard down to private for disobedience of my orders, and award him a Bronze Star with V, for his initiative and combativeness. Security: Possible and the only security may have provided (unauthorized) by Wolf Tooth. There are just too many stories that say people were surprised, sleeping, swimming, eating, turnip digging, fishing, and so on for me to think the camp was alerted. It is probably as distorted as every other thing is about this battle. (Battles are, after all, ridden with chaos and fog of war.) If they knew he was that close, they could have left and disrupted everything or they could have attacked him. But perhaps it was just the lateness of the arrival of the the 7th that resulted in the surprise that it did. If they expected an attack on the next day, then they may have also been preparing to move. IF, IF, IF. If my mother had wheels, she'd be a wagon.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Sept 13, 2022 16:35:33 GMT
There were twenty to thirty thousand people in that camp, depending upon whose analysis you subscribe to. If those stories were not there, then that's what I would think would be abnormal.
Think about this in the same way you would think about an attack on your cavalry troop around noontime. You would have half your crews manning their assigned weapons, and the rest not far away, washing up, maintaining their rifles and sidearms, or eating their noon meals. I see no difference here.
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Sept 14, 2022 11:04:35 GMT
I think that lower level of security is what we are talking about in the daylight hours of 25 June, with a security force in readiness, and others going about the business of the day. Wolf Tooth seems to back up this thesis. I don't know why Wolf Tooth left camp. Being a young fellow, I am going on the assumption that he and his cohort were out looking for bear, as young folks will do, mostly to the frustration of their elders. Regardless, he and his folks constituted a combat patrol, intending to make themselves useful should they meet the enemy. They in fact did both. Were Wolf Tooth under my command, I would bust the bastard down to private for disobedience of my orders, and award him a Bronze Star with V, for his initiative and combativeness. Security: Possible and the only security may have provided (unauthorized) by Wolf Tooth. There are just too many stories that say people were surprised, sleeping, swimming, eating, turnip digging, fishing, and so on for me to think the camp was alerted. It is probably as distorted as every other thing is about this battle. (Battles are, after all, ridden with chaos and fog of war.) If they knew he was that close, they could have left and disrupted everything or they could have attacked him. But perhaps it was just the lateness of the arrival of the the 7th that resulted in the surprise that it did. If they expected an attack on the next day, then they may have also been preparing to move. IF, IF, IF. If my mother had wheels, she'd be a wagon. I think it is fair to say about the situation, that the daytime attack was unexpected and was a surprise. Difficulties with the approach to Two Moon's village on Powder River, caused the attack to open on 9am. On the Washita, Custer launched at daybreak into a reasonably small camp and without scouting the broader area. It seems he was something of a creature of habit but the two strikes mentioned bot were during freezing deadly weather. Paul Hedren published a reasonable study and overview of the March 17th fight, I link it here, link (pages for speed read) and making some realistic points albeit in history's hindsight. J.J. Reynolds difficulties and eventual fall, played on minds in the field during 1876. Custer's rapid closing on the camp was a surprise as far as anything in the record of participants gives. It was known soldiers were in the field and reasonable to expect a further confrontation at some time soon but Custer pressing in as he did was unexpected and caused a panic and flight, and hurried defence by Sioux and Cheyenne minutemen - ready at a moments notice after they had 'painted up'. There had been intention to move the camp downriver on the morning of 25th June, per record of a number of the chiefs, but this was cancelled and put off for the following day. If it is accepted that Sheridan had some idea of how things went on, and was aware of events of 1873 and 7th Cavalry's two fights in the August along the Yellowstone then his point that Custer could do nothing if little else than he did, is reasonable. The nature and speed of the response to Reno in the valley, bears this out. Soldiers! Where? Here! Howna - Stomp on them.......... There was a perfect and prepared defence site a few miles up the south fork of Reno Ck. and George Herendeen knew of it, in having been a member of the expedition which fought there in April 1874. Albeit, that force had tow artillery pieces with them and had Custer had that, the outcome would have been in his favour. Whereas a large number of bands of Cheyennes and Arapahos camped in isolation at Washita, they concentrated at Little Bighorn and that made a huge difference in terms of the ability to respond quickly and in strength to any attack. There are comments from men in the village that they felt so strong they simply didn't care because no-one was dumb enough to do what Custer did. There ya go - by design or accident, the concentrated camps hidden around the timber in Little Bighorn valley down below the big bend in the river was a stroke of genius. It smacks somewhat of the Cheyennes having learnt lessons from Custer at Washita. The camp was too large to up roots and run in the middle of a battle so, again to my mind, if Custer had been able to take the ground the tipis stood on AND hold it, then he might have pulled something off. We know what actually happened and it is long understood the risks of attacking superior force in detail. Japan perfected this for 1942 but it didn't do them much good. If you hand someone with wheels, a big stone - they can rock & roll.
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Sept 14, 2022 11:24:47 GMT
Digging turnips!!!! And Little Miss Muffet was sitting on her tuffet too. Chief Thunderthud and Princess Summer Fall Winter Spring speak with forked tongue methinks. Those peaceful swimming, turnip picking folks were so surprised that they were on Reno like stink on shit. The peaceful turnip picking and having a reaction force up, mounted, armed, and ready to meet Reno that rapidly do not compute There is some record that braves had horses to hand and were able to respond quickly. Paints Brown's story in F. Bennett Fiske 's Taming of the Sioux, tells this. Others seemed to have premonition and were prepared to react quickly, if, if, if.... It seems to have been a personal thing and some are always good boy scouts. What seems to have taken a little longer was the chief's responding and figuring out what was happening and how to respond. That wasn't a surprise since it's simple to imagine the situation was one they were aware of - attacked at peace in their camps. There are ideas and theories as to why Custer's battalions east of the river didn't go to an emptying village with a defence moving up the valley at Reno, and flight across it by the women, children and elderly considered as vulnerable these days. The way the job was done is take and destroy the property and that required getting into the camp. There was a strong force to defend the camp. It was not focused on the B fords when Custer took his force there. So, what happened? The Taming of the Sioux online read.
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Sept 14, 2022 13:17:28 GMT
I came, one day, to a reasonably simple format for understanding comment by 7th Cavalry survivors of this battle. There was a general reticence in embarrassment over being defeated besides the obvious acceptance that these things happen.Through the chain of command down, US forces were divides and seperated across southern Montana and their immediate areas of opposition.
Intelligence gathering was poor to disfunctional in a region where travel was difficult unless following the long established animal and Indian trails, and maps were just about sufficient to manouvre without getting lost as long as a military or civilian expedition had previously travelled.
Crooke divided his force at Powder River. He kept them together at Rosebud and was rebuffed. Sheridan divided forces in assembling and planning the summer campaign. Terry did when given intelligence that Little Bighorn valley was a good bet. He knew where but not how many. Custer did the same. The Sioux and Cheyenne routinely divided their forces across the plaind in bands which came together to celebrate the summer for a few brief weeks.
Custer died. Reno and Benteen survived. Custer was the battle-commander and the defeat was his responsibility. Why, therefore did Reno (it was Reno) mislead Terry on 27th June, to believe and report officially, that his command and that of Benteen, were besieged on Reno Hill, from 2:30 after retreating from the valley.
Terry was misled and reported that officially on the evening of 27th June, 1876. Custer was to blame for defeat, loss of five companies and HQ besides devastation of the balannce of the regiment and its animals.
Reno retreated poorly, suffered losses in consequence, united with Benteen's battalion, and closed up the packtrain and rearguard company. Well done but Major, why were you lying to your CO, the expedition leader, Terry. Why did Reno then write to Sheridan privately telling that failure was Gibbon's fault and Terry was incompetent. It's quite a letter he snuck out under Terry's nose.
|
|
|
Post by deadwoodgultch on Sept 14, 2022 18:51:05 GMT
HR, you mentioned time above, local or Chicago? Also, Reno did not retreat, that avenue was closed to him, he broke out. Could it have been done better, probably. It was an open plain, followed by a steep river bank, relatively deep water, followed very steep bluffs. When ever you turn your back on the enemy you put your tit in th wringer.
He was besieged, joined by Benteen, and the packtrain. Why in your opinion, is the exact time of concern? Nobody called him out on timing, they could have.
Regards, Tom
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Sept 14, 2022 21:38:44 GMT
"he broke out" Yes he did. He did not retreat. I do not know why the concept of "breaking out from encirclement" as opposed to retreat is so hard to understand.
Breaking out from encirclement and retreat are normally connected with the failure of a defensive operation. Some things to consider:
When one is attacking such as Longstreet's attack on 3 July 63, falling back from that unsucessful attack is not a retreat. It is a withdrawal. That withdrawl is normally followed by adopting a defensive posture. A retreat may or may not follow that defense. Concerning the Longstreet example that decision to retreat was adopted on 5 July.
When a defense is being conducted, and the defense turns out to be unsuccessful, retreat is what you do. The caution here though is that retreats are usually conducted from a linear formation, when the opposition that has just forced you into retreat mode is also formed in a linear fashion. The procedures are well set forth in doctrine, and the operation is usually conducted by bounds, successive or alternating.
A breakout from encirclement is different. Those desiring to break out are in a perimeter (all round) defense, and the oppostion has completely encircled the perimeter. The breakout from encirclement is an offensive operation, and is conducted essentially as you would conduct an attack, You detect the weakest point in the enemy's encirclement, and attack, suddenly, with as much suprise as you can muster during daylight hours. At night you have the choice to follow the same daylight procedure, or conduct an infiltrating attack using silence and stealth until contact is made or until the breakout is complete.
It was this third type operation that Reno conducted during daylight hours on the afternoon of 25 June 76. It was not a retreat. It was not a withdrawal. It was an attack. Do not listen to anyone who tells you any different. It was also a resounding success, as these things are judged. Fifty percent casualties during a daylight attack to breakout is to be expected. At night that number drops, but it is still high, Remember a breakout from encirclement is - An act of desperation conducted ONLY when you are out of other choices.
For those who would like to know more about the "breakout from encirclement" I would highly recommend you explore the operations of the 13th Demi Brigade of the French Foreign Legion conducted in late May 1942 at Bir Hacheim during the Gazala battle in the Western Desert. It is a textbook example of how to do it.
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Sept 14, 2022 21:56:26 GMT
Every now and again you hit attitude. It happened at Bir Hakim by your take. Custer hit it on greasy grass. Marines learnt from it on Tarawa and at Chosin. We were there and did our own our own little thing. Toot. Toot.
|
|
|
Post by herosrest on Sept 14, 2022 22:20:09 GMT
So. Attitude - Russia is Ukrainian.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Sept 14, 2022 23:03:44 GMT
I finally had a shower and a shave after a week without hot water HR, so maybe I am a little foggy in the understanding department, as a result of my sheer joy at no longer smelling like a goat, but I'll be double damned if I can understand what you are trying to tell me.
|
|
mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
|
Post by mac on Sept 15, 2022 5:55:02 GMT
While I am flinging around ideas and reading the definitions above; I have always felt that Custer expected that Reno would withdraw back to Ford A when he saw the Indian pressure and there was still no (Custer) support in sight. Colors my thoughts on what Custer thought was happening in the valley and why Benteen needs to Bring the Packs. Cheers
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Sept 15, 2022 12:36:51 GMT
When Custer last saw Reno, we can infer Reno was still attacking. Why else cheer?
People think Martini and some other Custer exchanged words, and that other Custer told GAC Reno was retreating. We do not know anything of the sort.
Again. If Custer changed his plan, it was his duty/job to tell Reno and Benteen about it. The order is for Benteen to come to Custer not go to Reno. IF GAC left Keogh behind, he should have also told him to link up with Keogh.
I feel I discovered a new encoded message in Terry's report to Sheridan in which Custer sent Reno: "Reno. Move back to river. Find Benteen. Follow my trail. Join Keogh. Smith knows the way. Bring the Packs."
"Come quick! " and "Bring Packs" is contradictory which Benteen understood, who says he told Weir.
Had I received that order I would have questioned the messenger. There is no evidence I recall that Benteen did that. And, WTF would Benteen send a person without an understanding of English and make him one a buguler and send him to his commander?
I selected my drivers and tank crew for their ability to clearly relay messages to and from me.
I have executed cryptic orders. "21 66. Move to CP 71. Orient to CP 41. Support 11 and 31 by fire. On order move CP 7. Out. " and off I go.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Sept 15, 2022 14:34:05 GMT
Mac: Had Reno been able to withdraw, Ford A is exactly where he would have gone, Custer's expectation or not. He could not withdraw because he was surrounded. Even then, after he broke out from encirclement he was headed in that direction, and ended up crossing the river at a less than desireable fording place, then up the bluffs, because the Ford A option was taken from him, by Indians getting in front of him, and between himself and that ford. It is like playing Chess and being put in check. The move you must make to get out of check, may not be one you desire to make, it is the move you have to make.
Mike: Martini left Custer with the message before Custer got anywhere near Ford B, which I firmly believe that Custer intended to use. I see no reason to doubt at that juncture (Martini leaving) Custer was in the process of doing just what he told Reno he would do - support Reno's attack. After Martini left that notion of supporting Reno was overcome by events, of which Martini had no knowledge.
Further, there is absolutely nothing to suggest that Benteen was going to Reno. I believe he fully intended to go to Custer, and where Reno was is where he expected to find Custer as well. Benteen literally rode to the sound of the guns, and expected both Reno and Custer to be the source of the sound. I also believe that when Benteen was diverted onto the bluffs by those three scouts waving to him and saying with their signals, come this way that he also expected to find both Reno and Custer together. What was his first qustion to Reno - Where is Custer? He wasn't referring to Custer being out in the wild blue somewhere. He was saying where is he, why isn't he here.
Why Custer went north beyond Ford B, is a question we will never be able to positively answer. We can only speculate on the answer, but no one, regardless of how good a speculative reason they provide, will ever be completely sure that answer is correct, myself included. The only people that know that answer, died on the afternoon of 25 June. Even the Indians do not know, so in that sense it is a waste of time and effort to chase that particular holy grail, and neither you or I are named Sir Percivil.
Why would Benteen send Martini? Because he could, and did. Ask him when you get to Fiddler's Green. Not something I would have done, but it could be that Martini made an outstanding Pasta Prima Vera, and Custer like Pasta Prima Vera. Also we do not know if Benteen sent him do we? He could have been asked for. Maybe Martini was a better trumpeter than Harry James and Custer liked music with his pasta. The bottom line in this sarcastic scree is that Benteen sending him, or not, like many other aspects of LBH, are just unknown and will remain so, and we assume the answers to our own detriment.
|
|