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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jun 20, 2019 1:26:38 GMT
I am currently having fresh choc. chip. cookies with pecans and milk 6 miles from MTC. Having a great time, wish you were here, seeing is believing. Regards, Tom
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Post by herosrest on Jun 20, 2019 15:29:49 GMT
OK, lets get some common ground. First off a surge does not equate to a frontal attack. It may be a frontal attack, depending upon who is doing the surging, like say the 1950 version of the Chinese Peoples Army at the Chinaman's Hat, or along the Injin River., but it does not have to be. The way I use the term is as a forward movement to gain a detected weakness of the retrograding force or a position of advantage over a retrograding force. The encirclement of Reno's battalion as it retreated into the timber would fit both of the above definitions, and not necessarily involve any sort of frontal attack. It would in fact mirror the encirclement of a buffalo herd. So can we agree on that, the manner in which I use the word? As far as what Custer should have done, I partially agree with that as well. I say partially in that once across he should have seen the smoke signals on the wall, to wit, he was about to get his ass handed to him and gone back. Partially also refers to the idea thar he should have never been there in the first place. So you understand a retrograde by bounds while in contact do you. Well your answer to 2) said incorrect, so I assume you do. I am quite busy this afternoon assembling and painting the hull of the IJN Shimakaze, so if you will kindly enlighten all of these folks with your grasp of the two ways to do said maneuver, and just how each is performed, and how to choose one over the other dictated by the tactical situation. You walked into that one Sunshine. Stand and Deliver. I will be enormously grateful if you will stop playing God. He's in a different class studying with pequod. QC - Surge - OK. At LBH the warrior force accumulated in the western hills and launched itself as the companies disappeared into the timber. Whether Custer should have done what he did is a can of worms best left alone which is a part of this board's raison d'ĂȘtre. Shall we leave it alone? In terms of retreating on Reno and Benteen when it was possible, that required knowing urgently that that was required. Reno could have organised a dismounted retrograde using an irregular skirmish line circling his staff and horse holders and walked to Ford A or the retreat crossing. That would not have been a lealfrog exercise. He could have launched one mounted company to attack the hostiles who 'always' retreated. He could then charge by bounds to get where he wanted to go. What he did was to breakout without properly advising or organising a race to safety. I am not sure that tactic was covered by the manual and do not believe it matters whether or not it was in the valley. We know from himself, that Reno conducted a charge and had it been organised then it stood a good chance of suffering fewer or no casualties. This was the 7th Cavalry, goddamit!
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Post by herosrest on Jun 20, 2019 17:11:14 GMT
deadwoodgultch _ Custer understood the need to communicate.
The idea exists that he was glory hunting but known facts dismiss this as sillyness. The situation which developed was thoroughly investigated by P.H. Sheridan who visited the battlefield in 1877 and he understood that Custer had either to attack - which he did; or be attacked. That is a mindset matter.
Terry requested a thorough examination of the upper part of Tullock's Creek and Custer's scouts returned from there to the Busby camp on the evening of the 24th. They confirmed that the Sioux trail turned towards the Little Bighorn.
Understanding Terry's requirement to thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock's Creek has morphed into invalid misnomer. The Creek, forks and was in fact known as Tulloch's Forks. The eastern one emerges near the Rosebud at Busby and was traveled by Maynardier in 1959 to the Tongue River. The western forks originate ten miles west along Reno Creek and constitute 'thorough'. The western fork is overlooked by high ground both north and south of Reno Creek.
Knowing that Gibbon would move to the mouth of the Little Bighorn by the 26th, and that the camp was in the Little Bighorn despite intending to attack it early on the 26th, what did everyone want and need to know? Where the camp was. There was time for the scouts to do this on the 25th with the 7th Cavalry hidden and get Herendeen through to Terry if he could make it past the village.
Whether Custer followed an accelerated march or not, he would not reach Busby before the evening of the 24th and the thinking which pervades is that Tulloch's Creek would then be scouted, reported back to Custer and Herendeen sent to meet Terry. From Busby to Terry's camp in Tulloch's Creek is more than 56 miles on the ground and leaving at, say 10pm of the 24th to find Gibbon somewhere along the Yellowstone on the 25th, Herendeen could advise Terry that the trail turned towards the Little Bighorn, that no sign of Indians was in Tulloch's Creek and there was no water in it; and that Custer would scout the camp during the 25th and attack on the morning of the 26th.
Herendeen could not have arrived to Terry before mid to late morning of the 25th June 1876. Gibbon's column was then on the Bighorn and having a difficult march.
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benteen
First Lieutenant
"Once An Eagle
Posts: 406
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Post by benteen on Jun 20, 2019 17:46:56 GMT
He could have launched one mounted company to attack the hostiles who 'always' retreated. He could then charge by bounds to get where he wanted to go. HR, Please correct me if I have mis-read you, but are you saying that Reno should have ordered an Officer with his 40 men to attack 900 warriors? Be Well Dan
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Post by herosrest on Jun 20, 2019 18:49:15 GMT
Precisely. Fighting the Sioux and Plains Indians was different. Attacking superior numbers had been done before by 7th Cavalry in very similar circumstances.
This is counter intuitive to thinking and experience but is the way it was. The way of Plains fighting.
When the men Reno had with him emerged from the timber the warriors backed off. This is record given in the Wooden Leg account which Marquis published.
Another practiced tactic was the irregular skirmish line which Custer did in 1873 with odds 90 to 300+ but I can see how that goes wrong. Charge Indians and they backed off until your horse winded or stumbled. That's how the mounted fighting went at the Rosebud battle.
This was what QC was getting at in challenging me. Attack to retreat by bounds.
I was on my phone but at PC now which is much easier. Reno had to charge or stand and risking some ire, Phil Sheridan discussed this battle in his memoires and when he is saying that Reno panic'd I am quite happy to accept that.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 20, 2019 21:48:22 GMT
I have to say, an officer and 30+ men charging a mass of Indians is what a lot of folks widley accepted for what C Company did on battle ridge.
If they did then it failed but it shows that you can't rule this tactic out is this was the case.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Jun 20, 2019 22:17:35 GMT
This may be me not understanding but what happens to the officer and 30+ men when they pause or when there is a counter attack organised (see Ian's Company C example)?
They would need to be the company with the fastest freshest horses wouldn't they?
Is there a point in the valley where the others could pause to give covering fire?
How does this evolve to allow movement all the way to Ford A?
As to Custer crossing at MTC to move back to Reno...I need more detail of how this evolves as currently crossing at this point seems suicidal to me.
Nice discussion. Cheers
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Post by herosrest on Jun 20, 2019 23:13:52 GMT
The company C fight as it is understood, was a dismounted affair or I misunderstand the thinking and concept. Reno undertook a mounted charge to punch through what seems to be considered a ring of steel surronding the timber. The Sioux and Cheyennes were nothing of the sort whether or not they were the better warriors that many accept today. The losses occurred because those who made out from the timber presented their backs to the hostiles during the charge into the river. Reno did charge into the river and out the other side.
If cavalry charged Sioux, the Sioux stopped and backed up and did not close to contact. Getting through their cordon wasn't a difficulty. They backed off and let Reno through. So if Reno had figured out how to prevent the close pursuit which followed his charge then his losses would have been minimal. If he had stayed in the timber he would not have suffered losses.
So how do you protect the rear of a cavalry charge that is going to cross a river?
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Post by herosrest on Jun 20, 2019 23:22:52 GMT
I just checked up that it"s ok to let know the answer.
You get the Marines to do it.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Jun 20, 2019 23:55:43 GMT
Ok, let's look at what really happened. Reno's skirmish line was too thin to hold for long against at least 9 to 1 odds against it. Most of the troopers had expended about 1/2 of their available ammo and needed the extra ammo from the saddle bags. As ammo depleted, the move to the timber was to retrieve the ammo from the saddle bags as much as anything else. Also, the Indians were on the left flank before M company began moving toward the timber.
Enemy pressure forced the skirmish line to withdraw to the timber. PERIOD. Had that not been the case, the line would have held and the extra ammo, possibly along with the mounts, would have been brought to the troops on the skirmish line.
The withdrawal from the valley that is being hypothesized is nothing more than fire and movement done in reverse. This requires some of the force to provide covering fire for the remainder which has to move backwards to a position that hopefully can provide cover and a good field of fire, so the unit left behind can begin withdrawing past the now covering unit to another position where they can take up firing positions. This goes on in a leapfrog movement until the whole unit can break contact or rejoin in a defensible position, so total firepower can be brought to bear upon the enemy.
In the valley, Reno had no cover or concealment for the reverse movement I just described. Their primary weapon required the shooters to be on foot to be effective. This means both the retreating unit and the covering unit are exposed. The Indians would see this and with their superior numbers would be able to defeat this maneuver and destroy Reno in the valley completely. The timber was the only decent cover available. Hence, the reverse fire and movement tactic was not appropriate in that instance.
As to the Indians fleeing if Reno had continued the charge, that is BS, considering that they had the numbers to counter the charge. Their testimony also indicated that if the soldiers coming down the valley wanted to fight and not talk, they were more than prepared to oblige them. And what weapon could the cavalry use during the charge? Their pistols. After 6 shots, the charge has no teeth anymore. And when the cavalry stopped shooting to reload, they would be rushed en masse and killed on the spot.
Custer left Reno holding a bag of dog do when he failed to support Reno's advance guard. That's on Custer. Did Reno panic, as HR suggests, maybe, quite possibly. He did not organize the breakout correctly. Most of his command did not know that was what was happening with respect to mounting and breaking out. As commander, Reno should have gotten the word out to his entire regiment that they needed to prepare to charge out of the timber. That was his responsibility and his failing. However, given the situation he was in, he probably did the only thing that was possible. Staying in the timber with low ammo and being surrounded was not a viable option.
All this boils down to the fact that the only option for a successful outcome was for Custer to have his entire force in the valley. He should have supported Reno. I think most of us, if not all, agree that was what Custer should have done.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 21, 2019 1:44:27 GMT
Common sense. Excellent Colt. Excellent
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 21, 2019 10:50:35 GMT
Good post Colt, you make some good points, and I think you have hit on a lot of points that I made earlier on my thread.
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Post by herosrest on Jun 21, 2019 11:13:36 GMT
Thank you. Great to be in agreement. Reno made a mounted charge through the hostiles blocking movement, to return back the way he came. He did so with about one company in numbers - those who managed to exit the timber with him before the movement began. The balance of those who made it out streamed along behind and some number remained behind or returned to cover and were not molested in the timber. I described what Reno did - an urgent mounted charge to retreat on support which was approaching Ford A. Reno called the movement a charge and this is entirely correct. Why he did it should be the matter of interest. I offer some relevant comment link and invite its criticism. This was the 19th Century and very much has changed. A hostile witness view of the charge is here link TBM. Regards Gentlemen.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 21, 2019 11:29:17 GMT
Could you hear the match last night from your home HR? It was a good game featuring two evenly matched sides with only two points between them after 80 minutes.
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Post by herosrest on Jun 21, 2019 13:14:35 GMT
Yes. I could hear some roars going up. Quite a turn around in recent form. I... erm... Well, I watched Sweden v USA WC soccer and thoroughly enjoyed it. Couldn't take my eyes off after intending just 10 minutes to see what was what. What talent.
ps Are you up this way or out West?
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