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Post by dan25 on Sept 7, 2018 13:36:50 GMT
Here is another little puzzler for contemplation: What if Crook had not tried to move north so fast, and instead had brought his supply trains with him on his way to the Rosebud. Had he done that, he could have sustained operations after the Rosebud battle, as he would have all his extra ammo, food, supplies, etc. with him, and he would not have been forced to withdraw back to Goose Creek. Had he stayed in the combat area after the Rosebud fight with all his supply trains with him, he could have continued on to the LBH area, and by the time of the 25th, he might very well have been in the immediate area of NFRC or ford A. This would have forced Custer to coordinate with Crook rather than launching his ill-fated jaunt up the bluffs with an inferior force, given the size of the village. I doubt very seriously if Crook would have sent a battalion up the east side of the bluffs. He probably would have done what most of us would have done, that is, send an advance guard toward the village to develop the situation, then send the main body to the west of the village to exploit what the advance guard created. That advance guard probably would have been all 12 companies of the 7th, with all of Crook's force serving as the main body. Had Crook not screwed up by leaving most of his supplies behind in order to move faster, and had been in the vicinity of LBH on the 25th, we might not be discussing the battle of LBH, as it surely would have turned out much differently. That is the big mystery: Why would an officer of Crook's caliber and experience decide to leave behind most of his supplies and trains, and mount infantry on mules just so he could move faster. He surely must have known that action would limit his ability to remain in the combat area. If Crook had done what you suggest, brought his supplies and stayed in the area there would have been a second battle and who knows the outcome. The Indians had no intention of leaving the area right away. This is from HeDog. When fought Crook, Ogalalla village was on Sundance Creek. We started out to fight Crook the second time but did not see Crows around and afraid Crows and Shoshones would get at our village, and we turned back. The reason did not pursue Crook was that we were too far from our villages which were not only a long distance off but were strung out over much country. Moved to Little Bighorn third day after Crook fight. He Dog does not mention where the Cheyenne where camped at the Rosebud fight. It also appears there were several villages, but he only mentions his Regards Dan25
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Post by quincannon on Sept 7, 2018 18:32:08 GMT
Colt: Crook was still operating as he did in Arizona, and was climbing a learning curve. I believe Crook was operating with a Dein Bien Phu in mind, a Base Aero-Terrestre. No I have not leaped on a cliff nor do I advocate time travel. A BAT like we see at DBP or earlier at Na San, envisioned a base placed in enemy territory to act as a mooring point for offensive operations deep in hostile country. For that you need both security for the base itself and still have enough combat power to dominate the surrounding enemy area. It's a good method when it works and a disaster when it does not. Fort Phil Kearny was intended as such, but ended up barely having a defense force, and no offensive power whatsoever.
I agree long range patrolling was required and not done. Information in irregular war is currency, that requires the most active measures to obtain.
While we are beating Crook to a pulp, why didn't he simply use the I90 corridor instead of stumblefooting around the back country on the Rosebud. Locate with your recon, then a quick night march from Goose Creek to establish yourself in an area just south of the Little Big Horn, that his scouts could tell him was the next station on the Indian migration train.
Land where highways and railroads are built are chosen for a reason.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
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Post by colt45 on Sept 7, 2018 22:01:00 GMT
QC, You are right. the I90 corridor would have been the route to use. What we don't know is just how far out front and to the sides he had his scouts go. They didn't go far enough west or they could have found that natural route.
I know we are beating up on Crook a bit, but the original plan called for a 3 prong attack, and Crook failed to execute his part of the plan due to not having the supplies with him to continue after one engagement. Who knows how things would have turned out if he had not turned back to Goose Creek but continued toward LBH.
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Post by dan25 on Sept 8, 2018 12:23:05 GMT
Colt, Do you recall who originally decided upon a three prong attack?
I remember reading the telegraphs from Sheridan to both Terry and Crook regarding coordinating their movements. Sheridan refused any input and left it up to them should they choose to do so.
dan25
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Sept 8, 2018 12:54:15 GMT
I think it was Sherman, but I could be wrong. If so, someone will correct me.
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Post by quincannon on Sept 8, 2018 17:10:03 GMT
Colt: That seems to be the case in regard to the scouts.
I too think it was Sherman, for he was setting the strategic objectives (the why), but it was military malpractice for Sheridan not to set the operational objectives (the how). The lesson here is that you never let the actual participants set the coordination parameters. That is the job of the operational commander, in this instance Sheridan. That is particularly true when boundaries are involved as they were here.
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benteen
First Lieutenant
"Once An Eagle
Posts: 406
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Post by benteen on Sept 8, 2018 21:47:57 GMT
I know we are beating up on Crook a bit, but the original plan called for a 3 prong attack, and Crook failed to execute his part of the plan due to not having the supplies with him to continue after one engagement. Who knows how things would have turned out if he had not turned back to Goose Creek but continued toward LBH. Colt, Yes, I have read that as well, that Crook was short on ammo. Perhaps I am being unfair to Crook and dont have all the facts. But, when you have fought and gained ground on the enemy isnt the prudent method to re supply is to have the supplies brought to you rather than give up the ground you have taken, go back for supplies and have to fight to gain that ground all over again. Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Sept 8, 2018 22:26:05 GMT
A couple of comments.
Ground, winning or losing it, is of little to no importance in irregular warfare.
You are quite correct in thinking that in a more conventional conflict that you do not fight for the same ground twice if it can be avoided.
With Crook, and this particular situation the Goose Creek site was set up as a base, meaning that all the supplies not on hand in his column were stored at that place. That is unlike a normal resupply, that today we would call as basic load that would travel with him. That is why I compared Crook's method of operation in this instance to a Base Aero-Terrestre, a mooring point for operations, rather than a normal supply column.
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Post by yanmacca on Sept 9, 2018 14:40:54 GMT
Now as you all know things larger than say a brigade are too large for me to deal with. I have this thing about generals who sit around a table smoking quality cigars and drinking vintage brandy whilst planning huge campaigns. Usually at the close of proceedings or when they have drunk enough they will come up with things like the summer expedition of 1876 in which three columns are sent out with no clear plan of working with one an other. Anyway, instead of me trying to look as if I know what I am talking about, I have found this document about Crooks column. It was complied by the US Army so it must be good. So if you have nothing planned for this Sunday afternoon, why not give it a read, as it is only 147 pages long.
Dam the link wont work. Sorry about that. But if you copy the line below and paste it into your search engine, it will come up at the top of the list in a PDF file, I would expect any of you to go to this trouble but it looks on the money to me.
The Battle of the Rosebud Crook's Campaign of 1876 - DTIC
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Post by yanmacca on Sept 9, 2018 14:56:09 GMT
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Sept 9, 2018 23:46:45 GMT
Interesting reading Ian!
I note he says " Crook also was very
creative, which made it nearly impossible to guess his
intentions throughout the operation. Everyone knew the
village was the target, but beyond that, Crook kept his
subordinates in the dark."
This is similar to Custer's command style in his portion of the action. Is this "cultural" for the time?
Cheers
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Sept 10, 2018 1:37:09 GMT
From the very end.
"The major lesson for leaders, is that your subordinates have to know your intent and your vision for how the force is going to fight prior to combat. Once you're in the fight it's too late. Standards are keystone to building an effective fighting force. Soldiers and subordinate leaders will do exactly what they think is expected of them."
Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Sept 10, 2018 4:05:48 GMT
Many commanders through the years have kept their own council. Three that come to mind, successful commanders all, Washington, Houston, and Jackson were famous for it. Grant kept his cards close to the vest as well. Each of them though, when they felt the time was right, laid it all out for his subordinates, well in time for those subordinates to complete their planning and preparations, so they could do what their commander expected of them.
Custer did none of this. He is the exception. I do not believe it is realistic to compare the Road Runner, to the less than adequate skills of Wiley Coyote.
In Houston's case at San Jacinto, no one knew what he intended until twenty minutes before the battle, but that was still plenty of time for Houston knew his army only had one battle in them, so he kept it very simple. Houston knew where he was going, and what he intended since leaving Gonzalez. His task was more to keep his army together, given all of the politics, and rivalries.
It is much harder, if not impossible to do today, as armies are spread out over huge areas, and no commander can coordinate their actions without extensive communications facilities. Gone are the days of sitting around the campfire and personally relating your plans face to face, at least above a company level. So, I suppose you are correct, such procedures are from a bygone era.
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Post by yanmacca on Sept 10, 2018 11:23:51 GMT
Interesting reading Ian! I note he says " Crook also was very creative, which made it nearly impossible to guess his intentions throughout the operation. Everyone knew the village was the target, but beyond that, Crook kept his subordinates in the dark." This is similar to Custer's command style in his portion of the action. Is this "cultural" for the time? Cheers Glad you liked it Mac and thanks for letting me know that it opened okay.
I know it seems large at 147 pages, but many of the pages are just credits and stuff plus some have maps on, the paragraphs too are well spaced so you don't have large amounts of text on each page, so you could read it from end to end pretty quick.
You do find these 'pdf' US Army Documents all over the internet and they are very informative and thought out like you would expect with an army document.
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Post by quincannon on Sept 10, 2018 16:19:11 GMT
Be very careful with documents such as these. This is a Master's Thesis submitted to the School of Advanced Military Studies at the Command and General Staff College. As such it has an agenda, that being to present and defend the author's view of the subject. In short one man's opinion.
As with all of this type there are good and not so good. This one is better than many, but still, it is one man's opinion, and one that presents, in my view, some false contrasts.
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