mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Apr 2, 2018 12:02:45 GMT
In the Basics section there is a thread on Indian Tactics. This would be a good starting point to this thread for some.
Reno Fight The Reno fight is started by Reno's advance down the valley towards the village. The Indian response is that warriors from the village (primarily Sioux) move first to confront the Reno threat and they are sufficient in number to cause him to dismount. The warriors initial intent is to stop the advance and to screen the village to allow women and children to evacuate. Most speculate that Custer knows this and it is this action that generates his decision to move right in an attempt to move around the defensive screen.
As more warriors arrive they follow the standard warrior tactical approach which is to join the defensive front and then, on their own judgement and initiative, to move to challenge and pass the enemy flank. The quickly growing numbers result in Reno being flanked on his left and so force him to gradually contract his lines until he ultimately falls back into the timber. Indians only complete an envelopment when they feel that they have enough numerical superiority to gain a total victory. This is the reticence that allows Reno just enough time to breakout through the warriors and make a charge across the river and up to the hill.
Next the battle at Ford D. Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 2, 2018 12:58:42 GMT
Hi Mac.
I am sure that the initial phase of this fight started with the Indians riding back and forward in front of Reno’s men, in an attempt to kick up as much dust as possible to act as a screen.
I suppose when warrior numbers built, that open left flank of Reno’s would become his Achilles heel, but reading about this battle, it seems that Reno was more concerned with his timber lined right flank.
Company M would be in a similar position to what L Company was on Calhoun hill and that they may of had to split their fire between targets to their front and warriors moving around their left flank.
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mac
Brigadier General
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Post by mac on Apr 17, 2018 2:30:50 GMT
Yes Ian and the problem for Company L is that both flanks are open but more later on this.
Ford D
We can assume the same warrior tactical approach at Ford D and this is supported by the archaeology.
The initial approach to the river by Custer is halted by a small number of warriors and by Custer's realization that the river crossing is not a viable option.
As other warriors arrive they move around the cavalry right flank, probably following the west side of the river. This is the northern loop around Battle Ridge Extension (BRE) that has been long proposed. The archaeology going out to the highway and the trading post confirm this proposition. The warriors follow this path and end to the east of Last Stand Hill (LSH). Again this is well supported by the archaeology. The final formation is then the characteristic warrior "half moon" with the open end of the formation to the south.
Custer has retired from the valley to Cemetery Ridge (CR) and BRE and LSH. He now begins to try to break contact and move his troops back to the south exploiting this gap in the warrior formation. This is discussed in more depth in the associated threads in this Ford D section.
As Custer releases Companies L then C then I, the warriors are able to "tighten" the "half moon" formation.
The final event in the action at LSH is the warriors bringing the troops on CR to hand to hand combat, again discussed in more depth in other threads.
All this then is consistent with the standard tactical approach of both the warriors and the cavalry. Cheers
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on May 7, 2018 23:39:33 GMT
The south end of the ridge.
When Custer's movement to Ford D is detected warriors (mainly Cheyenne) rush to Ford D as above.
Warriors at the Reno fight are also informed of the cavalry being in the north and many start to return north after Reno's retreat.
The early returners move back along the valley and enter MTC and move up intending to pick up the cavalry from behind (seems to me a common sense tactical approach) newcomers from the village do likewise. Men like Red Hawk have also returned on the east side of the river.
The first of these encounter Company L low on Calhoun Hill and stop their progress, forcing them to dismount and go to a skirmish line. Red Hawk observes and describes this. As the numbers grow Company L is forced back up to the top of Calhoun Hill (CH). It is now that some returning warriors from the Reno fight see them and conclude erroneously that they were forced back from Ford B. The usual warrior tactics play out (Red Hawk accurately describes it) and Company L is soon challenged on their right flank from Finley Finkle Ridge (FF). Company C arrive and deploy on FF to address this threat not realising that Greasy Grass has become a collection point for warriors. When Company C are assaulted from Greasy Grass by Lame White Man the tactical half moon of warriors are already in place around Calhoun Hill. This pushes soldiers back onto Company I who have just arrived from the north. The joining ultimately of this southern formation with the northern formation completes a double envelopment of the 5 companies. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on May 8, 2018 1:27:37 GMT
Outstanding for its sheer simplicity.
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mac
Brigadier General
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Post by mac on May 8, 2018 10:00:47 GMT
I copied this post from another thread but I am sure Ian will not mind me using it here. It is the simplest and best explanation of how Indian tactics can be so successful within their cultural approach to battle. "I would have guessed that the Indians would have fought in bands but also as individuals and when they arrived at the point of contact, would feel around the flanks to get behind their enemy.
Example: If a warrior reached the firing line held by his fellow braves, then he would naturally move out to one of the flanks by using any cover available to remain unseen. This would be true of any warriors who arrived after the line was already set and in action. If his enemy were already fixed on a hill by his fellow braves, then this would allow him time to maneuver round the most vulnerable flank and then he could either get closer or cut off his enemies escape route.
So if you imagine this on a larger scale, you could easily be seeing a hundred or so braves firing at the enemy line and another group of late comers again a hundred or so, feeling around one of the flanks. So in no time at all that fixed group of soldiers on the ridge is being out flanked and eventually out gunned to the point that it will soon break and run, or die in fixed order.
So what is special about this is that no orders had to be given, because this would probably be a natural tactic for these Indians to adopt."Read more: greatsiouxwar1876.proboards.com/thread/694/basics-handle?page=4#ixzz5Eu20U29ZMarvelous Ian. Cheers
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on May 8, 2018 10:10:16 GMT
The thought that has occurred to me before is how the timing matters here. I am sure Custer expected Reno to move back down the valley towards Ford A when pressed by the warriors. It does not matter if this is true for the sake of discussion.
Let's imagine that as soon as Reno saw what he was up against, he had started to retire back towards Ford A rather than move into the timber. First a question Could Reno realistically make it back to Ford A given the situation in the valley?
Second a thought If Reno did do this, then the warriors would have followed him and the way may have been clear for Custer and his command to escape from the north back to Ford A.
Love to have thoughts on either or both parts. Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on May 8, 2018 11:17:43 GMT
Hi Mac, nice work mate.
The problem I feel concerning Reno is that after he set up his skirmish line, he then started to move troopers into the timber area in dribs and drabs and this diluted his firing line.
I can't remember off hand because I am just home for lunch then I am back out again, but, I am sure that first he sent men from M Company and later half of G Company into the timber, A Company then pulled back leaving the rest of M Company on the line all by itself, this company still had its horses so it mounted up and headed towards the timber.
With pulling men back company by company, virtually ruined Reno's chance of pulling back to ford A intact and instead they held the a channel which ran along the edge of the timber, which acted like a trench in some ways, with troopers firing over the top and sheltering their horses in the dead ground behind the bank.
This crucial period was what caused Reno to get surrounded and forced events later.
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Post by quincannon on May 8, 2018 16:49:09 GMT
"Could Reno realistically make it back to Ford A" - Only if he had started his retrograde as soon as he saw Indians coming out of the south end of the village to challenge him. So when you consider Reno's impression of what Custer had directed him to do, the answer must be no. Reno's impression of his mission was to be the advanced guard and that primarily entails making contact and developing the situation. Reno did everything he was supposed to do in that regard, by dismounting and skirmishing with the enemy. The act of dismounting therefore was the factor that made such a move as moving back to Ford A impossible. It was not going into the timber per say. Had he not gone into the timber, he would have still been faced with the same tactical problem. In fact going into the timber, probably saved him from total disaster. The timber clouded and masked his later intent to break out. Keep in mind here even during the breakout he could have never made it to Ford A, without some outside assistance. In my opinion, the only thing that saved Reno is turning eastward toward Retreat Ford and going up the face of that bluff. The Indians followed him, but I believe climbing that bluff caused them to fracture their pursuit just enough to allow Reno to reach the top and from there fend off the relatively few that were in close pursuit.
"If Reno did this" Unlike our dear friends on the Lunacy for Lunch Board. Reno on that hill top, with or without Benteen, would serve the same purpose as Reno in the valley, in or out of the timber. If you accept the idea that Reno was bait for Custer's fishing pole it did not matter where Reno placed his bait, bluff top, valley, timber, or Ford A. The act of placing the bait and drawing the fish with your lure, was all that was required of him. Those Indians did not draw off and go after Custer, because Reno in any way failed. They drew off and went after Custer because Custer had been spotted and was probably engaged, and Custer was by far a greater threat to the Indians.
Imagine if you will that a fire breaks out in the shed you have in your back yard. It attracts your attention and you bend heaven and earth to fight it, UNTIL, you discover that the fire has spread to your house. You would do the very same thing the Indians did. You would fight the fire in the shed until you discovered the house was on fire too, and at that point, you cease to care about the shed and turn all your attention to the house.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
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Post by colt45 on May 8, 2018 21:50:17 GMT
Good point Chuck. And on top of that, the Indians could see Reno was now a much reduced threat, and there was no need for a large force to stay on top of him. He wasn't going anywhere. The small force that remained to keep an eye on him was more than enough. So now the majority of the force facing Reno could go north to attend to the now greater threat.
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Post by yanmacca on May 8, 2018 22:41:46 GMT
Hi Colt hows it going.
At what point did Reno face a mobile threat, did he initially only face braves on foot with a few mounted warriors racing about raising dust?
I thought that Crazy Horse entered the frey after Reno had withdrawn into the timber, and he was not alone, as he brought a large bunch of mounted friends with him.
If Reno had faced many mounted warriors from the on set, then he did well to last as long as he did because from dismounting to running to the timber his men held that line for nearly 45 minutes.
So if they did decide to pull out and head back to ford A before Crazy Horse turned up, were there enough mounted Indians to trouble three companies? Because the ones on foot would be left eating dust.
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Post by quincannon on May 8, 2018 23:54:21 GMT
How long does it take to mount, form up. retreat, get back to Ford A, dismount, organize a defense. I don't know.
What I do know is that the Indians sometime within the first several minutes, measured from Reno dismounting, grasped and maintained a mobility advantage. It was because of that mobility advantage Reno retreated into the timber in the first place, the mounted force had enveloped his left flank and reached his rear, cutting him off from Ford A.
Generally speaking the outcome of a battle is decided by the first side that gains that elusive whore called initiative. It is like a face off in hockey or a jump ball in basketball. Once lost initiative is a down right, no good motherforker of a female dog to get back.
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Post by yanmacca on May 9, 2018 12:26:08 GMT
This why I gasp with disbelief at the way Custer planned this attack. He sent Reno into that valley against the village hoping that the Indians would try and halt his progress and buy time. I would guess that in his head he thought that while this blocking force was doing its best to delay Reno, he could nip in through the back door and role them up from the north and when the braves screening Reno got wind that more soldiers had attacked the other end of the camp then they would panic. I suppose he wanted Benteen to be the straw that broke the camels back. Of course none of this panned out that way. This is all down to sheer arrogance. I don't normally like to compare commanders but his arrogance was on par with Lord Chelmsford and his poor judgment of the Zulus.
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Post by yanmacca on May 9, 2018 12:57:21 GMT
I was going to make a map showing the Reno battalion positions, given that fact that once he dismounted his companies, they then advanced on foot to another position towards the village. Out of the three companies, I think only M kept their horses close by but the other two sent theirs closer to the timber. Now I have looked at three different versions of these positions by using Fred's, the Bonafides and even one done by Clair. But all them have different positions, so I have had to shelve the idea for now until I can find more clearer data.
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Post by Beth on May 9, 2018 21:01:54 GMT
This why I gasp with disbelief at the way Custer planned this attack. He sent Reno into that valley against the village hoping that the Indians would try and halt his progress and buy time. I would guess that in his head he thought that while this blocking force was doing its best to delay Reno, he could nip in through the back door and role them up from the north and when the braves screening Reno got wind that more soldiers had attacked the other end of the camp then they would panic. I suppose he wanted Benteen to be the straw that broke the camels back. Of course none of this panned out that way. This is all down to sheer arrogance. I don't normally like to compare commanders but his arrogance was on par with Lord Chelmsford and his poor judgment of the Zulus. I honestly don't think Custer hoped that Reno could hold the NA in the valley while he went around to the north. I believe that Custer believed that Reno had sufficient forces to do so. Custer unfortunately based his beliefs on false intelligence on his enemy's strength and prejudiced beliefs about their behavior and fighting skills. Perhaps a lot of that had to do with Custer's own arrogance but it was an arrogance that existed in the entire army at the time-perhaps like some of the prejudices that existed in other 'European nations armies against those who weren't European. I am sure other cultures have time and again fell into the same trap. Perhaps Custer's arrogance comes when he dismissed the advice from others, his scouts, guides and even is officers who were at the scene with im and inside relied on a false set of facts. He seems to have had an inability to adjust his thinking for the situation before him instead of what was in his head.
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