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Post by yanmacca on May 13, 2018 18:50:29 GMT
Hi Beth, you know that taking liberties with military matters always gets me into hot water, but what the hell, so looking at the terrain on those two maps above, you can see that if Custer wanted to use Reno as advanced guard then his options are somewhat restricted as one flank is a no go area because of the river, trees and bluffs. The other flank would be a natural choice because it looks wide open. I can't see the point of Custer being really close to Reno, so if he stayed to Reno's rear and waited for him to make contact, he would keep to the east of Reno's battalion and come round with a left hook
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Post by Beth on May 13, 2018 18:52:20 GMT
I don't know why Reno didn't get word that Custer's men where spotted on the bluffs apparently moving north with the river between them, plus didn't anyone think of looking back south to see where Custer was moving? The two columns had earlier been moving almost together on both sides of Reno creek, now the Custer column vanishes after informing Reno that they will be supporting them and no one thinks anything about it. I have often wondered that myself. Who should have informed that Custer was sited on the bluff? How could Reno have adjusted his response? Would that notice have been timely enough to have made a difference? The other question is would be even if Custer had been spotted on the bluff and Reno informed, would it have given Reno liberty to change his orders? I am unsure that even if Reno had been told Custer was sighted on the bluff that Reno would assume it meant that Custer took his entire command up there and not just one or two companies with the other 3 left to join Reno in the valley. Were all 5 companies seen on the bluff? I love your maps, don't stop putting them up
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Post by yanmacca on May 13, 2018 19:01:36 GMT
Thanks Beth, I wasn't sure if I had posted them maps more then once. I think if Reno had been told that E Company was spotted on the bluffs and he assumed that Custer had mounted them with all five, then it would change things drastically. I don't expect Reno to still be an advanced guard when he was guarding nothing but grass behind him, I would say that it changes to a two pronged attack. Troopers were spotted by a few of Reno's men, I think that at least one of those sightings was E Company. I remember posting something about these sightings a while ago, but I can't recall the total number, but I can offer you this;
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Post by quincannon on May 13, 2018 19:20:59 GMT
With an advanced guard there is not much room for creativity. You advance on a given axis until one of three things happen. You are either stopped by enemy action, stopped by an obstacle, or someone tells you to stop.
1) If you are stopped by enemy activity you do exactly what Reno did. You dismount, form a base of fire, act at a pivot point for maneuver by the main body either to your right of left depending upon terrain, then mix it up with the enemy to hold his attention while the main body maneuvers to strike. Reno did every one of these things, about as well as anyone could expect.
2) If you are stopped by an obstacle alone, you report that fact and wait for instructions.
3) If someone tells you to stop, you stop, until you receive orders telling you to move on, or some other instruction.
If bedlam does not reign supreme as you try to accomplish all these things related to developing the situation, you may be somewhere else, but combat is not one of them. Bedlam in combat, some idiot moving horses to the wrong place, some company advancing too far, is to be as expected as a state of normalcy.
Did Reno wait too long for Custer. I just don't know. I was not there. What I can say is that he was obligated by mission to wait as long as it took for Custer to come, to his aid from the rear. Had he pulled out just as Custer was starting his left end around it would have proven itself to be a major, very serious error. Reno only moved when it became apparent to him that Custer was not coming. How it was made apparent is above and beyond my pay grade.To those who say Reno should have stayed in a skirmish line or in the timber, are completely at odds with then and current doctrine. Custer relieved Reno of any such obligation when he did not show up as expected.
Your question about then becoming a rear guard Beth is impossible to answer. During the battle itself, had Custer come around Reno's left and struck the enemy, there was no need for a rear guard. After the main action, with them again moving forward, the rear guard could be anyone.
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Post by yanmacca on May 13, 2018 19:27:57 GMT
If you are stopped by an obstacle alone, you report that fact and wait for instructions. Reno was faced with a creek bed which could have been construed as an obstacle, the Indians took no time in using it as an avenue to get around his left flank. Reno did send two messengers to Custer, these men actually got through, so maybe he was keeping Custer fully in the loop with events.
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Post by quincannon on May 13, 2018 21:33:31 GMT
I am not sure about how much of an obstacle that creek bed was. In this particular instance though it was probably significant enough that you would not want your force split on either side of it.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on May 14, 2018 2:34:29 GMT
What I can say is that he was obligated by mission to wait as long as it took for Custer to come, to his aid from the rear. Had he pulled out just as Custer was starting his left end around it would have proven itself to be a major, very serious error. Reno only moved when it became apparent to him that Custer was not coming. How it was made apparent is above and beyond my pay grade.To those who say Reno should have stayed in a skirmish line or in the timber, are completely at odds with then and current doctrine. Custer relieved Reno of any such obligation when he did not show up as expected. The time Reno stayed is interesting in that he waited long enough that his only "out option" was his breakout charge with associated losses. A timing analysis with the Wagner timeline reveals (from memory, did it a long time ago) that even if Reno stayed another 15 minutes; Benteen would still not be able to assist. The only difference by staying longer would be that Reno probably would have sustained much higher losses (even perhaps 100%). As QC has pointed out, in the absence of any clear order to retire, Reno did as much as he could possibly be expected to do. My private thought here is this. IF Custer was actually waving his hat at Reno from the bluffs then it may well have been to try to signal to him to go back. That is "see me here...you go back." Just because no other interpretation makes any sense to me, if indeed the event occurred. A retrograde by Reno at that early stage seems to me a better tactical solution for Custer and obviously Reno and his men. Cheers
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Post by deadwoodgultch on May 14, 2018 10:17:27 GMT
The creek bed was wide enough that it could not be jumped, deep enough that it would have slowed the advance, and was used by a fair number of the Indians as cover to fire on Reno.
Regards, Tom
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Post by yanmacca on May 14, 2018 11:10:15 GMT
From dismount to withdrawing around 45-50 minutes, but in that time they did a lot of moving with a patrol clearing the woods, G Company also taking half its number off the line to protect the horses in the timber, plus the when they first dismounted they formed into skirmish line and then advanced to another position on foot, then we had the rest of G and then A pulling off the line and finally M.
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on May 14, 2018 15:10:12 GMT
Chuck
Years ago we had a discussion on the boards regarding what an advanced guard could do when in close contact against overwhelming numbers of enemy force. I believe it addressed moving in a retrograde while maintaining contact with overwhelming forces. So if we disagree that Reno could move back up the valley drawing those Indians willing to fight away from the Big Village while maintaining contact then I will be forced to research it.
But as I know decision making is not just by the book and involves personal factors and an assessment of the capabilities of those being asked to do something, along with real time observations. On the personal side I believe Reno would not charge into the village with his three companies.
As far as fighting from the horses Sgt Ryan stated even Custer would not fight these soldiers mounted. So if that eliminates remaining mounted from available choices it still leaves dismounting but keeping the horses in close proximty. Once the horses are moved to the timber it fixes one point of distance between the dismounted soldiers and their horses which is not the same as dismounting and moving forward on the advance toward the Big Village with the horses in the rear.
Regards
Steve
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Post by quincannon on May 14, 2018 15:53:39 GMT
I believe in your first post on the subject you indicated that Reno's mistake was dismounting. No that was not a mistake in that he dismounted to start developing the situation, with the expectation that Custer would be in his rear, and strike as the situation clarified.
That overwhelming force you speak of was not there initially, but rather as Ian said it built up over a 45 to 50 minute period as the advanced guard action progressed.
Had there been 900 to a 1000 Indians present initially then Reno was a fool not to remain mounted and start a retrograde nearly immediately, after reporting these facts to the main body commander.
Had he remained mounted with only smaller numbers presenting themselves, thinking that he may have to retrograde as those numbers built, he would not be fulfilling his advance guard mission of developing the situation.
I don't believe Reno would have charged the village either. He was ordered to do so but that order was overcome by the event that the guy giving the order had no idea as to its size. Reno was obligated to use his own judgment in that instance as the parameters of his orders had changed.
Personally I would have kept the horses in close proximity, but 1) I was not there. 2) Battalion commanders fight their battles through company commanders. 3) Company commanders, not Reno, have direct control of their soldiers and horses. 4) Company commanders are responsible for fighting their own portion of the battle, and the direction of that company is left unto them. 5) Company commanders don't always do what you might wish to be done. Therefore take up your horse issues with the company commanders, and if you feel they did something wrong blame them and not Reno.
We would not be having this discussion had Custer done what he said he was going to do, and what Reno expected him to do. What Reno expected governed his decision process through about two thirds of the valley battle, and changed only when Reno determined that Custer was not coming.
It is pretty damned easy to find fault with any commander if you look at this battle, or any other, through the rose colored glasses of textbook perfection. It is quite a different matter though when you look at it properly through the lens of the fog and friction of war. I try to do the latter, and I do not expect perfection of either thought or action. Based upon that, and trying to get in the head of the commander (Reno), my find is that he did what he was supposed to do as an advance guard commander, and without error.
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azranger
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Ranger
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Post by azranger on May 14, 2018 17:41:28 GMT
I believe in your first post on the subject you indicated that Reno's mistake was dismounting. No that was not a mistake in that he dismounted to start developing the situation, with the expectation that Custer would be in his rear, and strike as the situation clarified. That is my opinion and it stated correctly as to what I believe.That overwhelming force you speak of was not there initially, but rather as Ian said it built up over a 45 to 50 minute period as the advanced guard action progressed. The overwhelming force developed over time. Agreed But the dismounting and placing the horses in the timber out of sight limited the ability to advance or maneuver. Had there been 900 to a 1000 Indians present initially then Reno was a fool not to remain mounted and start a retrograde nearly immediately, after reporting these facts to the main body commander. I think seeing the Big Village size and reports from those scouts that stated they would fight would be part of his decision making. The retrograde would not have to begin until the Indians showed they willing to flank his location and move to his rear.Had he remained mounted with only smaller numbers presenting themselves, thinking that he may have to retrograde as those numbers built, he would not be fulfilling his advance guard mission of developing the situation. Placing the horses in the timber in my opinion demonstrated that he was not going to move within effective range of weapon system even if the ditch where he thought there was Indians waiting for him was empty. He would was not going to walk into the Big Village in my opinion. I believe he stopped because of all the unknowns. He didn't how many Indians there were in the ditch and he didn't see Custer in close proximity in the valley.I don't believe Reno would have charged the village either. He was ordered to do so but that order was overcome by the event that the guy giving the order had no idea as to its size. Reno was obligated to use his own judgment in that instance as the parameters of his orders had changed. I agree. I really believe we make choices in regards to what we do based upon our personal beliefs. If Reno stated previously that he was not going to die at the hands of Indians needlessly then it would indicate to me that he would fight but how he did it may have limited his choices/Personally I would have kept the horses in close proximity, but 1) I was not there. 2) Battalion commanders fight their battles through company commanders. 3) Company commanders, not Reno, have direct control of their soldiers and horses. 4) Company commanders are responsible for fighting their own portion of the battle, and the direction of that company is left unto them. 5) Company commanders don't always do what you might wish to be done. Therefore take up your horse issues with the company commanders, and if you feel they did something wrong blame them and not Reno. Reno stopped the forward progress not the company commanders.We would not be having this discussion had Custer done what he said he was going to do, and what Reno expected him to do. What Reno expected governed his decision process through about two thirds of the valley battle, and changed only when Reno determined that Custer was not coming. I totally agree. Custer should have followed Reno and just allowed Reno to develop the situation for a short period of time. Custer should have met the Indians flanking Reno's left head on in my opinion.It is pretty damned easy to find fault with any commander if you look at this battle, or any other, through the rose colored glasses of textbook perfection. It is quite a different matter though when you look at it properly through the lens of the fog and friction of war. I try to do the latter, and I do not expect perfection of either thought or action. Based upon that, and trying to get in the head of the commander (Reno), my find is that he did what he was supposed to do as an advance guard commander, and without error. I take a different approach and maybe it just from how we do things in law enforcement. We hold a debriefing at the end of an operation to discuss what worked, what didn't work (maybe an error if you repeat it but not the first time something occurs), and how we could do it better. No blame involved only comment to the extent if could be done better. So I see it maybe as an error without blame in that it could have been done better.
Regards
Steve
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Post by quincannon on May 14, 2018 18:27:15 GMT
We are not dealing with law enforcement. We are dealing with military matters.
Everything can be done better. That does not change the fact that Reno did everything expected of him constistant with his mission.
Reno ordered forward progress to be stopped. The company commanders stopped the companies. It is not the guy who issues the order, it is the guy who implements the order that is held responsible for the execution.
No commander sets out to die at the hands of the enemy needlessly. Therefore every commander's choices are limited as to what he thinks he can and cannot do. We make too much of this battle as if it contains both Holy Writ and the Fountain of Youth. It was just another battle, fought in an out of the way place, and of no particular consequence. Yet we tend to look on all these events, actions, and reactions as if they are unique. They are not. They are just some run of the mill things that can be expected in every battle and without exception. I know it is Keogh's Holy Grail but certainly not yours.
Where do you get the idea that Reno knew the size of that village. Certainly he could not determine size from his vantage point unless he had Xray vision. He could determine the southern boundary. He could determine width. He could have absolutely no idea of the depth south to north, so your point is not really valid, because even the information provided by scouts would not give him information on configuration. Those numbers the scouts spoke of may be in ten village circles, each separated by a mile or more, for all Reno could tell. Your point is attempted to be made with 20/20 hindsight. To be valid those points must be made with only the information Reno would have. Recall even Custer was surprised at the size and extent of that village, and he had a much better vantage point than anything Reno could have had pre-battle.
Reno was obligated to dismount to bring into action his most lethal weapons system, the carbine. Not to do so would be inconsistent with his mission, and dereliction of duty.
Again with all the other comments encapsulated. Company commander's control their companies. I would be willing to bet that Reno did not have the foggiest idea of where the damned horses were, nor did he care, nor should he have. His job was to focus on and fight that battle, and by necessity he must fight it through his company commanders. What you are saying in a modern sense is that it is the battalion commander's job was to keep track of all of the company armored personnel carriers in the battalion, after the troops dismount. That is not his job. It is the job of the company commander to keep his mobility close at hand, consistent with security. Some do it better than others.
I would be willing to bet good money that most of your experience in law enforcement concerning leadership of men deals with rather small groups, no bigger than a military squad, led by one man. Much of what you say betrays that one man in control method of operation. I would also be willing to bet that on those occasions when you have been part of a larger operations, say a search for a missing person, or a big traffic control event, where many teams of men are involved, that it was a coordination cluster f**k. Military operations are ALWAYS coordination cluster f**ks.
I was just reading on the 13 November 42 night naval action off of Guadalcanal. Callahan commanded 13 ships of various types and sizes, and during the battle he issued very few orders, most of which were contradictory (fire - cease fire - orient port - then starboard etc.). Most of them were momentarily obeyed, then virtually all disobeyed, because each of the ships captains were concerned with what was happening, and based their decisions on, the circumstances of his own ship. Now the valley fight at LBH cannot overall be compared to a sea battle, but the point is that while one man was in command, each of the company commanders were responsible for what their company faced, and the circumstance that each of them faced was at least slightly different than their neighbor. That is not unique to either battle, but is universally applied to all battle.
Steve I don't make the rules. I just try , as best I can, to inform anyone who reads what I post as to what the rules are.
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Post by yanmacca on May 14, 2018 18:40:23 GMT
Here is the brain section of the Reno battalion [I don't know what Lt Wallace's orderly his doing in this party, Wallace was detached from his company [G] and serving in a scout group that protected Reno's left flank].
Reno's Headquarters Detachment
Major Reno (Battalion Commander) Lieutenant Hodgson (Battalion Adjutant) Dr DeWolf (Surgeon) Dr Porter (Surgeon) Corporal Mason (Co E) He could be in charge of the EMs in this unit Trumpeter Penwell (Co K) Pvt Davern (Co F) Reno's orderly Pvt McIlhargery (Co I) Reno's striker Pvt Mitchell (Co I) Reno's cook Pvt Hackett (Co G) Lt Wallace's orderly Pvt Trumble (Co B) Lt Hodgson's orderly Pvt Abbotts (Co E) Dr DeWolf's hospital attendant Pvt Robinson (Co E) Dr Porter's hospital attendant
I have to stress that most of this information came from another source which was posted many moons ago on the black board, I cannot be certain of the poster, it may have been Gerry?
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Post by Beth on May 15, 2018 0:19:58 GMT
What I can say is that he was obligated by mission to wait as long as it took for Custer to come, to his aid from the rear. Had he pulled out just as Custer was starting his left end around it would have proven itself to be a major, very serious error. Reno only moved when it became apparent to him that Custer was not coming. How it was made apparent is above and beyond my pay grade.To those who say Reno should have stayed in a skirmish line or in the timber, are completely at odds with then and current doctrine. Custer relieved Reno of any such obligation when he did not show up as expected. The time Reno stayed is interesting in that he waited long enough that his only "out option" was his breakout charge with associated losses. A timing analysis with the Wagner timeline reveals (from memory, did it a long time ago) that even if Reno stayed another 15 minutes; Benteen would still not be able to assist. The only difference by staying longer would be that Reno probably would have sustained much higher losses (even perhaps 100%). As QC has pointed out, in the absence of any clear order to retire, Reno did as much as he could possibly be expected to do. My private thought here is this. IF Custer was actually waving his hat at Reno from the bluffs then it may well have been to try to signal to him to go back. That is "see me here...you go back." Just because no other interpretation makes any sense to me, if indeed the event occurred. A retrograde by Reno at that early stage seems to me a better tactical solution for Custer and obviously Reno and his men. Cheers If Custer was trying to get Reno's attention, why didn't he dispatch a messenger? Reno had sent several to Custer, Custer sent Martini to Benteen and perhaps Kanipe was sent back by a Custer.
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