Axis forces of World War Two

[yanmacca]

Hi everybody, after reading through the posts and threads, I see quite a lot of stuff written about the German and Japanese forces during WW2. Also we have threads which cover the American and British armies. I thought it would also be a good idea to cover the Axis nations too and start a thread just for them.

So this thread will cover the big five;
Germany
Japan
Italy
Hungary
Romania

I know the Hungarians and Romanians fought mainly in the east and are rarely mentioned here. The Italians too played a major part in WW2 and fought against the British and Commonwealth, USA, French, Russians, Yugoslavians and Greeks, which shows that they played their part.

I don’t expect this thread to take off in the manner that the others have, but if it does, I promise to bore you all to tears with threads on the other allied nations, The French, Dutch, Belgians, Czechs, Danes and Norwegians, and you all know I have the data at hand to do it

[quincannon]

OK, in an effort to bore everyone to death. I will start it off with a question for you Ian. Your opinion, yes or no, will not be sufficient. You must back it up with the rational behind that opinion.

Everyone knows that the Panzer division was a revolutionary development in the between the wars years. With only the German Army in mind, was it overall beneficial to them in the long run, meaning the entire course of the war, or would it have been better to put into place some other type of construct?

Which begs the second question.

Was it to any army's, allied or adversary, advantage to adopt the panzer/armored division construct? If so, which ones and why?

Others may join in as well with answers. I expect Colt to virtually leap into the conversation, but again, you must not only provide a yes or no, but also the rational you answer is based upon.

There is no school solution here. I just wish to have your opinions.

[deadwoodgultch]

Germany was nearly land locked and for the most part their Navy could be bottled up and had to win the war quickly, much like the south in the ACW. The Allies had a nation factory that could, at the time not be bombed, therefore the factories could continue to function(USA). Germany needed raw materials that they could not/did not grab fast enough. Also slave, conscript. subjugated workforces will never compete with a free motivated workforce.

It was to the Soviet Unions advantage to build/adopt the armored division construct. It became a meat grinder as the Soviets had the ability to continue to build out of the range of Axis bombers. The Axis could not replace their lost weapon systems to continue to compete. Germany's tanks may have been the best. But, Old Joe's Generals took anther piece of ACW history, get there firstest with the mostest.

Not enough coffee to continue.

Regards,
Tom

[yanmacca]

Well Chuck it depends what phase of the war we are talking about as the war from 1939-1940 mainly took place in Europe. This meant that the objectives where mainly close together and the roads system was up to scratch and their main bases were still in range. That meant that the Panzer divisions had better air and artillery support and the slower moving infantry could to a certain extent, keep up. Europe suited the Panzer Divisions because it was what they were designed for, which was a short, sharp campaign and every country they invaded took a matter of weeks if not days.
The problems arose when they were faced with the vast distances in places like Russian and North Africa, because the Panzer and also the dozen Motorized Divisions were the only fully motorized formations the Germans had, so the rest walked and their support was horse drawn, which in a place as vast has Russian is a bad idea.

The German high command was consistently changing the format of their Panzer Divisions, mainly through losses and a dip in production but they started with;
Type 39 [March 1939]
Type 40 [July 1940]
Type 41 [February 1941]
Type 43 [September 1943]
Type 44 [August 1944]
Type 45 [March 1945]

But the basic format was;

Two Panzer Regiments [later reduced to one]
Motorized Infantry Brigade [later changed to two regiments]
Reconnaissance Battalion
Motorcycle Battalion [dropped in 1942]
Motorized Engineer Battalion
Motorized Anti-Tank Battalion
Motorized Artillery Regiment
Motorized Anti-Aircraft Battalion [added in 1943]

Compare this to the US Army;

Three Tank Battalions
Three Armoured Infantry Battalions
Three Armoured Artillery Battalions
Mechanized Cavalry Squadron
Armoured Engineer Battalion
[Other battalions could be added like tank destroyer and AA]

[dave]

Deadwood
That was a very astute post by an Airman! As you stated, the Soviets used to their advantage the vast supply of manpower to overwhelm the Nazi's forces in the last few months of the war. I do wonder if someone other than Hitler was directing the German armies would their have been a different outcome? Or would it only have delayed the inevitable results?
Regards
Dave

[quincannon]

I will withhold until others express their opinions, especially Colt as he is the only tanker among us.

The first thing though is to consider what a division is, and for that matter what it is not. Did anyone need "type" divisions, or would "type" units be better were they formed an echelon or even two, lower than the division echelon.

A division's purpose is two fold; 1) command and control of assigned forces, and, 2) the bringing together of combat, combat support, and combat service support elements into a cohesive mutually supporting whole. Could this have been done without the method of "typing" divisions.

What effect do outside factors like economy, resources, production capacity, transportation, and access to easily trainable manpower have on these decisions. 

Don't just think military, think total in your answers. 

[yanmacca]

I think in hindsight that I would probably change some of the units in the armoured division, but if you look at all of the armoured divisions used in this period [1939-45], then you notice that no matter what country they all look the same with one or two tank regiments or battalions, an infantry component which could differ from three battalions to a couple of regiments, an engineer unit, a recce unit and an artillery regiment or three battalions, that’s it, all virtually the same on paper.

If you take the concept of the Panzer Division, you can see that these formations did well until 1943 and this could be down to a number of reasons, the main ones being no air cover and the lack of replacement vehicles and crews. Look at the shattered divisions that the allies chased across Europe in late 1944, they were a shadow of their former selves because they had been ground down by constant battles with no air cover and no replacements, Faliase was the straw that broke the camels.

[quincannon]

It is my considered opinion that Germany did not need a panzer division to support its offensive doctrine, and that the panzer division itself was an impediment to that doctrine, more than it was a facilitator.

The truth is that the German economy, resources, and production facilities were not all that great. It is my further opinion that it would have been a much better use of resources and production capacity to modernize the entire German Army, which, with the exception of a relatively small number of panzer divisions had not seen any leap forward in the means of mobility since Blucher reinforced Wellington at Waterloo. When you have nine tenths of your force in the stone age, then having one tenth fighting star wars in completely insane.

I would say the same thing for all of the European armies, allied or axis, as well. No European nation had the economy, trained workforce, or production capacity to sustain massive armored formations over the long haul. Add to that the UK, in that they did not have, organic to country, the maritime assets required to keep these formations equipped,supplied, and sustained in the many and varied locations that such forces were required.

I also believe that the United States, among all the warring powers had the ability in terms of resources, trained work force, and production capacity to field an armored force, along the lines the early pioneers envisioned. Even we though saw the folly in this course of action, as exemplified by completely halting the activation of armored divisions after the Spring of 43, completely doing away with the concept of the armored corps, and converting motorized divisions back to straight Infantry in 43 from whence they came. We could produce, but we found that we could neither move nor adequately sustain them, and the regular Infantry division provided MORE combat power than the armored division for much less cost.

I feel the proper solution for all of these armies was to take the standard Infantry division, which in all armies was quite similar, bring them up to a fully motorized standard of the time, then add what you wished to them in terms of combat power.

In general I do not like specialized divisions of any form or fashion. I think them wasteful, generally ill employed, and in reality nothing more than a feel good for the proponents of the reformation du jour

My solution will not please many. Maybe that's why I never made Chief of Staff.

[deadwoodgultch]

No Chief of Staff for you. The Fulda Gap kept Armored Divisions in play nearly until you retired.

Are you saying that special operations, air mobile, psyops, and other such specialties should be rolled into the standard division?

On another topic (you and I have touched on)that may be of interest to others. Going forward how much do you see contractors taking over certain military skill/ career fields? Think security for the State Department, services, and some others. The British are delving into the contractor business for some skills. Also how do you feel about foreign contractors handling some aspects of security?

Regards,
Tom

[yanmacca]

I think to get a sense of why the Europeans formulated their divisions circa 1939, you have to cast your mind back to that era and how no one wanted to fight a war like they had just been through. In this age, the tank and air power was the way forward. But as you said, the infantry formations needed motorizing but that was not possible. But what the Europeans did was to rely on their rail network to move their men about the continent. I think that no one had any ambitions to try and conquer Russia so if you look at a map of Europe you can see just how small it is and how many countries were actually contained in that small area.

The doctrine around this period was to have the tools to smash through defence lines. I have a book called “Fortress Europe” and it shows that every nation had belts of defensives fortifications around its borders. So that left the European leaders with no choice but to adopt tactics similar to those of late WW1, with heavy tanks followed by foot soldiers, but now they had extra support from the air which not only gave them a type of mobile artillery, but a way of observing enemy positions too, so this along with better communications gave most of the big nations the edge.

Just looking at the main tanks of the period from 1930 - 1940, you can see that many had these huge multi-turreted tanks which were used as break through tanks, the other type was the light tank which was only armed with a machine gun, and every nation had light tanks like this, even the Americans. I think the idea behind these tanks was to sweep trenches with machine gun fire once the heavy tanks had broken though and then the infantry mopped up.

The Germans fielded their first panzer division in 1935, the British in 1939, the French in 1940, and Italy 1939. The Russians never fielded tank divisions, but went for tank corps which contained tank brigades. The Japanese also used the brigaded system, but by 1942 had formed four tank divisions, but only used them in regimental sized groups and sent them where they were needed most.

While all this was going on in Europe during the 1930s, American tank tactics were similar to what the British had done in the First World War, even in 1940, the US Army realized that they were not only way behind the Germans, but all the other major European powers too. When the Germans invaded the west in May 1940, the American army had only 28 new tanks [10 x medium and 18 x light], but they still had 900 old models dating from WW1.

[quincannon]

Tom:

No I am not saying special operations (all types) should be rolled into standard divisions.

Yes, to airmobile, in that all airmobile operations require is a standard Infantry battalion or brigade, some additional training, and the means of lift. It is done that way today, with all of our non-heavy divisions, including the 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain and others. Heavy divisions today also have that capability.

What I am saying is that the standard triangular Infantry division, with plus ups in tanks, and the ability to motorize when necessary is every bit the equal of any armored (heavy) division on earth, and in the WWII time frame when these assets were attached (which was most of the time) was equal or greater than anything the Germans had, both in firepower and mobility.

The only advantage contractors offer is by using contractors you are paying a set fee for services rendered. You (the government) are not responsible for their retirement, health care, housing, dependents, etc. that is the eventual cost that must be paid for a soldier to do the same job. I favor nothing though that is not done by an employee of the government, so no I do not advocate, nor were it my decision ever use a government contractor for anything that was the ultimate responsibility of the government, including cleaning the toilets. All government employees take an oath to faithfully serve. That is not so with a contractor.

As far as armored divisions and the Fulda Gap goes, that is true that was the accepted solution at the time. That does not mean it was the right solution. I once had a stack of German staff studies and academic papers authored in the main by Germans that felt that standard Infantry was the best means of defeating Soviet armored formations in Germany, and had the Cold War lasted any longer we would have seen a transformation of Federal German Republic forces away from the heavy construct by at least half, which is the same thing we were doing, based upon German work, with the light division work I was heavily engaged in. We in fact activated or converted five such divisions in the mid 1980's to address the shortfalls created by over reliance on heavy forces in Europe.

The truth is that lighter forces move faster, further, and with far less logistical requirements than heavy forces,and that has been proven time and again. One example for WWII is the 10th Mountain and 88th Infantry Divisions moving against the Germans in Italy and leaving 1st Armored in their dust. Another example, the one I am eluding to with my original statement is the defense of the Bastogne Corridor on 16-20 December 44 where heavy forces reinforcing a standard Infantry division kept that corridor blocked, until Bastogne could be occupied by the 101st, Following that it was a heavy-light mix of forces, a high-low approach that held Bastogne against the combat power of four panzer divisions.

In summation, I think the proper solution then, and the proper solution now is an across the board high-low mix contained in the same division.


Ian:

A couple of flaws in what you are saying.

Reading "Through Mobility We Conquer" the armored doctrine we developed in the early 1930's at Knox, with the 7th Cavalry Brigade as a test bed was studied by the Germans, mainly facilitated by their many visits to Knox and incorporated into their own doctrine.

The number of "so called" modern tanks we had at the onset of the war in Europe is immaterial. We had the doctrine, and all we needed were the tanks to implement it. It takes much longer to design and develop doctrine than it takes to build the tanks and other material for 50 armored divisions.

George Patton once said that the three decisive weapons on the ground in World War II, were the M-1 Rifle, the 105mm howitzer, and the two and a half ton truck.

You Ian are still thinking and talking about things, implements, when what I am talking about is economics, the ability to produce, the workforce to produce, priorities of production, and the ability to sustain once the products are in the field. Military forces must be a direct reflection in all aspects of the societies they serve. The German force structure of WWII is non-reflective of the economics, resources, workforce, or the means of sustainability of the society it served. You must solve that problem first, or allow for your societies shortfalls, before you put pen to the doctrinal paper, and start to develop the TTP based on that doctrine.

[deadwoodgultch]

Chuck, I enjoyed the entirety of your above post. I do think we are gradually moving beyond attempting to fight current and future wars with the last wars construct. I do however hope that we don't forget history.

Regards,
Tom

[yanmacca]

What I am proposing here is how we can form a strike force which we can all agree on, by strike force I mean a formation which can be put into the field pretty quick.

Obviously we are looking at these types of components;

Formation type [is it brigade or regimental in size]
Armour [what type of main battle tank]
Infantry [what do they travel in]
Recon [what type of vehicles]
Artillery [field or self-propelled]
Logistics [everything to keep this formation running, from food to fuel]

[quincannon]

I wish I felt the same way.

Looking at today's Army force structure, I think they have adopted one that is far too cute, an over reliance on whiz bang,and not enough on the basic skills required on the battlefield.

The only ones that have it anywhere near right are the Marines, and they have had it right since 1942 with little change in structure or emphasis.

Follow the 3rd Infantry Division, and the 1st Maine Division on the road to Baghdad in 2003. The heavy 3rd, could not keep up with the relatively light 1st.

[quincannon]

The first step Ian is deciding upon what you want a strike force to do, and where you propose for them to do it. If you want to employ them in Normandy from the UK that force is going to be one hell of a lot different in construct than if you wish to employ them in Afghanistan.

Before you consider how to equip that force, you had better first determine how you are going to sustain them by both sea and air. If you do not have the maritime and air assets available, you could design the best force on the planet and have them immobilized by lack of transport, and the means to establish the lines of sustainability.

The size of the force is important. The conventional wisdom of today is that it should be of brigade size, but as my friend Jack will tell you, when the command authority tells you to deploy a brigade (five thousand) and you tell that authority you will have to deploy an additional ten thousand to support those five in theater, then you might as well settle on a force that is from the outset the size you will require in totality. That is a division. The problem with the trend lines in the U S Army, the British Army, and French Army, and their reliance on the brigade as a striking force, is that by pushing down all of the assets needed for a self sustaining force, you are in fact putting fifty pounds of shit in a two pound bag.

Logistics is an unforgiving burden.

So what do you want that strike force to do, and where do you want them to go, and what are your means of sustaining them?

Ian: There are times and places in this world where nothing is faster than walking. That is what I meant when I said that we rely all too much on whiz bang, the solution du jour, being ever mindful of the lessons of history, as Tom reminded us,  that things do not win battles, men do.

The prime mission of any strike force must also be kept in mind, that being to prevent the onset of conflict, by the demonstration of military power. They are absolutely no good to anyone if they cannot do that. Once the conflict cat is out of the bag, you are not talking strike forces pissing on the appetizer any more. You are instead sitting down to a full course dinner.