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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Jun 3, 2017 21:07:06 GMT
Just finished The General v. The President by H. W. Brand. Having read very little in the subject therefore little to compare it against, it is well written, an interesting read and the author attempted to be very subjective in his portrayal of the events leading up to MacArthur's ouster. Solid 4 out of 5 stars. Also recently finished James Donovan's A Terrible Glory. 3.5 of 5 stars. Get very tired of authors trying to pawn their opinions of what happened with Custer after Martini was sent off as fact. Otherwise well written interesting read. Next up THE big one: William L. Shirer's The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Give me a few weeks. Best, David I am reading A Terrible Glory now. I promise not to spoil the ending. 😉
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Post by quincannon on Jun 3, 2017 22:06:21 GMT
Never said the were bad Ian. I said they were different, and that reflects a difference in culture
You were caught flatfooted by the Germans and their tactics because no one in your war office was looking at what they were doing, and listening to the heretics in your own army who had solutions to what they were doing.
There is nothing so debilitating to an Army than winning the last war.
We were not in WWI long enough to get bitten by the bug that carried the same disease. As early as 1921 Pershing himself said that we could never fight that way again. The story of the U S Army in the 20's and 30;s was to find a way out of static warfare. It was not only in armor but in our Infantry divisions, especially in our Infantry divisions.
I do not think we were caught cold by the Germans at all. In fact if you look at what the Germans say about us they were pretty impressed by what we were doing at Knox. There was a constant stream of German officer visitors there during the id 30's/ The combination of Infantry and armor the Germans used was right out of Chaffee's playbook.
Thinking and doing are two different things though, and you are correct we were green as grass at Kasserine and got the crap kicked out of us. It only happened once though, and that was because our doctrine was sound.
You have also remarked several times about your equipment being deficient, and not nearly as good as the Germans. Step back a moment and ask yourself why was that the case. It was the case because your people made it so. You did not have the ground equivalent to the Spitfire and Hurricane in you forces because your generals dropped the ball. They were still using the ground equivalent of the SE-5 and Sopwith Camel. That is no one's fault but your own.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Jun 3, 2017 23:08:10 GMT
QC Tomorrow is the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Midway in which Joseph Rochefort and his companions played a major role in the American's victory. What sacrifice and valor by both sides in a pivotal battle. Regards Dave
The pissants in Washington DC arguing with Rochefort were Joseph and John Redman who operated OP-20-G under Admiral King's close supervision
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Post by quincannon on Jun 3, 2017 23:44:31 GMT
My guy at Midway was Tomonaga. A braver man never wore a uniform. We forget sometimes that the other side were fighting for their country to.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Jun 4, 2017 0:09:36 GMT
"Many of my friends are now dead. To a man, each died with a nonchalance that each would have denied as courage. They simply called it lack of fear. If anything great or good is born of this war, it should not be valued in the colonies we may win nor in the pages historians will attempt to write, but rather in the youth of our country, who never trained for war; rather almost never believed in war, but who have, from some hidden source, brought forth a gallantry which is homespun, it is so real."
"When you hear others saying harsh things about American youth, do all in your power to help others keep faith with those few who gave so much. Tell them that out here, between a spaceless sea and sky, American youth has found itself and given itself so that, at home, the spark may catch. There is much I cannot say, which should be said before it is too late. It is my fear that national inertia will cancel the gains won at such a price. My luck can't last much longer, but the flame goes on and on."
--Ensign William R. Evans, USN, a pilot of Torpedo Squadron 8, KIA at Midway, 4 June 1942.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Jun 4, 2017 0:10:48 GMT
I forgot to cite the source for that quote. It is the Midway Round Table and it is very good and informative. Regards Dave www.midway42.org/
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 4, 2017 8:49:57 GMT
We were skint Chuck, and many of our top commanders were still fighting WW1.
Having said that our artillery, AA and AT guns and infantry weapons were sound, so it was only our tanks that let us down, as one tank commander said after the war “we gave these tank designers medals for their work, I would have took them all outside and shot them”
On the other hand though, when we sent the BEF to France in 1939, the US Army was still equipped with light tanks armed with machine guns and top heavy medium tanks which needed six men to crew them because they carried nine machine guns. So if the US had also sent an Expeditionary force over in 1939, then they would have also got their feet wet at Dunkirk.
Dark Cloud used to rubbish our navy, but as I said to him, from May 1940 to November 1942 we were fighting alone and even though we took some knocks the Germans could not defeat us. Even getting stabbed in the back by the Vichy French and fighting the Japanese in the far east, we never actually got defeated, pushed back yes but no knockout blow, so I am really quite proud of that, because we stayed in the fight and took on the Germans when they were at their strongest and not a defeated army with no air cover running back to Germany.
I see our people are again under attack in London, these attacks too will also fail to break us.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 4, 2017 13:47:23 GMT
2) Correct.
3) Wrong. We did not have anything to send in 1939. Our Army was as bad off in 1939 as Custer's Army was in 1876.
3) Correct.
5) Correct.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 4, 2017 15:35:27 GMT
I didn't know that the US Army was in such a bad state, I had them down to have 73 light tanks and 112 medium tanks, which is pretty bad. But the point I am making is that your tanks were just as bad as ours in 1939/40 and it was 1941 before you developed the M2 Light and M3 Medium.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 4, 2017 16:51:40 GMT
Never said they weren't. In fact yours were probably better.
In 1939 we had 3 half strength Infantry divisions, a cavalry division, and two "divisions" that were theater defense forces the Hawaiian and Philippine. The 1st Cavalry Division was nothing more than the border patrol.
We had a bunch of divisions in the National Guard at about one third strength with very little equipment, and an equal number of Organized Reserve divisions that were in reality nothing much more than a patch and several filing cabinets full of ROTC graduate officer records.
What we did though is develop modern doctrine, and had a first rate mobilization plan to rapidly expand the Army in time of need. We had no conscription, but that would come in 1940. We depended upon the Navy to buy time. The amazing thing is that it all worked, but it did not work to its full capacity until 1944.
This country has an aversion to a large regular force. Always have. That aversion is enshrined in the Second Amendment to our Constitution. We don't mind fighting, but when we fight we are heavily dependent upon the citizen soldier, which goes back to our revolution, and the Spirit of the Cincinnati, the yeoman farmer and the city tradesman, who take up arms, then lay them down again when the need passes, returning to plow and shop.
We still think that way, although our standing forces are much larger, because navies do not protect and buy time the way they used to.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Jun 7, 2017 0:59:18 GMT
Mary How are you doing with "A Terrible Glory"? Donovan does a good job of addressing and discussing the causes of the 1876 campaign by the army which explains the who, what, where and why of what took place.
Lost somewhere in his book and I don't remember where, Donovan mentioned Custer's complete ignorance of the impact of his comments on others which I found to be very enlightening in my study of Custer's personality and make up. He also lists all the incidents, facts, beliefs and many pieces of falderol which lead up to the events of June 25, 1876.
His sympathetic treatment of GAC is an area in which I disagree but overall it is well worth the reading. Regards Dave
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Post by mlynn on Jun 7, 2017 2:57:49 GMT
Dave, I find the book very easy to follow and is a good summary of the step by step process. It also is good at displaying the interpersonal relationships between the officers that kind of remind me of politics today. That is to say, who is going to get the fame, who is going to call the shots and etc. The bickering and toe stepping is so disturbing given hindsight but, it humanizes the story. I agree it gives you a window into Custer's personality. I did find the first part of the book a bit too sappy describing Custer. I thought it was going to be another author glorifying their hero type book. But, it kind of came out of it and I am now enjoying it. Thanks for recommending it. It is summing up the battle for me and it makes it easier to follow the posts in here.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 7, 2017 3:37:00 GMT
As long as you understand ML that the interpersonal relationships described in that book are what is called in my book a piss poor command climate.
If you were coaching a girls basketball team would you put up with that crap?
If you were supervising a production line would you put up with that crap?
Would you put up with that crap around your family dinner table?
I suspect the answer to all three questions would be a resounding no, and further you would say, why would you ever ask me such a stupid question.
OK then, revisit the subject of those pre LBH interpersonal relationships, in light of teamwork, and focusing on one primary objective in a matter that could very well get you killed. Only the most insecure of commanders ever wonder about who will achieve fame or credit. Only the most abysmal of commanders ever let the minds of their leaders and troops stray from the job at hand.
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Post by mlynn on Jun 7, 2017 13:35:38 GMT
As long as you understand ML that the interpersonal relationships described in that book are what is called in my book a piss poor command climate.
If you were coaching a girls basketball team would you put up with that crap?
If you were supervising a production line would you put up with that crap?
Would you put up with that crap around your family dinner table? d I suspect the answer to all three questions would be a resounding no, and further you would say, why would you ever ask me such a stupid question.
OK then, revisit the subject of those pre LBH interpersonal relationships, in light of teamwork, and focusing on one primary objective in a matter that could very well get you killed. Only the most insecure of commanders ever wonder about who will achieve fame or credit. Only the most abysmal of commanders ever let the minds of their leaders and troops stray from the job at hand. I totally agree with you. Remember my last few years in the workforce was in management. I was "promoted" in the last two years to a situation that involved fixing a "broken" team. It was total chaos and the main focus of running the business became second to smoothing over the "personal crap" as I called it. I find these personal politics an important part of the story because, as you stated, it becomes important to the outcome. It gives insight into Custer's character and mind like Dave stated and points to what and who influenced what he did. Also, the rest of the "team", the raw, uneducated troops, were expected to follow the example of their leaders. I can only imagine what was going on in their minds and how that effected their actions. I know from reading that an inflated ego was a common characteristic of many officers at that time. This self inflated ego kinda brings us back to MacArthur.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 7, 2017 14:40:57 GMT
Now you know what I asked such a seemingly stupid question. It was to illustrate in situations we confront in our everyday lives, are the very same factors we have to deal with in a military environment, team climate, work force climate, family climate.
All to often folks that have never been exposed to the military think that there is something associated with the military climate that does not equate to the human climate. It is somehow separate and divorced from. As long as we pick people for the military from the human race, these things will always be the same. It is for the military commander therefore to get these things under control, just like the coach, supervisor, or the head of a family. Custer not only did not get it under control, he fostered and facilitated the acts themselves.
Magnificent answer. It must run in the family or be something in the Iowa water.
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