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Post by yanmacca on Jun 15, 2017 14:18:58 GMT
I am amazed that these units had something as heavy as 4.2 mortar at this level, I know that this is a fine weapon but its minimum range was around 600 yards, where as the 60mm and 82mm could come down as low as 75 to 90 yards. Big difference when fighting at the ranges recon units do, but I think its main use would be for firing smoke rounds.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 15, 2017 15:27:09 GMT
Battlespace expansion is the answer Ian.
If memory serves the maximum range of the 4.2 was somewhere around 5600 meters (It's been a long time but it is around that). With the changes that occurred from 1948-49 onward, cavalry was meant to become more of a force that could fight for information, thus the tanks and rifle squad, and the larger mortar.
Generally the trend in all forces is to do the same mission better.
The 60mm and the 81mm had limited range, and range becomes very important in the expanded battle space. That is particularly important in the mission most of these ACR's were tasked with on the inter-German border. They were there as a first screening line to buy time for the divisions that were garrisoned in Germany behind them to deploy from garrison and deploy to their battle positions. At one time we had four ACR's on the inter-German border, the 2nd, 3rd, 11th, and 14th.
Episodes like the 14th Cavalry Group in the Losheim Gap proved that the structure of the old groups could not do this. So when they became ACR's they became heavier, with more long range weapons. Going by the 1951 TO&E I managed to find the ACR's were constructed as follows:
Headquarters and Headquarters Company (company not troop until 1960) Service Company Medical Company Aviation Company (light observation fixed wing aircraft - became an air cavalry troop about 1962, and later expanded to a squadron)
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion (battalion not squadron until 1960) Company A (Recon) Company B (Recon) Company C (Recon) Company D (Tank) (remained designated a company after 1960) Howitzer Battery, 1st Battalion
2nd Battalion (Companies E-F-G-H-How Btry, 2nd Battalion)
3rd Battalion (Companies I-K-L-M-How Btry, 3rd Battalion)
All in all a strength of about 3000 (plus or minus), Artillery was at first 105mm SP, and later 155mm SP. Light tanks in the recon companies. Main battle tanks in the three tank companies.
When you scrambled a company you could produce two light tank platoons, a carrier mounted rifle platoon, and another rifle platoon formed from the scout sections, who were mobile in 1/4 tons, but could not really fight high intensity from them so they were most often deployed dismounted. Plus a three tube mortar platoon. High density of automatic weapons. All in all a very powerful defensive force, which was of course their main mission.
What they proved to be though is not worth squat for reconnaissance in that being as heavy as the main battle force that was behind them, and with the same degree of mobility, they did not possess the mobility differential (screen mobility = main battle force X 2).
The end result then was that a tailored balanced armored or mechanized infantry brigade could have done the same job better. That's why we no longer have ACR's
Armored divisions had a reconnaissance battalion, consisting of an HHC and 3 Recon Companies until 1957 when they became Cavalry Squadrons, and added an air cavalry troop (Troop D)
Infantrys division had only a Reconnaissance Company until 1957. In 57 the company was expanded to a squadron organized just like those in the armored divisions.
Divisional squadrons did not have a tank company or howitzer battery, although it was not uncommon to attach a tank company and dedicated battery to them for some missions.
Remember in the U S Army it is mission that dictates the force structured for the mission. It would be a mistake to read the narratives of battle where this or that unit was composed of thus and so, and make the assumption that, that was the way they always were
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 15, 2017 18:32:06 GMT
Great info Chuck, by reading that last bit it looks like a commander could assemble a force to suit his immediate needs, rather like choosing certain tools from a tool box, if he didn't need a certain tool to take on a particular job, then he left it behind so to lighten load.
Going back to the 4.2in, what I meant was the minimum range not the maximum, meaning that if the enemy got within a certain distance, then the 4.2in could not drop rounds under 600 yards, which is a fair distance, especially if you are operating in close country, if your enemy managed to get under 600 yards, then you would have to pull back your mortars.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 15, 2017 19:51:08 GMT
I understood exactly what you meant. That's why a cavalry platoon leader would:
1) Keep his mortar to the rear of his FLOT (forward line of troops) by say, 500 meters or so. (When I had a 4.2 platoon my tubes would typically be 1000 meters behind the FLOT, and I would be looking for targets 50 to 4000 meters in front of the FLOT. We were not in carriers, rather in trucks and fired from the ground, so I was not nearly as mobile. I would displace forward or rear by half platoon.)
2) Keep his mortar mounted on the carrier, so as the FLOT moved forward or backward the mortar carrier and mortar could move to compensate.
3) All indirect fire weapons have minimum ranges.
4) No indirect weapon is positioned on the FLOT on purpose. Even a small boy like a 60mm is slightly to the rear.
Americans do not do the same things as the Brits, Japanese, and Germans with their weapons. Americans use rifle launched grenades,and later grenade launchers to do what some armies did with their mortars in WWII.
################################################################
Like assembling the correct tools for the job and in the correct order is exactly the way we do it and no two jobs are exactly alike.
You have often wondered why Americans are so critical of the British Army in WWII. We look at your army and see that you do not have a tendency at any level to alter structure based upon mission the way we did and still do. That is a cultural thing. We speak the same language but we are not the same. What you would note though is that the technique of the British Army in the years that have passed since WWII, especially in regards to mobile forces, has greatly changed and is now nearly identical to ours. Another reason I say do not judge good or bad until you follow a given army from conflict to thirty years beyond that conflict to see what they learned.
We did the same thing with British methods of special/irregular warfare, which, across the board, were far superior to our own.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 15, 2017 20:14:10 GMT
Two additional things:
1) There is one of the Osprey painting diagrams in Rottman's Cavalry Group books that shows a cavalry platoon making a deliberate dismounted attack on a German position. Everyone is dismounted and the only fire support for that attack is a dismounted (off an armored car) 50 Cal, a dismounted (off a Bantam) 30 Cal, and a dismounted 60mm mortar. All the rest are armed with rifles. So doing the calculations they left 3 - 37mm cannon, 2 - 50 Cal, 5 - 30 Cal machine guns, and 2 60mm mortars behind. Two questions
a) Does that make any sense to you?
b) If not, now do you see why these units were so bloody weak, and not intended for dismounted operations, other than the need to dismount scouts for probing?
2) The typical cavalry troop in WWII would be task organized by attaching a platoon of light tanks (from Troop F) and two assault guns (from Troop E). It was not always that way but mostly, making one wonder, from the force structure perspective, why they needed Troops E and F. Why not just make the recon troops stronger from the outset.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 15, 2017 20:24:38 GMT
Well Chuck, I think the only way that it makes sense is because the weapons they left behind are all crew served, so if some of these support weapons had to be stripped off vehicles and the assault is made up of crews [both from armoured cars and Jeeps], the they wouldn't have enough man power to launch an attack on foot and apply cover fire, so these weapons would be left crew less because their crews would be fighting with personal weapons.
The a German recce battalion had five companies, one was equipped with light scout cars and armoured cars, two were equipped with medium armoured cars or half-tracks. Another was considered heavy with support weapons mounted on armoured cars or half-tracks, the final company was an armoured infantry company all mounted in SD.KFZ 250s and had its only heavy platoon with SD.KFZ 250s mounting 20mm cannons, 81mm mortars and 75mm howitzers, but no light tanks or HMCs. They did make their recce battalions stronger after 1944 with Panzer II Luchs and the new range of armoured cars [the 234 series].
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Post by quincannon on Jun 15, 2017 21:57:04 GMT
So your first paragraph argues against the practice, which is exactly the same argument I am making. What you are talking is a weak, very weak platoon, that is not designed for the mission
The German battalion was well suited not only to conduct reconnaissance, but to also act as an additional maneuver battalion as required, which is also the very argument I make for making all maneuver battalions capable of conducting reconnaissance as just another item on their menu of responsibilities. I am firmly and fundamentally against any ground maneuver element being a one trick pony. It is not the best way to organize men and machinery.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 16, 2017 9:55:59 GMT
Chuck, I don't like stepping on your toes, but may have add what I think would be a good mix of units for a Recce Squadron circa 1943-45 or even later;
Squadron Headquarters Headquarters and Service Troop Medical Detachment "A" Troop (Armoured Car) "B" Troop (Armoured Car) "C" Troop (Armoured Car) "D" Troop (Armoured Infantry) "E" Troop (Assault Gun) "E" Troop (Light Tank)
This has almost everything except heavy AA/AT capabilities, but if the light tanks were M24s then this would make up the shortfall, but even taking it further, if you add M19s [Dusters] and M7 HMCs in the assault gun troop, then this would give a squadron some clout, oh and made the infantry platoon four rifle and one weapons platoon.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 16, 2017 14:22:48 GMT
What would be wrong with:
Headquarters and Headquarters Company (Containing a light aircraft detachment of L5's) Three Armored Infantry Companies Medium Tank Company Howitzer Battery (SP)
Nothing unless you think Infantrymen are incapable of conducting reconnaissance.
The problem with cavalry in WWII was that they were cavalry.
We wasted a lot of time, money, and peoples lives in WWII trying to keep something that was dead as far as the battlefield goes alive, when we had the right combination of equipment already available. It goes back to Army branch politics Ian, and it must be experienced, and cannot be explained well to someone on the outside.
The horse cavalry was dead. It had been since the dawn of the 20th century. The invention of the tracked fighting vehicle threw dirt on a corpse. The tracked vehicle would take 20 more years to perfect. The successive branch chiefs of the Cavalry Branch would have nothing to do with anything that did not include the horse.
The obvious solution was not to form armored divisions, but rather take the cavalry division and make it into an armored fighting force. You could also retain some regiments as non-divisional to operate with corps strictly for reconnaissance and economy of force purposes. All these things were proposed and the cavalry branch would have nothing to do with them. It made no provision for the horse.
All this came to a head around 39-40 when war broke out in Europe. Marshall completely exasperated with the cavalry mafia, created the Armored Force, and from that moment on cavalry was looking for something to do. They had been left by the wayside because their leadership could not understand that the world had changed. Same thing with the battleship admirals.
I mentioned some days ago a current proposal that is now part of the current Senate Armed Services Committee buget proposal for the upcoming year. I mentioned it was bad for the Army. Mainly it is something along the lines of the creation of the armored force, in that it throws what exists out in favor of creation of a whole new way. It is bad because it throws everything out. The best way to change, the time proven way, is to change what is, not create new.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 18, 2017 15:04:33 GMT
The politics between the infantry and cavalry was there for all to see when the US cavalry had to change the name of their tanks to combat cars. Funny enough the same sort of sectionalism happened in Japan, with their cavalry, they developed a light tank to try a replace their outdated armoured cars as these vehicles couldn’t operate as good on the bad road systems in Manchuria, so the cavalry wanted an all tracked vehicle in order to operate in all weathers. The cavalry had to call this tank the Type 92 combat car.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 18, 2017 15:43:55 GMT
Ian: It was the National Defense Act of 1921 that put into law that tanks would be part of the Infantry.
Look at the lineages for the 66th and 67th Armored Regiments that I sent you a few weeks ago.
The cavalry called them combat cars because the law would not permit them to have tanks.
Actually I think it was a good law with that one exception (only the Infantry could have tanks). Had both been allowed to develop tank doctrine, and the development process been a cooperative effort, we may have seen far different outcomes in 1939-40. The effort to get rid of the horse would have been much stronger in the cavalry branch I think.
A tank is nothing but a tool. You did not need Infantry tank regiments, but the Infantry needed tanks, probably along the lines of one large tank company per regiment. The cavalry needed more tanks, but blended in with armored Infantry probably on a half and half balanced basis. We may even have ended up with combined arms units at company (troop) level, or at least mixed battalions (squadrons).
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 19, 2017 13:42:36 GMT
I suppose that a compromise could have been reached with the Infantry getting the medium tanks and the cavalry getting the lights.
Other vehicles like self-propelled artillery and tank destroyers could be issued to both branches.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 19, 2017 15:58:22 GMT
What the war demonstrated Ian is there was no need for medium or light tanks. What was needed was the main battle tank, and by 1955 or so we were convinced of that.
There was to be no compromise with the cavalry branch, if that compromise did not include horses. Think of the cavalry branch of the U S Army being like the brown board. About one third were just like the Queen's Musketeer, and the other two thirds like the Arizona Ranger. The Queen's Musketeers controlled all the levers of power, and the Arizona Rangers, while they loved their horses, could see that modernity was at hand, and they went toward what would win a war. The inevitable outcome was the brown board shutting down after all the blood drained from them.
All these things had to be learned in the crucible of war. The things learned among others were;
1) Tanks were the best anti-tank weapons. There was no need for tank destroyers.
2) Cavalry, as organized, were to weak and incapable for modern warfare.
3) Tanks were required as essential to dismounted Infantry operations, so we added a large tank company to each Infantry regiment.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 19, 2017 18:59:12 GMT
Chuck, I think that once the US Army developed a main battle tank that was as fast as a light tank and was armoured and armed like a heavy tank, then they had a tank for all seasons.
In my way of thinking you keep things simple and try and keep your weapons and ammo to a minimum, like so; One main battle tank One type of self-propelled gun or howitzer One type of armoured car One type of APC Keep all your small arms ammo to two calibres [pistol and rifle]
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Post by quincannon on Jun 19, 2017 20:08:19 GMT
One size fits all sounds easy, and never works, unless you are trying to build an army that Larteguy says is only capable of being displayed for a modest fee on every fairground in the country.
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