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Post by quincannon on Jun 12, 2017 19:38:11 GMT
You are then talking about a completely different phase of the battle, the recon-counter recon phase. If you do that you throw that game map away, and build another one about five hundred to a thousand meters from that village and bridge, off the bottom of the present map.
Any good German platoon leader is going to have at least a squad spread out on the nearest high ground in front of that position at the bridge. That squad is going to have a radio or at least wire contact with his platoon leader who in turn is going to have contact with his supporting artillery. In addition that road is going to be mined with anti-armor mines, and the shoulders of the road strewn with anti-personnel mines.
The first time one of your armored cars appears they will be hit with preregistered artillery, and that fire will both be observed and adjusted. The mines will add a little more flavor to the mix.
You have at that point lost the recon battle and the Germans have won that phase.
What you have done though is obtained information that there is enemy presence ahead. it is time for plan making, but that takes time. If the German is smart he will pull back his outposts, blow that bridge, and exit the village. He will move further back with those two guns of his, and while you are screwing around trying to figure out what to do next, or repairing that bridge, he is going to lay dormant.
When you have convinced yourself that the enemy is gone, and the bridge is repaired you will move into that open area beyond the village and your first platoon of tanks is going to get whacked by those two 75's, and the war goes on.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 13, 2017 14:48:04 GMT
Chuck, what was that fight that me you and Tom discussed a while back, I think it may have been in the Ardennes, remember when I said it was so unusual because the main unit was a US Armoured car company [or platoon], they dismounted from their vehicles and mounted an attack on foot towards a village or structure.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 13, 2017 15:10:21 GMT
Don't remember, but there are a couple of things to consider.
1) There are no armored car companies in the U S Army. Never were. Armored cars were part of each cavalry platoon in the cavalry squadrons attached to the groups, and organic to the armored divisions, plus the cavalry troop that belonged to each of the Infantry divisions. After the war their place was taken by light tanks, first the M24 then the M41. We used these armored cars within those platoons for direct fire support of the platoon. Their crews did not ordinarily dismount.
A typical cavalry platoon of that era would have
Platoon headquarters 1 scout sections (usually six 1/4 ton Bantams ) 1 armored car section (usually two, sometimes three) 1 60mm mortar squad 1 rifle squad (usually attached from outside, or provisionally organized from within the squadrons)
In theory the strength was 29, but in practice usually around 40 or so. MTO&E's were also something we threw away before the sand of Omaha and Utah were off their boots.
2) They spent most of their time dismounted. The absolute best narrative of how mechanized cavalry operated in WWII is contained in the unit history of the 106th Cavalry Group. Superb book. My Mom borrowed a copy of it several times for me to read from the Library of Congress. Last time I looked copies on e-bay were well into the hundreds of dollars. The Osprey book on cavalry groups, unlike most of their others, is decent and fairly accurate. Don't have it within reach at the moment, but I think it was written by an American.
The American Army has never had much use for armored cars. Their off road mobility sucks.
Understanding the US Cavalry in WWII is trying to understand a force trying to stave off extinction. The boards of review after WWII was scathing in their evaluation of cavalry as organized (and as organized is an important point). I am fully convinced, and I would like Carl to chime in here, that if we had not found ourselves having to deal with the inter-German border Armored Cavalry Regiments of the 50's and 60's would have never existed. They were very good for patrolling that border, but not much use for anything else. They provided nothing that could not be done better by a conventional armored brigade. When the 11th ACR, The Blackhorse went to Vietnam all they really were is a lightly configured armored brigade. I aggressed against these people before they deployed at A.P. Hill, and they were a guerrilla ambush wet dream on tracks.
It was fairly common for a US cavalry platoon to probe into a village or town. In those instances it was the rifle squad and the scout sections that did the probing. The mortar and armored cars did the close in supporting, while the howitzer troop provided on call fires. Not uncommon to have a light tank platoon available as well, Cavalry doctrine was to shape the battle space, to find, then back off and let the real attacking be done by forces designed to do the attacking, the task forces that followed behind. Rarely did cavalry intend to or get sucked into a situation that went one on one with a deliberate defense.
Most documented dismounted action of a US cavalry group is the 14th Group in the Ardennes, especially the 18th squadron. You get the impression that these squadrons were at the same time incredibly strong and incredibly weak
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Post by quincannon on Jun 13, 2017 16:04:22 GMT
The Osprey book is "World War II US Cavalry Groups - European Theater" by Gordon L/ Rottmam. Rottman was ex-Special Forces (5th SF Group). Later he was 1st Bn.(Airborne), 143rd Infantry TXARNG. Knew some people in Texas who did not like him much. Thought he was too much of an out of the box thinker. Later he worked as a civilian at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, LA. Rottman has written several Osprey books on the U S Army, and I consider them by and large first rate. He has the access to the same things I do and is very detail oriented. He also wrote the go to order of battle of the USMC in WWII.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 13, 2017 17:07:57 GMT
Some things you must always remember about the US Army.
1) Their organizations were far from perfect.
2) The TOE was considered an organizational and equipment authorization and guide, but in combat it was generally thrown away, and local commanders from platoon to division did what they damned well pleased consistent with the mission that confronted them.
3) The cavalry platoon is an excellent example of the above. Platoons were most often scrambled (just like eggs) to meet the mission. The platoon headquarters in theory was part of the armored car section in WWII. The PL was assigned an armored car. He rarely rode in one. Most often he operated from a Bantam with the scouts. Most often the armored cars did not even have a section. They would most often be employed with one armored car and a scout squad (each one of three) together to form a composite squad. Rifle squads as I mentioned were sometimes attached from the outside, but most often they were formed for each platoon, by any extras the squadron had, from any source, clerks, cooks, mechanics. Some units were authorized an overage to fill. That was a common source to form these provisional squads.
The general trend from 42 to 62 was a continual plus up in combat power, from armored car in 43 to MBT in 62, with the same mission. Over time the CG to Constabulary to ACR became so heavy that there was not a hell of a lot of difference in practical terms from a standard armored brigade. Today you can take a Heavy BCT, and do the same job "better" than the ACR's of which we no longer have any, simply because the need for the ACR has passed due to technology. Why risk scouts to check out that bridge and village of yours when we can do it with a recon/attack Apache (from the division aviation brigade) or a drone from the brigade's organic cavalry squadron?
Reconnaissance is still a necessary function, the same was it was at LBH, or France 1944. We now have the reconnaissance functions fully integrated into our maneuver brigades. They still sneak and peak, and as a general rule still avoid decisive engagement in combat. In the BCT they are relatively light. They are not intended to mix it up with the enemy, and are not organized to do so. It is only a matter of time when they too will pass, and those functions fully integrated within the maneuver battalions. Only a matter of time.
I mentioned that the cavalry of WWII was a force trying to preserve its existence. Over those years and the years that followed they became so heavy that the original intended role became beyond their capabilities. So in the end they did not preserve their existence, it just took them fifty more years to die.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 13, 2017 18:47:37 GMT
Chuck, I got this info from US Army sources, and it goes into great detail; linkGod, for the life of me I cannot think of that action involving the dismounted cavalry men, I recall saying to Tom that these car crews fought a pitched battle armed with machine guns and grenades in an effort to capture this village, I am sure it was around the time of the battle of the bulge.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 13, 2017 19:59:27 GMT
It was probably was the 18th Cavalry Squadron, 14th Cavalry Group in the Losheim Gap.
The 18th Squadron was the only one on the line. The other squadron in that group was in reserve several miles behind, and were in a maintenance stand down at the time the battle opened.
The 18th Squadron filled the gap between the 99th ID on the north and the 106th ID in the south. They did in fact dig in into what amounted to troop strong points, and sent their vehicles to the near rear. In that process they dismounted most of the weapons from all their vehicles. That included the 50 Cals off of the armored cars and well as the 30 Cal's off of the Bantams. This action has been well documented in several accounts of the Bulge.
I think I mentioned at that time that a friend of mine did one of his C&GS papers on the debacle that was the 106th ID piss poor defense, including the attached 14th CG. He gave me access to the after action reports of the 18th Volksgrenadiers that he used for that paper, which dealt with how that division dealt with the 18th Squadron. That was the genesis of my comment that these cavalry troops were at the same time incredibly strong and incredibly weak. Long on firepower, but short on dismounts to support those weapons. Time after time it was related that the German grenadiers would just slip into positions to overcome those heavier weapons, because they did not have enough riflemen necessary to deter those approaches.
This one action was the most highly criticized cavalry action in the post war evaluation boards.
There was another action involving the 6th Cavalry Group that was heavily reinforced that did some attacking. and another involving the provisional 316th Cavalry Brigade (3rd CG+16th CG) that did the same. I do not recall talking about either of those, but it does not mean that we did not.
First thing you have to do is define attack, as opposed to the ordinary procedures of conducting a recon. It would be highly unlikely in my view that any cavalry unit would dismount heavy weapons from their vehicles in either an attack or recon.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 14, 2017 9:40:19 GMT
So didn't the cavalry squadrons have their own infantry component, which was organic to the unit? I have not checked all of my data, but the Germans and British certainly had an infantry component in their reconnaissance battalion/regiment, the Germans especially took great pains to add a really strong armoured infantry company to each of their armoured recce battalions, you name it, it had it and everything was mechanized. I was surprised when you said the US Army didn’t care for armoured cars, I can see their reasons for this, but they were popular in Europe. Many had duel controls to that they could drive just as well in reverse as they could forward. This meant that they had two steering wheels and pedals and stuff, with a rear facing vison slit. The British loved their armoured cars, as you can see in the link to that great web site below. Just check out the Staghound, which was an American design which was built in the states but turned down by your army, we bought nearly 2.700 of them from you during the war. link
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Post by quincannon on Jun 14, 2017 16:10:00 GMT
No, not officially by TO&E.
The early arrivals in France, among them the 4th and 106th CG's saw the need for Infantry and added an Infantry squad to each platoon, by the means I described, gathering them from within their own resources, but never anything official. Some of the recon squadrons in the armored divisions did the same, by attaching a squad to each platoon, by pilfering the combat power either internally or getting an attached platoon from an armored infantry battalion and splitting that platoon up to provide a squad of Infantry to each cavalry platoon. Most of the early arrivals in France were authorized a 20 percent personnel over strength plus up, and used those 20 percent to strengthen what the TO&E did not give them.
Officially the TO&E called for
Platoon headquarters and armored car section: ( 3 - M8 armored cars - 12 personnel) Scout section:( 6 Bantams = 3 scout squads / 6 - 30 Cal MG's / 3 - 60mm Mortars - 17 personnel)
Each troop had 3 platoon and a troop headquarters section
The Cavalry squadrons were organized as follows
Headquarters and Headquarters Troop 3 Reconnaissance Troops ( Troop A-B-C - squadrons in the armored divisions had 4 recon troops Troop D) 1 Assault Gun Troop (Troop E) 1 Light Tank Troop (Troop F)
#################################################################
Very soon after the war as a result of the cavalry review board that TO was changed and remained unitil the mid 1970's
Platoon Headquarters Tank Section (2 then later 3 tanks, first light like the M24 and M41 and later M48 and M60) 2 Scout Sections (each with 4 Jeeps, then M114's, then back to jeeps) Rifle Squad Mortar Squad (1 - 4.2in Mortar)
The late 1940's to mid 1970's were a result of lessons learned during the war.
The U S Army hated armored cars and could not wait to get rid of them. The M-8 was nothing more than a two and a half ton truck chassis fitted with a thinly armored box.
The cavalry reconnaissance squadron of the WWII era was a one trick pony, and intended to be as such. The Army would have rather not had them. They were only there because it was a way of telling the Cavalry Branch - shut up and go away.
The Armored Force wanted reconnaissance assets of battalion and group size, but it wanted reconnaissance units to be heavy enough to get in and mix it up like the German recon units. The cavalry had just enough political drag left to insure that the Armored Force did not get its way.
Remember that the Armored Force was not really a branch. It was an experiment. The realistic thinkers in the cavalry fled from it in droves to the Armored Force. All of your big time armored leaders, (with a few exceptions) were all ex-cavalry. The political infighting was to the point of exasperated nausea. The cavalry was the army equivalent of those that rearranged the deck chairs on a sinking Titanic.
That is why I often remark to you, that you cannot understand the U S Army, without first understanding the internal politics and struggles of that Army. You pick up a book by say George Forty, or anyone for that matter and they only give you a small snapshot in time, where any discerning reader would say - What the hell is this. That reader will never know until he takes that provided snapshot and goes twenty years back in time, then twenty years forward.
I don't know what to tell you further about the armored car issue, except to say that we are not British or German or French. We are American, and we would much rather have a track than a wheel.
I also don't know what to tell you about the provisional or unauthorized changes made in the units based upon need and combat experience other than to say that Americans tend to read a book , say - That's nice - then throw the book away and do as they damned well see fit. It is a cultural thing, which we have not seemed to be able to get over in 400 plus years.
Bet you also did not know that many of our Infantry companies added a fourth rifle platoon late in the war. You will not see that reflected in any TO&E
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Post by quincannon on Jun 14, 2017 19:10:08 GMT
I did some research on behalf of both of us today and found two more books that may be of interest to you, both by Rottman, and both published by Osprey in the UK.
"World War II U S Cavalry Units - Pacific Theater". Covers more than the title suggests. 26th Cavalry (PS) in the Philippines; 1st Cavalry Division on the Mexican Border 41-43, and then in the Pacific; 2nd Cavalry Division and all their ill stared adventures in nothingness; 112th Cavalry in the Pacific; 124th Cavalry/MARS Task Force in Burma.
"World War II Combat Reconnaissance Tactics" - Subject matter self explanatory.
I have ordered both today, and I should receive them before the end of the month. I will give you my opinion on them if you wish before you start to go out and look for them. Rottman is generally good, but I do not know how much editorial control he has, and I would not wish to tell you something prematurely that does not hold up in reading the books themselves.
Keep in mind here that these units are completely different from those in Europe. The 1st Cavalry Division and the 112th and 124th were horse mounted units at the start of the war. They were converted to Infantry in all but name, and fought only as Infantry. The 26th Cavalry was horse mounted at the start of the war, used horses against the Japanese, later shot and ate their horses and were finally nothing more that lightly armed Infantry at the end. The 2nd Cavalry Division was active early in the war, partially inactivated, then fully reactivated all as horse mounted. As far as I can tell they turned in their horses, and were shipped overseas with the purpose in mind to reorganize them into Engineer and service units upon arrival.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 14, 2017 19:22:38 GMT
Chuck, I have quite a few Osprey books, but not the ones you named. I like them and some of the ones I have are written by Zaloga. Let me know if they are worth the money and I will add them. I only buy working books now, I think that a book should be kept for reference and they fit in to that category.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 14, 2017 19:39:42 GMT
Was the addition of the extra rifle platoon a decision made in the field? I know the Americans [like the British] were running short of Infantry replacements during 1944/45, which resulted in AA units being disbanded and their gunners used as infantry, which was not a bad idea since the Luftwaffe was not really a threat. So I guess that any influx of troops to allow for the extra rifle platoon, came from these ex-AA Gunners.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 14, 2017 20:27:05 GMT
The extra rifle platoons in France were made up exclusively by Black soldiers, many of whom took voluntary reductions in rank, some down to private, from service units in excess to requirements. Some from AAA, some from truck and engineer companies and battalions, some direct from replacement depots of newly arrived in theater people. All were volunteers. The fourth platoons were created because of segregation policies at the time.
They did very well, and this, along with some of the really outstanding Black ground units, like field artillery and tank battalions, as well as the Tuskeegee airmen really started the ball rolling for a completely integrated service. The Air Force became the best(which is not saying all that much) in this regard. The Army dragged its feet and bitched and moaned. The Navy was the absolute worst. While all of our services shared the blame, the Navy, along with the Marine Corps, bear the Mark of Cain.
Bradley, that lily livered piece of crap said after the war and in response to Truman's order that "The Army is no place for social experimentation" I would counter that the military is THE PLACE for social experimentation, for the military is THE POPULACE in microcosm.
They say the same thing about women. One of the Capitol Police officers shot on a baseball field in Alexandria, VA this morning, protecting Congressmen practicing for tomorrow nights Congressional baseball game for charity was a woman. I don't think anyone was conducting a gender check before she returned fire and killed the gunman. She and her brother officer went up against a man armed with a semi-automatic high capacity rifle, armed only with hand guns. She was obviously qualified by physical ability, training, and temperament. Ironically she was protecting Republicans who are the ones who are the most vocal in the bitching and moaning department about women in uniform. I suspect it is not in sync with their traditional southern and mid-western values. Without her though most of them would be dead.
Same way here several years ago when a woman security guard killed a shooter at one of our churches, while her male counterparts ran and hid.
We had an entire regiment created in Italy, the 473rd Infantry, created out of an Armored Group headquarters and three AAA battalions.
PS: Ian I am sorry I did not answer your first question. Eisenhower acting only on his authority made the decision.
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carl
Recruit
Posts: 48
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Post by carl on Jun 15, 2017 0:12:41 GMT
The Constabulary NCO Academy in 1951 had a block of instruction on the organization and tactics of the Recon Platoon.
Tank Section - 2 tanks Rifle Squad Scout Section ( as I recall only 1, don't remember how many jeeps) Mortar Section (not a 4.2 at that time)
I believe it might have been later (say about 1955) that Howitzer (Batteries/ Troops) were organic to AC Squadrons.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 15, 2017 0:30:47 GMT
That tracks with that post war cavalry review board Carl. I think they were first applied to the 3rd ACR at Meade which was the only one of the CG's that went right to the ACR without being Constabulary
Probably around 49 or so that same TO was applied to the Constabulary as they were shortly to become ACR's
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