mac
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Post by mac on May 1, 2017 10:34:54 GMT
We know there was evidence of the cavalry dismounted in this area. How far do we think Custer got in the approach to the river? Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on May 1, 2017 10:47:09 GMT
I think [this is my own personal view mind], that Custer’s column lost a bit of momentum once they came down the coulee which took them from BRE to the flats adjacent to the ford D crossing points.
I can see there being some fragmentation here and this diluted the approach the ford, maybe with three holding back, I see it in a similar way to how some see the approach to ford B, with three companies remaining on any high ground, another company supporting any approach to the river by the remaining company, in an effort to make sure that the area was not a death trap, because this area could have been heavily covered in trees, brush and shrubs and an ideal place to ambush a column as it crossed the river as I would expect that any column would be very vulnerable when doing a crossing manoeuvre, so doing this under fire would be a concern to any commander.
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Post by quincannon on May 1, 2017 13:36:13 GMT
Mac: I would be very surprised if the units coming off of BRE got any further than the highway interchange, while at the same time the units coming off of CR got to the river crossing near the old Kellogg marker.
By the way, it was suggested to me yesterday that your good eye for terrain is enhanced by the fact that you play golf.
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Post by yanmacca on May 1, 2017 14:05:51 GMT
Mac, how much credence to you place on the stories of soldiers at the river, now if you shift all the emphasis to ford D and forget about ford B, then do you think that all the accounts of soldiers trying to cross the river are false?
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Post by quincannon on May 1, 2017 15:41:31 GMT
Not Mac, but I do believe the stories of trying, not trying, got near, did not get near the river are completely inconsistent with Ford B, and totally consistent with Ford D.
When you put Ford B in the picture there is no room for inconsistency, because the terrain itself makes inconsistency invalid. At B you either did or you didn't and there could be no question about it.
At Ford D, it is perfectly consistent that some reached the river while others did not, depending upon where the observer was located, and what part of the unit(s) he could observe. Again the terrain itself makes it impossible for one or all observers to see all of what transpired. The same is not true at Ford B where anyone on the west side of the river could determine if soldiers got to and attempted to cross the river, or did not.
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Post by yanmacca on May 1, 2017 18:06:59 GMT
You are correct about the LOS, if the cavalry used the terrain to mask their movement from the southern end of battle ridge to the mouth of that drainage which extends down to the ford D flats, then they would be provided with natural cover, that cover would extend to the flats too, because of the tree lined river course.
Just shows how important that chance meeting with Wolftooth was it relation to discovering the cavalry's attempt to hit the village from the north.
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mac
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Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on May 1, 2017 21:49:49 GMT
Mac: I would be very surprised if the units coming off of BRE got any further than the highway interchange, while at the same time the units coming off of CR got to the river crossing near the old Kellogg marker. By the way, it was suggested to me yesterday that your good eye for terrain is enhanced by the fact that you play golf. QC, I have always liked the outdoors or "the bush" as we say here. My first professional gig was as a field geologist but the golf thing is very relevant. To address the river question Ian puts, and here I think the comparison QC made with Ford B is right on the money. Considering the deployment of a line swinging off BRE and anchored on CR. The end out near the road intersection will never get too near the river but the end down near CR will be much closer, so the observer's position is critical to the observation. I do not think there is any evidence that anyone from the cavalry actually got their feet wet. Ian is correct about the discovery of Custer by Wolftooth. Custer was also spotted by women who had escaped up MTC and saw him coming from up there. They hot footed it back to the village and there were soon criers telling everyone that Custer was after the women and children. At that time we go to the critical point of the warriors having internal lines. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on May 1, 2017 22:08:31 GMT
Sometime you must wax eloquent as to why golf allows one to appreciate terrain more than the average Joe non player.
It is very relevant to the subject at hand.
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mac
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Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on May 2, 2017 0:30:28 GMT
Golf is life. You go through the game alone. There are limited opportunities to seek advice, otherwise you rely on your own technique, judgement and imagination. Golf is not fair as it is played in a natural environment and nature is not fair. Consequently your resilience in the face of misfortune is extremely important. Most casual players and beginners start at a local municipal golf course. These are usually simple courses on generally flat terrain with similarly flat playing surfaces. Few tactical demands! Tactically I am reminded here of my favourite comment by a US General. Shortly after Desert Storm there were problems in the Balkans and he was asked about military action there and he said "we do deserts, we don't do mountains". The best golf courses are played on rolling terrain like St Andrews in Scotland, or Augusta National in Georgia or Yarra Yarra in Melbourne. The course designer loves to use the terrain to create "dead" ground around the approaches to greens to fool the eye of the player and make them select the wrong shot. Tactically beware of what cannot be seen. The ball rolls and spins so the approach to the objective needs to be considered. The shape, spin, roll of the shot should be matched to the terrain being covered. Tactically how do you approach the objective. The best laid plans are apt to go astray. The recovery is incredibly important and the rest of the result will depend on how it is handled. The golf maxim is that "after a bad shot you don't need a great shot, a smart one will do." Battles are probably not won on one good decision but they can be lost on one bad decision. I will take mercy and stop . Cheers
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Post by quincannon on May 2, 2017 1:19:31 GMT
I would hope everyone would copy that, print it out, paste it above their computer, and read it every day before logging on here. It is that good.
Buy the way it was Tom
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Post by deadwoodgultch on May 2, 2017 23:04:43 GMT
Mac, Thank you made me look/sound good. I met a big blond fella in 1980's who discussed the design of a course in Chesterfield County, VA. He was a bear of a man and discussed making a course challenging, appealing to the eye, with excellent camouflage. It must play different in different seasons and weather conditions, and be easily changeable, so it never gets old. I also met Mickey Mantle that day. The course winds through a community and was designed by Gary Player. It is, so I am told, really nothing special, but always full.
Regards, Tom
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mac
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Post by mac on May 3, 2017 1:11:34 GMT
Tom The relative quality of golf courses are a matter, to a degree, of opinion. Also a matter of education and knowing what you are looking at, which is something many people fail to appreciate. Again similar to those who debate battles without appreciating that education in battle is necessary to actually understand what you are seeing. To return to Ford D It seems to me that Custer wanted to get there quickly and with surprise, and that the expectation in this case was that he would be there before any opposition. This would make the crossing of the river fairly quick and easy and let him get straight to work. I need to look at the timeline but have been too busy. I hope to soon. I expect he realized very quickly (perhaps we can gauge a time length here) that the backdoor was shut tactically and so did not linger for long before pulling back. In short it was not loses that made the decision to pull back but rather Custer's situational awareness. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on May 3, 2017 15:17:50 GMT
I also suspect that there was not much time involved here, perhaps ten minutes maybe less. I also don't think that there was all that much fighting in the flat area, and while the opposition was obviously building up fast, there was only just enough presence there to stop him and give him pause. Once again it is not a matter of much but enough.
The tactical error Custer evidently made was in coming across those ridgelines in force, before he knew what was on the other side. Once he did that he had no choice but to fight. Had he instead put scouts out ahead of his forming line of battle those Indians in the flat area could have been detected. Detected means knowing, and in the knowing Custer would have had the option to proceed and commit, or pull back and withdraw to some other place.
Throughout the course of this campaign Custer did not pay much attention to, or gave reconnaissance lip service. What is remarkable about that to me is that cavalry, the mounted arm, is the arm of reconnaissance. They perform it as part of a larger force, in much the way Custer did at LBH, probing. When doing it for a larger force though they always have that larger force to fall back on. When by themselves though they must both probe, and have the main body available for the probers to fall back on, as well as the responsibility, while probing, to keep the main body intact. In short if Custer was operating as part of the Army of the Potomac, he was doing this pretty much right. On his own, not so much.
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azranger
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Post by azranger on May 8, 2017 13:39:41 GMT
Mac, do you mean this arm of the river, which is shown on the Bonifide map? This image shows the river course in 1876 and how the river juts out and this river course would mean that to get north of the village, the cavalry would have to swing wide to traverse this feature, thus adding time and distance to their journey; Ian
That map shows how close to the river that the Kellogg marker was located. You can see the old entrance road in the same drainage as BRE and the Cemetery area.
My thoughts are that the forward advance ended shortly after they made that turn around CR and BRE.
Regards
Steve
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azranger
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Post by azranger on May 8, 2017 13:53:50 GMT
I think I am looking at a tighter turn for BRE and it follows the contour of CR. Another portion continues on toward the Trading Post which now serves "Chicken Reno:. That made me laugh when I say it on the white board menu outside.
The ideal tool to work this would be GIS with added layers of artifact based upon discovery.
I think there could be some movement north toward the Trading Post and Casino areas but I think it was not on offense by Custer's battalion.
My thought is the Cheyenne were getting thier horses from across the LBH and north of the Big Village. The terrain features would bring them to CR and BRE as a travel corridor. The fight was on.
Regards
Steve
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