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Post by yanmacca on Mar 5, 2017 15:45:52 GMT
The US Army adopted a triangular formation when re-organising their armoured divisions, you see this in the three main fighting components, the armoured regiment has three tank battalions, the armoured infantry regiment has three infantry battalions and there are three artillery battalions.
The British armoured division circa 1944, had a similar set but differed slightly;
Armoured Brigade 3 x Tank Regiments 1 x Motorised Infantry Regiment
Infantry Brigade 3 x Motorised Infantry Regiment
Artillery (Brigade size) Field Artillery Regiment Armoured Artillery Regiment Anti-Tank Regiment Anti-Aircraft Regiment
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Post by Deleted on Mar 5, 2017 15:47:13 GMT
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Post by yanmacca on Mar 5, 2017 15:51:53 GMT
That German artillery is very accurate, three shots taken, one miss, one near miss and a direct hit.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 5, 2017 16:10:05 GMT
The 1944 British armored division was not the same as the construct of those type divisions in 1941 during the Crusader battles and it was the Crusader battles that was what was under discussion.
During the Crusader battles the British armored brigades consisted of three tank regiments (U S Army battalions) It was a pure tank organization that contained no Infantry, and as such was not a combined arms organization. It did not differ in any way from the organization of the Union Brigade at Waterloo (all one arm) with the exception of the type of mounts they rode, tank vs. horse. That was the point. The organization itself was obsolete, and did not reflect the realities and requirements of the modern battlefield.
Auchinlech changed this unofficially after those battles, into what became known as brigade groups. The material cited is drawn from "Desert Generals". He was completely dissatisfied with both the armored brigades performance, and organization, and took steps to correct it. Those are the facts.
The further point is that while the American Armored Regiment and the British Armored Brigade of 1941 were nearly identical in construct, the American Armored Regiment cross attached with the Infantry Regiment for employment, and typically the division construct would be two armored regiments with two (or three) tank battalions and an Infantry battalion, and the one Infantry regiment consisting of when cross attached an Infantry battalion and one or two tank battalions. The British Armored division would employ their brigades as single arm elements with no cross attachments.
Thus is the genesis of my comment "understanding how these things came together". Understanding how they were organized on paper is only one quarter of the effort necessary. Understanding how they were employed is the other 75 percent. You must either understand that remaining 75 percent or you end up understanding, and I mean understanding, nothing.
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Post by yanmacca on Mar 5, 2017 19:09:20 GMT
Changes made to British Armoured Divisions 1940-43
April 1940
HQ Armoured Division 2 x Armoured Brigades [3 x Tank Regiments Each] [Total 340 Tanks] Support Group [Royal Horse Artillery Regiment] [Anti-Aircraft/Anti-Tank Regiment] [2 x Motorised Infantry Battalions] Royal Engineers [Field Squadron & Field Park Group]
October 1940
HQ Armoured Division 2 x Armoured Brigades [3 x Tank Regiments & 1 x Motorised Infantry Battalion Each] [Total 340 Tanks] Support Group [Royal Horse Artillery Regiment] [Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment] [Anti-Tank Regiment] [Motorised Infantry Battalion] Armoured Car Regiment [Not issued to Middle East Divisions] Royal Engineers [2 x Field Squadrons & Field Park Squadron]
May 1942
HQ Armoured Division Armoured Brigade [3 x Tank Regiments] [Total 227 Tanks] Motorised Infantry Brigade 2 x Royal Horse Artillery Regiments Armoured Car Regiment Royal Engineers [2 x Field Squadrons & Field Park Squadron]
August 1942
HQ Armoured Division Armoured Brigade [3 x Tank Regiments] [Total 186 Tanks] Motorised Infantry Brigade 3 x Royal Horse Artillery Regiments Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Anti-Tank Regiment Armoured Car Regiment Royal Engineers [2 x Field Squadrons & Field Park Squadron]
April 1943
HQ Armoured Division Armoured Brigade [3 x Tank Regiments] [Motorised Infantry Battalion] [Anti-Tank Regiment] [Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment] [Total 278 Tanks] Motorised Infantry Brigade [3 x Motorised Infantry Battalions] Royal Horse Artillery Regiment Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment Royal Engineers [2 x Field Squadrons & Field Park Squadron]
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Post by quincannon on Mar 5, 2017 20:35:31 GMT
Specifically speaking of the Crusader Battles of November 1941 the 7th Armored Division was composed of
4th Armored Brigade 7th Armored Brigade 22nd Armored Brigade 7th Support Group Division Troops
Of those the 7th and 22nd Armored Brigades were pure armor (three regiments the equivalent of 3 US tank battalions).
The 4th Armored Brigade was formed into a brigade group, by adding one battalion of Infantry from outside the division for a special assignment, along with the organic three regiments (US battalions) belonging to the brigade. There is no indication in the narratives that this battalion, of the Scots Guards was present for any reason other than to be escorted by the tanks to where they were to be assigned. Further there is no indication in the narratives that there was any effort at all to form combined arms teams consisting of tanks and Infantry working together tactically.
I would be happy to provide a complete order of battle upon request.
What is on paper does not indicate the reality of the battlefield.
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Post by yanmacca on Mar 6, 2017 11:21:59 GMT
On paper the 7th was organised like this, but in reality they may have detached their infantry, but I don’t know. Their mission was bring the German armour into battle in the hope of destroying them in the open desert, which I suppose wouldn’t require infantry. Was the 4th Armoured Brigade detached from the 7th AD? Some say that it was placed under the command of XIII Corps.
A lot of authors claim that weapons were the main assets in desert battles, tanks, artillery and aircraft were the game changers, with infantry taking a back seat, so I don’t know if this was the reason they didn’t co-operate together.
Any way here is a breakdown of the 7th Armoured Division [November 1941]
7th Armored Division: Major General W.H.E. Gott Division Troops: Advanced HQ, 9 cruiser tanks 11th Hussars (armored cars) 1st King's Dragoon Guards (armored cars) 4th South African Armored Car Regiment Misc. troops of anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery
4th Armored Brigade Group: Brigadier A.H. Gatehouse HQ (10 M3 tanks) 8th Hussars (50 M3 tanks) 3rd Royal Tanks (52 M3 Tanks) 5th Royal Tanks (52 M3 Tanks) 2nd Royal Horse Artillery (24 x 25pdrs) 102nd Anti-Tank Regiment RHA (Northumberland Hussars, less 1 btry) 122nd Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, RA (less 1 troop) 2nd Scots Guards 22nd Guards Brigade: Brigadier J.C. Marriott Squadron, 6th South African Armored Car Regiment (less 1 troop) 51st Field Regiment, RA (24 x 25pdrs (less 1 btry) 73rd Anti-Tank Regiment, RA (12 x 18 pdrs & 36 x 2 pdrs (less "C" Btry) 1st Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (1 btry, less 2 troops) 3rd Coldstream Guards 9th Rifle Brigade 12th Anti-Aircraft Brigade, RA (army troops under the command of the 22nd Guards Brigade)
7th Armored Brigade: Brigadier G.M.O. Davy HQ (5 cruiser tanks & 5 close support cruiser tanks) 7th Hussars (37 cruiser & 20 crusader tanks) 2nd Royal Tanks (52 cruisers) 6th Royal Tanks (49 crusaders) 4th Royal Horse Artillery (2 btrys, 16 x 25pdrs) 102nd Royal Horse Artillery (Northumberland Hussars) (1 troop, anti-tank) 1st Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (1 btry, less 2 troops) "A" Company. 2nd Rifle Brigade
22nd Armored Brigade: Brigadier J. Scott-Cockburn HQ (8 crusader tanks) "C" Battery, 4th Royal Horse Artillery (8 x 25pdrs) 102nd Royal Horse Artillery (Northumberland Hussars (1 troop, anti-tank) 1st Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (1 btry, less 2 troops) 3rd County of London Yeomanry (47 Crusaders & 4 close support tanks) 4th County of London Yeomanry (43 crusaders & 5 close support tanks) 2nd Royal Gloucestershire Hussars (47 Crusaders & 4 close support tanks) "B" Company, 1st Kings' Royal Rifle Corps 7th Support Group: Brigadier J.C. Campbell 3rd Royal Horse Artillery (36 x 2pdrs AT guns) 203rd Battery, 51st Field Regiment RA (12 x 25pdrs) 60th Field Regiment, RA (24 x 25pdrs) 12th Battery & troop, 1st Light Anti-Aircraft Regt 1st King's Royal Rifle Corps (less "B" Company.) 2nd Rifle Brigade (less "A" Company.)
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Post by quincannon on Mar 6, 2017 14:12:01 GMT
The sources I used were your own War Office.
Those sources do not reflect any combined arms organization existing within the 7th Armored Division, with the exception of 4th Armored Brigade becoming a brigade group by virtue of adding 2nd Battalion, Scots Guards for a special mission, which did not include that battalion, being cross attached to any armored unit within that brigade for the purpose of forming tank Infantry teams
The 22nd Guards Brigade was a separate Infantry Brigade, that was not part of 7th Armored Division.
Anyone who tries to use armor alone, as opposed to forming tank Infantry teams at battalion level thereby creating all arms battle groups when fighting the German's or for that matter the Little Sisters of The Poor, is asking to get their ass handed to them. That is the way of the world. That is why two of those brigades 4th and 7th Armored were effectively destroyed during the Crusader Battles. The British Army did not know how to effectively employ armor, but more specifically did not know how to effectively employ the tank Infantry team, in conjunction with supporting fires.
That was a glaring deficiency. Auchinleck realized it and took the initial steps to correct the problem as early as December 41-January 42. His efforts did not completely correct the problem, because the problem was one of your own doctrine being obsolete. Gradually though change came about and by the Fall of 44 most of your problems were ironed out.
I believe the order of battle you presented above was more reflective of 7th Armored Division at the close of Crusader rather than the beginning. Great adjustments were made when that division lost two armored brigades, and when many of the units listed there were shells of themselves, and no longer combat effective units.
Anyway, what I gave you came directly from war office records.
My suggestions for further reading are
"The Crucible of War - Western Desert 1941" Barrie Pitt
"The Rommel Papers" - edited by Basil Henry Liddell-Hart
I am not an expert on Armor. We do have one here though in Colt 45. I would strongly suggest you ask him about tanks operating without benefit of Infantry in any environment, be it the Western Desert or the North German Plain.
Ian the two arms must integrate to compliment each other and the whole supported by indirect fire. The British early on neither believed or subscribed to this basic fact, and they employed their single arm brigades as single arm brigades. That was the problem. The Infantry wanted no part of cavalry, and the cavalry no part of the Infantry. That is an internal cultural difference within your own army.
What you were fighting in Crusader were Germans who had formed all arms battle groups. Typically they would take a Panzer regiment headquarters, with one panzer battalion, add to it an Infantry battalion, a battery of 88's, a reconnaissance company, some field artillery, and some other division troops, and operate completely together in an all arms configuration. They would take the Infantry regiment headquarters and build another similar type battle group. Typically the Germans would not go any further down in cross attachment.
We, the US, looked at what they had done an adopted a similar pairing of tanks, infantry, artillery, reconnaissance, and service troops and attach them to a combat command headquarters. Then we went a step further within those combat commands, pairing an Infantry company with a tank company to form teams (usually designated by the name of the commander - Team Cherry, Team Desobry etc.). We could, and generally would form three teams in each combat command. The team composition above having a tank and an Infantry company was dependent upon what mission they were given. Some were configured stronger than others based upon the factors of METT-TC (then known only as METT). What resulted is that at every level we had available at the appropriate command levels all that was necessary to meet any situation encountered. When you go pure, as the British Armored Brigades were doing in 1941 you do not have those options.
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Post by yanmacca on Mar 6, 2017 16:16:36 GMT
I have both volumes of “The Crucible of War” the second one which covers El Alamein, is not as good as the first, what was good about it was that I got both books for a pound each when our local library decided to have a clear out, that was back in the 1980s and I still have them.
If we were to talk about these things face to face, you would see that I know exactly what you are talking about and you would also realise that the things I would tell you would make sense and you would probably agree with what I had to say, but this is the problem, we are not disagreeing here at all, but for some reason we are failing to communicate together in the way we used to do.
I know the failings of the British army and if you look through my posts you will see that I don’t mention that these generals were right in the way they handled their armour, even under Auchinleck’s command they still made huge mistakes, just look how 40th and 46th Royal Tank Regiments were shot to pieces on Ruweisat ridge, it was more like the charge of the light brigade then a modern battle.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 6, 2017 16:53:19 GMT
That is exactly my point. They were shot to pieces because there was no integration of combined arms.
That is not a problem of the generals, not exclusively anyway. It is a problem of the people who developed and promulgated the doctrine, the foundation stone of tactics. If the doctrine says do it this way, then the tactics used will be in accordance with that doctrine.
I agree the second volume is not nearly as good as the first. There was supposed to be a third volume, but I do not believe it was ever published.
I will say though that First Alamein was what both stopped Rommel, and started the downward spiral in the desert for the German/Italian forces. I do not believe Second Alamein needed to have been fought. Moral lift or no, the deal was done without it. I consider it a complete waste of life.
There was another British charge of the light brigade on the other side of the desert as well. I forget the details. I fact I forget the unit involved and the location. Whichever unit it was though they were equipped with Shermans, and were destroyed completely in a very reckless tank only charge against Infantry supported by dug in 88's. Do not have the book the incident was contained in, but it was a history of European cavalry from Napoleon to North Africa, Read it as a kid, and my mom checked it out from the Library of Congress where she worked.
We learned these same lessons in North Africa as well. We got our ass handed to us at Kasserine Pass, because we did not follow our own doctrine.
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Post by yanmacca on Mar 6, 2017 17:00:09 GMT
Off hand I can really only think of Longstop Hill, but I am sure we did pretty well in that one.
I wonder why there was no real infantry - tank co-ordination, maybe it was down to the lack of armored troop carriers, the British never had an amoured half-track like the M3 or Sd.Kfz 251, they did have the tiny Universal Carrier and formed carrier platoons, but these were never used with armour in the same way the Germans used their half-tracks, plus it could only carry four men and one of those was the driver.
British motor battalions, were just that, truck mounted infantry, that is why they kept the infantry tank concept as these were designed to move at walking pace, which is no good in a mobile battle. Infantry would be used to clear out built up areas, clear wooded areas or enemy defenses. The main attack tank was the cruiser, these were fast but many of the early models were mechanically unreliable, but the infantry couldn't keep up with these vehicles unless they traveled in trucks, and these were vulnerable to all kinds of fire, especially in a flat and wide open desert terrain.
I am not sure just when we received the M3 in any numbers, it may have been late 1943.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 6, 2017 18:28:26 GMT
It was precisely because you did not develop any armored troop carriers. You had nothing for your Infantry to ride in that could keep up with the tanks, with onboard weapons systems that could compliment the fire of the tanks.
Truck mounted Infantry does not cut it in armored combat. It fills only half of the function required. You needed something like the American M-3 or the German 251, and you just didn't have it. That goes back to the issue of doctrine though. If your doctrine says that tanks will operate alone, then there is no requirement passed on to the guys who formulate the specifications, so that requirement can be forwarded to industry to design a suitable vehicle.
Our M3 was better than a truck, but it did not provide all that was necessary for our Armored Infantry. Same with the 251, although that was developed to a much higher level than the M3.
The only time we ever did it right was when we developed the M1 and the M2 at the same time to compliment one another. There are a lot of people in the US Infantry community that would dispute that, in that the M2 has too much fight, and not enough carry.
The overarching point though is that Infantry, Armor, and Artillery, along with the variety of vehicles that support them, must be developed as a design package, and not separately and hope they will fit together into the combined arms team. A fast tank is no damned good, if you do not have an equally fast Infantry carrier to keep up with it. A howitzer is no damned good if it does not have sufficient range, so as to preclude the tanks and carriers from constantly outrunning that range. Support vehicles are no good no matter how much they can carry and dispense, if they can't get to the places that the tanks, carriers, and artillery go. Attack helicopters are no damned good if they cannot communicate with those on the ground they need to support. You just cant design this or that anymore. You must design first what you want to do with regard to doctrine, then design the equipment that allows that doctrine to be fully implemented. You cant make the mistake the Brits and nearly all other armies did in the 1930's, that being design your equipment for one part of your army, without first figuring out how it would fit in and compliment the other parts of your army.
It all comes down to four simple words - INTEGRATE - SHOOT - MOVE - COMMUNICATE. If you cannot do that in the most efficient manner possible it is best to stay home and watch TV.
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Post by yanmacca on Mar 6, 2017 19:32:11 GMT
Yes only the Americans and Germany saw the need for armoured transport, as all the other European nations envisaged the next war to be another first world war slogging match
The French did attempt to build a number of armoured trucks in the shape of the Berliet VUDB and Panhard 179 and these could carry a full infantry squad, but they made around eighty of both models and they sent them to their colonies in Africa.
See I could see why many countries they felt the need for a break through tank, as they thought that they would be facing trenches and wire, but they also developed faster tanks to exploit any break throughs made by these heavy infantry tanks, but never gave a thought to how their infantry would keep up with them.
The Germans got it right, they tried to attack only at weak points and broke through with concentrated attacks, and had the vehicles to exploit any break through, once they out ran their artillery cover they had specialists vehicles with ground to air radios to bring in the flying artillery, in the shape of the Stuka.
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Post by yanmacca on Mar 6, 2017 20:09:17 GMT
I forgot about the French and their Division Légère Mécanisée, they managed to develop three of these divisions and they contained;
A Reconnaissance Regiment with two squadron’s of motorcycle troops which were armed with LMGs and 60mm Mortars. A Combat Brigade with two Light Armoured Regiments [AMC and AMR Light Tanks] A Motorised Infantry Brigade with two motorized dragoon regiments which had two battalions, one was mounted on Laffly S20 TL trucks, which were classed as “cross country trucks” and the other standard trucks, each such battalion also had a heavy company with MMGs, 81mm Mortars and 25mm AT Guns. And a motorised Artillery Regiment.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 6, 2017 21:01:46 GMT
No truer words were ever spoken.
Except for Germany, European nations thought that the next war would be exactly like the last one.
I would argue that Germany did not think that way because all they did was adapt the storm tactics they used in the closing year of World War I to the mechanized/armored battlefield, throw in the radio, and all kinds of possibilities present themselves. Absent the radio, there would have been no panzer divisions, and the other European nations would have been correct. With storm tactics, plus the radio, it became possible not only for armored vehicles to break through, but also exploit, which starts the spiral, if you exploit you must have infantry and artillery along for the ride, and if they are along how do we transport them so that they will keep up with the armor.
It is very easy and far less expensive to think the next will be the same as the last. That is very attractive to politicians. It is comforting to overage in grade general officers who are more concerned with the regularity of their bowel movements than in thinking and fighting. It is always wrong
Americans did not develop along the same lines as the Germans. They got pretty much the same result, but took different roads to get there. Our marriage of tanks and Infantry was drawn from the period we most discuss here. Every mounted formation we had ever fielded was based upon the dragoon. Some fight mounted, while others fought on foot as the occasion arose. Regardless both rode to battle and were accompanied by horse guns.
The guys who solved these problems for us in the 1930's were all horse cavalrymen. What they wanted to do is take those first two converted regiments, the 1st and 13th Cavalry, and within the regiment itself put tanks guns and Infantry together. The branch chiefs of Infantry and Artillery went ballistic, then semi-comatose. You can't do that. Are you nuts. What the f**k will George Washington say? Of course that was mild to what the Chief of Cavalry had to say. He could not abide the idea that his horses would be put out to pasture. Horses do not do well I have noticed against machine guns, so you know just how goddamned bright that stupid son of a bitch was. So we were forced by branch politics to take the imperfect solution and do what we did in WWII and it took us seventy years to get to the place where the visionaries knew we should be in 1935.
Of course those guys did have the right idea, and it took us eighty years to fulfill it with the combined arms battalion we now field. As soon as we find a sure fire way of getting artillery down to that level, we will add a battery to each battalion and perfect them even more. The only reason we cannot now is that there would be no slots for Artillery Lieutenant Colonels (If you think I am kidding I am not).
The old expression in the retail trades is - If you are doing business today, like you did it yesterday, you will be out of business tomorrow. That goes triple when you substitute the word war for business
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