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Post by royalwelsh on Jul 19, 2015 22:31:00 GMT
A full regiment of the US Cavalry crossed the divide between the Rosebud and Little Big Horn valleys on 25 June 1876 - what were the tactical reasons that led to the US Army defeat and the victory by Lakota Sioux and Northern Cheyenne hostile Native Americans on 25/26 June 1876?
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jul 21, 2015 15:31:22 GMT
RW,
I have watched this go unanswered for several days, I will take a shot. First I must disregard what I feel were failings prior to the 25th. I will give but one answer and hope others will participate. Failure to concentrate full battle and firepower strength in the valley. At this point the score, NA's 15, 7th love.
Regards, Tom
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Deleted
Deleted Member
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Post by Deleted on Jul 21, 2015 16:57:54 GMT
RW, Excuse me for for being flip - is arrogance a tactical reason? Best, c.
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dave
Brigadier General
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Post by dave on Jul 21, 2015 17:15:39 GMT
RW Would GAC's inability to play well with others be considered a tactical issue? He was not a detail kinda guy and seem to play loosely with little planning and even less explanations to his officers. Marching your men relentlessly and wearing your horses out to hurry to a potential conflict with the enemy with only your regiment unsupported is poor planning. GAC did not know the location or size of his foe and operated "on the fly" without sharing his plans or vaguely giving orders/directions. He did not follow the 6 "Ps." Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Jul 21, 2015 17:59:02 GMT
Over in the Powder River thread, Ian did not agree with how Reynolds deployed his force, saying in particular that he disagreed with one (two company) battalion being deployed to the west, instead of being engaged in the village assault. Reading into what Ian said, it seems that he was saying that it was his feeling that Reynolds dissipated combat power. I suppose he did do just that.
What we do see with Reynolds though (despite his later troubles)is that Reynolds assigned a clearly defined mission to each of his three battalions. I don't think we see that at LBH, with emphasis on the words clearly defined. Saying you go here and you go there is not clear definition. Regardless of how poorly executed PR was, each of those three commanders Moore, Noyes, and Mills knew what their commander expected of them.
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Post by Beth on Jul 21, 2015 18:08:35 GMT
Personally I think the biggest failing were 1. no apparent clear battle plan understood by all officers. 2. dividing the Regiment into too many pieces. After all, if you can put a whole cow down your sink if you cut it into small enough pieces for the garbage disposal.
Beth
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 21, 2015 22:14:45 GMT
Chuck it goes back to when we used to talk about keeping a reserve, you used to say that you must have a reserve of some kind because if there was an enemy breakthrough you better tell every cook and HQ staff to get a rifle (well it was along those lines anyway), were as I always thought that the best way to defeat your opponent would be to out gun him from the on set, you read about attacks going to ground because the defending fire was too intense, well at the BPR I would have committed all six companies in capturing the pony herd and sweeping through the camp.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 21, 2015 23:39:49 GMT
Yes Ian it was something like every cook and bottle washer. It sounds a lot better when it is said that upon committing your designated reserve, you reconstitute that reserve, from whatever resource is available, or you designate your least engaged element as your reserve. At least I think it sounds a lot more military that way, but I suppose cooks and bottle washers serves the purpose as well.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
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Post by colt45 on Jul 22, 2015 13:49:34 GMT
Tactically, only having 3 companies out of 12 involved in the assault violated the principle of mass. Failing to support those 3 companies was also a tactical sin, leaving no way for the regiment to take advantage of any opportunity the attacking 3 companies might have provided. That mistake totally gave the initiative over to the Indians for the rest of the battle.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 22, 2015 15:28:27 GMT
Every once and awhile you can violate a Principle (like Mass)or two and get away with it. On those occasions, if you do end the day with success, the violation is mitigated and overcome by the ruthless execution of those that remain.
Every Principle was violated on that afternoon, some by forced errors, some by errors of deliberate commission. You can never get away with that.
The passing of the initiative went unnoticed, another fatal error.
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Post by royalwelsh on Jul 22, 2015 18:29:16 GMT
QC,
Isn't that the crux of the debate?
GAC violated almost every tactical principle of warfare, and yet many still try and defend him for the disaster?
RW
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Post by Beth on Jul 22, 2015 19:15:10 GMT
QC, Isn't that the crux of the debate? GAC violated almost every tactical principle of warfare, and yet many still try and defend him for the disaster? RW It's because of the man, not because of battle. Custer was a celebrity in his time and people view some celebrities with almost godlike perfection and their idealised image has nothing or very little to do with the real person and their accomplishments. I sometimes believe that many people confuse Custer the real man with Custer his image.
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mac
Brigadier General
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Post by mac on Jul 22, 2015 22:19:43 GMT
Sadly most people come to this debate with a pre formed opinion that usually lacks any knowledge of the POW. Some even refuse to aknowledge or learn them. There is still plenty of room for debate even when taking a realistic, military, view of the battle. First one must have no heroes or villains at the outset. Cheers
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Post by Beth on Jul 22, 2015 22:36:49 GMT
Mac, I will admit that I first came to the conversation with a lot of preconceived notions, after all I had read at least 3 whole books on the subject and just had one point I wanted clarification on--talk about naive!
Forever learning,
Beth
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Post by quincannon on Jul 23, 2015 0:49:03 GMT
Mac: For those that have a villain or a hero, it really makes it pretty easy. They do not have to think. Too many people go through life without wanting to think. I guess we who do should be grateful. They make it so easy for us.
All of them should be judged, but that judgment should be based upon performance on the day of battle. Does not matter who it is, what or where the battle is, if or if not someone loved their dog or was kind to their mother, it matters not what they did or how good or bad it was, yesterday, or tomorrow. Performance on the day of battle is the only criteria.
You have seen within the last day that I have a fondness for Stuart. In many ways he was the Clown Prince of The Confederacy. He loved his song and loved his frolic. He also had several bad days. Lee should have had his testicles for breakfast after the Chantilly stunt. He who communicated could not communicate squat at Viedersville. He took much too long screwing around in Chambersburg and damned near got caught before he could cross back over the river. I will leave Gettysburg be because he was not the only altar boy snitching the sacramental wine in that affair. He also took over a corps from a wounded Jackson in the middle of the night and was fighting that corps and driving the Yankee Army before dawn. He forced McClellan off balance before the Seven Days. Never told a lie about what he saw, and ran his brigades as if they were well oiled machines. All these things are important, and only the dunce evaluates the whole man by only focusing on one.
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