mac
Brigadier General
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Post by mac on Jul 23, 2015 22:20:34 GMT
In the end the question is what was the outcome? In the case of the LBH the outcome was a disaster. To take one simple thing tactically...first rule is do not divide...so if you divide and have a disaster....blame attached! Cheers
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dave
Brigadier General
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Post by dave on Jul 23, 2015 22:28:36 GMT
QC Stuart and Custer both needed acclamation and praise from superiors as well as the masses plus they were fearless. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Jul 23, 2015 22:46:59 GMT
Mac: It's OK to divide (sometimes). What is not OK is that when you divide you do not have a well defined plan to again come together in space and time to achieve mass.
Dave: Concur about acclamation and praise. Also agree that both were fearless. Stuart for instance was quite hurt when he did not get Jackson's Corps after Chancellorsville, and it shows in letters to his wife Flora.
When you are a commander, your personal fearlessness must not be allowed to translate into the decision making process for the units subordinate to you. They are filled with live human beings, who may not be so fearless, and who are trusting you to get them through this, whatever that currently happens to be. I do not recall Stuart ever risking a unit recklessly. If he did I sure can't recall what or where. Yet he pulled off so pretty risk associate operations.
I think in this particular case the paint job worn by Stuart and Custer was quite similar, but the structure beneath quite different.
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dave
Brigadier General
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Post by dave on Jul 24, 2015 14:21:43 GMT
QC Both men were perfect for their time during the War when individual bravery was demanded of commanders who had to lead from the front. It was a foolish policy that cost both sides many exemplary leaders, the South more so because of having fewer men to begin with. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Jul 24, 2015 14:40:19 GMT
Granted. It probably had also to do with the type and style of leadership required for volunteer armies. The South got the lion's share of talent initially, and the casualties that hurt them the most were those between May 62 and May 63, when the cream was skimmed off the top of the milk.
If there is a point to be made here, I think it is in the form of a question we must all ask ourselves. Does it require the same type and style of leadership to engage in irregular warfare, as it does the conventional battles of the ACW? Good leadership is good leadership wherever it is found, but the question I think must revolve around technique. Should a commander lead that assault? Should he be out front? Should he content himself with control over a part, or do his responsibilities lie in the whole. I think we should also remind ourselves that leaders at division and below during the ACW rarely separated the whole.
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Post by Beth on Jul 24, 2015 16:05:30 GMT
As a non-military type, part of me understands the "I'm out here with you and taking even more risks so be as brave as me' of leading from the front. However the other part of me says, Why the heck would you put the person who knows the most about what is going on and how to do it at the most risk?
I suppose though in an age where you can't communicate by radio and communications distance, meant as far as your voice would carry, there needed to be an officer at the front to direct people.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Jul 24, 2015 16:27:17 GMT
Beth I believe part of the reason these men had to lead from the front was the style of war being fought 1861-63. The armies were massed in formation when attacking with the leaders being out front with the flags of the units. They were expected to lead and knew the men---a few women also--- were watching for them to be there in place. In 1864 this style of fighting changed into the massed assaults on trenches and prepared defensive positions which took many casualties till Grant and his forces changed their tactics. QC Your post below: If there is a point to be made here, I think it is in the form of a question we must all ask ourselves. Does it require the same type and style of leadership to engage in irregular warfare, as it does the conventional battles of the ACW? Good leadership is good leadership wherever it is found, but the question I think must revolve around technique. Should a commander lead that assault? Should he be out front? Should he content himself with control over a part, or do his responsibilities lie in the whole. I think we should also remind ourselves that leaders at division and below during the ACW rarely separated the whole.
I believe Forrest was an outstanding proponent of irregular warfare as you mention above. I am not a historian but I don't believe ever commanded much over 5,000 men at any time during the War. He command a small force at Brice's Crossroads which was he only, that I know of, formal set type of battle during the War. I wonder if he could have performed as Stuart did at Chancellorsville if had the opportunity. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Jul 24, 2015 16:36:30 GMT
A commander's place is to be where he needs to be doing only what a commander can do. There will be times when he needs to be out front literally leading, and at other times he needs to concentrate on the controlling. Most of his time should be spent on the latter, all things being equal.
When you look at it carefully a commander who is "always" in front is telegraphing his sense of mistrust in his subordinates. That is why units are structured and the echelons of command are built into those structures. A wise commander lets company and battalion commanders do their business, and if he does the only thing the regimental or brigade commander must do is orchestrate and coordinate his subordinates activities. I expect company commanders to always be forward. I expect battalion commanders to spend a good part of their day up there as well.
If a commander at any level has people he does not trust to get the job done, then he needs to find people that can. If a division commander has brigade or regimental commanders that can only lead, and exercise control by getting out front, that division commander needs to look for people who can do the whole job, not just part.
Keep in mind here I am not saying that a higher echeloned commander needs to be in the rear with the gear. He needs to be where he can follow the action and make timely decisions, but he also must let his subordinates do their jobs or the whole thing falls apart. It may not be today or tomorrow but it will happen.
The best way to facilitate letting them do their jobs, is to tell your subordinates what you expect of them, how what they are about to do fits in the complete picture, thereby letting them know what the commander has in mind for all. It is not a once and done affair though, coordination must be ongoing until the end, and that is the commanders prime responsibility.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 24, 2015 16:56:28 GMT
Dave: I think Brice's Crossroads is an excellent example of battle orchestration. Forrest spent his time maneuvering his units not, getting out in front of them.
Of the second I am not sure. Stuart took over a command that he was very familiar with, knowing the leadership people quite well. His relationship with Jackson went back to the very early days in the Valley. His division worked with Jackson's Corps quite often, being out front and screening for him on a number of occasions, or working Jackson's flanks. There seems to be a fairly close relationship between the two men, or at least as close as Jackson's ever let anyone get close. That translates at Chancellorsville into if the wounded boss trusted the man, I will too, from a subordinates perspective. So it's a long winded answer, but I think one that points out a somewhat unique situation. Had Forrest had a similar relationship and the situation was of a similar nature, I don't see why Forrest would have been found wanting, but then again I am not seeing all.
Trust and confidence is the byproduct of relationships. You don't give the neighbor down the street the keys to your car if that neighbor just moved in yesterday.
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Post by Beth on Jul 24, 2015 16:58:48 GMT
Thinking of Custer in particular, I wonder sometimes if a lot of his 'lead from the front' was more because he was an adrenaline junkie than anything else. I personally have to wonder about someone who talks about how he would be willing to see a battle every day or to personally regret the end of a war.
Beth
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Post by quincannon on Jul 24, 2015 17:04:02 GMT
It is well that you wonder. What would you think of my state of mind if I said I wanted to be boiled in oil every day, and regretted an oil shortage?
If that statement is truly from Custer, and not some product of a sensational reporter or biographer, then the man was completely self centered, had no moral compass, and was a mad man in every sense of the words.
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Post by Beth on Jul 24, 2015 17:31:21 GMT
It is well that you wonder. What would you think of my state of mind if I said I wanted to be boiled in oil every day, and regretted an oil shortage? True. Maybe it's just me though but comments like that make me think that Custer had a disregard for the cost in human life during a battle. To him it was a fun romp. Have you ever read what Custer wrote in a letter to his family about an incident at White Oak Swamp where he took his engraved Confederate sword. He describes riding down and shooting the office as the most exciting sport I ever engaged in. link to Google book Glory-Hunter, A Life of General Custer
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Post by quincannon on Jul 24, 2015 17:44:48 GMT
That is the product of a sick mind. I can understand hatred, and emotion, but not that
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Post by Beth on Jul 24, 2015 18:00:59 GMT
That is the product of a sick mind. I can understand hatred, and emotion, but not that Yet that was Custer. What strikes me when I read that passage is how similar it is to the story Custer wrote about chasing a buffalo on the plains, where he shot his own horse (which he was riding) while aiming at the bison. There was something in him that processed hunting down a Confederate officer and a bison the same way. I am sure NA fell into the same category. Perhaps that was on of the factors in the events of LBH, Custer was so focused on the hunt that he didn't see the horse.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Jul 24, 2015 20:04:16 GMT
Custer never seemed to be squeamish to the loss of human life whether in battle, force marching or executing men but he did care about animals. He was a very complex individual that seemed to have a very child like view of life. He was a piece of work that any good psychiatrist or psychologist could delve into. Wait, here is a book about Custer from a psychologist: Custer and the Little Big Horn: A Psychobiographical Inquiry The web site below also sheds some light on GAC and how he behaved and why. RegardDave www.handwriting.com/pdf/custer.pdf
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