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Post by Beth on Oct 8, 2016 8:33:42 GMT
I know that we have often discussed that Custer had no experience commanding at the Regimental Level and was used to handling brigades. I was going through some quick backgrounds of the other officers of the 7th and realized that very few of them had much experience, some were very young and others had spent the war as staff officers. It seems to me that Benteen was the only person on the field that day who had extensive experience as a regimental commander, followed by Reno.
Was it unusual to have so many inexperienced officers in one regiment. Does being a staff officer give you experience that is translated into battlefield conditions?
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 8, 2016 10:16:59 GMT
Beth, I am not well up on the back ground on most of these officers, but my guess is that the US army was lacking in most things because of military budgets, but I will harp back to what a said a couple of years ago and that is the USA had just fought a four year long civil war.
I would expect that such a conflict would give the US army a surplus of experienced officers, but ten years after the event you do see how regiments like the seventh were lacking in not only officers but in experienced ones at that.
Just looking at the companies fielded that day would show that not only were they lacking nearly a third of their strength (a standard cavalry company should have contained 70 all ranks, but they averaged around 40), each company should have been led by three officers but many were commanded by junior officers and captains were promoted to battalion commanders.
This would leave some of the companies in the hands of officers who had either never commanded a company in battle or fought Indians, but the US army like many armies would place great faith in officers leaning their trade “on the job” and that this campaign would teach these junior officers the art of combat in the field.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 8, 2016 15:12:27 GMT
Oh God, be kind to these souls to whom I am about to spread the gospel, at least my gospel.
THE MILITARY PROFESSION is both science and art. It is a science because like any science you must learn the fundamentals, the accumulation of thousands of years of knowledge of what has gone before. The art portion is how you put into practice what you learn. You must also be familiar with the science that applies. For instance you might not wish to hire a botanist if the primary science involved was chemistry. So it is not the experience that matters so much, as having the right kind of experience.
STAFF OFFICERS: Today the average officer's career is about one third troop time, and two thirds being on some staff, at some level. In the ACW, many of the pre-war regular officer were assigned to staffs, for the simple reason that they knew how the army ran. That also goes for those fresh faces just out of West Point as well. Those newly minted Second Lieutenants, as little as they knew, knew more than the volunteer officers of units that literally sprang from the countryside.
In the ordinary course of things today, by the time a junior officer reaches the rank of Captain he has had five or six years of troop time learning his branch, and learning the art of how to apply what he has learned by training and interacting with soldiers. It is at that point, Captain, where he starts getting staff assignment, after the successful completion of a company command tour.
What "Staff" matters. An officer's first staff assignment will be at battalion level, from which he may progress to brigade. The two are similar in scope of responsibility differing only in size. Before the officer makes Lieutenant Colonel, and after he receives appropriate schooling, he will undoubtedly serve on the Army Staff, or the staff of a major command. These higher level staff assignments both narrow and broaden you. They narrow you in that you may be assigned to a very tiny part of what is a much broader subject. When I was on the Army Staff my specialty assignment was in light Infantry companies and battalions. I had nothing to do with other types of Infantry units (mechanized - airborne etc.). My task was to help design a light Infantry unit, that was organizationally consistent with the doctrine being developed concurrently. Very narrow. During the course of that assignment though I was brought into contact with others who had like assignments in other areas (artillery, aviation, cavalry, logistics etc.)and cross pollination took place, in that all concerned had to insure that what we were doing meshed with everything the other were doing. At the end of that process you had a very clear picture of how the Army operated as a whole.
An officer so prepared would most likely have their next assignment be either command of a battalion or brigade, or go to a key (meaning the G) staff of an operational unit like a division or corps. One of my good friends for instance went from War Plans directly to assume command of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment,(sadly he died as an MG in a helicopter crash in Germany was serving as deputy commander of V Corps - My friend Jack was on the operations staff of that corps at the time, and had a seat on that aircraft that he decided not to take opting instead to go by ground back to their home station to see that his whole section returned safely as it was heavily snowing at the time). Others that I worked with went directly from that assignment to the G-Staffs of the 6th, 7th, 25th, and 29th Infantry Divisions, and the 10th Mountain Division. Still another went directly to Benning and activated a brigade of the 10th MD, assuming command with I suppose just himself and his Sergeant Major to start with.
I mention these things not as a trip down memory lane, but to illustrate how staff experience, along with schooling, BUT underpinned by that initial experience with troops at your career's beginning, cumulatively prepare you for high (meaning at brigade or higher) command. If one part is missing, you are not adequately prepared. It must be the right kind of staff experience though. You can't be on the shit shovel overwatch staff at Fort Swampy. Alabama, and expect your next assignment to be command of the Big Red One.
The T word: Would you expect George Patton to be at home running special operations in Yugoslavia? Would you expect John Mosby to be at his best commanding the amphibious operation at Iwo Jima? The one thing that separates the successful from the unsuccessful practitioners of the art is a thorough preparation in the specific part of the art form. The guy who dabbles in water colors and becomes very good, may not be so good when taking up oils. If the water color guy trains to the task and in the process learns all he can about oil painting, he may very well transition acceptably, and find success in that other arena. Spike Jones was a musician, but I highly doubt that he was able to perform Wagner in the way it was meant to be performed. Given time and training though, if he was a good musician, he could have.
So the lesson for today from the 28th Book of Gospel, is that officers must be both experienced (meaning schooling, training, and application) and must be well rounded, with that training and application, being broad, AND, AND, AND, you train and prepare yourself for the specific task, in the specific environment before, the band strikes up Garry Owen and you march out the gates of Fort Lincoln.
I do not believe any of the officers in the 7th Cavalry had the requisite experience for what they set about to do. I further believe that the one who most closely approached the standard was Benteen, but that is not saying all that much.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 8, 2016 16:40:27 GMT
As most of you are veterans of the brown board, what I am about to say will either e familiar to you or at least not be a surprise.
I will address a certain person's posts and the tone, tenor and substance of what he has said in the past, without rancor or derision, simply stating the facts and pointing out why what he has previously said point to the fact that his knowledge of the Army, and therefore the basis of the subject matter under discussion is at the knowledge level of a child playing soldier in his back yard, and not that required of a mature adult having as complete a knowledge as possible of the military profession.
This person views the staff officer as some manner of incompetent to command flunky, good for no more higher responsibilities that the carrying of messages, and making sure his commanders boots and brass are shined honor bright. You may go way, way back in the Way Back Machine of that board, to verify what I have just said. It is still there for all to read.
This person also, by virtue of the infamous "I had dinner with a cavalry colonel" post see that this person views a successful, therefore the kind he wanted to be, officer, as one who is constantly with troops, climbing the ladder from company to battalion to regiment/brigade and beyond based solely upon his troop experience. Reread it if you must, then read between the lines of what he says.
Those of you who read the Sharpe novels as I do will remember one of the main characters that flows through all the novels set n Spain. I can't remember his name, but the character was Wellington's Exploring Officer, a member of Wellington's staff that ranged far and wide to obtain information for his chief. Many of Sharpe's adventures were in service to this Exploring Officer. Other vital staff position character's also make their appearance from time to time as well, as their vital functions are inserted into the story. To be sure there were a fair amount of "staff" officers who were indeed messengers and personal aides. The reason for that is that in most instances the officers were the only ones able to read and write, and their military knowledge exceeded the "this is my rifle, this is my gun" knowledge of the average enlisted soldier of the time, Sergeant Harper being a notable exception.
I write this to illustrate that staff functions were known at the time, and while they were not as nearly sophisticated as they are today, they were still vital to the functionality of an Army and the function of command. To deny this is an indicator of no depth of military knowledge.
Had that person been given the answer he sought at that infamous dinner, and had the answer been true, a career path of just command only assignments would have produced an officer of little usefulness. He would have probably been fine at platoon and company, but as a battalion, brigade, and divisional level commander that person would have been a miserable performer, for he would not possess a background that would enable him to function.
When you are playing soldier in the backyard, or in momma's basement you can be a commander until your heart's content. No one on the playground wants to be the nuts and bolts guy, who insures that the information is gathered, the troops fed, the plans formulated, and the trucks have adequate fuel for the mission. No one on the playground whishes to be the person learning the trade and performing a vital function in so doing, but rather the guy who runs the show.
Again this command only path is fine in backyard or basement, but to think that is how officer's develop, and that the backyard and basement attitudes reflect the real world shows an immaturity and lack of knowledge that the word astounding does not adequately describe.
Therefore, dear friends, paraphrasing the words of Christ Himself on the Cross of Salvation. Forgive him, for he does not know shit from Shinola.
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Post by Beth on Oct 8, 2016 19:40:34 GMT
I'd like to make a point of clarification about the British system when it came to officers-or at least as far as I understand it. At that time Army commissions were bought, entry level was a cornet or Ensign. A young man's ability to gain rank depended on the families ability to buy a higher rank and that rank being available for purchase up to the rank of Lt. Colonel-promotion after that point was based on merit and most likely family connections.
Commissions were expensive so it meant that officers came from the ranks of the Gentleman and Peer classes. Families would buy the commissions because it meant the younger sons had respectable employment for their class and even an income when they retired at half pay. A half pay officer's income was better than the average citizen's income but did not keep up with the lifestyle that they may have grown up with.
It was because these young men came from the upper part of society that they had skills like reading and writing. Their ability to handle a gun and ride are also skills developed from hunting. They were viewed as leaders because of the long standing class divides that existed in society at that time.
As for the 'I had dinner with a Cavalry officer conversation. I'm not sure that the posts no longer exist especially since I was the other person in that conversation.
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 8, 2016 19:54:42 GMT
Major Nairn or Major Hogan?
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Post by quincannon on Oct 8, 2016 20:20:11 GMT
Points about purchased commissions, educational levels and stratified societies, are well made and accurate. That is why the Thin Red Line, usually ends - led by fools. That is only accurate in the Land of Sometimes.
The cavalry colonel dinner is still up I believe, but it does not really matter who the conversation was between. or if one party was boastful. What matters is the childlike view expressed within the meaning of the content. It indicated a complete lack of knowledge of how officers are developed. It betrayed no knowledge whatsoever of career paths. You will recall that the poster indicated that this dinner was a turning point for him. If he could not be with troops in the cavalry ( a branch that no longer exists) that he did not wish to be an officer. The validity of that statement may be questioned as to reason proffered, but not in the viewpoint expressed, a viewpoint based on lack of basic knowledge. Those are the points. The only points.
Back in that day, 1813 and 1876, the prime qualifications for an officer, were literacy, with a grasp of both history and geography. Changing times have caused these requirements to expand exponentially. Today, before you even think about applying for the training to become an officer, you had better have a grinding into the brain level of knowledge of English (including literature) at least one foreign language, History, Geography (geology also helps), Political Science, and recently Religious Studies. All this must be thoroughly reinforced with a grounding in mathematics and chemistry. Mind you this is before you even open the book on fine tuning your leadership skills, and well before you learn the first thing about tactics and the physical tools of your new profession. Your continuing education, beyond going to your service school requirements, should mandate that you immerse yourself ideally in the culture of your area of most likely employment.
SIDEBAR: Consider if this last, immersing in culture, had been a mandatory requirement for the officers of the 7th Cavalry. Would the approach to the tactical problem presented have been the same?
The overarching point I wish to make consistent with the questions previously asked, the comments made, and the title of this thread, is that what you see on display, is the end of a very long road, the road of varied experiences, and those experiences leading in but one direction toward the goal of military competence. Those, at the end of the day, that are deemed competent by history, are when you look at their backgrounds, all well rounded, who have paused and gained the most at the stations, along the railroad to the top. You can't skip a station, or stay at a station, and end up with the same result.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 8, 2016 20:20:52 GMT
Hogan is the one I was thinking of.
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Post by Beth on Oct 9, 2016 2:16:42 GMT
My point about still being up since I was banned from the site, I don't know if my posts were all deleted and if so, if he would leave his responses to questions. I do remember the conversation well because I was stunned by his statement. That person and I are nearly the same age and even I who had very little exposure with the military knew that there was no horse cavalry left in the mid 70's, but it could be because I remembered seeing something about the last cavalry horse dying a few years earlier-I have a brain that holds onto useless trivia and forgets what I want to commit to memory. Sometimes it is easy to find a detail to blame such a detail for the reason you failed rather than just not measuring up.
I don't think anyone in 1876 would have even considered immersing themselves into Indian culture. I'm not even sure if they thought of NA of having culture. Once you say a group has a culture, they are no longer savages that need to be civilized.
Didn't officers leaving West Point have a better than average education--usually with an emphasis in engineering? I wonder though if when your family has a long tradition of military service if in the post Civil War climate, if you might have been helped along more than average-especially if you could keep your nose clean when it came to demerits. A large number of the 7th officers had ties to family members-fathers, grandfathers who were in the upper ranks of the military.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Oct 9, 2016 11:42:06 GMT
Custer had experience as a staff officer( at least twice ), balloon jockey, scouting functions, Brigade Commander, Regimental 2nd (10 years from the inception of the 7th). He was in fact the Regimental Commander of the 7th, as the Commander was always deployed elsewhere. He was basically your Action Jackson figure, but poor as an administrator, delegator, or trainer.
Staff officers have performed admirably and interchangeably as needed (Walter Bedell Smith, Hugh Lennox Scott, Maxwell Davenport Taylor, to name a few). Chuck you may not fully support my list, I thought I would make it a wee bit eclectic.
Lastly, there was a company commander escorting the pack train, that had had experience fighting not only Plains Indians, but Apaches as well. HE HAD MORE EXPERIENCE THAN MANY WHO ACCOMPANIED CUSTER OR RENO!
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 9, 2016 12:23:56 GMT
The trouble was Tom, that this officer could not get is company in line and ready to move in time, and by the unwritten rule of the day suffered the penalty, as the last one in line had the job of protecting the pack train.
I know that all top commanding officers should be able manage their staff and administration as well as be a fighting commander, but in the past there was a difference, in 1942 the German army had fighting commanders like Model and Rommel, but Von Paulus was placed in charge of the 6th army and one of his failings was that he was a staff officer and not a fighter.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Oct 9, 2016 13:23:10 GMT
Ian, the Captain I was referring to(McDougal) was late to officers call, his company could have been ready as fast as any other. A good manager does not leave a good hitter on the bench, because he missed batting practice to circumstance.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Oct 9, 2016 13:38:13 GMT
As an aside, maybe not germane, 5 of the 24 MOH's were awarded to his company, B.
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Post by Beth on Oct 9, 2016 14:11:49 GMT
Do you think it would have made any difference if McDougal hadn't been with the mules? Did Custer consider his counsel of value? Other than Tom Custer were there any officers that Custer would have listened to or he was a "I make all the calls' kind of guy.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 9, 2016 14:30:26 GMT
Beth: The applicable word regarding cavalry was branch not horse. The last horse cavalry n the U S Army was in late 1943 with the dismounting of the 2nd Cavalry Division, prior to their deployment to North Africa. Cavalry thereafter was mechanized. The branch ceased to exist by act of Congress in 1949, when the branch was disbanded, and new legislation created the Armor Branch, with an unusual special note, citing Armor was to be a continuation of Cavalry. At that point three things happened 1) Former Cavalry officers became Armor officers. 2) Cavalry became a battlefield function that being reconnaissance and security. Certain historic units ( The 5th, 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments) reorganized as Infantry, retaining their cavalry designation.
Today there are more cavalry units in the force than Armor. Most of them are the reconnaissance squadrons that belong to each brigade combat team, and each divisional aviation brigade has an Attack/Reconnaissance squadron designated cavalry. There are also two Stryker and one armored Brigades that carry cavalry designations. The Stryker and Armored brigades are commanded and officered by a mixture of Armor Branch and Infantry Branch people, in about equal numbers. The attack/recon squadrons are purely Aviation Branch.
The point with that poster is that he thought evidently that ///////////////// I just don't know. I do not have the words. He was in a time warp of fantasy like it was still 1876.
Ian: You have accidently his on a point. The career path of an officer alternates staff and line assignment for the very purpose of finding out who is better at what. There are some fine, very competent staff officers that should never command anything. There are also some excellent, top of the mark commanders that by temperament are piss poor on any staff.
No you don't leave your most experienced player on the bench. That itself indicates a pettiness that is beyond rational belief.
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