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Post by quincannon on Dec 1, 2016 22:09:34 GMT
I think what you said Colt would be especially true if those few Indians were dug in (figurative) in that bulge to the left side of the crossing point Ian used. Enfilading fire would be much more devastating than frontal if Custer tried to trim down to a column for crossing purposes.
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colt45
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Post by colt45 on Dec 1, 2016 22:48:04 GMT
Agreed, Chuck. The sides of that U-shaped funnel caused by the river is where I would hit Custer if I were the Indians, and he tried crossing in a column. It would be a turkey shoot, and who knows, maybe that is exactly what he tried to do with at least 1 company and that is what the Indian accounts are telling us about the aborted crossing attempt. If so, it's no wonder he aborted and went back to CR and BRE.
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mac
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Post by mac on Dec 1, 2016 23:37:50 GMT
Great to have your input Colt! The last thing here is that the warriors with the women and children were old, experienced guys who may well have had repeaters. We know Lame White Man was there (at 36 considered an old warrior) and that he left a sweat lodge, wrapped a blanket around himself and grabbed his gun. So they were not just using bows. This gives us a completely plausible and probable reason why Custer was not able to cross and in fact was probably repelled quite quickly much as accounts relate. Bearing in mind that we know Cemetery Ridge was involved and that Custer had just passed there and now had an idea of the terrain. My question now is, how do you withdraw? That is, what deployments do you use to move away from the river? Cheers
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colt45
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Post by colt45 on Dec 2, 2016 1:55:26 GMT
If we assume Yan's layout of companies at ford D was what Custer used, then you basically have to reverse the movement. C company becomes the lead unit in the withdrawal, followed by L and I companies. THis leaves E and F to cover the others, so the lead units become the tail units. C, I, and L move back to BRE and E and F move back to CR. These are the two high ground areas closest to the the attempted ford point and allows the troops to cover the ravine that divides those high ground areas.
If only 1 or 2 companies were going to cross, covered by the other 3 from further behind, then the lead 1 or 2 pull back under cover of the other 3 that presumably were far enough back from the ford to still cover the withdrawal, but not so close as to have to themselves move out immediately. If Custer had approached using the bell that QC described, then the lead units fold back on the "bell", making it transform into more of a line while the flank companies begin to withdraw.
Based on the map and where the river was in 1876, I don't think Custer approached in the Panzer Glock. I think it was more like what Yan showed on the map. I think the foliage his map shows was there in 1876 because trees are always found close to a water source and there is no reason to think that area would have been barren. The terrain, if it was anything like Yan's map, funnels a large unit into the U-shaped crossing point we discussed earlier, plus it affords the cavalry a good view into the north end of the village. The downside is that the crossing point is made for a defender, with the river on 3 sides and the crossing point being a constricted area.
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Post by quincannon on Dec 2, 2016 3:55:47 GMT
Mac asks difficult questions, difficult to adequately answer that is.
What would be the (fill in the blank)? From our present perspective, knowing what we know, the answers are nearly always apparent. We fall back on training, sift and sort the situation, and come up with what our best judgment tells us is the answer. Such is the case with Panzer Glock, or Panzer Schlock for that matter. I think it is the correct solution based upon my training and what I know of the situation. My training is not Custer's training. My personality is not Custer's personality. My knowledge of the situation is much clearer than what Custer had to work with. I know for instance where the other guy was, and when it counted Custer did not.
So Mac's questions are hard, because he asks what I and others think and none of us are George Custer on that particular Sunday afternoon in June. Hell if we were, knowing what we know, we would have won the damned battle, had a Bar B Q, and gone home.
Now if we go on what Custer knew, there is a high probability that Ian's array of forces on his last map would be pretty close to being correct, in my view. If he had not detected anyone at the river (I think Colt is correct with the vegetation near water. That's the way it is here, and here is not all that much different than there) he would have approached it fairly slowly. His companies would most likely have been in company column (still arrayed more like Ian map, not playing company follow the {battalion} leader). As he neared the timber it would probably look quite similar to the picture Ian posted.
From there I don't intend to repeat what Colt wrote. Once shot at and realizing he was not going to get across, he would have fallen back using either method Colt outlined,
Giving Mark due credit. Custer leaves the impression of being a completely unsophisticated tactician. He never had to be. He always played the role of toolbox and never the mechanic. Given that Chhhhaaaaarrrrrgggggeeee, was his screwdriver, his wrench, his hammer, and his plyers.
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Post by yanmacca on Dec 2, 2016 13:15:20 GMT
The scrub, brush and trees that cover the river area would funnel Custer’s battalion as it approached the ford and as the military folks have said this would place the cavalry in an area where they could be hit on three sides, and I would guess that the last thing they wanted would be to dismount and try to winkle out defenders from this close terrain, as the old saying goes that would be a job for the infantry. Custer would or should have noticed this choke point and it wouldn’t surprise me if the whole column halted and one company was sent forward. This does relate to Indian accounts that a single group approached the river and some even say that a detail from this group rode to the center of the river and then drew fire from the defenders, and some say one or two were hit;
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azranger
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Post by azranger on Dec 2, 2016 13:51:11 GMT
You guys are beginning to scare me. This makes to much sense. It has Custer on offense until way to late in the battle. It is surprising how far they made it back.
I think this is pretty close to what I believe happened.
Good job to you all.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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azranger
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Post by azranger on Dec 2, 2016 13:59:07 GMT
Tom
This is close to Grandma Real Bird's house.
Steve
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Post by yanmacca on Dec 2, 2016 15:55:47 GMT
Steve, it does look far but with you being a horseman and knowing the terrain like you do, could you hazard a guess at how long it would take you to nip across NFRC, up over them hills and travel along the LCN complex, straight across to battle ridge, right around BRE to end up on the area near ford D. I would expect that the conditions be dry too, so would it be asking too much of this unit to do this trek? And would the amount of time taken to complete this journey rule it out for any military value.
In other words, would it be worth the effort!
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azranger
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Post by azranger on Dec 2, 2016 16:03:59 GMT
Ian
It would look doable on preferred terrain and I think they could do it. First the excitement to get to the other end of the village and then the fear factor to get out of there.
Looking from the cemetery area it looks like terrain favorable to cavalry. It's that last look approaching the crossing that turns things around.
This would not effect what we are talking about but selecting a D ford below the housing would require putting back the timber and fill removed for the road.
I see where I am going to be looking June 2017.
Regards
Steve
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azranger
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Post by azranger on Dec 2, 2016 16:11:13 GMT
I have sighted in my two carbines both have iron sights one has an Aimpoint and the other an EOTech optic. Monday starts the carbine course at Gunsite. Got to love a class that states bring a minimum of 6 30 round magazines. If loaded to 28 each that is 168 rounds on your person.
Regards
Steve
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Post by yanmacca on Dec 2, 2016 16:32:34 GMT
I have always thought that if you had a B.A.R and a Colt M1911 pistol, that you would be armed enough to look after yourself in a street fight, not that I have ever been in one mind you, but I suppose if the criminal element raises the bar by using rapid fire weapons, then so should the law, which sounds rather strange from an English man whose police force carry only a pepper spray and a stick.
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Post by quincannon on Dec 2, 2016 17:53:51 GMT
Myself I would prefer a tank in a street fight in a bad neighborhood. But that's just me and I am on blood thinning drugs.
The B.A.R. and the 1911A1 are good powerful weapons. The B.A.R. was the preferred weapon of Clyde Barrow, when he and Bonnie Parker roamed the Mid West. BUT to bring this back on topic, it is not the weapon, but the skill of the man behind the weapon that counts.
Case in point, and dealing with the very subject of the crossing point at Ford D. The cavalry was armed with a superior weapon for long range engagement, but many of those so armed were not skilled in its use. The Indians were armed with a variety of weapons, some going as far back as the stone age, while others were modern rapid fire, but with a shorter effective range. Like the cavalry individual skill was spotty, but when you depend on using that weapon to eat, you can make the assumption that there were more skilled in the use of their weapons, than the cavalry were in theirs.
So to the crossing point. Using what they had, and the physical characteristics of the terrain, the Indians made better use of theirs than the cavalry could with their own.
So the next time you enter a dark alley with a B.A.R. and sidearm, remember there may be some guy waiting for you that is gangbusters with a stone and slingshot, and he just may kill you.
I have tried for three days to concentrate on my latest project USS Scott, named for Rear Admiral Norman Scott MOH, Dave, KIA on 13 November 42 on Atlanta, when you dad's ship Portland was in trail behind him. The conversation over these last days has been so interesting that you all are inhibiting my progress and should be ashamed of yourselves. On second thought, the Scott can wait a little longer.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Dec 2, 2016 18:12:22 GMT
Steve I think that is Grandma's house in the corner by the bend in the white single lane rd..
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mac
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Post by mac on Dec 3, 2016 21:24:15 GMT
Looking at Ian's map above, the C, I, L, formation extends back nearly to the highway. If they are supporting as E and F retire from the ford that places them out near the trading post where we have a report of a couple of markers. It also puts them moving up onto BRE within range of the warrior firing positions found along the highway. Would they be that far north? Does this fit? Cheers
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