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Post by quincannon on Jun 22, 2016 14:30:02 GMT
Jumping out of an aircraft over enemy territory, except for special operations, is as obsolete a concept as David's flinging stones with his slingshot.
Our armies will continue to spend large amounts of shrinking treasure on this stupid shit, because tradition and the glories of the past are more important to them than modern combat competence.
When was the last time that the British Army made a mass drop into combat? In the U S Army, there were two in Korea, one in Vietnam. and a company sized operation in Iraq early on, and that last was into territory held by friendlies.
Air defenses are far too sophisticated for this type nonsense on a large scale. We know it, but still the fiction continues.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 22, 2016 20:39:22 GMT
When was the last time that the British Army made a mass drop into combat? In the U S Army, there were two in Korea, one in Vietnam. and a company sized operation in Iraq early on, and that last was into territory held by friendlies. I think I was in WW2 mode Chuck. We still have a parachute regiment and although they haven’t done any done any large scale jumps since 1956, they were supposed to land in battalion strength during the invasion or Iraq in 2003 and take an airfield but this was postponed because motorised units got there first, even before that they were going to do a similar job in 2001 at Bagram air base in Afghanistan, but Tony Blair pulled the plug.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 23, 2016 3:24:42 GMT
So if we have not done any large scale mass drops, mass being defined as above regimental combat team/brigade since WWII, and the most likely occurrence for such operations is at the battalion level, why does the United States Army maintain at outrageous expense five brigade combat teams of airborne soldier, who the moment they hit the ground become inadequately equipped Infantry, made so because of their means of strategic mobility and insertion?
You will always need the capability for forced entry. That is a given. Even the threat of that forced entry capability makes your adversary spread himself thin. That is a good thing. But, enemies are also fairly good a math, and understand that lift is the determining factor for all airborne operations. At this very moment we would have great difficulty mustering the lift for a ABCT.
Another factor to consider is if that operations, loses a good part of that lift capability to enemy action. It may sound callous but it is far faster and easier to replace those paratroops and air crews lost, then it would be to replace those airframes. Those are the things that a war planner, and force structure weenie life myself think about, not the state of morale on Eubank Field or the Green Ramp at Pope.
You research how many transport airframes the RAF can muster for strategic lift tonight, then you will know what size your airborne force should be. I would wager that your calculations will reveal that you can probably put one heavily reinforced company into the air, remembering that some of those airframes must be reserved for resupply and sustainment.
It ain't 1944 anymore, and armies that don't change doctrine, outlook, and ways and means ---DIE.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 23, 2016 12:05:00 GMT
Chuck, I think that the emphasis is now on a Joint Rapid Reaction Force, this force can be made ready within forty eight hours. It comes in three phases with the first being the Spearhead Force which contains elements of the SAS and SBS, this is the land element which also contains a single light infantry battalion or even a commando group. It also has a naval element which has two frigates or destroyers and a submarine, this element also has its own auxiliary fleet.
The second phase is called the first echelon which contains a landing force from either 3 commando or 16 assault brigade.
The third phase is called the Second echelon which contains the heavy stuff like the 1st armoured division and 3rd mechanised division, this too would also have a major naval force at its disposal.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 23, 2016 12:42:36 GMT
I am assuming that the one battalion in the spearhead is the Para battalion assigned to the Special Forces Support Group. Of that force you will probably insert by airborne assault one reinforced company at a time. That of course depends largely on the mission and situation.
The fact that the planning involves a joint operation is a very good step in the right direct, but remember that aircraft move a heck of a lot faster than destroyers and submarines, so the reality is that 48 hours may not be a valid figure at all depending again upon the situation.
16th Air Assault or 3 Commando Brigades must move either by land or sea. Neither have complete air assault capability, but can be mostly transported by air. What is the range from start point to target, Where are friendly staging areas located in route if that range exceeds that of your primary transport aircraft. Does such a staging area actually exist, and is the proprietor sympathetic with your goals and objectives. For instance you guys would have been SOL in the Falklands had not your cousin lent you the keys to the Azores.
We still have not addressed the question though, which is - In the year of our Lord 2016 is a large airborne (not airmobile or airliftable force numbering five brigade combat teams necessary, given the great expense in both organizing, but also in training and maintain, for what is essentially an inadequately equipped force for modern mid intensity combat on the ground, once they have been landed, and is the air component sufficiently robust to maintain an air bridge which may span many thousands of miles, for the month and a half to two months it will take for heavy follow on forces to arrive.
These are the questions that must be asked and answered before some young man steps out the door and yells Geronimo.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 23, 2016 13:09:09 GMT
The 16 air assault brigade is the largest brigade in the British army, and this force of around 8.000 personnel only contains four infantry battalions (two para and two air assault), I think that the strength of each of these battalions is around the 500 mark, but there was reports that this force would be cut by up to a third so I don’t know what it will be by 2020.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 23, 2016 13:57:37 GMT
My friend Jack who knows a thing or two about these matters, at the highest level tells often that the National Command Authority is always saying let's send a brigade in to clean up this situation or that. What numbers are we talking about Jack? The answer is always the same - Oh about 20K give or take. These response is always the same too. Jack a brigade is only about four thousand or so, why is the number so high (thinking cheap with expensive play toys again). The numbers are so high Mr. President or Mr. Secretary because you must sustain the forces you send in, and a brigade cannot sustain itself. OK, that's different then. Let's send in a division, that should do the trick. Oh that's very different Mr. President, or Mr. Secretary, with a division you only need forty thousand, and you wont have a worry in the world. At this time you see Mr. President or Mr. Secretary pulling their hair out as they come to grips with the stark reality of logistics.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 23, 2016 14:14:26 GMT
Well Chuck, some say that it takes ten soldiers to keep one combat soldier fighting, but some think that is too high and in reality it is around three to one, but bayonet strength will always be lower than the total of support troops.
I will be off to work in about an hour or so to do evening shift, then it is down to the ballot box to vote on what could turn out to be our Independence day.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 12, 2019 20:37:06 GMT
Looking at the Fetterman Massacre and how large the garrison was at Fort Phil Kearny. On line it says that the military component included thus; 18th/27th Infantry [5 x companies] 9 x Officers 1 x Surgeon 329 x Ems Company C 2nd Cavalry 1 x Officer 60 x EMs Total of 400 troops
The site says 'Five infantry companies of the 18th/27th Infantry, including the newly recruited Company K, 27th' would this mean two battalions from different regiments?
The other people in the fort were 150 civilian quartermaster and contractor employees.
I have yet to find if the fort contained any engineers, I know they had canon but even gunners are not on the list, unless these soldiers were among the 340 infantry at the fort.
A mix of Cavalry [27] and Infantry [49] went out to face the Indians, all in all 81 men. That still left 319 in the fort.
FT PK;
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Post by quincannon on Jan 12, 2019 21:17:54 GMT
No Ian not two battalions of two regiments. Remember what I have often said - To understand the U S Army all you need know is the 3rd Infantry is actually the first infantry. We designate units numerically. The 3rd Infantry (The Old Guard) is our oldest Infantry Regiment, being the first one that was organized. Confused yet?
During the ACW the US Army organized Infantry Regiments 11 to 19. Supposedly to save money each regiment was to have three battalions. These were not battalions designed to operate together, and each of them was of 8 companies. As such it was similar to the British system, in that two battalions were to be in the field wherever they were needed, while the third battalion was the recruit depot.
After the ACW wiser heads prevailed, and the first battalions of each regiment 11-19 were designated as the 11th thru 19th Infantry Regiments, and expanded to 10 companies. The second battalions were similarly redesignated starting with the number 20.
So, the 18th Infantry at Fort Phil Kearny, until just before December 1866 was actually the 2nd Battalion 18th Infantry, that had not yet been given its new designation. Actually that is not correct either, as 2/18 had been redesignated earlier in the year on orders, but it had yet to take effect. News travels slow. When they were redesignated, news arriving shortly after Fetterman shot his wad, 2/18 became the 27th Infantry Regiment. Three years later the Army realized it had bitten off more than it could chew and reduced the number of Infantry regiments from forty five to twenty five. They did this by merging two or more regiments into one. For us the process is called consolidation, In the British Army it is called amalgamation.
So in 1869 the 27th Infantry, consolidated with the 9th Infantry to become the 9th Infantry (Manchu). The 9th Infantry spent the entire ACW in California, so when you look at their accumulated battle honors, all of them for the ACW were earned by 2/18, and Wyoming 1867-67, and maybe one or two more came from the 27th Infantry
NOTE: Today's 27th Infantry (Wolfhounds), nor the 18th Infantry (the old 1/18) are in anyway connected with the unit at Fort Phil.
NOTE TO A NOTE: When a unit was reduced to zero strength before the year 1923, there was no legal way to keep the regiments name and previous history on the rolls of the Army, in an inactive status. Therefore when a unit was no longer needed it was disbanded. The National Defense Act passed just after WWI changed that mainly at the insistence of WWI vets, who wished to see the history of their units preserved against the possibility of future need. Today, we can activate a unit off of the Army rolls, fill it with people and things, and it carries the previous history and battle honor of that unit, that may have been inactive for many years.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jan 13, 2019 1:03:17 GMT
Not that this anything to with the above conversation. If you go Ft. P.K. you can see the entire footers of the fort. You are just mins. of the Wagon Box Fight and where Fetterman bit his bullet. The folks there and the museum are great. And, you just shy of an hour from the LBH battlefield. You are near the Hayfield fight.
Regards, Tom
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 13, 2019 15:33:07 GMT
So you could cover all four battlefields in a day then Tom, or do the LBH one day and the other three the following. Here is another couple of images to go with the Ft. PK one;
The Hayfield image show the disposition of the defenders, don't know if this was a random formation or structured to the commanders taste.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 13, 2019 15:48:24 GMT
Chuck, I know that my military tactics are rudimentary, but looking at the Fetterman battle, I can't help feel that they played into the Indians hands, I mean why would you send out a detachment of Infantry and expect them to keep up with cavalry, it looks pretty obvious to me that these two units would end up being separated.
This was a rescue mission and what I would have done was used my full component of cavalry [61 in all] and a full company of Infantry. Now I have read that there was a ridge line between the fort and the battlefield, which obviously blocks all LOS. So I would have stationed my Infantry company on this ridge line and sent the cavalry forward to find the missing wood cutters. Apparently the howitzers at the fort fired on a group of hostiles who crossed over this ridge line and drove them off, so if my Infantry company had to get back to the fort it would be covered by these guns.
Having this company on the ridge line would cover any retreat by the company of cavalry, if it got into trouble, which it did, so by being mounted this company could gallop back to the ridge line under the cover of a skirmish line, then both detachments could fall back to the fort under the cover of the howitzers.
By using the full company of cavalry, I am only twenty men short of the 80 Fetterman took, that being that all of mine would be mounted and have repeating carbines.
BTW; By looking at the fort, you can see that it is surrounded by thick woods, so why the hell would send out a detachment of wood cutters to go miles away to cut wood when you are in touching distance of a whole forest.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 13, 2019 16:16:56 GMT
Having been there, and looking at the surrounding terrain. I personally would not have ventured outside the fort's port-a-potty.
Fetterman disobeyed his orders not to go over Lodge Trail Ridge. Those orders were issued for a reason, and meant just what they said. As with Custer at LBH you can do the right thing, the wrong way, and many time prevail in spite of your own ineptitude, but if you do the wrong thing, even in the right way, you generally get snookered. In going over that ridge Fetterman did the wrong thing, and seeing that ground as I have, had he had been the best small unit tactician in the world he was not going to change that outcome.
It is not the number of men you have, or whether they are Infantry or cavalry that matters. It is what you do with them.
Keep in mind that December, the Infantry was still equipped with muzzle loading rifles. They would be reequipped with single shot breech loaders before the Wagon Box Fight that followed, and in that case the rifles made the difference firing from a fortified position. Fetterman though on the terrain he fought on, and against the numbers he fought against would have either needed Divine intervention or be equipped with assault rifles. I am sure the first could have saved him, but not all that sure about the assault rifles.
Also in those days, going outside the fort, even on sentry duty close by, much less wood cutting, was dangerous business. Many a sentry was shot at just patroling outside the gates. I don't know why they set up these woodcutter camps, maybe our old friend Tyree does, but I am going to assume that the wood cut, was for construction and not fire wood, so maybe it was the species and length of the trees that most concerned them.
As for a five in one day. Fort Phil will take you an hour. The Fetterman site another. The Wagon Box and Hayfield are good for fifteen minutes and a yawn apiece. The LBH site, if you do it right will take three or four days.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jan 13, 2019 17:35:52 GMT
From the Fetterman site you can see the wheel ruts of the Bozeman Trail.
Regards, Tom
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