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Post by quincannon on Jul 18, 2015 17:20:04 GMT
Expedition Commander: Brigadier General George Crook
Tactical Commander: Colonel Joseph J. Reynolds, 3rd Cavalry
For the expedition the total force was divided into six battalions and a pack train. Three of the battalions, the 2nd (CPT William C. Hawley), 4th (CPT Thomas Dewees), 6th (CPT Edwin M. Coates), and the pack train (Mr. Thomas Moore) remained in the area of Otter Creek, Montana and did not participate in the battle.
The following units constituted Reynolds' strike force
1st Battalion - CPT Mills Company E, 3rd Cavalry - 1LT John B. Johnson Company M, 3rd Cavalry - CPT Anson Mills
3rd Battalion - CPT Noyes Company I, 2nd Cavalry - CPT Henry E Noyes Company K, 2nd Cavalry - CPT James Egan
5th Battalion - CPT Moore Company E, 2nd Cavalry - 1LT William C. Rawolle Company F, 3rd Cavalry - CPT Alexander Moore
Approximate strength 379
Reynolds attacked a village consisting of no more than 250 members of the Lakota Sioux and Northern Cheyenne Nations.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jul 18, 2015 18:25:29 GMT
After initial success, Reynolds fortunes were somewhat reversed, and Reynolds later suffered a courts martial. This action set Crook back several months if I am not mistaken.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Jul 18, 2015 20:20:19 GMT
Don't think you are mistaken at all. Reynolds got himself in a lot of trouble both for his handling of Powder River as well as issues unassociated with it. There were a lot of non-battle casualties associated with this operation as well.
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dave
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Post by dave on Jul 18, 2015 21:25:04 GMT
Reynolds acted very similar to how GAC handled the LBH in that he did not scout the area before attacking and he split his force up into smaller sections without coordination and burned all captured stores. Bad day. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Jul 18, 2015 21:37:07 GMT
The part of this action that sticks out most in my mind, is a statement by I think Bourke that relates that they actually had to chop holes in the ice in the river, to thaw limbs that would otherwise have suffered frostbite, the under ice river water being warmer than the outside air temperature.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Jul 19, 2015 18:06:30 GMT
QC Would you consider the battle of Powder river as the 1st battle of the Centennial campaign (great Sioux War) since it occurred in 1876? Regards Dave
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 19, 2015 18:57:07 GMT
This battle was fought under totally different weather conditions to the BLBH plus the casualty figures were very much lower too, this would give you the opinion that the two battles were poles apart.
They did in fact had a lot of things in common, the fact that is was US Cavalry against the Sioux and a village was involved makes comparable it some ways. It featured a three pronged attack with one battalion (two companies) splitting with one company going up the bluffs from the south, whilst the other captured the pony herd.
Another battalion (two companies) was to charge village around the same time as the company on the bluffs made its attack. The third battalion (two companies) was to block the Indian escape route.
The Cavalry misjudged the distance of the village by a mile and this along with difficult terrain threw the timings out, resulting in only one company actually making their assault.
So the battle did have certain similarities with BLBH, it had battalions split into penny packets, timings threw out of kilter because of the terrain and flanking moves over bluffs.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 19, 2015 19:17:05 GMT
Dave: I would.
Also agree with Ian here. I think Reynolds had the right idea, and knew his force was capable of taking care of a relatively small village. I don't even have a lot of heartburn with his scheme of maneuver. His main failing was timing and execution, and looking at that picture Chris posted I think you can see just how difficult the terrain was, when you add in ground conditions and weather, what may have been good on a spring or summer's day, may have foiled him in late winter.
I believe the lesson to be learned here is that the more you have outside forces effecting what you want to do, the more simple and straightforward you approach to doing must be.
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 20, 2015 12:47:38 GMT
I don't know why Reynolds took one of his battalions out of the action to cover any escape, surly with the weather being so bad that any groups that escaped the net would die of exposure, as these would have ran for their lives taking little or nothing along with them.
Personally I would have committed every battalion I had to the attack, if any did get away then they wouldn't last long.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 20, 2015 15:44:53 GMT
Ian: I am not sure there was enough maneuver room to commit everything. The photo does not look like there is, but I think you would have to see a map to be sure.
You are talking about Moore's battalion being held out to watch for escape, and where he was placed could lead one to think that was his only mission. Tell you the truth though I just don't know. I will go to Bourke sometime today and see if he sheds light on this.
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mac
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Post by mac on Aug 11, 2015 1:07:31 GMT
Given the similarities QC mentions above there are similarities in the lack of preparation prior to the attack and this leading to the plan being uncoordinated. Reynold's good fortune was attacking a village where he actually had numerical superiority. Probably because it was winter. Custer hit a summer gathering of tightly packed tipis. Does this reveal a flaw in the army approach that is seen here and for that matter at Washita? Poor preparation! Should more have been learned before LBH? Cheers
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Post by Beth on Aug 11, 2015 4:19:52 GMT
I think in order to learn, one has to see the lesson. They would have to realize that the failure of Powder River was from being unprepared, instead of blaming it on Reynolds.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 11, 2015 16:03:29 GMT
Fail to plan. Plan to fail.
Reynolds had a plan. Upon reflection it probably was not a very good plan, or one that was stabilized by adequate reconnaissance, but he had a plan, and that plan was communicated to his subordinates for execution.
A plan does not meet the basic requirement for a plan, if it is not communicated for execution, therefore it is not a plan, but a mental exercise. Custer was in the mental exercise business.
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mac
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Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Aug 11, 2015 22:09:17 GMT
Seems a complex plan given the conditions and the communications and faltered due to lack of enough knowledge of the actual location of the target. Very similar to LBH but at least everyone knew what they were trying to do. Cheers
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 8, 2015 23:37:10 GMT
Reynolds acted very similar to how GAC handled the LBH in that he did not scout the area before attacking and he split his force up into smaller sections without coordination and burned all captured stores. Bad day. Regards Dave Dave, You don't know how close to right you are.
Colonel Reynolds was accused of dereliction of duty for failing to properly support the first charge with his entire command; for burning the captured supplies, food, blankets, buffalo robes, and ammunition instead of keeping them for army use; and most of all, for losing hundreds of the captured horses. In January, 1877, his court-martial at Cheyenne, Wyoming Territory found Reynolds guilty of all three charges. He was sentenced to suspension from rank and command for one year for his conduct. His friend and West Point classmate, President Ulysses S. Grant remitted the sentence, but Joseph J. Reynolds never served again. He retired on disability leave on June 25, 1877, exactly one year after the Battle of Little Bighorn. Crook's and Reynolds's failed expedition and their inability to seriously damage the Lakota and Cheyenne at Powder River probably encouraged Indian resistance to the demands of the United States.
I have held on to this next, for a while, for reason. I hope you enjoy.
oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA396759
Regards, Tom
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