dave
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Post by dave on Nov 9, 2015 1:00:38 GMT
Deadwood I am reading the thesis now. I appreciate the heads up on this paper. Regards Dave
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dave
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Post by dave on Nov 10, 2015 1:33:56 GMT
I have finished reading the Colonel Joseph Reynolds thesis that deadwood posted. Very informative and easily readable paper. I was struck at the perception the army and US government had about the plains Indians. They were rather disparaging of the warriors courage and willingness to combat the army. I immediately thought about the US military's opinion and analysis of the Japanese military's capability prior to Pearl Harbor. Both times US forces forgot that the enemy will not behave and fight as they expected them to. I also discovered that Crook summarily had both Reynolds and Royall court-martialed after his defeats at Powder River and Rosebud. Not a flattering picture of a supposed hero and "best Indian fighter." Regards Dave
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Nov 10, 2015 2:08:07 GMT
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dave
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Post by dave on Nov 10, 2015 2:49:40 GMT
montrose Are we as a nation not making the same mistakes we make after every conflict or war? Ignoring or belittling our enemies and cutting the military budget. We draw down our forces while the enemy is still thriving especially the radical religious groups. How long after we went into Iraq and Afghanistan did it take for our military to provide better protected vehicles? We seem to make this mistake time after time. The old saw about "dogs and soldiers keep off the grass" seems to be true. Rudyard Kipling wrote a poem called Tommy
"But when it comes to fightin', Lord! they'll shove me in the stalls!
For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Tommy, wait outside";
But it's "Special train for Atkins" when the trooper's on the tide,
The troopship's on the tide, my boys, the troopship's on the tide,
O it's "Special train for Atkins" when the trooper's on the tide."
Regards Dave
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Post by Beth on Nov 10, 2015 2:58:48 GMT
I believe that part of war is to dehumanize your opponent. You don't fight your friends after all, you have to become distrusted enemies first.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 10, 2015 11:22:31 GMT
Ignore the Japanese at your own peril, here is an analysis written by the US army in 1944 about IJA tactics in the field; link
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dave
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Post by dave on Nov 10, 2015 16:28:41 GMT
Ian Wow! What an article. Thank you for posting it for us to read. Regards Dave
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Nov 11, 2015 8:29:06 GMT
The US Army section that wrote the IJA analysis also published monthly items on all enemies.
Here is a bit about German TTP for a meeting engagement.
a. The Meeting Engagement
(1) A meeting engagement means that a commander dispenses with preliminary preparations, and deploys straight into battle. Careful coordination and a determination to succeed on the part of all concerned will compensate for the absence of preliminary preparations.
(2) A commander will not commit himself to a meeting engagement unless either:
(a) he feels that his troops and leadership are superior to that of the enemy (this does not necessarily mean a numerical superiority) or;
(b) he would, by waiting to launch a deliberate attack, sacrifice ground which he cannot afford to lose.
(3) Sound tactical decisions in the initial stages are essential. Mistakes cannot afterwards be rectified. The worst mistake of all is hesitation.
(4) The advance guard will delay the enemy and seize important positions, e.g., for artillery OPs. It may therefore:
(a) attack with a limited objective;
(b) defend its existing positions;
(c) withdraw to more favorable positions. (Withdrawal is likely to hinder the deployment of the main body.)
(5) The main body will deploy immediately. To wait for further information in the hope of clarifying the situation is wrong. Time will be lost and lost time can never be regained. The time available determines whether the commander should concentrate his troops before launching them to the attack, or launch them on their tasks as they become available.
(6) The meeting engagement will normally take the form of a frontal attack by the advance guard, combined with one or more enveloping attacks by the main body.
If GAC had supported his advance guard LBH would be a footnote in history, no Last STand.
I assume you WW2 types know the Lone Sentry site.
www.lonesentry.com/
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 11, 2015 12:00:14 GMT
Yes Montrose I have visited that site on many occasions.
Yam.
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mac
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Post by mac on May 10, 2016 3:46:20 GMT
Some reading on Powder River to add to our resource.
handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA396759
Cheers
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