DIME--Civil War (Moved discussion)

[quincannon]

Another that Thomason wrote that would be meat and drink to AZ is "Fix Bayonets" stories of the Old pre-WWII Corps.

Thomason was a Lieutenant in the 5th Marines in WWI, notably at Belleau Wood. While he writes the WWI portion in a fictional style, the adventures contained are real life Thomason. Later in the book he gives you the flavor of the Banana Wars and the China Station. Superb book, highly recommended.

"Lone Star Preacher" is another that Dave would spill his julep all over his lap he would get so excited reading. The adventures of the Reverend Captain Praxiteles Swan, 5th Texas, who serves with both Bible and Rifle, in the skirmisher detachment of the Texas Brigade. Great stuff. Again written in the style of the Old South.

[dave]

Mac
For a man who claims to know little about the War you sure do sell yourself short. Excellent point regarding the Economic aspect of the DIME strategy. The industrial revolution had not impacted the south in any measurable fashion as it was still an agrarian society. Southern leaders, planters, merchants and bankers were supremely confidant that European nations would immediately support their cause since cotton was considered king. 

Another facet of the American political structure prior to the War was the Democrat parties influence. The Democrat leaders all during the 1850's did their best to hold both parts of the nation together. President Buchanan, arguably the worst president ever, did nothing in his administration to settle any political disputes but rather let things take their course. Sounds plausible if you believe Hollywood's vision as in "Gone With the Wind." The portrayal of southerners as a hot headed group who acted without thinking verses the cool northerners thoughtful actions has been around since the War began but it is not true.

Mac there was no other option available to the South to save their slave based economy and political power. Adding states that were slave free would erode any political power held by the slave holding states. The Republicans, Lincoln's party, won the 1860 election and their party platform forbade any new state to be a slave state. 

Slavery was the core cause of the War and to deny that fact is to be delusional. The other cause was that old buga bear, state's rights which interfered with the ability to wage a successful war. The south's governors, especially Joseph Brown of Georgia and Zebulon Vance of North Carolina, coupled with the legislature prevented Jefferson Davis having the power and ability exerted by Lincoln and produced serious in fighting.

The Confederacy has this epigram on its tombstone "Died of State's Rights 1861-1865."
Regards
Dave

[quincannon]

This is another paragraph from Thomason, the last in the chapter on the ride around McClellan. Here Thomason takes off his hat of storyteller, and fastens the chinstrap on the helmet of cool analytical officer in rendering judgment as a professional practitioner of arms, on the whole enterprise. See what you think, but as you read it through, recall that Lee's objective was the destruction of the Union Army, not winning a battle or two or ten, but destruction.

Setting the stage. Stuart penetrates Porter's flank. Thinking that the Union Army would logically block his exit (They didn't) he concludes he will ride around from Old Church near the York river, across the Chickahominy (then and still is, a miserable swamp) to Charles City Court House, thence to Richmond. The upshot is that two days after the event, McClellan moved his base from the York to the James. He left Porter where he was, and Porter got creamed in the first of the Seven Days, but McClellan's base was safe, and base safety ultimately meant that regardless of the fact that he had his ass handed to him in the Seven Days, he avoided the destruction of his army, beaten, but still a powerful force in being.

"It is hard to access fair judgment upon such an exploit. Its moral value was enormous: the Southern trooper was confirmed in his opinion he could outride, outfight, and outdare anything the Yankee nation might put on four legs., and for a year the Confederate cavalry superiority was hardly disputed. The Seven Days' battles, which followed at the end of June , were opened on the information brought back by Stuart as to Fitz-John Porter's dispositions; and his examination of the terrain, gained in the raid, was the basis of Lee's orders to his striking flank. But if Stuart had turned back at Old Church, after the fight on the 13th, he would have missed his fun among the wagon trains, yet he would have had most of the important information - and I do not believe that McClellan would have been ready for that change of base which saved his army from complete disaster. Still military history would be poorer by a fine and daring thing."

What Thomason is saying is that Stuart and by extension Lee let tactical expediency, spoil what would have been a campaign ending operational victory, that just may have eroded that Northern will to the point where it could not recover.

Was Stuart correct continuing the ride, or should he have turned around? The answer is somewhat a reminder of LBH, but you will figure it out.

[dave]

QC
Ah what could have been? Would it really had made a difference in the outcome? 
Reagrds
Dave

[quincannon]

I think it could, and evidently so does Thomason.

Moving that base, saved that army from complete destruction. Jackson, over in the Valley had clobbered Fremont, Shields, and Herr Sigel. Washington was in near panic thinking his next move was DC. Reinforcements had already been drawn off of McDowell at Fredericksburg, leaving him very weak. A decisive victory or series of them that pinned McClellan back on the James, could very well have been crucial. As it turn out McClellan was pinned back on the James, but he was pinned back at his base on the James, and was able to sustain himself from that base until he could embark and get away.

Stuart had one hell of a decision to make here. Custer assumed away capabilities at LBH. Stuart, knowing both his father in law Cooke, and Fitz Porter, made the logical assumption that they would block him from returning from whence he came. Problem was though that Porter and Cooke did not have Mosby, Farley, and the locals from the New Kent Company, and left open a rather wide doorway in the northern part of the battle space. Easy to do down there. I have driven those roads, all the way around perhaps thirty years ago, and they are not much better today, then what Thomason describes on his trip over those same roads nearly ninety years ago. That is one Godforsaken part of Virginia.

Oddly enough Lee's orders were the most detailed and specific he ever gave Stuart. The one thing that was absent was what he wanted Stuart to do after he completed his task of information gathering. He should have said, get in, look, get right out while the getting is good. It's the information - stupid, not the hurrah and wagons. Lee did not.

Tell you the truth, were I Stuart and had the same decision to make, I would have done just what he did, and sitting in my arm chair a hundred fifty plus years later, looking at the whole picture I would have kicked my ass all the way to the kitchen to get a double shot of Scotch.

The lesson here is that commanders never have the whole picture. They do what they feel is best consistent with the mission. I cannot fault Stuart. To Stuart getting that information back was the main task, and assuming they had him blocked he did the only other thing open to him to accomplish the mission.

The base movement on McClellan's part was the most risky thing he did during his entire tenure of command. Totally uncharacteristic.

Don't ever think Dave that the guy with the most guns wins. The guy with the most will wins, guns help. The will of the Union cause, save Lincoln, was not strong until Grant's Overland Campaign of 64. Up to then it could have gone either way. After that it could only go one way - stronger - determined to finish the South. That is why I continually point to that fork in the road in the Wilderness as the real high water mark. That was the turning point, the turning point of will.  

[dave]

QC
A logical proposition that will require further study on my part as my knowledge the Army of Northern Virginia and the terrain is a weak area for me. I ordered a copy of Thomason's book about Stuart.

I remember years ago when I read Burke Davis' Marine! that Puller mentioned Thomason and how he would get a check for a story, circle the date and the night before it was due he would bang it out. Quite a talent the man had for story telling and drawing.
Regards
Dave

[quincannon]

They were the best of friends until Thomason's death in 1944. USS John W. Thomason is named for him, and try as I might there has never been a model made, that I could convert to the JWT in her Korean War or FRAM rig. Someday, and you can be assured that when and if, it will be on the mantle over the fireplace, no matter what the Madam says. I admire that man that much.

His writing is so rich with the flavor of the Old South. His grandfather was Major Thomas Goree of Longstreet's staff. He sat on many a front porch down in Texas absorbing the stories of those days. But the key is that he could approach the subject matter with the perspective not of a writer, but rather a professional who could write. As a result he sees the whole man of Stuart, which makes the book a gem.

[mac]

Could the south ever realistically destroy the northern army? Was the purpose actually the age old "hurt them so much they would rather make a deal"?
Cheers

[BrevetorCoffin]

Mar 31, 2016 6:30:06 GMT mac said:

Could the south ever realistically destroy the northern army? Was the purpose actually the age old "hurt them so much they would rather make a deal"?
Cheers

Or show enough success to pull European powers into the war on the Southern side.

[dave]

Mac
I am going to attempt to answer your question but please realize that I am merely a amateur and know far less than others, especially QC and Deadwood. That being said here is my swing at the ball.

The South was fighting more for diplomatic recognition from the European powers than actually defeating the Union army though that was a goal. Southern and later Confederate leaders knew of the disdain European nations had for slavery and they attempted to walk a tight line stressing independence from the political tyranny of the United States. The political situation in 1860 was precarious for both sides as Lincoln had not won the plurality vote and his election foreshadowed the split of the nation. The Democrat party was split in twain with the Southern Democrats opting for secession. Many Americans did not care if the south seceded. The plantation owners in slave states truly believed that since Cotton was King that the industrialized nations would buy it and keep them afloat till battle fatigue would cause the bass metal Yankees to give up.

An example of the split between factions is that of the West Point class of 1861 where a total of 65 cadets---from southern states as well as boarder states--- resigned from a class of 218. Both sections of the nation had volunteer militia companies from communities and cities and these units were quickly absorbed by their governments in to the national force. Jefferson Davis knew the disparity in numbers and established a strategic plan to defeat the Union.
1) Defend the Confederacy
2) Gain diplomatic recognition
3) Defeat the Union army
4) Destroy the Union's willingness to fight

The Confederacy had the advantage in field leadership for the first year of the War especially in the Eastern Theater but Grant established himself in the West in early 1862. As QC has pointed out the South had the advantage in cavalry leadership and performance till about May of 1863 but the Federals had the superior artillery and ammunition. All during the War Union forces were cutting out the confederacy's heart by occupying territory and destroying the fragile rail system of the South.

Mac I may have drifted from the point of your question if so I apologize. I am more enthusiastic than knowledgeable but as a typical American I am just loud.
Regards
Dave
  

[quincannon]

I think it could also be added that Southern Infantry (and I am talking ANV here, for I know jack about the other theaters) was clearly superior to their Northern counterparts throughout the course of the war. By that I mean much superior material.

[dave]

QC
Was it the quality of the men or more the quality of leadership? The Western Theater, in my opinion, never recovered from the death of Albert Sidney Johnston at Shiloh. His abilities were never really displayed but he was far superior to any other general with the possible exception of Joseph Johnston that held command of the Army of Tennessee. Unlike in the Eastern Theater, the Army of Northern Virginia, Jefferson Davis spent his time meddling in the Western army's business and appointing inept generals.

The Army of Northern Virginia had regiments from each Southern state and they were of the same caliber and make up of those units in the Army of Tennessee would you not agree?
Regards
Dave

[quincannon]

Here is what I mean, and it is a lesson for today as well.

Generally speaking the Southern Infantry soldier was from a rural, or semi-rural background. That gave him a greater skill set in field craft than the average Northern soldier. Mind you that was not a universal, but very generalized statement. He was probably a better marksman on average as well. His leaders, even if they did not have military experience, generally had leadership experience in other walks of life, the South being a society of strata.

The real difference though was one of unit efficiency. Once a Confederate regiment was organized, and recognized by the central government, it stayed together through thick and thin. As it would be reduced by casualties, the regiment or brigade would be withdrawn allowed to recruit, or gain back its recovered casualties, and rebuild itself around a cadre of experienced men and leaders. The Texas Brigade for instance maintained its regimental membership throughout the war, and even at the end, when Davis wanted to consolidate depleted brigades into full up regiments, they refused, and the matter was dropped across the board. There is a fictionalized account of this in Lone Star Preacher, but true.

The Northern Army would use up a regiment, then disband it, replacing it with one newly raised. A never ending learning curve.

Soldiers must have confidence in their leaders, and an equal, and often overlooked, confidence in those around them. They must take their lumps in battle, be allowed to withdraw, absorb new input, train together, the new absorbing the wisdom of the old, then go back in. We never understood that in WWII or Korea. We are only just learning what the Confederate Army knew in 1862. Just learning is relative, say the last 10 to 12 years.

[dave]

QC
Very good analysis and one with which I agree.
Regards
Dave

[quincannon]

Agreeing with me does not get you off the hook about throwing away your Old Miss sweatshirt, in favor of the land of your birthing. God is going to hear about this. It's a well known fact that He was born in Winchester in the Valley. That must be the case for the Valley is the only part of earth that is heaven. Watch your step Buster.

Count your blessings. You could have been born in the Portsmouth Naval Brig, and that just might be a triffle difficult to explain to the grandkids. That is New Hampshire though so you could keep your Old Miss sweatshirt, so look on the sunny side of the street