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Post by quincannon on Mar 28, 2016 16:28:48 GMT
Dave: I disagree a bit with the above.
I don't believe the use of Stuart on the 1st and 2nd was all that critical, a little perhaps, because the absence of a Union force on the Round Tops (on the 2nd) would have most probably been detected. It was earlier (27-30 June) where Stuart's absence was most felt.
We can make the presumption that had he been there on those days, the early detection of Meade would have been made, and it would allow more time for the concentration at Gettysburg. Seizing that high ground below the town, and preventing Buford from deploying, would have led to a critical decision point on Meade's part. Most likely it would have led to the occupation and defense of the Pipe Creek line, which would have been fairly easy to flank, via Emmitsburg, Frederick, around Sugar Loaf and open a clear path to DC. In that scenario if things went bad for Lee it would be fairy easy to shift south of the Potomac, and drive into DC via Leesburg, Fairfax, Annandale, Alexandria. There were defenses of course, but those manning them were thin and untested, while the ANV was in top form.
If you cannot defend your own Capitol from ANV guns then the strategic and operational objectives, that bear on the political, would be largely met.
So I think it is a safe assumption that Lee would have used Stuart, had he been there, as he always used him - Scouts out and looking/screening.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 28, 2016 18:08:48 GMT
As I am prone to do when the subject of Stuart comes up I first turn to Thomason for answers, before all others.
I remember the following passage, and sought it out this morning in relation to the content of the link Mac gave us.
"Now we are judging men who were laboring to the best that was in them for these things they believed. Our after-knowledge is complete: they could know only a little of the situation then. You sit coldly in your study, removed from the haste and violence and responsibility, and say: there he did wrong: there he erred greatly: there his judgment was unsound. So, of necessity, history is written: to be valuable it must be critical. Jeb Stuart was a trained and experienced officer; so was Lee; so was Longstreet, and they all were loyal and devoted. Lee, the Commanding General had a doubt, but passed it on, conditionally, to his subordinates for decision. Longstreet affirmed the matter, and passed it on to, still conditional, to Stuart. Stuart understood as well as any man the functions and uses of cavalry. But he did not concede its limitations, and , if he saw obstacles, he did not allow that they might turn him from his course. Personally, he admitted no limitations, took never any counsel of his fears".
Thomason, who in my mind is Stuart's best biographer, and who is thoroughly pro Stuart in his approach, I believe has correctly evaluated the whole matter.
A review of the map, and the positioning of the five brigades Stuart had immediately to hand between 10 June and the start of the "Ride" will shed light on why those three were selected, and it was not all what the ACW presenter would have you believe. It's the position stupid.
Given my choice I too would have used my most experienced and dependable brigades on such a high risk - potentially high reward operation, and I suspect so would you. That is not the point though. Those three brigades were in the best position to assemble undetected and undertake the mission.
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dave
Brigadier General
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Post by dave on Mar 28, 2016 18:23:46 GMT
QC Very good post and I agree with your points of view. My feeling regarding the absence of Stuart all the way from Virginia to Gettysburg is that Lee was crippled not having Stuart available for scouting as well as his counsel. Lee relied heavily on his subordinates to handle all the menial work while he envisioned his plans and attacks. Jackson, Longstreet, AP Hill and Stuart all contributed in the Army of Northern Virginia's successes yet each failed Lee at crucial times.
One of Lee's greatest faults, in my opinion, was having too small a staff. His aides were handling far too many details and Lee spent valuable time on clerical concerns. This situation coupled with moving into strange country, Pennsylvania, required Lee to rely on Stuart more than he usually did.
QC you have your military service to assist in judging the impact of Stuart's absence at Gettysburg which I respect greatly. Still I believe that his presence was critical for Lee prior to the battle. Lee's relationship with Stuart was closer than a typical military liaison between a commanding general and a subordinate. As you know far better than me there was a synergy among the Virginian's based on family and position within the gentry enabling them to have closer relationships than with other officers from different states.
I hope I have explained what I am attempting to express but feel I have done poorly. Regards Dave
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Post by Beth on Mar 28, 2016 20:14:12 GMT
Excellent video. Like QC I foresee a lot of War College presentations in my immediate future.
I thought that the point about interpersonal relationships was most enlightening and something you see time and again through history though I of course thought of Custer, Benteen and Reno.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Mar 28, 2016 20:50:15 GMT
You are right Beth...the names change through history but humans are always humans. QC my apologies for leading you astray. Personally I am having a nice day of furniture moving, one of my favourite activities. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Mar 28, 2016 21:41:11 GMT
I'll bet it is Mac, right up there with a root canal.
Dave: Lee had cavalry which he did not employ, or failed to employ properly. He missed Stuart, not Stuart's three brigades.
My dad always said there were too many Virginians in the Army of Northern Virginia. I think him correct. The relationships formed by these men from Virginia in the old army, many times trumped good sense, when it came time for assignments, and selection for command. Unfortunate, but that is the way of human kind.
Staff: Our Pretend hero on the other site, thinks that staff officers are those that cannot cut it as combat commanders. Our pretend hero is an idiot. It is a strong staff that makes any commander from battalion to Army Group. A weak staff can hamstring even the best commander. They must be smart, energetic, able to read their commander's mind, before he knows what he wants to do, and they better be a tactician's tactician, or subject matter expert, and I damned well mean EXPERT.
The ANV staff at every level were too few, and there were more than a few downright dummies in their midst. That is the prime reason I am dead set against the two to three split before Gettysburg. Too little butter in the first place, spread so thin after that reorganization that you could not taste it.
You already see what a nearly non-existent staff did for Custer. Add piss poor communicative skills on top of that, and you look at the results, which are just about what you would expect. Did I mention that the Pretend hero is an idiot. If not --- The Pretend hero is an idiot.
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dave
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Post by dave on Mar 28, 2016 22:06:51 GMT
Beth There was a 180 degree difference between Lee and his subordinates and Custer. Lee was a courtly man with a strong sense of personal duty and obligations to family and state. Lee generated respect and reciprocated it with his subordinates. Lee's inability to issue direct to the point orders caused him and the army to suffer with misunderstandings and failed performances. Yet Lee could issue orders leading to the loss of great life and carry on much better than Grant could.
Custer, a braggadocious popinjay, was not respected or appreciated by Benteen for sure but Reno is an enigma. I know he did not do well after his wife's death in 1874 exacerbated by being denied permission to attend her funeral. Custer cared little for others except those who could boost his career and social standing. Nor was Custer considered a soldier with great intellectual ability. He was a man of action not plans and fly by the seat of his pants. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Mar 28, 2016 22:18:56 GMT
Not sure what you mean by Lee vs. Grant above. Please elaborate. I think I may be following in that you are getting into personal makeup, which I agree with, but just not completely sure where you are going.
My take on the two men is this
Lee was a much better tactician
Operationally it was a draw between the two
Grant was a far better strategist, BUT-BUT-BUT, Grant had a far better communications infrastructure to exercise overall command of those in his charge, where Lee, due to the lack of that same advanced structure was always a day late and a (Confederate) dollar short.
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dave
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Post by dave on Mar 28, 2016 23:03:44 GMT
QC I was referring to the crushing reality of the number of dead and wounded that fell on Grant after battles, especially during the summer of 1864. Grant was unable to eat meat that was not well done as the sight of blood upset him. Shelby Foote relates the story of Grant entering his tent and laying in his bed crying the first night of the Wilderness Battle yet attacked again the next morning. I can not see acting in a similar way as I believe him to be as deadly as Jackson was.
I do believe Grant was the first of the modern generals who envisioned total war where Lee was old fashioned and courtly and not willing to have civilians feel the cost of war. His magnanimity towards Lee and the ANV did much to ending the War without guerrilla warfare. Regards Dave
PS Grant wept at Lincoln's funeral indicating an emotional man which is just fine with me.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 28, 2016 23:25:05 GMT
I mentioned awhile ago a remark made on Madam Secretary by Keith Carradine who plays the President. He was talking about his character's time in the Vietnam War where the character received a medal, and told his commander he did not deserve it for what he did. His commander told him that he was not getting it for what he did, but rather having to live with what he did. Very true. Had I been Grant on that first night in the Wilderness I would having been laying on my bed crying like a baby just like he did. He did however show his strength of character by two days later taking the right fork toward Richmond, rather than the fork that led back across the river. The Angle was not the high water mark. That fork in the road was the high water mark. Believe it.
Modern War --- Where do you think we get our concepts even today - From Grant. If you have not consumed that hour long presentation from the War College on Gettysburg, do so immediately. Not the one Mac posted, but one of those on the side. You will see there how Grant influenced modern thinking, if you know what to look for. They are applying Grant's playbook for that strategic review.
Lee was sadly out of date for his time. He would have been a crackerjack in Spain with Wellington though. Damned if I would not like to see that myself.
Here is the rub though. We are constantly, even to this very moment having, to reorient the Lee's of the Fulda Gap to the Grant's of today. Nine times out of ten we fail. Grant's out of the Army experience before the war served him much better than Lee's in the army same old, same old. Grant harvested the seed of practicality, while Lee watered dead grass
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dave
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Post by dave on Mar 29, 2016 3:05:48 GMT
QC Regarding the turn south towards Richmond it was the turning point of the War as the north was going to exert its over whelming strength on the Confederacy. Grant brought the sense of purpose that had been lacking in the Army of the Potomac as well as the Union itself. You are correct regarding Grant being the beginning of modern warfare as Lee was the last of his kind who refused to wage total war.
Grant's unwillingness to exchange casualties with Lee sealed the fate of the southern cause as it became a war of attrition. Shelby Foote famously said:
"I think that the North fought that war with one hand behind its back. At the same time the war was going on, the Homestead act was being passed, all these marvelous inventions were going on... If there had been more Southern victories, and a lot more, the North simply would have brought that other hand out from behind its back. I don't think the South ever had a chance to win that War. "
Regards Dave
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Post by Beth on Mar 29, 2016 3:35:18 GMT
I find it telling that Dave refers to Lee's courtly behaviour. It really shows a bit of the old south way of thinking which was more in like with the English peer system--only not the English society of 1860 but more akin Georgian society before the start of the Industrial Age. Southern planters viewed themselves akin the the Gentleman class in English society. Gentlemen were men whose wealth was based on land ownership. It was very strict about what professions one could undertake and still be a gentleman--usually military or the church. In England one could become a barrister but being a solicitor was strictly for one of a lower class, not a gentleman. You were born into your place in society and you had no real freedom to move up or down in your generation but with luck and good marriages a family could move (ideally) up over a number of generations.
I agree with you QT that Lee was out of date and would have fit in more with Wellington. I'm not sure though Wellington would have welcomed Lee on his staff. Wellington was a stickler for class and even though Lee was a gentleman in the South, I don't know if he would have been the right sort of gentleman in Wellington's eyes.
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Mar 29, 2016 4:29:38 GMT
QC Regarding the turn south towards Richmond it was the turning point of the War as the north was going to exert its over whelming strength on the Confederacy. Grant brought the sense of purpose that had been lacking in the Army of the Potomac as well as the Union itself. You are correct regarding Grant being the beginning of modern warfare as Lee was the last of his kind who refused to wage total war. Grant's willingness to exchange casualties with Lee sealed the fate of the southern cause as it became a war of attrition. Shelby Foote famously said: "I think that the North fought that war with one hand behind its back. At the same time the war was going on, the Homestead act was being passed, all these marvelous inventions were going on... If there had been more Southern victories, and a lot more, the North simply would have brought that other hand out from behind its back. I don't think the South ever had a chance to win that War. " Regards Dave Grant also ended the practice of parole as he understood the numbers game.
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Post by quincannon on Mar 31, 2016 15:20:34 GMT
In nearly every text on the ACW it mentions that Lee's overall objective was to revisit Cannae on the Northern Forces. I suspect you all remember that Cannae was the classic battle of total destruction in antiquity. So I take from that, that Lee thought he could, and I am not going to argue the point with Robert Edward Lee.
Dave's points are all good. The industrial base of the north was mighty, the population greater, they could walk and chew gum at the same time, so it would seem unlikely. The reality is that it would be impossible as long as Lincoln was in office. That said it has been done before, but done only when the will of one side rots from within.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Apr 7, 2016 23:50:56 GMT
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