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Post by Beth on Nov 27, 2015 22:52:13 GMT
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Nov 28, 2015 0:45:29 GMT
The most interesting part of this thesis was how it uses a military formula to review the battle from the theories of the 3 disparate authors. Regards Dave
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 28, 2015 1:52:05 GMT
Very Poor, indeed.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Nov 28, 2015 3:40:02 GMT
Deadwood The value to me was a look into a military evaluation of LBH and the author's theories. Regards Dave
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Nov 28, 2015 4:28:10 GMT
Interesting read. His analysis, which appears to be about 17 years old, supports very well the timing analysis Fred has done in "Strategy". I agree with the author that Fox's theory is the most logical of the three presented. I think Fred's work goes deeper than Fox's and his timeline is much, much better than Gray's.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Nov 30, 2015 18:37:55 GMT
Colt I agree with you that Fox has the best view of what happened. The paper is dated but it just shows how much new material has arrived in the first few years of this century. Very interesting thinking that more will be known regarding this small insignificant battle in the years to come, hopefully. Regards Dave
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Nov 30, 2015 20:29:13 GMT
Good point, Dave. The further out in time we go, and with ever improving technology, we may yet unravel some of the mysteries of LBH. I don't think we will ever know what the heck Custer was thinking after leaving 3411, if he saw Reno in trouble. If he didn't see Reno in trouble, I can understand him thinking everything was still fine. But ford B should have told him to go no further north, as he would not have time to complete the envelopment. Remember, Reno could only be expected to hold out against the obvious size of that village (as viewed at ford B) for maybe at best 1 hour before he would no longer be able to "distract" the Indians. Moving further north timewise defeated the idea of envelopment, and moved him further from reinforcement and support. So, what the heck was he thinking? I don't think we can ever know that.
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Post by yanmacca on Dec 1, 2015 11:44:50 GMT
The two factors to consider here are these;
A/ If he saw that Reno on the verge of collapse then we must go along with the idea that he went straight for the jugular and attempted a crossing at ford B to help Reno.
B/ He saw that Reno was still holding his own in the valley and that this gave him time to re-assess the situation.
You see to me, I just cannot see him knowing that Reno was about to be defeated and then arriving in the vicinity near the river and just hanging around, it just doesn’t make sense.
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Post by quincannon on Dec 1, 2015 13:46:57 GMT
I think the great value of this board over the others is that we here tend to look at a bigger picture as well as looking at the picture in depth.
The big picture in this instance is Colt's skeptical glance at Custer knowing that Reno was in trouble at 3411 or subsequent to that event. Colt concludes, as I and many do, that the pattern of Custer's actions never changed in anything subsequent to 3411. Knowing Reno was in trouble by that viewing, or later as some claim, by Boston or the Tactical Good Fairy, is just plain claptrap, unsupported by the unfolding events themselves.
It then remains a complete mystery why, in the face of overwhelming odds that Custer could see, did he continue north, when common sense and tactical prudence dictated that, what was spread must be consolidated for any hope of a favorable outcome. To determine that you must go in depth into the personality that was Custer.
If you ignore those two factors, everything else about the battle is a series of blind trails and red herrings.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Dec 1, 2015 16:14:51 GMT
QC
From reading Custer's Trials by Stiles and another book dealing with the Goats of WP, I have formed the opinion that Custer was smart enough to graduate from WP without really studying hard except at the last moment. Custer had several close calls of not graduating because of behavior but still slide through by the skin of his teeth. This lead him to see himself as "Golden" and fated for future glory which he sought.
Custer seemed to believe he was untouchable and would always prevail because of "Custer's Luck" as I see it. He was rash and impulsive but had always been protected by superiors and coddled so he never faced difficulties till Texas and later in Oklahoma and Kansas. He went into the Lion's den in Washington DC, pulled the Lions' tail and still escaped because of superiors who placed him back in command. I don't know of any military members with the possible exception of Patton getting away with as much as Custer. I could be wrong and look forward to hearing more on this matter.
I am not a tactician but I don't think Custer was either. He seemed to play things out on the fly and had been successful in the past with this attitude and did not change after the War. Just my rambling thoughts. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Dec 1, 2015 18:23:43 GMT
Dave: I am not all that sure that Patton got away with much. I would describe him, as emotionally unstable, arrogant, and impulsive, but also a fine tactician, operationally superb, and loyal to those two people he knew he must be loyal to, Marshall and Eisenhower. You can be personally as weird as a three appendaged goat, if you can both think and fight. Custer only had half of it. He could fight but could not think.
Patton made himself indispensable in North Africa. Indispensable in that the Germans thought him indispensable to the Allied effort. That itself has value.
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Post by yanmacca on Dec 1, 2015 19:45:31 GMT
I think that Patton’s record in Sicily tops his efforts in North Africa, the way he simply bi-passed the Germans along the coast by using amphibious landings was unknown in that stage of the war, even though I think that the Germans were really just stalling for time around then and they knew they couldn’t prevent the allies from taking the island once the Italians had threw in the towel.
Going back to Africa, it just shows how tactics can win you battles over weaponry, a sick Rommel managed to defeat the US Army at Kasserine with less tanks and most of the ones he fielded were inferior to the American ones, a few days before Von Armin also cause problems at Sidi Bou Zid. The most common battle tank used in these battles was the Pz Mk. III with the short 50mm gun, against this the US forces had two mediums M3 and M4 both mounting 75mm guns.
Yan.
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Post by Beth on Dec 1, 2015 21:30:42 GMT
Dave I tend to agree that Custer was a person who rode his 'luck'. I believe that he had a gambling mentality that probably dictated most of his choices in life. It's just after the CW Custer never seems to realize the game had changed and he couldn't or wouldn't learn to play by the new rules.
I swear the more I read about LBH, the more I question some 'standard thinking'.
I know I have very serious reservations that Boston Custer ever peeked to see what was going on in the valley. It just does not make sense on several fronts. I believe once he committed to going up to the bluffs by following the largest trail, he would have stayed on it. He was anxious to catch up to the main body so he wouldn't miss out on anything. The largest trail would not taken him near the bluff's edge and even if one wanted to buy into he might have gone up Weir Point, he would have been looking towards the trail he was following, possibly to see a way to make up time--but I consider that a pretty low possibility. There just is no reason for him to have been along the edge of the bluff.
I also find that I question if the person people saw on 3411 was Custer, I think if they saw someone dressed like Custer, they would assume it was him. My question is was Custer unique enough in appearance that there would be no doubt it was Custer.
If it was Custer--he doesn't seem to have made any course adjustment in his plans--even if he had any--that indicated he thought Reno was in any sort of distress-at least 2 explanation might be possible--the timing of witnesses is confused, it was Custer and he didn't perceive Reno had a problem or it was Custer and he didn't care if Reno had a problem.
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Post by yanmacca on Dec 2, 2015 11:23:30 GMT
It is surprizing just how many times Custer’s group was seen on the bluffs, in Fred’s book and Article you read accounts of Reno’s men seeing the grey horses of E Company on the high ground, they are noted numerous times from privates to officers as they moved up the valley, Lt. Varnum recalls seeing E Coy just after they dismounted and formed skirmish lines (1:42 pm *), Lt. DeRudio saw Custer on 3411 from his position in the timber (1:53 pm *).
* Command Watch Time
So we have a gap there of about 11 minutes between these two sightings, if what Varnum and DeRudio says is true then it is possible that Custer may have seen Reno’s men deploy in skirmish order and then retire to the timber.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Dec 2, 2015 18:26:21 GMT
It's possible Ian, but I don't think very probable.
Eleven minutes can be a very long time when you are getting shot over, but when you are getting shot over, you are not likely to be looking at your watch, especially a leader looking at his watch (if he indeed had one in that era)
DeRudio only accounts for his whereabouts, not the whereabouts of the Reno battalion, so that too is not definitive.
Those that apply specific times to these events, almost to the second it seems, are in the outfield of serious study, trying to get into the infield where the majority of plays are made. The best that can be done are still approximations. Some are better than others. For instance I would take Fred's approximation of the Reno fight, and the Custer fight, over that of Captain Pretend any day, as I do not think Fred's are agenda driven, where CP is nothing but agenda. Still both are speculation, and I don't know about you or anyone else, but I don't bet the rent money on anyone's speculation.
I feel the best way is to conclude that the Reno firefight was probably on the order of half an hour, but I think it a grave mistake to include someone's speculative front and back door, for down the road it only leads to speculation begetting speculation, and that is ultimately the road to nowhere.
The bare unvarnished truth is NO ONE can say for any degree of certitude that any event after crossing the divide can be timed to the minute or the tens of minutes, and anyone who says he can is a bald faced liar.
These so called "battle students" want to be so specific about this battle, when the data, unlike a Midway or Coral Sea, does not exist. So when it does not exist, speculate or fabricate. At Midway and like battles, we know exact times on both sides, because they are immediately annotated in ships logs. We know for instance the exact time that MacClusky nosed his dive bomber over to attack Kaga, for it is recorded. These people all want to be Midway lite and record the exact time of Dandy's last bowel movement. Can't be done with the data available, so speculation, some much better than others, is all they have and they are reluctant to admit their own failure, so it somehow over the years becomes speculative holy writ.
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